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Abstract of M.Ed. Thesis 
1 The Bearing of Modern An a l y t i c a l Philosophy 
on Educational Theory 1 
A c r i t i c a l exploration of the l i t e r a t u r e from 1942 to 
1965 reveals the nature of the 'hearing' i n question. I n 
the pioneering work of C.D.Hardie, i n the present sustained 
contribution to educational thinking of many philosophers 
and i n the writings which s t e a d i l y accumulated during the 
years between, there i s ample evidence that the main d i v i s i o n 
within pure a n a l y t i c a l philosophy i s r e f l e c t e d i n the app-
l i e d f i e l d . The r i v a l ' p o s i t i v i s t i c ' and ' l i n g u i s t i c ' app-
roaches are c l e a r l y d i s c e r n i b l e i n each of the broad areas 
of i n t e r e s t which have emerged during t h i s short period. 
In ethics, the early ' p o s i t i v i s t i c ' position p e r s i s t s 
i n the form of arguments for ultimately i r r e d u c i b l e moral 
differences; but i t i s opposed by the majority view of the 
most i n f l u e n t i a l group of educational philosophers, a ' l i n g -
u i s t i c ' view best expressed by PL. S.Peters. A s i m i l a r oppos-
i t i o n i s seen i n the related l i t e r a t u r e on the teaching of 
morality. 
Current examinations of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of educat-
ional discourse show these opposed emphases. The l a r g e l y 
• l i n g u i s t i c ' elucidation of the role of d e f i n i t i o n s and 
other language elements given by I . S c h e f f l e r i s c r i t i c i z e d 
from a s c i e n t i f i c a l l y - o r i e n t a t e d ' p o s i t i v i s t i c 1 standpoint 
i n very recent contributions, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n those of G-.R. 
Eastwood. 
A central i s s u e , that of the nature of educational theory, 
i s s i m i l a r l y debated by representatives from each of the 
"branches of a n a l y t i c a l philosophy. The ' l i n g u i s t i c * P.H. 
Hirst argues that educational theory i s a complex ' f i e l d ' 
and not a d i s t i n c t 'form' of knowledge as a counter to the 
simpler 'means-ends' interpretation developed by such 'pos-
i t i v i s t s ' as D.J.01 Connor. 
The resolution of t h i s c o n f l i c t i n a n a l y t i c a l philosophy 
of education must await a s e t t l i n g of the basic issue i n the 
pure philosophy from which the new d i s c i p l i n e i s derived. 
There are signs that a solution of the problem can be ex-
pected which w i l l show that the two a n a l y t i c a l approaches 
are i n fa c t complementary and not contradictory. 
A.Tubb 
October 1966 
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Theoretical Orientation: Preview Of Method 
And Content.., 
There^ i s l i t t l e doubt that the a c t i v i t i e s denoted 
by the terms''modern a n a l y t i c a l philosophy 1 and 
'educational theory' are, these days., quite f a m i l i a r 
to the majority of those whose work l i e s within the 
academic sphere.. What i s l e s s c e r t a i n i s the extent 
to which i t i s known that there e x i s t s a connection 
between these two a c t i v i t i e s - the f i r s t enterprise 
bears impressively on the second - and that the f a c t 
and the manner of this, connection i s something which 
has been demonstrated and developed quite recently 
i n the i n t e l l e c t u a l l i f e of the English-speaking 
community/.;.! 
The establishment of t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p has been 
such a very recent event that controversies abound as 
to i t s precise nature and no one i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
commands u n i v e r s a l respect. At the present time, 
much i s being written on the subject: more and more 
individual philosophers are coming to devote the 
whole of t h e i r professional energy to describing, 
analysing, and c l a r i f y i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p and i t s 
consequences; and there i s now i n existence even a 
type of corporate investigation, involving the s y s t -
ematic and sustained co-operation of thinkers with-
i n a d i s c i p l i n e t r a d i t i o n a l l y associated with a 
dedication to egocentric performance and personal 
viewpoint. Nevertheless, doubt remains as to the 
more exact ef f e c t s of that twentieth century r e v o l -
ution which enables us to ta l k i n t e l l i g i b l y of 'mod-
ern a n a l y t i c a l philosophy 1 on the serious thinking 
about education which i s known, at l e a s t by those 
who are not disposed to exaggerate i t s t r a d i t i o n a l 
achievements, as 'educational theory 1. 
I t would be possible to ignore t h i s doubt; to 
accept, for example, what appears to be almost the 
' o f f i c i a l ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the re l a t i o n s h i p i n 
question, as i t i s developed perspicuously i n a r e c -
ent a r t i c l e by Paul H i r s t ( 1 ) , and to examine t h i s 
philosophically, enquiring into i t s i n t e r n a l c o n s i s t -
ency, tracing i t s elements to t h e i r origins i n cont-
emporary 'pure' philosophy and so displaying i t s 
l i m i t s as the l i m i t s of the sources demarcated by 
t h i s process. But to do t h i s i n i t i a l l y would be un-
illuminqting, for i t would c l a r i f y a viewpoint impl-
ied i n a proportion only of the ongoing work i n t h i s 
area - that being undertaken by c e r t a i n B r i t i s h p h i l -
osophers. This w i l l be attempted l a t e r , once the f a c t 
of d i v e r s i t y within -.analytical philosophy, both i n 
(1) H i r s t , P. H., 'Philosophy and Educational 
Theory'-, B r i t i s h Journal of Educational Studies, Vol. 
12, pp. 51-64, November 1963. 
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i t s pure form and i n i t s educational d e r i v a t i v e s , 
has "been outlined and i l l u s t r a t e d with reference to 
writings other than those having influence i n t h i s 
country at t h i s time and with reference also to asp-
ects of the philosophy/education nexus barely pro-
claimed and not argued i n any d e t a i l by Hirs t ( 2 ) . 
Such a procedure would be unilluminating, too, 
i n the emphasis i t would immediately place upon 
purely philosophical matters, an emphasis consequent 
on the nature of the argument presented i n the Hi r s t 
a r t i c l e . What i s needed, to put things i n proper 
perspective, and afford weight to as many as poss-
i b l e of the aspects that have been revealed during 
several decades of the bearing of one enterprise on 
the other, i s a mode of entry into the rapidly-
accumulating l i t e r a t u r e which w i l l provide cues and 
direct i o n s for sampling, comparison and cr o s s - r e f e r -
ence within the corpus a v a i l a b l e , so that the r e s u l t -
ant discussion i s both philosophically and education-
a l l y pertinent. Such a mode of entry i s at hand i n 
the a v a i l a b i l i t y of writings old enough to afford 
some p o s s i b i l i t y of chronological, i f not h i s t o r i c a l , 
comparison with current ideas, compendious enough to 
enable the se l e c t i o n of points of enquiry which w i l l 
lead to a f a i r sample of l a t e r commentaries, c r i t i c -
isms and developments and yet recent enough to carry 
(2) Surnames are used i n the body of the text 
following the f i r s t reference to each w r i t e r . 
philosophical weight within the r e l a t i v e l y young 
movement of a n a l y t i c a l philosophy, the doctrines of 
which are s t i l l very open to the kind of debate engen-
dered by the r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of e a r l i e r positions 
as a counter to the l a t e s t commitments. 
However, though 'old' expositions w i l l be re-
c a l l e d to provide s t a r t i n g points for enquiry, i t i s 
philosophical positions which r e t a i n some l i f e , and 
not mere h i s t o r i c a l surveys of dead i s s u e s , which 
w i l l provide the theme and v a r i a t i o n s of t h i s acc-
ount. To offer h i s t o r y and not philosophy would be 
to repeat the error of t r a d i t i o n a l 'philosophy of 
education 1 as taught to generations of students. 
Against t h i s passive transmission of i n e r t ideas, un-
enlightened by the act of philosophising, a l l analyt-
i c a l educational thinkers , of no matter what more 
detai l e d persuasion, have argued, distinguishing 
t h e i r own intentions and a c t i v i t i e s as genuinely 
philosophical and, i n t h i s sense, revolutionary. 
Thus, any h i s t o r i c a l element d i s c e r n i b l e i n the pres-
ent account w i l l be no more than the chosen frame-
work within which the confrontation of philosophical 
positions can be arranged: i t w i l l be h i s t o r y i n a 
sense coming to be appreciated within pure philosophy 
i n i t s many branches, for example the philosophy of 
science; that i s , c r i t i c a l history i n which the c r i t -
i cism i s from one standpoint (often but not necess-
a r i l y a l a t e r one) to another, a c r i s s c r o s s i n g proc-
edure the management of which i s i t s e l f a ph i l o s -
ophical a c t i v i t y . 
I t follows that there w i l l gradually emerge, to 
superimpose i t s e l f on the i n i t i a l and recurrent 
chronological structure, a second type of order, 
that of the major themes and areas which the compar-
isons of position delineatejas they are made from 
philosophers writing at various points on the l i m i t -
ed time scale of t h i s enquiry. F i r s t w i l l appear 
e t h i c s , i n i t s fundamental bearing on educational 
thinking and the p r a c t i c a l consequences of t h i s bear-
ing f or moral education, of primary importance i n 
any account, no matter what mode of entry into the 
l i t e r a t u r e i s used: and so i s i t i n t h i s account 
which chooses to s t a r t with the e a r l i e s t of analyt-
i c a l investigations into educational theory. A second 
theme tp appear, originating also i n early work but 
of great importance i n the most recent publications 
as w e l l as throughout the quarter of a century under 
review, i s the nature of the metaphorical expressions 
which pervade attempts made to t a l k of education i n 
meaningful and illuminating terms to a wide and heter-
ogeneous audience interested i n i t as a s o c i a l process. 
From a study of metaphor, an aspect of language 
of gf@a$ a t t r a c t i o n to the philosophical analyst, . i t 
i s a l o g i c a l l y short step to the examination of both 
wider and narrower aspects - those concerned, f i r s t l y , 
with the r o l e s of the many kinds of d e f i n i t i o n to be 
found i n serious writing, and the part played i n more 
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popular educational discourse by slogans. These 
themes, too, are approachable chronologically, i n 
that they can be discovered i n rudimentary form 
earl y i n the stated period, but, i n t h i s account, 
they occur at a point where the o r i g i n a l mode of 
entry, the element of his t o r y , has served i t s purp-
ose of providing some i n i t i a l structure: and so the 
themes and areas, the superimposing second type of 
structure, take over and furnish centres of i n t e r -
est within which the sampling of opposed viewpoints 
operates with more weight attaching to the contemp-
orary controversies and l e s s to the 'older' ones. 
Against t h i s background, which weaves a pattern 
of r e l a t i o n s h i p s out of the views and positions of 
the major philosophers who have contributed to the 
twenty-five year long debate, the ' o f f i c i a l ' i n t e r -
pretation of the nature of educational theory pron-
ounced by Hi r s t i s examined, at a stage i n the acc-
ount where i t i s possible to make more f r u i t f u l r e f -
erence to other names and other interpretations than 
would have been possible had the examination taken 
place e a r l i e r . And from t h i s c e n t r a l discussion 
there emerges a fundamental point about the sources 
which v i t a l i s e i t , a point which has been implied 
constantly i n building up the background, but which 
i s made f u l l y e x p l i c i t as a preliminary to the f i n a l 
stages of the t h e s i s . - that, broadly speaking, there 
are two branches within the 'family' of a n a l y t i c a l 
philosophy - the formal and the informal. Between 
those philosophers who value above a l l the p r e c i s i o n 
of the languages of science and mathematics and those 
who prefer the f l e x i b i l i t y of ordinary language there 
e x i s t s a c e r t a i n tension which can be seen r e f l e c t e d 
from the pure philosophical scene into the education-
a l areas where such philosophers are now at work. 
The nature of philosophy, of language and, partr 
i c u l a r l y , of knowledge, i s investigated from these 
two apparently c o n f l i c t i n g points of view ( l a b e l l e d , 
for convenience and without implications which could 
be read into the names from the history of recent 
philosophy, ' p o s i t i v i s t i c ' and ' l i n g u i s t i c ' ) ; with 
s p e c i a l reference to one area of knowledge chosen 
from the many a v a i l a b l e - that of s o c i a l science, 
taken to include history. This epistemological enqu-
i r y , together with the related investigations into 
the philosophy of mind, i s seen to be of an import-
ance to educational theory almost equal to that of 
the enquiry into ethics with which the post-intro-
ductory part of the present account begins, a f a c t 
which emerges from detailed analyses of the concept 
of 'knowing' given as an example of the rigour 
introduced into educational t h e o r i s i i n g by anal-
y t i c a l philosophers. 
F i n a l l y , these instances of philosophy i n act-
ion amongst r e s t r i c t e d conceptual problems leads 
into an attempt to forecast the resolution between 
the two kinds of a n a l y s i s which w i l l possibly be 
found - f i r s t within pure philosophy and then, as a 
consequence, within the new philosophy of education. 
This resolution, i t i s suggested, w i l l perhaps come 
about once i t i s more widely grasped that the 'posit-
i v i s t i c ' and ' l i n g u i s t i c ' approaches are complement-
ary and"not contradictory, that they emphasise d i f f -
erent aspects of the phenomenon of language i n ways 
which can be without tension accommodated i n a 
wider view, according proper weight to each of the 
sectors of language-study - the s y n t a c t i c s , semantics 
and pragmatics of C.W.Morris's semiotic, concerned 
with the embracing study of the uses, meanings and 
modes of combining signs. (3) 
To the suggested s t a r t i n g point of our enquiry we 
can now move, having sketched the path which leads 
from i t i n s u f f i c i e n t d e t a i l to explain the r e c o l l e c t 
ion of the 'oldest 1 exposition i n existence as a 
l o g i c a l beginning. The f i r s t (and s t i l l i n t e l l e c t -
u a l l y stimulating) attempt at showing 'the bearing 
of modern a n a l y t i c a l philosophy on educational theory 
i s the work of C.D.Hardie, dating from the early 
nineteen-forties and, consequently, of at l e a s t the 
h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r e s t that we have previously mention-
(3) Morris, C. W., Signs, Language and Behavior 
(Prentice-Hall, 1946) 
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ed i n order to renounce as the sole object of t h i s 
enquiry. (4) That the philosophical arguments devel-
oped i n t h i s book are s t i l l worthy of serious atten-
t i o n , even i f only to d i r e c t i n v e s t i g a t i o n towards 
philosophers who have argued on s i m i l a r topics but 
with more contemporary power and greater e f f e c t , i s 
a contention which t h i s t h e s i s hopes to j u s t i f y i n 
some measure by s i f t i n g what have proved to be the 
f r u i t f u l themes from the barren. 
C.D.Hardie: Barren Themes And The Nature 
Of Analysis. 
In Hardie there can be immediately and c l e a r l y 
distinguished the two enterprises, a n a l y t i c a l p h i l -
osophy and educational theory, under present d i s -
cussion. The author as much as says: Before us we 
have several examples of educational theory, chosen 
as t y p i c a l of the genre and created by thinkers 
whose conception of the nature of philosophy bears 
l i t t l e resemblance to the revolutionary conception 
of i t s nature developed i n recent times by anal-
y t i c a l philosophers. We s h a l l reveal the d e f i c -
i e n c i e s and l i m i t a t i o n s of these theories, employ-
ing for our task of c r i t i c i s m tools and techniques 
of a n a l y s i s devised by philosophers become, of l a t e 
and for the f i r s t time, f u l l y conscious of the nat-
(4) Hardie, C. D., Truth and F a l l a c y i n Education-
a l Theory. (Cambridge University Press, 1942). 
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ure of t h e i r d i s c i p l i n e . As a r e s u l t of t h i s c r i t -
ique, we s h a l l make c l e a r to ourselves what are the 
defining c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of an" educational theory, 
what are the l o g i c a l bones which any such theory 
must reveal, under the new kind of philosophical 
scrutiny, i f i t i s to be professionally acceptable. 
This implied intention and e x p l i c i t procedure of 
examination, to be found i n Hardie, has the merit of 
s i m p l i c i t y . His uncomplicated, straightforward app-
roach has made h i s views the object of occasional 
commendation by a fewjamongst l a t e r philosophers 
working i n the area charted i n t h i s book ( 5 ) . But 
h i s s i m p l i c i t y , rooted i n the view that theories are 
specimens to be put under a simple philosophical 
magnifying g l a s s , may seem to border on the naive 
when compared with l a t e r investigations. Certainly 
t h i s method of s r u t i n i s i n g 'standard' theories i s 
one of the l e a s t f r u i t f u l elements i n Hardie, i f 
lack of h e i r s i s anything to judge by: i t i s not a 
method which has proved to be even a minor occupat-
ion of those who have subsequently been concerned to 
use a n a l y s i s i n educational thinking. No one has 
produced, following h i s lead, a s i m i l a r c r i t i q u e of 
the t r a d i t i o n a l educational t h e o r i s t s l e f t , from 
Plato onwards, to add to h i s three; and, of these 
(5) See Tubb, A., 'CD.Hardie - Forgotten?', 
Education for Teaching Vol. 70, pp. 32-5, May 1966 
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three - concerned with the 'nature' t h e o r i s t s , Her-
bart and Dewey - only the Dewey c r i t i q u e has remain-
ed a l i v i n g issue, Hardie having defended at a l a t e r 
date h i s early refutation against attacks made by 
American philosophers wielding very sophisticated 
tools of an a l y s i s and eager to show Dewey's capacity 
for s u r v i v a l even i n the age of an a l y s i s ( 6 ) ( A prof-
essional eagerness which gives some warrant to the 
e a r l i e r remark that the very r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
a n a l y t i c a l philosophy and educational theory i s open 
to many interpretations and subject to continuing 
©on-t'iPb'versies.) 
However the pursuit of Dewey i n r e l a t i o n to anal-
y s i s would remove us too f a r from our main theme, 
being i n i t s e l f a topic for voluminous commentary; 
and i t i s therefore not the cue i n Hardie which we 
w i l l take. V/hat i s , i s the f a c t that a n a l y s i s of 
'standard' theories appears i n t h i s , the e a r l i e s t of 
investigations, as the paradigm procedure; and that 
i t c o n s i sts i n the juxtaposition of two elements: the 
(6) Fen, S. N., 'A C r i t i c a l View of the Educat-
ional Theory of John Dewey by CD.Hardie', Educat-
ional Theory Vol. 14, pp. 294-9, October 1964. 
Hardie, C. D., 'Language, Pragmatism and 
Dewey1, Educational Theory Vol. 14, pp. 305-7, Oct-
ober 1 964 
Hood, B. L., 'Some Comments on C D . H a r d i e r 
Refutation of Dewey*, Educational Theory Vol. 14, 
pp. 300-4, October 1964. 
12 
theories, which we can f o r our purposes ignore, and 
the philosophical analysis i t s e l f , about which we 
can ask a number of questions designed to e l i c i t i t s 
nature, i t s sources, i t s effectiveness, i t s influence 
on l a t e r w r i t e r s i n the f i e l d and i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p 
to aspects of the philosophising of such l a t e r w r i t -
ers which o r i g i n a t e i n pure philosophical i n v e s t i g -
ations not available to Hardie himself. The very 
reference to areas i n which questions can be asked 
implies, i n f a c t , the kind of answers which w i l l 
probably be found. Selected d e t a i l s of Bardie 1s 
early analysis must point i n the d i r e c t i o n of l a t e r 
analyses, enabling us to establish l i n k s and r e l a t -
ionships and so to i l l u s t r a t e the 'bearing' we are 
attempting to elucidate: the very concept of the 
'bearing' of one enterprise upon the other i s being 
defined, i n f a c t , i n terms of whatever varied i n s t -
ances such a f l e x i b l e s crutiny, passing from one 
w r i t e r to another, does reveal. 
Hardie sets out h i s f i r s t object-theory f o r ex-
amination i n describing the i n f l u e n t i a l view that a 
c h i l d ought to be educated according to Nature; and 
the manner i n which he does t h i s i s i n s t r u c t i v e f o r 
anyone wanting to i d e n t i f y h is precise p o s i t i o n w i t h -
i n a n a l y t i c a l philosophy. I t reveals i n a c t i o n the 
techniques closely associated w i t h 'the Cambridge 
In t r o d u c t i o n , acknowledging them as his pure p h i l o s -
r u y t i c a l school 1 to whom he makes reference i n his 
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ophical mentors ( 7 ) . Hardie's technique (and t h e i r 1 s ) 
i s easy to grasp: the substance of his analysis can 
he precised w i t h ease or set out i n note form i n 
such a manner as to reveal i t s t i d y , almost p r e d i c t -
able shape. The end-product i s a series of c l a s s i f -
ied propositions carved out of the body of the 
object-theory, commented upon, broken down i n t o sub-
propositions and eventually disposed of to the p h i l -
osophical s a t i s f a c t i o n of the author. The e f f e c t of 
t h i s exercise i s a type of c l a r i f i c a t i o n by dissec-
t i o n of an almost surgi c a l nature, the bones of the 
o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n being revealed f o r inspection. 
The vagueness of the o r i g i n a l proposition concerning 
the education of children according to Nature i s 
replaced by the more manageable precision of four 
propositions offered i n i t s place, each one of which 
can be examined i n a piecemeal fashion i n order to 
establish i t s t r u t h or f a l s i t y (Though not i t s t r u t h 
or f a l l a c y - the i l l o g i c a l dichotomy chosen, presum-
ably w i t h conscious but nevertheless puzzling i n t e n t , 
f o r the t i t l e of the book.) 
The question f o r us i s : What kind of analysis i s 
t h i s ? Can i t be that t h i s apparently mechanical pro-
cedure i s the whole of the much-vaunted a c t i v i t y 
which i s .widely acknowledged as having r e v o l u t i o n -
ised the mother of d i s c i p l i n e s ? The answer, prev-
iou s l y implied, i s that there Aindeed other forms of 
(7) Hardie, C. D., op. c i t . , p. i x 
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analysis than t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c product of the 
times which Hardie practised. While a f u l l y e x p l i c i t 
d e s c r i p t i o n of them, p a r t i c u l a r l y as they group 
themselves i n t o the ' p o s i t i v i s t i c 1 and ' l i n g u i s t i c 1 
approaches previously mentioned, must be postponed 
u n t i l s u f f i c i e n t movement around the educational 
l i t e r a t u r e has provided a background against which 
the description w i l l be meaningful, a preliminary 
Sketch of the two broad views of the nature of anal-
y s i s i s essential to ensure that t h i s movement has 
d i r e c t i o n . And so, i n t h i s we f i n d the f i r s t f r u i t -
f u l element of Hardie f o r our purposes: the cue 
which takes us from his l i m i t e d kind of analysis to 
an adumbration of analysis i n i t s various aspects, 
as seen from our vantage point i n the middle of the 
nineteen-sixties. 
He derives h i s techniques from the accepted 
practice of philosophers working without the bene-
f i t of a thorough acquaintance w i t h the l a t e r , sec-
ond-phase philosophical investigations of Ludwig 
Wittgenstein (8) - t h i s i s the simplest way of 
p u t t i n g i t . The Wittgensteinian slogan, 'the mean-
in g i s the use 1, and i t s far-reaching implications 
f o r analysis are not part of the background from 
which, t h i s w r i t i n g draws strength; and, consequently, 
•the 'meaning' of what the Nature t h e o r i s t s assert 
(8) Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Invest-
igations (Oxford, 1953). 
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has to be made clear by Hardie, to himself as much 
as to his readers, not by analysing i t s use i n the 
soci a l context of i t s t y p i c a l utterance, but by a 
form of t r a n s l a t i o n , of s u b s t i t u t i o n f o r the o r i g i n a l 
of supposedly clearer, expanded expressions. He 
gives meaning to what he regards as a hopelessly 
vague proposition by providing a series of new prop-
os i t i o n s which are supposed to be, c o l l e c t i v e l y , the 
l o g i c a l equivalent of the old without i t s incompre-
h e n s i b i l i t y . 
I f we thin k of the two broad views concerning the 
nature of analysis as l y i n g on d i f f e r e n t sides of a 
d i v i d i n g l i n e created by Wittgenstein 1s mature r e j -
ection of hi s own youthful theory (9) and cognate 
systems, then t h i s Hardiean technique f a l l s c l e a r l y 
w i t h i n the f i r s t view. His introductory acknowledge-
ment to G.E.Moore i s superfluous i n view of the e v i -
dence presented by his actual manner of philosophis-
ing, which i s Mooreian i n temper and d e t a i l through 
and through. During the course of a long l i f e ' s 
work Moore displays several views about what anal-
ysis i s , t h a t i s , about knowing the meaning of an 
expression i n the technical sense; and Hardie draws 
upon the most consistently used of these views f o r 
his own work - that which asserts that analysis i s 
concerned w i t h being able to state what the c o n s t i t -
(9) Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Tractatus Logico-Phil-
osophicus (London, 1922). 
uent concepts are i n t o which a concept under scrut-
iny can be divided and which compose i t (or the con-
s t i t u e n t propositions, when the expression being anaL 
ysed i s a complete sentence). Such a view i s also 
predominant i n the early work of Wittgenstein and 
i s based on the concept theory of meaning, that i s 
of meaning as a peculiar sort of e n t i t y which the 
mind can view and understand, which he came to r e j -
ect i n his l a t e r work, of which Hardie c l e a r l y has 
l i t t l e knoxfledge. 
Hardie reveals h i s indebtedness to t h i s 'div-
i s i o n ' view of analysis when he asserts that ' i t 
i s necessary always to state each theory i n the 
clearest possible way so that no ambiguity may be 
allowed to f l o u r i s h undiscovered 1 (10), implying 
that analysis i s concerned w i t h p u t t i n g an unruly 
house i n order rather than more t o l e r a n t l y invest-
i g a t i n g the possible l e g i t i m a t e reasons f o r the un-
r u l i n e s s . He i d e n t i f i e s vagueness and subs t i t u t e s , 
at greater length, precision: he translates and ex-
pands, p r o f f e r i n g terms and propositions the r e f e r -
ents f o r which are less opem to doubt and dispute; 
and i n t h i s way he banishes the l u r k i n g ambiguities 
which bar t h e o r e t i c a l progress i n education. Such, 
at any r a t e , i s h i s i n t e n t i o n . V/hat remains f o r us 
to develop, i n order to complete t h i s preliminary 
(10) Hardie, C. D., op. c i t . , p. i x . 
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sketch, i s the contrary view of the nature of anal-
y s i s , which i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the philosophising 
done on the other side of the d i v i d i n g l i n e ident-
i f i e d above and which, though strdmgly associated 
w i t h the Wittgenstein of the 'Philosophical Invest-
i g a t i o n s ' , can be described at t h i s stage with r e f -
erence to Moore, i n that h i s w r i t i n g s show some signs 
of i t s presence. ( ' I t i s , I t h i n k , possible and of 
some i n t e r e s t . . . t o characterise Wittgenstein's... 
l a t e r "Philosophical Investigations" as Mooreian' 
( 1 1 ) ) . 
The ' d i s t i n c t i o n ' view of analysis i s concerned 
w i t h being able to say how a concept or proposition 
under scrutiny i s related to and distinguished from 
other concepts or propositions which are embedded i n 
the same or d i f f e r e n t expressions. We s h a l l f i n d 
t h i s view implied i n much of the philosophising about 
education to be considered; and i t i s a view which, 
i n contrast to the approach of Hardie, lays great 
emphasis upon the patient disentanglement of mean-
ings by taking seriously what i s a c t u a l l y stated i n 
the context of i t s statement instead of an eager d i s -
missal of apparently ambiguous expressions i n favour 
of the establishment of a more easily acceptable 
t r a n s l a t i o n , which i s Hardie's method. 'The mean-
(11) White, A. R., 'G.E.Moore1, i n A C r i t i c a l 
History of Western Philosophy. O'Connor, D. J. (Ed.), 
(London, 1964)» p. 464. 
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ing i s the use 1 sums up, i n slogan form, t h i s l a t -
er approach, w i t h i t s dedication to a n a t u r a l i s t i c 
observation and description of the forms language 
takes i n actual use, with i t s emphasis on looking to 
see what i s a c t u a l l y there rather than mining beneath 
the surface of language to f i n d some deep l o g i c a l 
bedrock. 
I n the l i g h t of t h i s conception of analysis, 
Hardie's procedure of taking l i t e r a l l y a vague exp-
ression such as 'a c h i l d ought to be educated accord-
in g to Nature', seeing i n i t no l i t e r a l sense and 
then t r a n s l a t i n g i t i n t o a number of supposedly 
constituent expressions the truth-claims of which can 
be judged, appears misconceived. I t i s an unsympath-
e t i c and i l l i b e r a l stance to adopt towards language 
- so the proponents of the contrary view of analysis 
would contend. I t overlooks the necessity of asking 
what meaning a proposition has f o r the person s t a t i n g 
i t ; what i n t e n t i o n such a person has i n using i t ; 
what l i n g u i s t i c and social context i t appears i n as 
a l e g i t i m a t e attempt at communication. This kind 
of d elicate probing, a car e f u l separation of express-
ions designed to d i s t i n g u i s h the various uses w i t h i n 
a context which contains manifold human intent i o n s 
and language conventions i s very d i f f e r e n t from -
though not necessarily superior to or a contradict-
ion of - the blu n t , simple a n a l y t i c a l enquiry fav-
q 
oured by Hardie i n o u t l i n i n g h is pr©ramme: ' . . . i f 
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two educational t h e o r i s t s disagree I th i n k i t 
should be made clear whether the disagreement i s 
f a c t u a l or verbal or due to some emotional c o n f l i c t . 1 
(12) 
We can enter i n t o t h i s programme, having sleetched 
i n the main l i n e s of both views of analysis, the more 
and the less formal, using i t as a gateway i n t o the 
branch of philosophy which has, perhaps, the great-
est relevance of any f o r education; and which, i n 
i t s contemporary developments, reveals c l e a r l y the 
workings of both types of philosophical analysis -
the branch called moral philosophy or et h i c s . Hardie 
begins by r e j e c t i n g the proposition that a c h i l d 
ought to be educated according to Nature on grounds 
that we would, by now, expect: c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y he 
states that i t 'is so vague that i t i s not important 
to decide what i t i m p l i e s 1 (13), and confidently sub-
s t i t u t e s four propositions of his own which are less 
perplexing and easier to break down and handle i n the 
• d i v i s i o n 1 manner. From our point of view, i t i s the 
casual bypassing of an 'ought* here that i s s i g n i f -
i c a n t , that r e l a t e s to his previous reference to 
•emotional c o n f l i c t 1 being behind c e r t a i n disagree-
ments i n educational theory and gives the f i r s t p o i n t -
er to hi s e t h i c a l p o s i t i o n , which we can now fol l o w 
through, i d e n t i f y and compare with other positions 
taken by philosophers working i n the f i e l d of education. 
(12) Hardie, C. D., op. c i t . , p . i x . 
(13) I b i d . , p.1. 
CHAPTER I I 
MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND EDUCATION 
Hardie - The Hesitant EmOtivist. 
That Hardie looks at the problems of moral p h i l -
osophy from the standpoint of an emptivist seems, so 
f a r , clear enough. But t h i s f a c t t e l l s us very 
l i t t l e i f we are not to know what sort of an emotivist 
he i s ; f o r t h i s p o s i t i o n has taken a v a r i e t y of forms 
i n recent philosophy, some of which appear so gross-
l y simple and philo s o p h i c a l l y untenable that to l i n k 
Hardie with them would be to dismiss him as an object 
of worthwhile enquiry, while others are subtle and 
q u a l i f i e d enough to have remained a l i v e and close to 
the centre of e t h i c a l discussion: and so, f o r us to 
uncover any re l a t i o n s h i p of Hardie w i t h such a more 
sophisticated approach would be to establish h i s r e l -
evance to the ongoing debate. 
There i s c e r t a i n l y l i t t l e i n the way of evidence 
at the required l e v e l of d e t a i l i n the early parts of 
his book. The f i r s t chapter, f o r example, shows a 
conspicuous reticence i n developing the kind of anal-
ysis of the ubiquitous 'ought' which a reader w i t h 
e t h i c a l i n t e r e s t s might expect to f i n d i n an author 
dedicated t o the job of c l a r i f i c a t i o n . Each one of 
the substituted propositions contains, as does the 
discarded o r i g i n a l proposition, a valued judgment 
expressed either i n an 'ought' or a 'should' or con-
cealed i n some other form of words: yet there i s , as 
yet, no recognition of the need to give an analysis 
of i t s meaning. 
I t may be that Hardie"s i n t e r e s t s are directed 
temporarily elsewhere, as the r e s u l t of a decision 
made by him about p r i o r i t i e s i n discussion: i n which 
ease i t i s the order of p r i o r i t y which i s possibly 
questionable, i f we accept the heavy emphasis l a i d 
upon the relevance of ethics to educational theory 
by most l a t e r w r i t e r s . For instance, Hardie, i n 
discussing his f i r s t substituted proposition, 'A 
child's education ought to be such that i t i s free 
to develop according to the laws of i t s own nat-
ure* (V)', ignores the all-important 'ought'and em-
barks on a b r i e f i n v e s t i g a t i o n within.another, and 
almost c e r t a i n l y less important, sector of analyt-
i c a l a c t i v i t y , a sector with which we s h a l l be con-
cerned, i n t h i s account, l a t e r , i n accord w i t h the 
emphasis i t receives i n the l i t e r a t u r e under scrut-
i n y . S i m i l a r l y , the equally important 'should' 
contained i n h i s own f o u r t h a l t e r n a t i v e proposition, 
'The education of the c h i l d should be a process 
which i s s i m i l a r to that through which mankind has 
passed i n the course of evolution' (£)"', i s l e f t un-
(1) Hardie, C. D., op. c i t . , p. 2. 
(2) I b i d . , p. 19 
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analysed, as i s , too, the c l e a r l y implied value-
judgment contained i n his second substitute-prop-
o s i t i o n : 'Sense-impression of Nature i s the only 
true foundation of human i n s t r u c t i o n , because i t i s 
the only true foundation of human knowledge * ( 3 ) . 
They are ignored i n favour of an immediate epistem-
o l o g i c a l enquiry of the kind which, i n the present 
account, does not take precedence over e t h i c a l en-
quiry - again, i n accord w i t h the trend and the em-
phasis discernible i n the l i t e r a t u r e . 
I t - i s only w i t h reference to his t h i r d s u b s t i t -
uted proposition, 'A c h i l d i s to be morally educat-
ed by exposing i t to the natural consequences of i t s 
own act s ' ( 4 ) , that Hardie begins to show any sign 
of a grasp of the importance to educational theory 
of an e t h i c a l viewpoint, and to present arguments i n 
s u f f i c i e n t d e t a i l to allow the bu i l d i n g up of the 
background necessary f o r an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of his 
p a r t i c u l a r p o s i t i o n w i t h i n the broad emotivist area. 
He contends, w i t h the u t i l i t a r i a n Spencer, that ' A l l 
theories of mor a l i t y agree that conduct whose t o t a l 
r e s u l t s , immediate and remote, produce pleasure i s 
good conducts* giv i n g t h i s as the type of j u s t i f i c -
a t i o n which could back the p r e s c r i p t i o n contained 
i n his own t h i r d proposition. He then refutes the 
contention at some len g t h ( 5 ) , g i v i n g us f o r the very 
(3) I b i d . , p. 5 
(4) I b i d . , p. 13 
(5) I b i d . , pp. 14-9 
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f i r s t time an extended piece of the analysis we are 
seeking, and revealing, i n the process, the roots i n 
pure philosophy from which his emerging e t h i c a l pos-
i t i o n has grown. 
The roots l i e i n f a m i l i a r ground. The most s i g -
n i f i c a n t move i n his argument derives from a w e l l -
known technique of Moore ( 6 ) , used by him to counter 
such statements as "Pleasant resu l t s are what we mean 
by good conduct 1, which i s one of the i n t e r p r e t a t -
ions that can be given to Spencer's assertion. As 
Hardie says, i n naming the technique he employs, 
such statements 'can, I t h i n k , be proved f a l s e by 
the f a m i l i a r type of argument known as the open 
question' ( 7 ) . What the 'open question' i s must be 
explained i n more d e t a i l , f o r i t s use played an imp-
ortant part i n causing an impasse i n the so-called 
1 d e s c r i p t i v i s t 1 ethics which predominated i n English-
speaking philosophy u n t i l very recent times, and so 
i n creating the i n t e l l e c t u a l conditions i n which 
some such p o s i t i o n as that of the emotivists had to 
emerge. 
To any person asserting that 'pleasant' (or any 
other natural property) i s what i s meant by 'good', 
i t i s sensible to put the p e r f e c t l y straightforward 
question 'Is pleasure good?*., and hence by the imp-
(6) Moore, G. E., P r i n c i p i a Ethica (Cambridge, 
1903), Ch. 1 
(7) Hardie, C. D., op. c i t . , p. 17 
l i c a t i o n of the accepted d e f i n i t i o n the strange 
question, 'Is pleasure pleasant?*, which i s c l e a r l y 
not what such a person intends to ask. So argues 
Moore, maintaining that the f a l l a c y arises because 
things which possess what he i n s i s t s i s the.simple, 
unique, i n d i v i s i b l e q u a l i t y of goodness, also have 
other q u a l i t i e s - q u a l i t i e s which e x i s t i n the time 
and space of nature: natural properties - which are 
mistakenly taken as defining 'good' because they are 
always found with i t . But good, according to Moore, 
i s not a natural property. Though c e r t a i n l y i t i s 
a property, and therefore i s what the term 'good' 
names, i t i s a non-natural, unanalyzable property, 
not located i n time and space, which we can have 
before our mindu ( i n whatever dimension that e n t i t y 
can be said to e x i s t ! ) f o r d i r e c t inspection, and 
against which we can measure the value-claims of 
ordinary natural properties by asking such a simple 
but meaningful question as that given above: 'Is 
pleasure good?' 
The necessity of creating a non-natural world i n 
which to locate goodness and to which we can have 
only some form of i n t u i t i v e access i s a necessity 
f o l l o w i n g only from the premiss that value-terms 
have purely 'descriptive' meaning, a premiss which 
the emotivists, d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h the mystifying 
(8) See Ayer, A. J., Language, Truth and Logic 
(London, 1936). *** 
*** See p. 25, i n f r a . 
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t a l k of non-natural q u a l i t i e s , challenged i n a var-
i e t y of ways, ranging from the crude.assertions of 
the o r i g i n a l Logical P o s i t i v i s t s ( 8 ) to the more care-
f u l pronouncements oplater w r i t e r s who were genuinely 
interested i n f i n d i n g new approaches w i t h i n ethics. 
I t i s Hardie's p o s i t i o n amongst t h i s class of moral 
philosophers that we are attempting to establ i s h . 
So f a r , i n looking at his f i r s t chapter, we can not 
f i n d s u f f i c i e n t development of a p o s i t i v e viewpoint 
f o r a sure i d e n t i f i c a t i o n , to be made, so we must 
tu r n to the f o l l o w i n g chapter, that on Herbart, i n 
the hope of finding.the kind of systematic exposit-
ion which the sketchy comments so f a r made by Hardie 
imply. 
Unfortunately, our previous judgment that Hardie 
i s postponing his f u l l statement on ethics because 
of a decision about p r i o r i t i e s i n unfolding h i s 
theme i s confirmed i n the second chapter. There are 
indeed h i n t s and clues which can be int e r p r e t e d i n 
such a way as to warrant the placing of him amongst 
the emotivists; but these elements are merely i n c i d -
ental to his main argument, which, being non-ethical, 
i s not of present i n t e r e s t . And these pointers are 
also open to other i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s which, i f given, 
blur the simple, clear pi c t u r e of Hardie the moral 
philosopher which wajiid otherwise begin to emerge. 
(8) See p. 24, supra. 
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On the one hand, f o r example, he comments on Her-
b a r t 1 s opinion that i t i s meaningless to t a l k about 
j u s t i f y i n g moral judgments - an opinion based on the 
b e l i e f that we have knowledge by i n t u i t i o n or i n -
sight of the Tightness or wrongness of our acts of 
w i l l - i n terms which strongly r e c a l l h is In t r o d u c t -
ory remark that value questions are closely l i n k e d 
with emotional c o n f l i c t s and are to be elucidated 
by a t t e n t i o n to emotive meaning i n language. His 
comment i s : 'The great d i f f i c u l t y about such a 
theory i s to explain why people disagree so v i o l -
e n tly on e t h i c a l questions 1(9) i and t h i s manner of 
speaking does not surprise us. 
But, on the other hand, Hardie concludes a sub-
s t a n t i a l section of argument f o r the c o m p a t i b i l i t y 
of a b e l i e f i n determinism with a f a i t h i n what the 
process of education can achieve(10.-) i n such a 
manner as to throw doubt on his being the emotiv-
i s t he has h i t h e r t o seemed, f o r he uses terms such 
as 1 should*, 'proper 1 and 'important' with an assur-
ance which would be puzzling coming from a p h i l o s -
opher who claims that value-terms express mere pers-
onal preferences. He says: ' I t seems to me to be 
important that educationists should hold a determ-
i n i s t theory of some kind, not only because of i t s 
(9) I b i d . , p. 32. 
(10) I b i d . , pp. 42-7 
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t r u t h , but also because of the tendency at the pres-
ent time which leads some educationists to urge that 
teachers should be much less active than Herbart ad-
vocated. 1 (11). That Hardie favours teacher-activ-
i t y and teacher-intervention i s clear, as indeed i s 
the end to which t h i s te vcher-involvement i s a means 
and by which i t i s j u s t i f i e d by him i n commenting 
on two of the technical terms used by Herbart: 
we have seen that we cannot separate the s e l f from 
the d e s i r i n g s e l f , and i t i s therefore of the u t -
most importance that the teacher should secure the 
proper desires i n each c h i l d * (12). I n view of t h i s 
statement, what i s not now at a l l clear i s whether 
he i s an emotivist i n ethics at a l l ; and, i f he i s , 
what odd sort of a more detailed p o s i t i o n i s i t 
which allows him to t a l k without co n t r a d i c t i o n , or 
at least without sounding l o g i c a l l y odd i n a more 
informal sense, of the 'proper desires' that the 
'desiring s e l f * must be taught to have. 
Whether Hardie's delaying of a f i r m e t h i c a l pro-
nouncement i s merely the impression given to a read-
er who i s too sure of the primary importance of 
ethics f o r education because he i s prejudiced by 
knowledge of l a t e r developments or whether i t i s a 
f a c t , symptomatic of Hardie's whole approach to the 
(11) I b i d . , p. 46 
(12) I b i d . , p. 47 
i 
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bearing of a n a l y t i c a l philosophy on educational 
theory may be judged best by having an example 
before us of such l a t e r developments: w i t h t h i s we 
can then compare the i n d e f i n i t e Hardie view which 
we have so f a r encountered, as w e l l as the more def-
i n i t e p o s i t i o n of his which we s h a l l f i n d and sc r u t -
i n i s e l a t e r . We tu r n , then, to as good an example 
as any i n the work of R.S.Peters, moving thus frpm 
one end to the other of the period i n question, 
and to a philosopher who does not hesitate to state 
h i s e t h i c a l views and his own strong b e l i e f i n the 
great relevance of ethics f o r educational theory. 
We can attempt to answer the question, 'What i s 
Peters' p o s i t i o n i n moral philosophy?', before com-
in g back to Hardie and asking a s i m i l a r questionj 
w i t h reference to l a t e r parts of his work. 
Peters And The Autonomy Of Ethics. 
Peters' most substantial work i n t h i s area i s 
so very recent - May, 1966 (13) - that i t s a s s i m i l -
a t i o n i n t o the present thesis i s not possible; though, 
as w i l l be seen, some of i t s main arguments were to 
be expected, having been anticipated i n the various 
parts of his s i g n i f i c a n t though h i t h e r t o scattered 
c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the discussion which we are i n the 
process of i n v e s t i g a t i n g . I n one such p a r t , an e a r l -
(13) Peters, R. S., Ethics and Education (Lond-
on, 1966). 
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i e r o f f e r i n g , we can f i n d what we need at t h i s 
point - a b r i e f i n d i c a t i o n of an e t h i c a l viewpoint 
to contrast with that of Hardie: and i n other parts 
we s h a l l f i n d , l a t e r , other valuable material f o r 
our theme. . The u n i t y given so very recently to 
Peters' views i s , i n f a c t , less of an example of 
the bearing of a n a l y t i c a l philosophy on education-
a l theory as we are displaying i t than i t i s of the 
success of tha t bearing i n one of i t s i n t e r p r e t a t -
ions - that which we have elsewhere and with r e f e r -
ence to another English philosopher l a b e l l e d the 
' o f f i c i a l ' view ('...with deliberate abusiveness.. 
? ) . 
I n the e a r l i e r o f f e r i n g - broadcast t a l k s to a 
Third Programme l a y audience - Peters examines the 
e f f e c t on public t h i n k i n g about a cent r a l moral con-
cept, ' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y 1 , of the widespread misunder-
standing of the theories of Marx and Freud. (14). 
I n doing so, he c l e a r l y shows his e t h i c a l hand, f o r 
he i s concerned to a l l e v i a t e what he considers to be 
the morally bad consequences of the public swallowing 
h a l f - t r u t h s , and he can only do t h i s by going f i r m l y , 
i f b r i e f l y , i n t o e t h i c a l theory. He r e f e r s to '... 
a denial of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y coupled w i t h a story 
about the causes of actions and standards' (15), 
(14) Peters, R. S., Aut h o r i t y , Responsibility 
and Education (London, 1959), Ghs. 4, 5 and 6. 
(15) I b i d . , p. 57. 
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using a philosophical technique which i s of p a r t i c -
u l a r i n t e r e s t because of i t s contrast w i t h t h a t of 
Hardie. I t i l l u s t r a t e s what an acceptance of W i t t -
genstein's l a t e r views - those to be found on the 
near side of the d i v i d i n g l i n e mentioned e a r l i e r 
(p. 15) - and an adoption of h i s practice has done 
f o r philosophical analysis. Phrases of a c e r t a i n 
kind abound: '...there are occasions when i t would 
be reasonable to say 1, .'...these, we might say, are 
unusual cases', 'the f a c t that we s i i u e out such 
odd cases...suggests that we believe that i n gener-
a l ', and so on (16). 
This appeal to what we o r d i n a r i l y say, to the 
usual and the non-odd expressions of reasonable men, 
i n order to disentangle meanings, i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
of modern a n a l y t i c a l philosophers. I t i s a gentle, 
probing, non-doctrinaire technique which gives a 
clear impression of being an a r t i n i t s e l f . To note 
that t h i s kind of c l a r i f i c a t i o n i s , l i k e Hardie's, 
"analysis', i s to be struck by the vagueness of that 
term, f o r the f l u i d i t y of Peters and the almost math-
ematical r i g i d i t y of Hardie stand i n great contrast 
as methods of enquiry. 
What t h e o r e t i c a l point Peters i s attempting to 
communicate, using t h i s technique, i s that causes of 
actions and reasons f o r actions are ( l o g i c a l l y d i s t -
(16) I b i d . , pp. 57-8 
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i n c t : the description of them involves two separate 
ways of t a l k i n g which should not be, but ofte n are, 
confused. Consequently, we su f f e r from needless 
anxieties generated by a f a i l u r e to take t h i s i n t o 
account when pondering the 'revelations' of Freud 
and Marx, both of whom seem to have stripped men 
of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e i r own actions. On the 
contrary, Peters says, '...a r e v e l a t i o n of the 
causes of our actions should increase rather than 
decrease our r e s p o n s i b i l i t y foi? them' (17), f o r 
'causal' explanations of human behaviour are bound 
to show themselves as incomplete - why, otherwise, 
should men have developed and constantly used a 
whole language to do w i t h motives, dispositions and 
reasons f o r actions? The answer i s % u i t e clear. 
He stresses that he i s t a l k i n g about the meaning 
of ' r e s p o n s i b i l i t y ' - t h i s i s the philosopher's job 
i n these days of language-awareness - and that the 
meaning can only be grasped by inspecting our ordi n -
ary use of the term, the standard cases and the odd 
cases, i n such a way as to eventually a r r i v e at the 
sense of what we are constantly and unhesitatingly 
saying. The view of language implied i n a l l that 
Peters i s doing becomes quite e x p l i c i t at one point(18) 
when he states: 'Our language has developed i n no 
haphazard way; and i t enshrines the commonsense con-
(17) I b i d . , p. 59. 
(18) I b i d . , p. 60. 
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v i c t i o n that i n general men can help doing what 
they do. 1 
Prom the analysis carried out on the basis fif 
t h i s assumption about language there emerges a fund-
amental point about causality and moral i t y : causes 
i n general must be distinguished from those causes 
having effects which are apparently unavoidable i n 
a l i m i t e d range of circumstances. I t i s to the 
l a t t e r that we must look, 1...not j u s t i n anger but 
with a d i s c r i m i n a t i n g empirical eye 1 (19); that i s , 
we can, on the basis of sound, detailed empirical 
knowledge of the re l a t i o n s h i p between events, make 
decisions of our own, about which a l l t a l k of a 
general nature concerning causes and a l l vague r e f -
erences to 'determinism' i n human a f f a i r s i s complete-
l y i r r e l e v a n t , belonging as i t does to a d i f f e r e n t 
language not intended to cope w i t h the r e a l i t i e s of 
human choice and w i l l . 
We can, at t h i s p o i n t , r e c a l l that Hardie reaches 
not d i s s i m i l a r conclusions when he discusses determ-
inism and argues f o r the a c t i v i t y of the teacher i n 
implanting the 'proper d e s i r e s ' i n the c h i l d ; and 
he does so, as we saw, without the benefit of the 
kind of analysis available to and demonstrated by 
Peters. The i n t e r e s t i n g f a c t i s t h a t ^ argues i n 
(19) I b i d . , p. 68. 
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t h i s way while apparently holding an e t h i c a l pos-
i t i o n f a r removed from that of Peters, a f a c t which 
throws doubt on the consistency of his approach. He 
wr i t e s , f o r example, i n Peters-like terms i n t h i s 
passage: there may be a law to'i&ffect that a 
human mind under c e r t a i n conditions w i l l make a cer-
t a i n choice,.but i f the conditions are a l t e r e d then 
that p a r t i c u l a r law w i l l not have a chance to oper-
ate. Wow i t i s precisely t h i s that education has to 
achieve, that i s , education has to a l t e r the condit-
ions to such an extent that when each i n d i v i d u a l i s 
confronted w i t h a choice then he w i l l choose that 
a l t e r n a t i v e which i s considered best. 1 (20). 
On the evidence of t h i s and s i m i l a r assertions, 
we would expect t o f i n d Hardie somewhere declaring 
an early version of an e t h i c a l p o s i t i o n s i m i l a r to 
that of Peters, one which stresses the autonomy of 
ethics and the production of reasons f o r actions 
w i t h i n a l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t moral discourse. How-
ever, such a view does not appear i n the early parts 
of h i s work, as we have seen, and most of the evid-
ence points to the eventual disclosure of a p o s i t -
ion which w i l be, to say the l e a s t , completely 
dissonant w i t h any of t h i s obfuscating t a l k of educ-
at i o n ensuring the choice of 'that which i s consid-
ered best'. 
(20) j&M±Qfm. B., op. c i t . , p. 43 
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However, "before ret u j i i n g to Hardie, t&ere i s 
more yet i n Peters concerning the all - i m p o r t a n t 
d i s t i n c t i o n between reasons and causes. To f i n d 
t h i s Ryleian d i s t i n c t i o n developed i n philosophy 
addressed to parents and educators i s i n i t s e l f a 
sign that progress has been made i n the 'bearing' 
under review - progress which i s not unconnected 
with the movement of 'analysis' from the.technical 
to the more ordinary aspects of language. 
Peters i n s i s t s that i t i s pointless to specul-
ate about whatever causes there may be f o r b e l i e f s 
which already have good, acceptable grounds to sup-
port them. He puts forward t h i s central point of 
his w i t h force and humour: ' I f there are, i n gener-
a l , good reasons f o r keeping promises - as there 
obviously are - and someone suggests that our duty 
to keep them was drummed i n t o us at a public school, 
or at our mother's knee, the appropriate answer i s : 
"So what?", or: "How thoughtful of them."1 (21). 
This kind of emphasis on there being genuine good 
reasons f o r moral action must be encountered, i t i s 
now clear, i n any philosopher who i s prepared to 
w r i t e i n a c e r t a i n way about e t h i c a l matters - i f he 
i s to be consistent. Hardie, f o r instance, i s prep-
ared to stateohis b e l i e f i n the 'utmost importance' 
of the teacher i n ensuring the 'proper desires' i n 
(21) Peters, R. S., op. c i t . , p. 72 
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the c h i l d ; but he does not back t h i s b e l i e f , so 
f a r , i n the manner we would expect. 
This way of speaking implies that there are cer-
t a i n things of value which education ought to ensure 
are passed on to the next generation. I t implies, 
too, that the value placed upon these things can 
be j u s t i f i e d i n some way; that i s , that ' j u s t i f i c -
a t i o n ' makes sense i n t h i s area. What we see i n 
Peters even at f i r s t glimpse, and what we s h a l l note 
f u r t h e r when we look at other parts of his c o n t r i b -
u t i o n , i s ample evidence of the acceptance of a mor-
a l philosophy i n which i t makes clear sense to t a l k 
of ' j u s t i f i c a t i o n ' and 'reasons' f o r moral choice. 
On the other hand, there i s as yet no comparable 
evidence i n Hardie, though there should be i f the 
'moral'' tone of his argument about the r o l e of the 
teacher i s not to be dismissed as an inconsistency 
w i t h i n an emotivist approach. We must re t u r n now 
to examine the l a t e r parts of his work against the 
background provided by t h i s f i r s t brief..glimpse of 
aj.later philosopher. 
The Tolerance Of The 'Persuasive' Theory. 
In Hardie's next chapter, on Dewey, there ace 
some i n t r i g u i n g l i t t l e asides but nothing substant-
i a l or more s a t i s f y i n g than that which has gone be-
f o r e . He remarks, f o r example, that '...an i n t e r e s t 
i n Greek l i t e r a t u r e or i n d i f f e r e n t i a l equations or 
i n medieval h i s t o r y i s often acquired, and i t i s 
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surely the case that an i n t e r e s t i n such a subject 
f o r i t s own sake i s extremely valuable. 1 (22). This 
makes us eager to encounter the moral philosophy 
which can s a t i s f a c t o r i l y accommodate the free use of 
terms such as .1 extremely v a l u a b l e 1 , p a r t i c u l a r l y 
when Hardie makes a.point, i n the same context, of 
appreciating the c l a s s i c a l blunder of John Stuart 
M i l l ' s use of the related term 'desirable'. M i l l ' s 
f a i l u r e to d i s t i n g u i s h , to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of his 
c r i t i c s , between 'that which i s des^ired 1 and 'that 
which ought to be desired', i s hardly the sort of 
weakness which Hardie has the r i g h t to i n d i c a t e , on 
the strength of the unclear p o s i t i o n he has so f a r 
developed. 
However, i n the substantial f o u r t h chapter, 'The 
Basis Of Any Educational Theory', we come at l a s t to 
what we have been p a t i e n t l y seeking - an unblurred 
declaration of what, i n Hardie's opinion, ethics i s 
about. I n a p o s i t i o n of importance at the end of the 
long, varied argument of t h i s chapter, f o r which the 
other chapters w i t h t h e i r diaappointing s c a r c i t y of 
the material we need f o r our theme have served as a 
c r i t i c a l prologue, we f i n d the p l a i n recognition of 
the primary importance of ethics which we have been 
demanding of Hardie: 'This leads usltb the consider-
ati o n of what i s perhaps the most important of the 
(22) Hardie, C. D., op. c i t . , p. 59. 
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conceptions i n the d e f i n i t i o n of education - the 
idea of value, because on that depends what changes 
we decide should be produced i n the c h i l d . ' (23). 
The core of Hardie's exposition of moral p h i l -
osophy i n r e l a t i o n to education follows an unconvin-
cing excursion i n t o arguments f o r and against a ' r e l -
igious theory of education', which raise hopes but, 
i n sum, t u r n out to be one of what we have ca l l e d 
Hardie's 'barren' elements; and t h i s core i s , as we 
s h a l l see, the most ' f r u i t f u l ' part of the whole 
work, i n the sense of presenting ideas which can be 
related without s t r a i n to the work of Peters and 
other l a t e r w r i t e r s i n the f i e l d . 
He i d e n t i f i e s the problems: 'The educationist 
has, I t h i n k , two problems i n t h i s region to solve. 
The f i r s t i s , what i s meant by such a term as "good" 
or "valuable". The second i s , how do we come to 
know and hence how can we teach the meaning of such 
a term? For the valuable changes i n behaviour which 
education has to secure must include the description 
of i t as such. Education would c l e a r l y have p a r t l y 
f a i l e d i f i n d i v i d u a l s behaved p e r f e c t l y but did not 
know i t . The s o l u t i o n of the second problem w i l l , 
however, probably depend on the s o l u t i o n of the f i r s t . ' 
(24). 
(23) I b i d . , p. 113. 
(24) I b i d . , p. 118. 
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The f i r s t of his problems i s of immediate con-
cern: the second - that of moral education - w i l l 
be examined i n a separate chapter, being i n i t s e l f 
a very large question. Hardie i s at l a s t asking 
about the meaning of moral terms: his problem i s 
that of accounting f o r moral language by .stating a 
sa t i s f a c t o r y e t h i c a l theory . I t i s hardly possible 
to read him at t h i s point without being reminded of 
Peters and the cent r a l i n t e r e s t s of other philosoph-
ers now working i n t h i s region. The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
of the problems and even the manner of the suggest-
ion of the l i n k between them i s what warrants the 
judgment that he i s s t i l l of some contemporary s i g -
n i f i c a n c e . 
He clears the ground e f f i c i e n t l y f o r a demon-
s t r a t i o n of hi s own leanings: the sense of good-in-
i t s e l f or i n t r i n s i c good i s quickly d i f f e r e n t i a t e d 
from other senses as that which requires e l u c i d a t -
i o n ; and he then relates the question of i t s mean-
ing to some of his previous remarks on d e f i n i t i o n 
(to which we s h a l l r e t u r n i n another context), before 
d i s t i n g u i s h i n g 'non-naturalistic' from 'n a t u r a l i s t i c ' : 
approaches i n ethics, claiming that a l l such l a t t e r 
theories can be refuted by the 'open question' arg-
ument of Moore, already described. And f i n a l l y , l e f t 
w i t h a non-n a t u r a l i s t i c p o s i t i o n , he declares h is 
hand by denying any assumption that moral terms are 
intended to convey information. 
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He says: '-We have assumed so f a r that i n such a 
proposition as "knowledge of Greek l i t e r a t u r e i s 
good" the i n t e n t i o n i s to convey information; that 
i s , we have assumed that "good" i s the name of a cer-
t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c which we predicate of a number 
of things or mental states or what not, and we have 
been attempting to get clearer about the nature of 
t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . Now I propose to deny t h i s ass-
umption. Our i n t e n t i o n i s rather to arouse a c e r t a i n 
a t t i t u d e i n our audience...when we make value judge-
ments we are using language emotively rather than 
s c i e n t i f i c a l l y . ' (25). I n the face of t h i s , we 
must immediately wonder whethcer Hardie recognised 
that he was himself merely using language 'emotive-
l y ' at the moment of w r i t i n g the passage which con-
demns 'educationists' f o r leading teachers astray 
down the path of p a s s i v i t y ] (See p. ,:27, supra.) 
He does, however, go f u r t h e r than a simple acc-
eptance of an unqualified emotivism by d i s t i n g u i s h -
ing, w i t h i n an 'emotive' use of language, two com-
ponents: an 'expressive' f u n c t i o n and a 'persuas-
ive ' function. The former, unsurprisingly, refers 
to the f a c t that language of t h i s sort expresses 
a person's feelings about a c e r t a i n state of a f f a i r s 
and i s so not open to contradiction. The l a t t e r i s 
a dimension necessary, Hardie maintains, to account 
f o r the often v i o l e n t disagreement about value judg-
(25) I b i d . , p. 123. 
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merits which i s encountered i n everyday l i f e and 
which would be e n t i r e l y pointless and misplaced i f 
the purely 'expressive 1 i n t e r p r e t a t i o n were true: 
feelings are not the sort of t h i n g that can be reas-
onably disputed, and yet i t i s generally f e l t that 
moral disagreement i s a reasonable enough phenom-
enon. The only kind of s o l u t i o n to t h i s paradoxical 
s i t u a t i o n i s that found i n the 'persuasive' theory. 
So Hardie contends. The p i t y i s that he does not 
appear to r e a l i s e that t h i s solves nothing - i t only 
leaves.things even more 'open' than before, as his 
own words, w r i t t e n with s p e c i f i c reference to 'val-
ue ' disagreement as i t shows i t s e l f " i n educational 
theory, indicate i n s t a r t l i n g fashion. 
He says: 'The disagreement /among education theo-
r i s t s 7 h a s not been i n what has been said, but i n the 
feelings which each educationist has had f o r the dif£ 
erent a c t i v i t i e s of l i f e , and each has attempted to 
persuade others to f e e l the same way as he does. 
I f we r e a l i z e t h i s we can be t o l e r a n t of a l l t h e i r 
theories, f o r no one i s r i g h t and no one i s wrong. 
I t i s true that some may be said to be "better" than 
others i n the sense i n which one poem may be be t t e r 
than another, but when we r e a l i z e that much of the 
s t i n g has gone out of educational controversy. 1 (26). 
The tolerance of the 'persuasive' theory i s apparent-
l y l i m i t l e s s ! 
(26) I b i d . , p. 127 
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I f no one i s r i g h t and no one i s wrong as Hardie 
asserts, there seems no point i n w r i t i n g a book 
such as his own i n which teachers are urged to 
take on a ce r t a i n r o l e on the grounds that t h i s 
w i l l be 'better' f o r the chil d r e n , f o r i f 'better' 
means 'what I prefer and wish to persuade you to 
prefer too', the seriousness of whatever 'argum-
ents' are produced to make the persuasion e f f e c t -
ive i s bound to be suspect - so i t must appear to 
anyone who has had access to the kind of w r i t i n g 
such as Peters produces, i n which the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of there being genuine reasons f o r moral choices 
i s emphasised. 
I t may be that Hardie uses the analogy of moral 
with poetic judgments i n order so to persuade, f o r 
most of us accept unthinkingly that 'poetry' i s 
'good' and that there are many styles to be found 
w i t h i n t h i s class of 'good' things. But t h i s i s 
merely to push the problem back on to aesthetic 
theory, w i t h i n which the d i s t i n c t i o n between 'good' 
poetry and cheap verse i s j u s t as philosophically 
d i f f i c u l t to make as i s the d i s t i n c t i o n between 
'd i f f e r e n t a c t i v i t i e s of l i f e ' embodied i n . r i v a l 
educational theories, p a r t i c u l a r l y when i t i s noted 
that ones such a c t i v i t y could be, f o r example, the 
t o t a l , b l i n d acceptance of a t o t a l i t a r i a n state 
such as was found i n Nazi Germany. Presumably the 
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educational theories of that time and tfrat place 
would be tol e r a t e d as j u s t another 'poem' which 
most of us do not happen to prefer. 
This unsatisfactory p o s i t i o n i s the i m p l i c a t i o n 
of Hardie's version of an emotivist theory: i t app-
ears to make nonsense of the c r i t i c a l assertions he 
has himself made about other t h e o r i s t s i n the early 
part of his work. Herbart, Dewey and the 'Nature' 
t h e o r i s t s were only, a f t e r a l l , expressing t h e i r 
own feelings f o r a p a r t i c u l a r way of l i f e ; and there 
i s l i t t l e point i n attacking them f o r t h a t . I t i s 
small wonder that even admirers of Hardie see i n 
his incautious expression of a d i f f i c u l t e t h i c a l 
theory an unacceptable element of his otherwise 
carefully, stated views. G.H.Bantock, one - i f the 
few educationists to have sympathetically remember-
ed Hardie's- early work during the quarter of a cen-
t u r y of i t s existence comments i n words which r e -
c a l l the emphases i n Peters which contrast scjstrong-
l y with those we have j u s t seen i n Hardie: 
'One can merely urge that educational value 
judgments are matters f o r r a t i o n a l argument and 
that choices ought to be j u s t i f i e d by good reasons; 
wea\re not, that i s to say, abandoned to the p o s i t -
ion that preferences are questions simply of person-
a l taste or express merely the emotions and per-
suasions or exhortations of the w r i t e r , as Profess-
or CD.Hardie seems to have thought i n his other-
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wise important "Truth and Fallacy i n Educational 
Theory" 1 (27) 
I t may be that , i n i d e n t i f y i n g a weakness here 
i n Hardie, we are i n danger of underestimating the 
type of theory which he propounds. His p o s i t i o n 
of 1942 i s i n f a c t derived almost wholly from the 
o r i g i n a l work of the most adventurous moral p h i l -
osopher of his day, the American C.L.Stevenson (28). 
A b r i e f look at hi s work i s necessary i n order to 
ensure that there are no aspects of i t which Hardie 
has overlooked, and which would make a 'persuasive 1 
theory more acceptable. This w i l l be followed by 
a comparison of views on ethics c u r r e n t l y held by 
a v a r i e t y of modern a n a l y t i c a l 'pure' philosophers, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y those which can be rela t e d to the work 
w i t h i n education of interested philosophers such as 
Peters, i n order to underline the i n a d v i s a b i l i t y , 
mentioned e a r l i e r , of accepting any single i n t e r p r e -
t a t i o n of the bearing of a n a l y t i c a l philosophy on 
educational theory merely because i t happens to be 
the l a t e s t to appear and to have widespread support 
of the moment w i t h i n the f i e l d of education. This 
w i l l carry f u r t h e r our procedure of de f i n i n g the 
'bearing' under examination i n terms of what can be 
discovered by journeying around the relevant l i t -
(27) Bantock, G. H., Education and Values (Lon-
evenson, G. L., Ethics and Language (Ox-
fo r d , 1944). 
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erature and contrasting examples from what i s an 
ongoing and e s s e n t i a l l y unfinished a c t i v i t y . 
R a t i o n a l i t y I n 'Pure' Ethics; Stevenson 
And A f t e r , 
Stesrenson presents a version of the emotivist 
theory which i s f a r more subtle than the account gi v -
en of i t by Hardie: developed i n massive d e t a i l , i t 
i s very 'persuasive' indeed and i s hardly recogniz-
able as a l i n g u i s t i c a l l y sophisticated version of 
the crude iconoclastic emotivism associated w i t h 
the Logical P o s i t i v i s t s . He attempts to c l a r i f y 
the meaning of e t h i c a l terms, as we have seen Hardie 
making p l a i n enough; but he also attempts to show 
the methods by which value judgments are j u s t i f i e d 
- not an aspect of his work which Hardie brings 
out i n his own peculiar manner of expression. 
Stevenson distinguishes disagreements i n b e l i e f s 
from disagreements i n a t t i t u d e s , stressing, at the 
same time, t h e i r complicated entanglement w i t h each 
other i n actual p r a c t i c e . When we believe something 
to be the case i t quite c l e a r l y influences our a t t i t -
udes towards that state of a f f a i r s : a t t i t u d e s are 
dependent upon knowledge and t h i s knowledge can be 
fa l s e 'knowledge' which can be replaced by a true 
account of how things are. Furthermore, our b e l -
i e f s can be shaped by our a t t i t u d e s - by what we 
f e e l towards an object. So t h a t , i n t h i s complex 
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s i t u a t i o n , moral controversy i n e v i t a b l y involves 
disagreement i n "belief and a t t i t u d e , w i t h the poss-
i b i l i t y of re s o l u t i o n only by a l t e r i n g both. 
Consequently, i n ethics, both the notions of 
descri p t i v e meaning and emotive meaning of the 
terms we use are important: the cruder emotivists 
unduly emphasised the importance of emotive terms. 
Moreover, the emotive meaning of our value terms 
have the persuasive component which we have noted 
Hardie describing. This i s closely related to an 
imperative, so that we express our own a t t i t u d e s 
on the basis of our b e l i e f s and t r y to r e d i r e c t 
the a t t i t u d e s of others who are morally disagree-
ing with us when we c a l l something, f o r example, 
•good 1. 
These quasi-commands are j u s t i f i e d by o f f e r i n g 
'reasons' f o r obeying them i n the form of descrip-
ti o n s of states of a f f a i r s - statements of our b e l -
i e f s - which can be accepted by others and w i l l 
thus form t h e i r new b e l i e f s and w i l l engender t h e i r 
new a t t i t u d e s . The assumption i s that agreement i n 
b e l i e f causes agreement i n a t t i t u d e , since most of 
us get s a t i s f a c t i o n from the same kind of th i n g , we 
being b u i l t of psychologically s i m i l a r material. 
To those who w i l l not grant t h i s assumption's v a l i d i t y 
a l l along the l o g i c a l l i n e Stevenson has nothing 
f u r t h e r to o f f e r : i f the 'reasons' do not appeal, and 
i f the b e l i e f s of both sides i n dispute are the same, 
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nothing can be done by the use of reason to resolve 
any continuing disagreement. 
This fundamental point has been put p l a i n l y by 
R.P.Atkinson, one of the interested 'pure' philosoph-
ers who contribute to the most recent of the very 
few volumes of readings i n philosophical analysis 
and education. He says: 'Stevenson...follows Hume 
on the main point. He t,oo, despite sjaome few app-
earances to the contrary, maintains that there can 
be l o g i c a l l y i r r e d u c i b l e differences on moral matters. 
He i s prepared to allow that moral judgments may be 
held to be ' t r u e 1 , but i t ttirns out that he regards 
t h i s asjnerely an idiomatic, perhaps debased usage i n 
which the word functions simply as a mark of assent. 1 
(29)« So, the sop h i s t i c a t i o n of the 'persuasive 1 
theory does not conceal the 'emotivist' l o g i c of i t s 
ce n t r a l contentions. 
Stevenson, them, and Hardie as an educationist 
d i s c i p l e , allows l i t t l e r e a l scope f o r r a t i o n a l i t y 
i n moral disagreement: he remains fundamentally an 
emotivist, i n spit e of some ingenious and o r i g i n a l 
attempts to f i n d a place f o r 'reasons' with h i s t a l k 
of a l t e r i n g a t t i t u d e s by working on b e l i e f s . The 
hi s t o r y of ethics, from the time of his early work 
of the l a t e nineteen t h i r t i e s to the present day, 
reveals an intense e f f o r t made by many philosophers 
(29) Atkinson, R. P., 'I n s t r u c t i o n and I n d o c t r i n -
a t i o n ' , i n Archambault, R. D. (Ed.), Philosophical 
Analysis and Education (London, 1965), p. 177. 
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to d i f f e r e n t i a t e moral discourse from a l l other 
types; to d i s t i n g u i s h i t s own unique canons of r a t -
i o n a l i t y . An emphasis upon the meanings-fulness of 
moral language and the worthwhileness of moral d i s -
cussion has progressively replaced the extreme 'sub-
j e c t i v i s m ' which followed the abandonment of the 
search f o r a viable 'noak-natural1 r a t i o n a l e . This 
emphasis, as t y p i c a l l y found i n current 'pure' p h i l -
osophy, must be b r i e f l y described, being p a r t i c -
u l a r l y consonant w i t h the p o s i t i o n taken by Peters, 
whom we are taking as the philosopher of an analyt-
i c a l kind who best o f f e r s a contrast w i t h Hardie, 
and who, with him,reflects w i t h i n the area of educ-
a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s an aspect of moral philosophy . 
Then we s h a l l be i n a p o s i t i o n to r e t u r n to Peters 
and others w i t h i n education to establish what meas-
ure of agreement there can be said to be. 
I n turning to the problem of the j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
of value judgments as t h i s i s understood and tack-
led i n the l a t e s t philosophy, we must be clear about 
the sheer mass of work that i s being done - so much 
that any attempt t o summarise the main p o s i t i o n that 
i s emerging must be treated as very much a s i m p l i f i c -
a t i o n designed f o r present purposes only. The j u s t -
i f i c a t i o n i s commonly seen to involve a number of 
stages. F i r s t , we j u s t i f y an action by an appeal 
to standards or r u l e s : an action i s of a p a r t i c u l a r 
kind, a l l of which are r i g h t actions by common acc-
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eptance - disagreement at t h i s l e v e l i s always 
about whether the p a r t i c u l a r action i s of the 
stated kind or not, and never about whether the r u l e 
or standard i s a r i g h t one. 
This comes at the next l e v e l , at which reasons 
f o r the acceptance of rules and standards are prov-
ided i n the des c r i p t i o n of a value system w i t h i n a 
whole way of l i f e . But questions can be asked about 
the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a p a r t i c u l a r way of l i f e ; and 
s p e c i f i c a l l y the u l t i m a t e ^ question: What reasons are 
there f o r choosing one way of l i f e rather than anoth-
er? A passage from one of the most persistent and 
respected of contemporary moral philosophers, R.M. 
Hare, shows w e l l the extensive nature of the j u s t -
i f i c a t i o n required f o r a p a r t i c u l a r moral choice, 
provided that the question i s pursued to the l o g i c a l 
end: and, i n Hare's case, the end i s not nearly as 
f a r as some would locate i t , as we s h a l l see. 
He says: 'A complete j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a decision 
would consist of a complete account of i t s e f f e c t s , 
together w i t h a complete account of the p r i n c i p l e s 
which i t observed and the effe c t s of observing these 
principles...Thus, i f pressed to j u s t i f y a decision 
completely, we have to give a complete s p e c i f i c a t i o n 
of the way of l i f e of which i t i s a p a r t . 1 (30). 
But, of c r u c i a l importance to the nature of ethics 
(30) Hare, R. M., The Language of Morals (Ox-
f o r d , 1952), p. 69. 
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i s &he answer to the question put above: whether 
one choice of a way of l i f e i s more ' r a t i o n a l ' than 
another; that i s , whether ' r a t i o n a l i t y ' can be def-
ined i n such a way as to enable 'good reasons' to 
be produced f o r accepting one way of l i f e rather 
than another. Only with reference to a r a t i o n a l 
way of l i f e can any value judgment be r e a l l y true 
and completely j u s t i f i e d . 
The answer given by many contemporary a n a l y t i c a l 
philosophers i s that the preference f o r one way of 
l i f e rather than another need not be a r b i t r a r y ; need 
not, that i s , be mere preference i n the sense i n 
which we have seen Hardie asserts that i t i s ('... 
we can be t o l e r a n t to a l l t h e i r theories, f o r no 
one i s r i g h t and no one i s wrong 1; see p. 40, supra) 
The most thorough exposition of t h i s viewpoint i s 
contained i n the work of P.W.Taylor, who argues i n 
great d e t a i l that a meaning can be given to the con-
cept of r a t i o n a l choice of the type necessary f o r the 
•ultimate' j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a value judgment (31). 
Going as f a r as i t i s l o g i c a l l y possible to go, 
he refutes the sceptical demand f o r an even more fun-
damental 'reason' f o r choosing a r a t i o n a l rather than 
a non-rational l i f e i n terms which demonstrate that 
t h i s debate fi n d s i t s l i m i t s i n the very language 
that has to be used to argue i t : 'No reasons can be 
(31) Taylor, P. W., Normative Discourse (Pren-
t i c e H a l l , 1961), pp. 164-75. 
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given, i t i s true. But no reasons need be given; 
For knowing that a c e r t a i n way of l i f e i s r a t i o n a l 
i s knowing that one i s wholly j u s t i f i e d i n committ-
ing oneself to i t . To know that i t i s r a t i o n a l i s 
already to have a l l the reasons one could possibly 
have f o r l i v i n g i t . . . t h e decision to commit oneself 
to a way of l i f e which i s r a t i o n a l l y chosen over 
others ways of l i f e . . . i s the most reasonable, least 
a r b i t r a r y , and best founded decision of a l l . I t i s 
the decision to l i v e the way of l i f e one i s most 
j u s t i f i e d i n l i v i n g , a l l things considered. 1 (32) 
There i s l i t t l e doubt that a l l the philosophers 
mentioned i n t h i s section - and they stand f o r many 
more, as do t h e i r views f o r many others - are very 
close to the same philosophical ' p o i n t 1 : i n a sense, 
they hold the 'same' po s i t i o n and d i f f e r more i n 
the ways i n which they wish to describe that pos-
i t i o n - i n t h e i r various insistencies on using par-
t i c u l a r forms of words to describe facts of moral 
l i f e which they undoubtedly 'see' i n the same way 
- than they do i n what can only be termed t h e i r 
•metaphysical' standpoints. Even Stevenson and 
Taylor work i n the same philosophical climate of op-
in i o n , compared, f o r example, with the differences 
that obtained before 'non-descriptivist' i n s i g h t s 
about language began to bear f r u i t . I n a sense, 
differences are now seen to exist at the l e v e l of 
(32) I b i d . , p. 188 
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language and the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s put on i t s mean-
in g and significance i n r e l a t i o n to an independent 
' r e a l i t y ' . 
This becomes p l a i n i n the work of Peters and other 
philosophers working now i n education who th i n k 
l i k e him; so p l a i n , that i t can be f a i r l y said that 
much of what they w r i t e i s less a r e f l e c t i o n of 
'pure' philosophical developments from outside to 
w i t h i n educational theory than i t i s o r i g i n a l p h i l -
osophising i n ethics carried out with 'educational' 
material rather than with less concrete material. 
V/e can, then, r e t u r n to Peters to note what other 
parts of his (unconsolidated, see p. 28, supra.) 
c o n t r i b u t i o n read l i k e against the background now 
sketched of current moral philosophy; and to amplify 
a p o s i t i o n which not everyone i n education, as we 
s h a l l see immediately f o l l o w i n g the f u r t h e r expos-
i t i o n of his views, i s prepared to accept. 
The 'Autonomous' View Amplified. 
Peters i s concerned to stress, i n the source 
which we have already used, that by 'morality' we 
mean conforming to standards which we have serious-
l y thought about before accepting as our own: the 
point he i s making i s s i m i l a r to that made by Har-
die when he says 'Education would c l e a r l y have p a r t -
l y f a i l e d i f i n d i v i d u a l s behaved p e r f e c t l y but did 
not know it.'(See p. 37, supra.). He wishes to est-
a b l i s h , with t h i s emphasis, that loose t a l k of ' r a t -
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i o n a l i s a t i o n s 1 and 'ideologies' by those who are 
overimpressed with a p a r t i c u l a r (and fa l s e ) i n t e r -
p r e t a t i o n of the theories of Freud and Marx as these 
bear on human moral condmct i s the r e s u l t of semantic 
confusion. I f every 'reason' i s a r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n -
which i s the i m p l i c a t i o n of such det e r m i n i s t i c t a l k 
- then no clear sense can be given to the term ' r a t -
i o n a l i s a t i o n at a l l : i t loses a l l meaning by being 
used without a frame of reference which can provide 
the necessary contrast. Unless there are genuine 
reasons, there can be no r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n s ; j u s t as -
to use an analogy powerfully developed i n a seminal 
work of contemporary ethics (33) - there ES can be 
no weeds unless there are flowers, shrubs and plants 
tended by human gardeners! 
Peters puts t h i s i n terms which c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y 
display his o r i e n t a t i o n towards common experience and 
the ordinary language i n which i t i s a r t i c u l a t e d , 
when he comments: 'Terms l i k e ' r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n ' and 
'ideology 1, which castk aspersion on b e l i e f s , are 
verbal parasites. They only f l o u r i s h because com-
mon experience has provided hosts i n the form of 
r a t i o n a l b e l i e f s and genuine p r i n c i p l e s . ' (34) He 
thus r e i t e r a t e s i n a d i f f e r e n t form the d i s t i n c t i o n 
between reasons f o r behaviour, which i s the concern 
of ethics, and causes of behaviour, which the "various 
human sciences attempt to describe and explain. 
(33) Nowell-Smith, P. H.X, Ethics (Penguin, 1954) 
(34) Peters, R. S., op. c i t . , p. 76. 
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He thus f a l l s c l e a r l y i n t o one of the two 
classes of moral philosophers who have emerged from 
our enquiry - those who accept that there can be a 
r a t i o n a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n of moral judgments, and that 
the reasons produced w i t h i n an autonomous moral 
discourse are objective reasons and not merely a t t -
itudes dressed up i n sophisticated and persuasive 
a t t i r e . V/e can look f o r more evidence of t h i s a l l -
egiance i n a context other than that from which his 
views have so f a r been taken; that i s , popular t a l k s 
addressed to a l a y audience who are not expected to 
appreciate the su b t l e t i e s of an academic argument. 
Though, even at t h i s l e v e l , the emphasis upon the 
place of reason i n a r r i v i n g at and j u s t i f y i n g moral 
b e l i e f s , an emphasis of clear importance to the educ-
ators i n h i s audience, stands i n marked contrast to 
the contrary kind of emphasis which he have seen Har-
die make i n addressing what must be, i n p a r t , a sim-
i l a r audience of people concerned with education. 
A h i n t i n the f i r s t source can lead us to the 
kind of a m p l i f i c a t i o n to be found i n a second, more 
academic part of his work: he says, 'People who say 
that moral p r i n c i p l e s are self-evident often mean 
that no f u r t h e r reasons can be given f o r them. But 
perhaps they sometimes mean that the reasons f o r 
them are so obvious that they hardly need mention-
ing. ' (35) 
(35) I b i d . , p. 78 . 
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The term 'obvious' i s important here. What i s 
obvious to one man i s often an impenetrable mystery 
to the next - t h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y the case with 
s c i e n t i f i c explanations and the l i k e , which can 
often only be understood a f t e r long t r a i n i n g . 
What i s obv&jaus depends on one's knowledge: but cer-
t a i n knowledge i s so common, so much a part of l i v -
i n g at a l l , that what i s obvious about i t i s clear 
to a l l . Peters^ point i s that knowledge of the use 
of moral language comes i n t o t h i s category: the f a c t 
of i t s use provides, i n a sense, reason enough f o r 
accepting that the use i s meaningful and not i n need 
of explanation i n other terms, as, f o r example, i n 
terms of a vague psychology of emotion. 
I n the second source, Peters developes t h i s idea, 
that moral discourse has an obvious point and that 
i t s use as moral discourse rests on c e r t a i n presup-
positions which are j u s t i f i e d by that very use and 
are not i n need of any 'further' j u s t i f i c a t i o n . The 
closeness of t h i s view to that expressed by Taylor, 
when he implies that the r a t i o n a l O b j e c t i v i t y of 
morality i s i m p l i c i t i n the language used to debate 
i t , i s unmistakeable. (See p. 49, supra.) A consid-
eration of the main idea put forward i n the chapter 
on moral theory i n t h i s source - a standard work on 
soci a l philosophy - w i l l indicate how current argum-
ents f o r r a t i o n a l i t y i n ethics are related to some of 
the great philosophical positions of the past. 
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The f a c t that passages from t h i s chapter echo 
sections of the broadcast t a l k s i s not unimportant 
from the point of view weajre adopting. I t i l l u s -
t r a t e s the meshing of s o c i a l theory, educational 
theory and ethics which i s one of Peters themes i n 
bringing a n a l y t i c a l philosophy to bear on education. 
This composite sector i s , i n f a c t , one the three 
philosophical areas - the other two are the theory 
of knowledge and the philosophy of mind, w i t h both 
of which we s h a l l be concerned l a t e r - which he and 
others of his 'school' take to be most c l e a r l y r e l -
evant to education and which feature very l a r g e l y 
i n the philosophising of parties to what we have 
called the ' o f f i c i a l * theory (see pp. 2 and 23, 
supra.). 
Peters argues that c e r t a i n basic c r i t e r i a f o r 
moral r u l e s , c r i t e r i a which moral philosophers have 
long endeavoured to state, are i n f a c t implied i n 
the f a c t of the attempt i t s e l f . This i s so because 
a serious, that i s , a r a t i o n a l and c r i t i c a l , invest-
i g a t i o n i s one which must accept c e r t a i n normative 
standards - by d e f i n i t i o n . A respect f o r t r u t h at 
a l l costs i s presupposed by such an i n v e s t i g a t i o n : 
arguments must be heeded and personal wielders of 
arguments ignored i f the process i s to merit the 
above description. As Peters puts i t : 'The very 
idea of searching f o r t r u t h takes f o r granted, then, 
a norm of i m p a r t i a l i t y which holds that issues 
should be decided according to relevant c r i t e r i a and 
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that exceptions should not be made on i r r e l e v a n t 
grounds.' ( 3 6 ) . 
What he i s saying i s that to do moral philosophy 
at a l l - to ask seriously f o r the c r i t e r i a according 
to which a r u l e can be judged a moral r u l s - i s to be 
committed already to t h a t . r a t i o n a l discussion which 
i s founded on i m p a r t i a l i t y , i n that discussion can 
only be r a t i o n a l discussion when arguments and evid-
ence are the norm, and personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are 
i r r e l e v a n t : only i n arguments, and the language i n 
which they are expressed, i s found the inter-person-
a l a r t i c u l a t i o n of experience which we term 'object-
i v e 1 . I n a sense, any r i g h t to p a r t i c i p a t e i n ser-
ious publio discussion of moral p r i n c i p l e s and t h e i r 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s earned by the o b l i g a t i o n to accept 
the presuppositions of the public language i n which 
that discussion i s carried on. The place of reason 
i n ethics ( Peters acknowledges his indebtedness to 
S.E.Toulmin, whose book with that t i t l e (37) was the 
f i r s t f u l l - s c a l e attempt by an a n a l y t i c a l philosoph-
er to erect a post-Stevensonian p o s i t i o n of t h i s 
type) i s u l t i m a t e l y to be found i n the uniqueness of 
moral discourse, which has emerged as man has devel-
oped to regulate human behaviour w i t h i n a network of 
i t s own l e g i t i m a t e ' r a t i o n a l i t y ' . 
(36) Peters, R. S.^nd Benn, S. I . , Social P r i n c i p -
les and the Democratic State (London. 1959) , p. 31 
(37) Toulmin, S. E., An Examination of the Place 
of Reason i n Ethics (1950) . 
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Peters adopts the unusual procedure ( f o r a con-
temporary a n a l y t i c a l philosopher) of buttressing h is 
p o s i t i o n by commentaries which show how aspects of i t 
are contained i n several c l a s s i c a l viewpoints on 
ethics: he goes back beyond emotivism i n order to 
reveal the strong foundations of his post-emotivist 
standpoint. To show what he means by 'moral reason-
ing' , f o r example, he penetrates deeply i n t o Hume's 
psychological theory of the passions, l a y i n g bare 
essential l o g i c a l points about ' r a t i o n a l i t y ' as he 
wishes to i n t e r p r e t i t - not i n any narrow sense 
t i e d to the notions of deduction and induction as i-:a 
these are associated with the sciences, but i n the 
wider, more l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n which l i n k s i t 
with the 'r a t i o n a l being' who i s v i r t u a l l y created 
by the separate and unique discourses i n which he 
p u b l i c l y partakes. 
Peters says: '...Hume made a great c o n t r i b u t i o n 
to moral theory i n showing that moral d i s t i n c t i o n s 
do not derive from reasoning i n the sense i n which 
t h i s i s used to describe s c i e n t i f i c or mathematical 
calculations. There i s a l o g i c a l gap between state-
ments of fact and normative judgments, and moral 
rules are quite u n l i k e mathematical axioms i n many 
respects. But i n sketching the moral senffie from 
which he thought our moral d i s t i n c t i o n s are derived 
he introduced the normative c r i t e r i o n of i m p a r t i a l -
i t y which we have claimed to be necessary f o r explaini-
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in g what i s meant by a r a t i o n a l being. For on our 
account a r a t i o n a l being i s one who abides by the 
norm of i m p a r t i a l i t y i n assessing arguments and 
claims.' ( 3 8 ) . 
Another c l a s s i c a l philosopher i n t e r p r e t e d i n such 
a way as to underline the main contention i s Kant, 
the form of whose arguments i n moral philosophy i s 
welcomed by Peters as fol l o w s : 'He was here s t a t i n g 
the i m p a r t i a l i t y p r i n c i p l e which i s basic to moral-
i t y . This i s that i f we maintain that a p r i n c i p l e 
i s a moral p r i n c i p l e , then part of what we mean i s 
that i t i s a p r i n c i p l e which holds f o r anyone i n a 
s i m i l a r s i t u a t i o n . ' ( 3 9 ) . And again, j u s t to take 
a l a s t example from many available, he examines 
U t i l i t a r i a n i s m and finds i t not lacking i n elements 
which add weftght to his own contemporary thesis. His 
conclusion of t h i s section admirably summarizes what 
he i s attempting to say throughout; and to say, not 
as an isolat e d voice but, i n keeping w i t h the content 
of the p o s i t i o n he presents, as a sort of 'public' 
speaker f o r a rooted philosophical t r a d i t i o n . 
He ends: 'Our contention i s , therefore, that there 
i s a sense i n which moral philosophy or ethics, which 
i s the attempt to make e x p l i c i t the c r i t e r i a i n fc&rms 
of which rules are morally j u s t i f i e d , i t s e l f exemp-
(38) Peters, R. S., op. c i t . , p. 44 
(39) I b i d . , p. 49 . 
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p l i f i e s , i n a minimal degree, the acceptance of the 
c r i t e r i a which i t attempts to make e x p l i c i t . For 
philosophy, l i k e science, i s a clear example of r a t -
i o n a l discussion, and i s conducted i n accordance 
with the norms of i m p a r t i a l i t y and respect f o r t r u t h . 
Philosophers f l o u r i s h only i n societies where the r a t 
ional t r a d i t i o n has taken root. And though, as p h i l -
osophers, they are not committed to any p a r t i c u l a r 
maxims... they are, as philosophers, committed to 
the very abstract procedural c r i t e r i a implied i n 
being reasonable...Being moral i s a species under 
the genus of being reasonable. 1 (40-)-. 
But i t can also be said that philosophy can 
f l o u r i s h only when convincing arguments on one side 
are confronted by convincing arguments on the other 
- t h i s i s the presupposition of the present thesis. 
Peters presents a formidable case which only an 
equally formidable c r i t i c would dare attempt to 
shake: f o r t u n a t e l y there are such c r i t i c s , which 
makes the s i t u a t i o n p hilosophically i n t e r e s t i n g 
even i f somewhat inconclusive, the price of p h i l -
osophy even i n the age of the blanket-term 'Analysis' 
One such i s the 'pure'moral philosopher Atkinson, 
already mentioned (see p. 46, supra.); and another 
i s J.D.O'Connor who, though not arguing d i r e c t l y 
against the p o s i t i o n adopted by Peters, does i n f a c t 
present another e t h i c a l point of view w i t h i n the 
context of education which i s important f o r the 
(40) I b i d . , p. M 56. 
question o f 'bearing' we are e x p l o r i n g 
We s h a l l r e t u r n t o Peters i n the next chapter 
on moral education, f o r other p a r t s o f h i s pre-1966 
c o n t r i b u t i o n are o f s i n g u l a r importance f o r t h a t 
theme, the second element, i t w i l l be remembered, 
a r i s i n g out o f the pioneer comments on e t h i c s and 
education made by Hardie (see p.p. 37-8, supra.) see 
There we s h a l l / x t h e ' a p p l i c a t i o n ' , as i t were, of 
the h i g h l e v e l t h e o r i s i n g we are pursuing - the 
p o i n t of i t a l l f o r the e d u c a t i o n i s t . As g e t e r s 
h i m s e l f puts i t t h e r e : 'Bacon once said tteaat t h e 
discourse o f philosophers i s l i k e the s t a r s ; i t 
sheds l i t t l e l i g h t because i t i s so h i g h . But 
when i t i s brought nearer the e a r t h , as I hope i t 
has been i n t h i s paper... 1 (41) For the moment, 
however, we must remain a t s t a r l e v e l I 
The Wary - A t k i n s o n And O'Connor. 
Atkin s o n has, i n the important a r t i c l e mention-
ed above, some sobering comments on what he describe 
'...a prominent theme i n recent moral philosophy 
whose i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r moral education are, i t 
seems to me, i n s u f f i c i e n t l y appreciated i n much 
t h a t i s w r i t t e n on the t o p i c . ' ( 4 2 ) . He t h i n k s i t 
important to s t r e s s , i n comparison w i t h much being 
(41) Peters, R. S., 'The Paradox of Moral Educat 
i o n 1 i n N i b l e t t , W. R.(Ed.), Moral Education i n a 
Changing Society (London, 1963), p. 65. 
(42) Atkinson, R. P., op. c i t . , p. 171. 
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w r i t t e n along what we have termed the 'Peters' 
l i n e s , the sense i n which tbere are open o p t i o n s i n 
m o r a l i t y ; the sense, t h a t i s , i n which disagreement 
i s p o s s i b l e , even probable, and q u i t e l e g i t i m a t e . 
I n o r der t o do t h i s , he has t o e l u c i d a t e the coneept 
of ' i n s t r u c t i o n 1 : h i s conclusion i s , b r i e f l y , t h a t 
i t i s e s s e n t i a l l y t h a t r a t i o n a l process which demands 
the p r o d u c t i o n of adequate.support f o r any con t e n t -
ions being made t o another. This e n t a i l s the g i v -
i n g o f p r o o f s , evidence and reasons a p p r o p r i a t e t o 
the p a r t i c u l a r area of i n s t r u c t i o n , and c o n v i c t i o n 
on the p a r t o f the r e c i p i e n t o n l y t o the extent t h a t 
such support warrants. I n t h i s way, c o n v i c t i o n 
must be j u s t i f i e d and assent must be r a t i o n a l i n the 
process of ' i n s t r u c t i o n ' . 
I n any area, i t w i l l be seen, what A t k i n s o n 
means by ' i n s t r u c t i o n * presupposes c e r t a i n approp-
r i a t e c r i t e r i a of t r u t h , cogency and correctn e s s : 
w i t h o u t these, i t i s not l e g i t i m a t e t o use the con-
cept - which i s c l e a r l y r e l a t e d t o what ot h e r p h i l -
osophers w i t h l i k e i n t e r e s t s , i n c l u d i n g Peters, c a l l 
' e d u c a t i o n 1 , as we s h a l l seernlater. I t must be noted 
t h a t the pre s u p p o s i t i o n s concern c r i t e r i a and not 
any t h i n g more s u b s t a n t i a l , a f a c t o f some s i g n i f i c -
ance i n determining to what extent the 'wariness' o f 
Atkin s o n c o n s t i t u t e s t o t a l disagreement w i t h the views 
he i s examining. He makes t h i s p o i n t i n saying: ' I t 
i s not r e q u i r e d t h a t t h e r e should be a body o f estab-
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l i s h e d truths, f a c t s , laws, practices i n the f i e l d , 
only that there should be c r i t e r i a f or determining 
what i s and what i s not acceptable.' (43). 
Atkinson i s , i n t h i s way, leading i n to the key 
question - whether there are moral truths to be 
discovered, and so whether there can be moral educ-
ation (or 'instruction' i n the senae i n which he 
defines i t ) based upon the kind of reasoning on 
which such truths depend: as he puts i t , '...the pres 
ent concern i s with...the question whether there i s 
a possible content f o r moral i n s t r u c t i o n 1 (44). At 
root, the answer he himself gives i s that the opp-
osite, of any moral position can be maintained with-
out l o g i c a l error or f a c t u a l mistake, because there 
have not been demonstrated any c r i t e r i a of truth i n 
t h i s f i e l d . 
At f i r s t sight, t h i s a s s e r t i o n sets him up i n 
complete opposition to the position of those who 
argue for the place of reason i n e t h i c s ; but the 
plain-ness of ±± becomes adorned with the kind of 
b l u r r i n g q u a l i f i c a t i o n which we have noted i n much 
of the philosophising on morals. He establishes 
a d i s t i n c t i o n betwwen a c r i t e r i o n for moral truth 
and a c r i t e r i o n for the correct application of 
moral language which brings him back into the fold 
u h i cf43<)e i b i d . , p. 173. 
(44) I b i d . , p. 175. 
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which we described above (see pp. 50 and 51). He 
i s not b l i n d t o the i n s i g h t s i n t o language f u n c t i o n s 
gained from the p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s o f , 
say, the l a s t t e n years; but he i s concerned t o 
place the emphasis i n a way d i f f e r e n t from t h a t i n 
which i t i s commonly being placed by moral p h i l o s -
ophers working i n the context of education. He 
d i s t i n g u i s h e s the two c r i t e r i a i n t h i s way: 'There 
i s no one who s e r i o u s l y e n t e r t a i n s the hope o f 
being able to e s t a b l i s h a s u b s t a n t i a l moral c r i t -
e r i o n , a touchstone of moral t r u t h . The p o s s i b i l -
i t y o f f o r m u l a t i n g a c r i t e r i o n f o r a p p l y i n g the 
term 'moral' i s , o f course, another and fe. l e s s mom-
entous a f f a i r . ' (45). 
S t a r t i n g from the problem posed by Hume's c l a s s i c 
d i s t i n c t i o n between ' i s ' and 'ought' ( t h e ' l o g i c a l 
gap' which enters i n t o Peters' argument - see p. 57, 
supra.), A t k i n s o n comments on the v a r i o u s attempts 
made r e c e n t l y t o show t h a t moral d e c i s i o n s can be 
completely j u s t i f i e d . He reviews Hare, Toulmin and, 
f i n a l l y , Taylor - a l l o f whom we have had to c i t e 
i n g i v i n g the e s s e n t i a l background to what we can noxv 
best term the ' c o g n i t i v i s t ' approach - a p p r e c i a t i n g 
t h e i r s u b t l e t y i n e x p l o r i n g the nuances o f language 
use, but remaining adamadit i n h i s a s s e r t i o n t h a t 'No 
recent moral philosopher has found a way round the 
(45) I b i d . , p. 176 
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the p o i n t t h a t i r r e d u c i b l e d i f f e r e n c e s are p o s s i b l e 
i n m o r a l i t y and t h a t " j u s t i f i c a t i o n s " i n t h i s f i e l d 
have the remarkable p r o p e r t y o f f a i l i n g t o exclude 
opposed a l t e r n a t i v e s * ( 4 6 ) . 
Atkinson g r a n t s t h a t Taylor's d i s c u s s i o n o f the 
que s t i o n o f u l t i m a t e j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s as thorough 
as any could be - as indeed i t i s , being as compre-
hensive an enquiry as even the Americans are l i k e l y 
t o demand - but i n s i s t s t h a t , as Taylor's c o n d i t i o n s 
f o r a choice o f a way o f l i f e t o be a r a t i o n a l choice 
( t h e absolute c o n d i t i o n s f o r the chooser o f 'freedom' 
'enlightenment' and ' i m p a r t i a l i t y ' ) can never i n prac 
t i c e be known t o be f u l f i l l e d , i t : '...seems i n the 
end t o amount to no more than a more ela b o r a t e r e -
statement of Hare's p o s i t i o n . ' ( 4 7 ) . 
He then t u r n s to oth e r s e t t i n g s o f questions 
about j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n m o r a l i t y and so comes to 
Peters, f o r such s e t t i n g s are those designed t o av-
o i d the d i f f i c u l t y of u l t i m a t e j u s t i f i c a t i o n by 
p u t t i n g the questions i n such a way as t o b l u r the 
normal d i s t i n c t i o n between means and ends, a d i s t -
i n c t i o n which makes i t easy t o show j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
w i t h i n a framework but impossible t o show j u s t i f -
i c a t i o n o f a framework, t h a t i s , the u l t i m a t e j u s t -
i f i c a t i o n whieh i s the o b j e c t o f the search. Atkinson 
r e f e r s , i n t h i s c o n t e x t , t o the o u t s t a n d i n g character 
(46) I b i d . , p. 179. 
(47) I b i d . , p. 179. 
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i s t i c of Peters' most recent work, expressing the 
k i n d o f doubt about i t s e f f e c t on the d i s c u s s i o n 
which i s i n l i n e w i t h s t r e s s put on the 'open' nat-
ure o f the bearing of modern a n a l y t i c a l philosophy 
on educational t h e o r y t o be found throughout the 
present account. 
He says: 'Peters' recent d i s c u s s i o n o f moral 
education . . . w i l l bear examination from t h i s p o i n t 
of view. U~ot t h a t he Has, as I understand him, so 
much concerned w i t h questions o f j u s t i f i c a t i o n as 
w i t h emphasising the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a p p r a i s i n g the 
manner of education as w e l l as i t s aims and content. 
I t i s a l l the same worth e n q u i r i n g whether t h i s r e -
d i r e c t i o n o f emphasis a f f e c t s the matter o f j u s t i f -
i c a t i o n . ' ( 4 8 ) . And the r e s u l t o f h i s examination, 
of importance here, i n the next chapter and f o r our 
general t h e s i s , i s a f e e l i n g o f unease about the 
change i n emphasis: the s t r e s s on the manner r a t h e r 
than the matter i n moral education may obscure the 
££ct t h a t d e c i s i o n s have to be made - about the man-
ner i t s e l f . The r u l e s and the methods necessary 
f o r the guidance of p r a c t i c a l choices are, A t k i n s o n 
seeks t o remind us, adopted on the basis odf d e c i s i o n s 
t h a t we must make. 
His conclusion m e r i t s comparison w i t h t h a t of 
Peters (see pp. 58 and 59, supra.) and leaves the 
(48) I b i d . , p. 180 
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impression t h a t , w i t h such tenacious doubt i n the 
face o f undeniably s t r o n g commitment, e t h i c s cannot 
be f a r away from some major, enforced r e s o l u t i o n . 
He declares: ' I t might w e l l be thought t h a t the im-
p o s s i b i l i t y of e s t a b l i s h i n g an u l t i m a t e moral c r i t -
e r i o n has reeeivexL.at.lleast as much emphasis as i t 
deserves i n recent moral philosophy. I have, how-
ever, been s t r u c k by the absence o f much r e f l e c t i o n 
o f i t i n most of the discussions of moral education 
I have seen. There i s undeniably a widespread b e l -
i e f i n the importance o f moral education and some 
a t t e n t i o n i s given t o questions o f method and app-
roach, but i t seems t o be assumed t h a t t h e r e i s no 
room f o r serious d i s p u t e about what i s t o be t a u g h t . 
This assumption - but perhaps i t i s r e a l l y a con-
s p i r a c y o f s i l e n c e - needs very l i t t l e c o n s i d e r a t -
i o n t o be seen to be q u i t e e x t r a o r d i n a r y . There 
i s o b v i o u s l y widespread disagreement on the moral 
issues of d a i l y l i f e , on the ' d e t a i l s ' o f m o r a l i t y , . 
and, as Ihave t r i e d t o show, t h e r e i s l i t t l e enough 
reason to suppose t h a t x a g r e a t e r measure o f agree-
ment can be reached on fundamentals.' (49)« 
We t u r n l a s t l y t o the other philosopher o f a 
doubting t u r n of mind mentioned i n the t i t l e o f 
t h i s s e c t i o n - O'Connor. This i s an a p p r o p r i a t e 
p o i n t a t which t o make a f i r s t r e ference to h i s work, 
(49) I b i d . , p. 181. 
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f o r i t stands a t the c h r o n o l o g i c a l midpoint between 
t h a t o f Hardie and t h a t o f Peters, whose w r i t i n g s 
have provided the o r i g i n and focus f o r the e x p l o r a t -
i o n c a r r i e d out so f a r ; and i t thus enables us t o 
sample e t h i c a l theory as i t has been developed by 
philosophers w i t h an i n t e r e s t i n education a t a 
p o i n t midway between the extremes of the s h o r t per-
i o d d u r i n g which the 'bearing' under examination has 
developed. We can ask of O'Connor where he stands 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , both i n r e l a t i o n t o the o t h e r two 
'co-workers' and to the more general background i n 
'pure' e t h i c s which has been sketched. The answers 
w i l l be i n t e r e s t i n g on two counts: f i r s t , as y e t 
another example of the amazing v a r i e t y t o be found 
w i t h i n whatever u n i t y e t h i c s may be sai d t o possess; 
second, as coming from a philosopher who i s o f great 
s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r the ' h i s t o r i c a l ' approach t o the 
question of 'bearing', i n t h a t h i s work preceded 
t h a t which i s c u r r e n t l y p r o l i f e r a t i n g and i s , i n 
f a c t , the o n l y major c o n t r i b u t i o n t o appear between 
Hardie and the 'present' ( l i b e r a l l y i n t e r p r e t e d ) -
a l b e i t i t a c o n t r i b u t i o n i n which many now i n t e r e s t e d 
see more 'philosophy' than 'education'. 
O'Connor's book leaves us i n no doubt as t o the 
importance he a t t r i b u t e s t o e t h i c s . There i s a whole 
chapter on the j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f value judgments, the 
b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l notes are loaded w i t h references to 
the standard and a n a l y t i c a l approaches to the problem, 
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and the author o f t e n repeats what he c l e a r l y regards 
as a c e n t r a l p a r t o f h i s theme: 'The nature o f value 
judgments and the l o g i c o f t h e i r j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s 
thus the most important and most obvious p o i n t of 
contact between philosophy and education and I sJaall 
discuss t h i s i n some d e t a i l . ' (50-)-. He does, b u t , 
as much o f the d e t a i l has already been covered w i t h 
reference t o other philosophers i n the present account, 
we can reduce the space spent on O'Connor to the min-
imum, i n a chapter a l r e a d y swollen w i t h c o n t r a s t i n g 
t h e o r i e s . 
He c l e a r s the ground, as does Hardie, of the i n -
strumental sense o f moral terms by making '...the 
commonplace d i s t i n c t i o n between t h i n g s t h a t are good 
as means and those t h a t are good as ends.' ( 5 1 ) . He 
thus, as an orthodox means/ends d i s t i n g u i s h e r , f a l l s 
i n t o the non-Peters class mentioned above (see p. 64). 
Next, the s t a t u s o f philosophers' questions o f value 
i s c l a r i f i e d : they are '...not questions t h a t can be 
f i n a l l y answered by the c o l l e c t i o n and assessment o f 
f a c t u a l evidence. We must indeed take account o f a l l 
the f a c t s t h a t may be r e l e v a n t ; but these f a c t s , though 
they may be necessary t o r e s o l v e such a d i s p u t e , are 
not u s u a l l y s u f f i c i e n t . 1 ( 5 2 ) . This i n i t i a l o r i s n -
t a t i o n leads him, through a review o f ' o b j e c t i v i s t ' 
(50) O'Connor, J.. D., An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o the P h i l -
osophy of Education (London, 1957), p. 13. 
(51) I b i d . , p. 53 
(52) I b i d . , p. 55. 
69 
and 1 s u b j e c t i v i s t 1 t h e o r i e s , bot& o f which presuppose 
a f a c t - s t a t i n g use o f language, t o the p o i n t a t which 
he issues a Hardie-type i n v i t a t i o n : ' l e t us ^herefoee 
l o o k a t some of the o t h e r usgs of language t o see 
whether we may not get a more s a t i s f a c t o r y view o f 
value statements by t a k i n g account of these uses.'(53). 
Soon, there i s f a m i l i a r t a l k of the 'expressive' 
and 'persuasive' uses o f language, w i t h c r i t i c a l r e f -
erence t o the o r i g i n a l , crude form o f the emotive 
theory and the refinements o f Stevenson. O'Connor 
a t t h i s p o i n t reads f a r more c o n v i n c i g g l y than does 
Hardie, w i t h whom comparisons can be made on the 
grounds of mutual sources. He seems f a r more aware 
than Hardie of the attempts made to i n d i c a t e the p a r t 
played by reasons i n s u p p o r t i n g the p u b l i c claims 
o f moral judgments when he says, f o r example: 'We 
have somehow to show t h a t asjwell as being expressible , 
moral judgments are (a) i n t e r p e r s o n a l and (b) cap-
able o f r a t i o n a l support. An attempt to develop 
the expressive theory t o meet these d e f e c t s has 
been worked out i n some d e t a i l . . . ( t h e o r i g i n a l v e r -
s i o n . . . i s due to...Stevenson)...In t h i s way, a care-
f u l and d e t a i l e d study of the c o m p l e x i t i e s of a c t u a l 
moral discourse and the r e l a t i o n s between the i n f o r m -
a t i v e , expressive and persuasive uses of language 
can throw new l i g h t on the c e n t r a l problem o f moral 
( 5 3 ) I b i d . , p. 62. 
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philosophy, the problem of showing how our value 
judgments can be j u s t i f i e d . ' (54). 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t o s t a t e t h a t l i g h t can be thrown 
i s not i n i t s e l f t o throw l i g h t . O'Connor's account 
l a c k s the p o s i t i v e e f f e c t o f e i t h e r ' H a r d i e 1 s 'no one 
i s r i g h t and no one i s wrong! or Peters' i n s i s t e n c e on 
the o b j e c t i v i t y of m o r a l i t y . W r i t i n g i n 1957 he s u f -
f e r s from the u n c e r t a i n t y consequent upon a r e j e c t i o n 
o f the 'ol d ' a t a time when the 'new' has not been 
f u l l y f o r m u l a t e d . Like A t k i n s o n , who has the advant-
age of knowing what l a t e r developments have to o f f e r , 
O'Connor b e l i e v e s , nevertheless, t h a t the r o l e o f 
reason i n e t h i c s i s p r o b l e m a t i c a l : he says, ' I t can 
not be s a i d t h a t any philosopher has y e t give n a s o l -
u t i o n of i t t h a t i s both convincing and complete.' (55). 
His conclusion takes the form of a warning 
a g a i n s t dogmatism i n e t h i c s - a warning which the 
course t h i s account has had t o take must u n d e r l i n e . 
The very complexity of the problem, he argues, r e v e a l -
ed by the work o f Stevenson and displayed by those 
f o l l o w i n g him who have attempted to disen t a n g l e the 
v a r i o u s elements i n moral discourse, should make us 
wary of a simple answer. L i k e Atkinson again, h i s 
tone i s u n e n t h u s i a s t i c i n a s s e r t i n g t h a t '...the con-
s t r u c t i v e p a r t s of recent moral t h e o r i e s have not been 
(54) I b i d . , pp. 66 and 67. 
(55) I b i d . , p. 67. 
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so obvious o r so e f f e c t i v e as the c r i t i c a l p a r t s , 1 
(56) and thus p l a c i n g h i m s e l f , w i t h o u t a t the time 
knowing i t , i n o p p o s i t i o n to those l i k e Peters whose 
most evident i n t e n t i o n i s to be ' c o n s t r u c t i v e ' and 
who would, no doubt, vigo<-rrously deny Atkinson's 
c o n t e n t i o n t h a t '...the most thorough d i s c u s s i o n of 
the t o p i c t h a t has appeared...though i t i s c l e a r l y 
intended t o advance the discussion...seems i n the 
end t o amount to no more than a more elaborate r e -
statement. 1 ( 5 7 ) . 
From our p o i n t o f view, the i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r educ-
a t i o n of O'Connor's p o s i t i o n on the j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f 
value judgments seem, i n s h o r t , negative when com-
pared w i t h those o f both h i s most not a b l e predecessor 
and h i s most a c t i v e successor: Hardie, i n the end 
' t o l e r a n t o f a l l t h e i r t h e o r i e s ' ( 5 8 ) , has at l e a s t 
the m e r i t o f d e l i v e r i n g such a rough blow t h a t we are 
moved, as we have been, to f i n d c i v i l i z e d ways of 
co u n t e r i n g i t ; Peters i s i n d i s p u t a b l y thorough, t e n -
acious, convinced and contemporarily f o r c e f u l . 
What O'Connor has to o f f e r i s l e s s s u b s t a n t i a l b u t , 
n e v e r t h e l e s s , of value a t another l e v e l ; f o r he con-
cludes by s t r e s s i n g what must appear t o us by now 
to be the obvious, but which he t h i n k s - and we must 
agree - w e l l worth s t r e s s i n g because of i t s obvious-
ness; and i t i s a considered p h i l o s o p h i c a l o p i n i o n 
(56) I b i d . , p. 71. 
(57) A t k i n s o n , R. F., op. c i t . , p. 179. 
(58) Hardie, C. D., op. c i t . , p. 127. 
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which, even today, as we have documented, does not 
l a c k formidable p r o f e s s i o n a l support - '...the prob-
lem o f how t o j u s t i f y our value judgments i s s t i l l 
an unsolved problem of philosophy. To r e a l i z e t h i s 
w i l l save us from dogmatism and a t the same time en-
courage us t o go on l o o k i n g f o r an answer.' ( 5 9 ) . 
C e r t a i n l y the review given so f a r o f the bear-
i n g o f modern a n a l y t i c a l philosophy on edu c a t i o n a l 
theory - a l e n g t h y review t o be given o f only one, 
the e t h i c a l , aspect, but shor t enough on consider-
a t i o n o f the prime importance o f t h a t aspect - sug-
gests t h a t dogmatism i s u n l i k e l y t o s u r v i v e i n the 
c l i m a t e of c r i t i c a l awareness t o be discovered amongst 
the v a r i e t y o f viewpoints t h a t have been i l l u s t r a t e d . 
The sampling o f p o s i t i o n s which has a r i s e n from Har-
die ' s f i r s t problem( 1...what i s meant by such a term 
as "good" or "valuable"?' (60)) has embraced p h i l o s -
o p h i s i n g 'done " w i t h i n ah ed u c a t i o n a l context and w i t h -
out; and throughout t h i s sample, l i m i t e d though i t 
i s i n comparison w i t h the massive c o n t r i b u t i o n being 
made ( p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the minor p e r i o d i c a l l i t e r a t u r e 
l i s t e d i n the b i b l i o g r a p h y ) , the debate i s l i v e l y , 
w i t h no p o s i t i o n able to c l a i m , as y e t , a consensus 
of p h i l o s o p h i c a l opnion and the power which commands 
acceptance. To a s i m i l a r , but of n e c e s s i t y s h o r t e r , 
type o f e x p l o r a t i o n of the l i t e r a t u r e , which f l o w s 
(59)0'Connor J. D., op. c i t . , p. 71. 
(60) Hardie, C. D., op. c i t . , p. 118 
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from Hardie's second problem (see p. 37, supra) we 
can now go - t o the problem of moral education. 
CHAPTER I I I 
EDUCATION AND MORALITY 
Hardie And The 'Second Problem' 
Hardie i s not very i l l u m i n a t i n g on the 'second 
problem', t h a t o f moral education. But, a t l e a s t , 
h i s views, f o r a l l t h e i r l i m i t a t i o n s , give us another 
p o i n t o f e n t r y i n t o the l a t e r l i t e r a t u r e i n which 
the problem i s more thoroughly discussed; and they 
are l i n k e d , as the l a t e r discussions are, w i t h the 
more t h e o r e t i c a l questions o f e t h i c s j u s t surveyed. 
One of the main reasons, i n f a c t , f o r the enquiry 
i n t o e t h i c s by e d u c a t i o n a l l y - minded philosophers i s 
t h a t f i r m f i n d i n g s t h e r e w i l l have i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r 
moral education - a p o i n t which Hardie, i t w i l l be 
remembered, was the f i r s t t o make. While making 
i t , he pr o v i d e s , u n w i t t i n g l y , the excuse f o r h i s 
l a c k ox£ i l l u m i n a t i o n on the problems o f educating 
f o r m o r a l i t y , f o r he s t a t e s t h a t the ' s o l u t i o n of 
the second problem w i l l , however, probably depend on 
the s o l u t i o n of the f i r s t ' ( 1 ) : and we know now t h a t 
h i s own p a r t i c u l a r s o l u t i o n i s , even comparatively, 
not very s u c c e s s f u l . 
The guidance he o f f e r s t o parent and teacher con-
cerned w i t h the moral education of c h i l d r e n i s what 
(1) Hardie, C. D., op. c i t . , p. 118. 
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we can expect from a philosopher adopting a weakly-
developed v e r s i o n of the Stevensonian theory i n 
e t h i c s . An emphasis i s placed upon t h e i r ensuring 
t h a t c h i l d r e n are presented w i t h p l e n t y o f s i t u a t i o n s 
i n which they are l i k e l y t o experience the emotions 
which value judgments are s a i d t o express. This i s 
the burden o f the very general piece o f advice given 
by Hardie (before t a k i n g i t h i m s e l f and sketching i n 
i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s I). He says '... the e d u c a t i o n i s t 
should a d j u s t the ostensive d e f i n i t i o n s which he gives 
according t o the a l t e r n a t i v e s which he accepts. 1 ( 2 ) . 
The method of moral education advocated f i t s the 
e t h i c a l ' a l t e r n a t i v e ' which Hardie accepts: i t s t r e s s -
es the a r o u s a l i n the c h i l d o f the s o r t s o f f e e l i n g 
f o r t h i n g s which the parent o r teacher h i m s e l f exper-
iences. According to Hardie, t h i s i n f a c t happens, 
f o r many parents i n p r a c t i c e employ the very t e c h -
nique o f encouraging t h e i r c h i l d r e n t o l i k e what 
they themselves t h i n k i s v i r t u o u s behaviour by t e l l -
i n g them c o n s t a n t l y t h a t they, the c h i l d r e n , do l i k e 
i t , u n t i l the statement becomes t r u e w i t h i n the emot-
i o n a l complex of the r e l a t i o n s h i p . I n t h i s way c h i l -
dren are, and should be, t r a i n e d w h i l e q u i t e young t o 
have, as he puts i t , ' . . . c e r t a i n f e e l i n g s about o b j e c t s 
and s i t u a t i o n s , and indeed t o have learned the use o f 
"good" so as t o i n f l u e n c e o t h e r people's f e e l i n g s ' ( 3 ) . 
(2) I b i d . , p. 122. 
(3) I b i d . , p. 126. 
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This advice i s of l i t t l e use to educators. I t 
i s doubtless one description of what does take place 
within f a m i l i e s , but what i s wanted i s a way of d i s -
tinguishing methods within the context l e f t unanal-
ysed beneath terms l i k e ' f e e l i n g 1 ; otherwise moral 
'education' cannot be i d e n t i f i e d amongst the ' i n -
ddctrination' or the p l a i n , unthinking conformity to 
to be found i n the family si t u a t i o n s which Hardie 
describes. He i s c e r t a i n l y l o g i c a l , i n that the ad-
vi c e , for what i t i s worth, follows from the e t h i c s , 
for what that i s worth; but such emotivist theory and 
i t s implications for practice seem to have the very 
grave defect of being compatible with any content of 
moral education we care to name, and t h i s , we sense, 
can't be r i g h t . I n any event, Hardie's method would 
lead to the very s i t u a t i o n which he elsewhere con-
demns, for, as he says, 'Education would c l e a r l y 
have pa r t l y f a i l e d i f individuals behaved p e r f e c t l y 
but did not know i t ' ( 4 ) ; and having the 'right' 
feelings i s not knowing why they are r i g h t . 
As with moral theory (see p. 28, supra) we turn 
from"the disappointing early work of Hardie to the 
more recent work of Peters; and with even greater 
promise, i n that, as we have seen, the main purpose 
of Peters 1 work i n ethics has been to see i t r e f l e c t -
ed i n the"process of education, of which moral educ-
ation i s , i n h i s view and on the proportional evid-
(4) I b i d . , p. 118. 
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ence of h i s writings, one of the most important asp-
ects. Further, i t i s i n Peters' philosophy, with i t s 
unorthodox blurring of the means/ends dichotomy, 
that we f i n d questions of value being b u i l t into the 
general concept of 'education 1, so that whatever he 
has to say about moral education w i l l lead impercept-
i b l y into the l e s s r e s t r i c t e d questions about educ-
ation under i t s other aspects, which we need to ex-
plore i n t h i s account. For t h i s reason the chapter 
i s c a l l e d 'Education and Morality 1 and w i l l contain, 
towards the end, a f i r s t sketch of the concept of 
'education', to be amplified l a t e r , as with the pre-
liminary sketch of the nature of a n a l y s i s (See p. 14, 
supra). 
Peters And The 'Language' And 'Literature' 
Of Morality 
Peters, too, r e f e r s to the child-parent r e l a t i o n -
ship; but h i s parent, unlike that of Hardie, i s not 
any old begetter of children involved i n the job of 
passing something on and doing i t i n the 'natural' 
way. He i s a thoughtful, seriously-minded parent, 
rather l i k e the famous philosopher-father mentioned 
by Peters i n h i s t a l k of the two necessary kinds of 
rul e s which are found at the core of moral education. 
He says i n a source not yet tapped by us: 'Prom the 
point of view of moral education i t would be p a r t i c -
u l a r l y important to pass on procedural ru l e s and 
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"basic r u l e s . Hence, presumably, the importance 
which Hare attaches to the question to which he 
thinks moral philosophers should address themselves 
very seriously: "How should I bring up my c h i l -
dren?"' ( 5 ) . 
The necessity of passing on procedural r u l e s i s 
the fundamental point of Peters' t h e s i s , and one 
which, once f u l l y grasped, considerably softens the 
paradox of reason and habit i n moral education 
which he describes. Believing firmly i n the auton-
omy of morality and the p o s s i b i l i t y of moral action 
being validated by the production of reasons within 
what he terms '...a d i s t i n c t i v e form of discourse 
which has developed to answer d i s t i n c t i v e forms of 
questions' ( 6 ) , he seems more fortunately placed 
than i s Hardie to give advice on the methods of moral 
education; for he i s not inhibited by any such view 
as that which r a t e s moral b e l i e f s as nothing more 
than elaborate and refined versions of mere personal 
preferences. He can t a l k of r u l e s , which are i n t e r -
subjective and i d e n t i f i a b l e by the serious enquirer. 
Moral rules can, i n Peters' view, be applied 
i n t e l l i g e n t l y i n the l i g h t of relevant differences 
i n circumstances' (7) because there are c e r t a i n 
higher-order p r i n c i p l e s which, as we have seen him 
(5) Peters, R. S., 'Reason and Habit: The Para-
dox of Moral Education* i n Niblett, W. R. (Ed.), 
Moral Education i n a Changing Society (London, 1963), p.52 
(6) I b i d . , p. 47. 
(7) I b i d . , p. 51 . 
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maintain, can be r a t i o n a l l y j u s t i f i e d . These p r i n -
c i p l e s , '...presupposed by the very a c t i v i t y of giv-
ing reasons i n p r a c t i c a l discourse 1 ( 8 ) , are those of 
i m p a r t i a l i t y , l i b e r t y , t r u t h - t e l l i n g and the consid-
eration of i n t e r e s t s . C l e a r l y , any philosopher who 
thinks i n t h i s manner must have much to o f f e r on the 
teaching of morality, for he i s taking morality and 
the f a c t s and presuppositions of moral language very 
ser i o u s l y indeed and not handicapping himself for 
t h i s r o l e , as does Hardie, by i n t e r p r e t i n g the prob-
lem i n terms of complex expressions of emotion. As 
Peters declares, reminding us of h i s 'ordinary lang-
uage' position within a n a l y t i c a l philsophy, ' . . . i f 
we ceased to use these words and s t i l l wanted to 
get people to do things by means other than t w i s t -
ing t h e i r arms, hypnotizing them or giving them 
orders, we should have to devise a new family of 
words to do t h i s job.' ( 9 ) . 
Procedural p r i n c i p l e s are those which can be r e t -
ained even thoujgh the content of lower l e v e l r u l e s 
i s changed. Their possession ensures that the moral 
code of any person holding to them i s r a t i o n a l l y 
maintained. Peters looks to science for an analogy: 
morality, l i k e science, i s an autonomous a c t i v i t y ; 
and both a c t i v i t i e s show various l e v e l s of r u l e s , 
p r i n c i p l e s and procedures, an awareness of the d i s -
(8) I b i d . , p. 59. 
(9) I b i d . , p. 48. 
80 
t i n c t i v e nature of which makes a person, r e s p e c t -
i v e l y , a r a t i o n a l l y moral person or a s c i e n t i s t - and 
the t eaching of each w i l l be s i m i l a r l y based upon 
producing t h i s awareness. As Peters says, ' . . . i n a 
r a t i o n a l code there would be procedural r u l e s which 
could be regarded as presupposed by the very a c t i v i t y 
of g i v i n g reasons f o r r u l e s ; there would then be bas-
i c r u l e s which would be those which could be j u s t i f -
i e d under any conceivable s o c i a l c o n d i t i o n s ; then 
there would be more r e l a t i v e r u l e s which would dep-
end, f o r t h e i r j u s t i f i a b i l i t y , on more contingent 
f a c t s about p a r t i c u l a r s o c i a l , economic and geo-
g r a p h i c a l c o n d i t i o n s . From the p o i n t of view o f 
moral education i t would be p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p ortant 
to pass on procedural r u l e s and basic r u l e s . ' ( 1 0 ) . 
So f a r our l e v e l has remained somewhat t h e o r e t -
i c a l , r e l a t e d to the l a s t chapter and an i l l u s t r a t -
i o n of the pervasiveness of theory i n t h i s important 
aspect o f the 'bearing' i n question. Peters' p r e l i m -
i n a r y remarks are of t h i s k i n d , but he passes event-
u a l l y t o the l e s s a b s t r a c t concern and makes an imp-
o r t a n t p o i n t which i s connected w i t h the t i t l e chosen 
f o r t h i s s e c t i o n . He says: '...moral education w i l l 
be as much concerned w i t h the promotion of good a c t -
i v i t i e s as i t w i l l be w i t h the maintenance o f r u l e s 
f o r s o c i a l conduct, w i t h what ought to be as w e l l as 
(10) I b i d . , p. 52 
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with what men ought to do.* ( 1 1 ) . A d i s t i n c t i o n 
s i m i l a r to that made between the procedural and sub-
s t a n t i a l aspects of a r a t i o n a l moral code i s here 
suggested. I t originates i n the influence upon Peters, 
to be noted at many points i n h i s recent work, of 
Michael Oakeshott's now-famous description of the 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between what he c a l l s the 'language* 
and the ' l i t e r a t u r e * of the areas of human experience. 
( 1 2 ) . 
Peters makes reference to t h i s when he states 
that, 'The business of moral education c o n s i s t s large-
l y i n i n i t i a t i n g people into the "language" so that 
they can use i t i n an autonomous manner. This i s 
done l a r g e l y by introducing them to the " l i t e r a t -
ure" 1 ( 1 3 ) . By the use of one of h i s fi'avourite terms, 
' i n i t i a t i o n 1 , he shows that h i s thinking about moral 
education i s of a piece with h i s thinking about, educ-
ation i n general such as appears most cogently ex-
pressed i n h i s inaugural l e c t u r e ( 14 )o Young c h i l -
dren have to be i n i t i a t e d into morality. E a r l y ex-
perience i s of very great importance for l a t e r moral 
development, a f a c t for which evidence continually 
accumulates from a v a r i e t y of d i r e c t i o n s ; but t h i s 
experience i s had at an age when the c h i l d cannot 
( 1 1 ) I b i d . , p. 5 3 . 
( 1 2 ) See Oakeshott, M., Rationalism i n P o l i t i c s 
(London, 1 9 6 2 ) . 
( 1 3 ) Peters, R. S., op. c i t . , p. 5 4 . 
( 1 4 ) Peters, R. S., 'Education as I n i t i a t i o n ' i n 
Archambault, R. D. (Ed), Philosophical Analysis and 
Education (London, 1 9 6 5 ) . 
82 
grasp the reasons embedded i n morality. Unfortunate-
l y * by "the time a c h i l d reaches an age at which such 
reasons can be accepted, the--7 w i l l not be unless the 
appropriate early experience has been provided. This 
i s the paradox of moral education! 
As Peters puts i t , young children '...must enter 
the palace of Reason through the courtyard of Habit 
and Tradition' (15). B u i l t into them must be c e r t a i n 
habits of behaviour which w i l l leave open the possib-
i l i t y of the l a t e r development of a r a t i o n a l code; 
which w i l l not psychologically prevent i t . They 
must, i n other words, le a r n the 'language' of moral-
i t y through i t s ' l i t e r a t u r e 1 i n such a way as to 
give them the power, l a t e r , to evaluate the very 
' l i t e r a t u r e ' which has nourished them. I n plainer 
terms, those who have, as children, been morally 
educated are 'free' persons, capable of c r i t i c i z i n g 
the code which has been the substance of t h e i r moral 
education i n a manner not possible for those who have 
been indoctrinated; they w i l l have been taught the 
procedural ru l e s which enable them to develop codes 
of t h e i r own out of those given - codes of which 
they see the point, being now, to use a phrase dear 
to Peters, 'on the i n s i d e 1 of morality. 
The paradox comes about because, i n developing 
reasonable atti t u d e s to r u l e s of conduct, reason i t -
(15) Peters, E. S., op. c i t . ( p . 78, supra), p. 55. 
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s e l f can play l i t t l e part during the e s s e n t i a l early 
stages; and there i s consequently the big question 
which Peters puts: '...does the use of... e x t r i n s i c 
techniques m i l i t a t e against i n t e l l i g e n t , spontaneous, 
and i n t r i n s i c a l l y directed behaviour l a t e r on? 1 (16) 
Fortunately, the most important of the motivations 
which underlie the best of these ' e x t r i n s i c tech-
niques' - love and i t s withdrawal, approval and d i s -
approval - are better classed as • i n t r i n s i c ' : so Peters 
thinks, having i n mind the kinds of s i t u a t i o n which 
create the habits that do not incapacitate a person 
from l i v i n g on the plane of reason. 
C l e a r l y , 'habit' i s a c e n t r a l concept, the d i s -
entanglement of which i s necessary i f the paradox 
i s not to prove i n t r a c t a b l e ; and Peters spends some 
time doing this,, giving, i n the process, a paradigm 
of the r o l e of the philosopher, at work wher^ever 
there i s a conceptual problem. He pinpoints the 
s p e c i f i c a l l y philosophical task within the s i t u a t i o n 
i n t h i s way: 'The formation of sound moral habits i n 
respect of, for instance, what I have c a l l e d basic 
moral r u l e s might w e l l be a necessafcy condition of 
r a t i o n a l morality. I t can, however, seem to be an-
t a g o n i s t i c to r a t i o n a l morality because of an i n t e r -
esting sort of conceptual confusion' ( 1 7 ) . I n other 
words, the basic moral ru l e s ( t h e content of early 
(16) I b i d . , p. 58. 
(17) I b i d . , p. 59. 
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moral t r a i n i n g ; that i s , the ' l i t e r a t u r e ' already-
mentioned) may seem to r u l e out a l a t e r r a t i o n a l mor-
a l i t y (the application of procedural p r i n c i p l e s to a 
received code i n order to create a new personally acc-
epted one; that i s , the use of the 'language') because 
of a confusion i n our use of the key term 'habit 1; 
there i s need of the philosopher's p a r t i c u a l r s k i l l s . 
These s k i l l s , used to give a Ryleian a n a l y s i s 
which i s f a m i l i a r from our f i r s t chapter,equip Peters 
to analyse 'habit' as a higher order term, used" to des-
cribe c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of human actions which are extra 
to what we can observe them doing. By such terms we 
pick out the sort of thing we could have reasons f o r 
doing and which we could stop doing i f we were to 
think about them: when we t a l k of a 'habit' of a per-
son, we postulate a tendency for him to act i n a cer-
t a i n way, doing a thing he has done before and doing 
i t automatically i n order to get on consciously with 
the art of l i v i n g . For then, as Peters says, '... 
the mind i s set free to pay attention to things that 
are i n t e r e s t i n g , novel and worthwhile' (18). 
Habits of t h i s sort are the component parts of 
i n t e l l i g e n t ' s k i l l s ' ; the component habits, being 
capable of operating within a range of var i a t i o n s 
and so i n co-ordination with each other, permit many 
very different complex actions. I n Peters* words, 
(18} I b i d . , p. 60. 
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•The concept of "action" i s "open-ended" i n many-
dimensions 1 (19); that i s , there are not only mech-
a n i c a l actions such as are commonly associated with 
the term 'habit 1, there are also the s k i l l e d , i n t e l l -
igent actions i n which the component habits '...are 
conceived of as va r i a b l e and adaptable i n the l i g h t 
of some more generally conceived end" (20). These 
actions are taught with reference both to the wider 
conception and to the p a r t i c u l a r , elemental moves as 
they r e l a t e to i t , so that the conditions of teaching 
- the kinds of involvement of the teacher with h i s 
pupil - are those which the Peters' term ' i n i t i a t i o n ' 
implies. As he puts i t here, an 'on-the-spot appren-
t i c e s h i p system' (21) seems necessary for moral educ-
ation (and, indeed, for education generally) to succ-
eed - a system for which the most obvious model i s 
that found i n the learning of philosophy (and golf) 
by people l i k e himself! 
The importance of t h i s philosophical a n a l y s i s 
for handling the paradox of moral education i s un-
deniable, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n comparison with the weak 
attempt made by Hardie. Reason or i n t e l l i g e n c e i n 
moral choice can come about only through the form-
ation af habits analogous to these described s k i l l s ; 
that i s , habits which reveal themselves i n a wide 
v a r i e t y of actions and so count as legitimate moral 
(19) I b i d . , p. 61. 
(20) I b i d . , p. 61. 
(21) I b i d . , p. 56. 
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habits. The learning of such complex habits takes i' 
time, dependent as i t i s on the development of the 
appropriate concepts i n endlessly d i f f e r e n t s i t u a t -
ions, for'...the c h i l d has to l e a r n to see that a 
vast range of very d i f f e r e n t actions and perform-
ances can f a l l under a highly abstract r u l e which 
makes them a l l examples of a type of a c t i o n . 1 And, 
as Peters continues, giving the core of h i s solution 
of the paradox, ' I f the c h i l d has r e a l l y l e a r n t to 
act on a r u l e i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how he could 
have accomplished t h i s without i n s i g h t and i n t e l l i g -
ence* (22). 
This demonstration that there e x i s t s no contra-
d i c t i o n between reasoning and habit formation i n 
morality r a i s e s the question of why so many people 
should be deluded into thinking that there i s ; and, 
i n answering t h i s , Peters shows how necessary i t i s 
i n 'ordinary language' philosophy to have a ' f e e l ' 
for"what i s important and c e n t r a l i n common usage, 
giving an i l l u s t r a t i o n of what i s most c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
of t h i s branch of a n a l y t i c a l philosophy - i t s s k i l l -
l i k e nature (see pp. 17 and 18, supra), of the very 
kind that Peters has been discussing. He sees that, 
i n ordinary language, the term 'habit' does occur 
very frequently i n expressions x\rhich purport to ex-
p l a i n courses of action i n such a way as to suggest 
(22) I b i d . , p. 62. 
87 
that they are stereotyped, that the person i n question 
i s acting i n an instrumental, unspontaneous sort of 
way. And, i n f a c t , many actions are, of necessity, 
carried out i n t h i s manner. 
Peters' concern, however, i s not to deny t h i s , a 
fac t of nature, but to s t r e s s that 'Habits need not 
be exercised out of force of habit' (23), which i s a 
philosopher's f a c t discovered by conceptual a n a l y s i s 
of the kind we have j u s t described, and h i s p a r t i c -
u l a r contribution to solving the problem. Other d i s -
c i p l i n e s must make t h e i r s p e c i f i c contributions, the 
nature of which the philosopher can only suggest -
the conditions i n early childhood and the methods of 
upbringing which w i l l ensure that the right habits are 
learnt i n a non-compulsive fashion are open to empir-
i c a l enquiry, that '...careful examination of cognit-
ive development and the role of e x t r i n s i c and i n t r i n -
s i c motivation i n childhood 1 (24) of which Peters 
speaks. Only out of i n t e r - d i s c i p l i n a r y research can 
there be developed a po s i t i v e theory of r a t i o n a l 
child-rearing, a limited though e s s e n t i a l aspect of 
which i s t h i s kind of philospher's cogitation exer-
cised on the conceptual problems involved. I n t h i s 
way does modern a n a l y t i c a l philosophy bear upon one 
sector of educational theory. And f o r another way, 
i n harmony with that of Peters, we can now turn 
b r i e f l y to the work of a powerful American philos-
(25) I b i d . , p. 64. 
(24) I b i d . , p. 64. 
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opher, I s r a e l S c h e f f l e r . 
Scheffler - Reasons I n Moral Education 
Of the philosophers so f a r considered, the three 
whose work l i e s ' i n ' education - Hardie, O'Connor 
and Peters - do not constitute a f a i r sample, for 
much of the most s i g n i f i c a n t philosophising i s being 
done across the A t l a n t i c . Not a l l of t i t i s the work 
of Sc h e f f l e r , but he can stand as representative of 
the best, p a r t i c u l a r l y at t h i s point, for h i s work 
i s complementary to that of Peters and shares an i n t e r -
esting v a r i a t i o n of the 'ordinary language' approach 
i n dealing with the limited points we have time to ex-
amine. 
Before the appearance of h i s substantial wriings 
on philosophy 'in' education, Scheffler had already 
made a s i g n i f i c a n t contribution to the debate i n 
'pure' philosophy, on the nature and ststus of value 
judgments, by taking up the s c e p t i c a l challenge 
which we noted i n our f i r s t chapter. Concerning 
the v a l i d i t y and cognitive status of value judgments, 
h i s position involved establishing the i m p o s s i b i l i t y 
of distinguishing, i n any clear-cut way, moral from 
non-moral vocabulary i n the normal context of every-
day language, and showing that, for a sceptic to main-
t a i n the ultimate irrelevance of a cognitive a n a l y s i s 
on the grounds that the d i s t i n c t i v e feature of moral 
language i s that of di r e c t i n g , persuading and prescrib-
89 
ing, the d i s t i n c t i o n would have to be made. At. the 
l e v e l of theory, he i s thus to be classed with Peters 
and against, say, Atkinson on the evidence we have ex-
amined e a r l i e r . 
These t h e o r e t i c a l considerations extend into 
more p r a c t i c a l spheres i n Scheffler's i n f l u e n t i a l 
book on the language of education (25), from which we 
can s e l e c t for comment c e r t a i n emphases, differen t 
from but related to those already considered. One i s 
h i s b r i e f but t e l l i n g a n a l y s i s of a d i s t i n c t i o n not 
usually made i n the unphilosophical discussions of 
moral education found abundantly i n educational w r i t -
ings; and one which, once grasped, illuminates the 
discussion from a d i r e c t i o n somewhat differen t from 
that of Peters but, i n the end, having the same e f f e c t . 
I n h i s f i n a l chapter, while attempting to c l a r i f y the 
concept of 'teaching' by contrasting i t s ordinary 
use with that of ' t e l l i n g ' , he uses an example from 
moral teaching which we can inspect. 
Scheffler maintains that the evidence we require 
of success i n teaching a student that, say, honesty 
i s the best policy can be of more than one kind, dep-
ending upon what we have i n mind and expect. In one 
sense, i t i s the same kind of evidence as that which 
i s appropriate when we are teaching a f a c t - say, 
that Columbus discovered America. But there i s an-
(25) Scheffler, I . , The Language Of Eduaation 
(Springfield, I l l i n o i s , 1960). 
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other sense, i n which success i s shown by honest 
behaviour on the part of the student, and not merely 
by h i s verbal report of the meaning of the words. 
This d i s t i n c t i o n i s used by Scheffler to c l a r i f y the 
longstanding issue between those who claim that v i r -
tue can be taught and those who deny i t . 
He says: 'The ambiguity under discussion may be 
related to an ancient problem of philosophy, the a 
question whether virtue can be taught. Socrates i s 
interpret^-ed as having supposed.. .that we need mere-
l y to succeed i n teaching people to know what i s 
good, and virtuous conduct i s guaranteed...most other 
philosophers have held that men frequently do r e j e c t 
what they believe to be good and knowingly choose 
evil...Western r e l i g i o n s have...held that knowledge 
i s not s u f f i c i e n t for virtue...we need also to streng-
then the w i l l and to s e n s i t i z e the conscience.,.Since, 
however, the opposition of views, as thus construed, 
r e s t s on d i f f e r e n t interpretations of an ambiguous 
notion, i t i s mistaken to suppose that they are r e a l l y 
i n conflict...both views allow that i n t e l l e c t u a l app-
rehension of moral p r i n c i p l e s and i n t e l l e c t u a l avowal 
of them may go together with a .rejection of such 
p r i n c i p l e s i n conduct' (26). 
What i s required i n moral education, as we saw 
with Peters, i s both i n t e l l e c t u a l apprehension of 
(26) I b i d . , pp. 83-5. 
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p r i n c i p l e s , that i s , a r a t i o n a l acceptance of them, 
and a manifestation of them i n conduct; for without 
a grasp of the reasoned connection between p r i n c i p l e 
and conduct, the conduct can not be termed 'moral' 
but at best 'conventional*; and without a showing 
i n conduct, any known p r i n c i p l e i s a piece of mere 
i n t e l l e c t u a l luggage. So Sc h e f f l e r ' s disclosure of 
the ambiguity i s very important for elucidating mor-
a l education and the problem of l i n k i n g knowledge 
with conduct. He demonstrates i t i n d e t a i l by using 
to. 
c e r t a i n philosophical schema Awhich uncover character-
i s t i c s of ordinary uaage, establishing himself thus 
as a more formal analyst than Peters. 
The f i r s t schema i s 'X teaches T that...', into 
which i t i s possible to i n s e r t norm-stating as w e l l 
as f a c t - s t a t i n g sentences, the former, of importance 
i n t h i s context, capable of being given e i t h e r an 
'active' or a 'non-active' interpretation according 
to whether we take them to r e f e r to behaviour or to 
the mere r e p e t i t i o n of cer t a i n words delivered by the 
teacher - as with the above example, 'honesty i s the 
best policy'. I t i s the ambiguity of t h i s expression 
which must be resolved to avoid the nurturing of a 
dangerous f a l l a c y responsible foi? undesirable pract-
i c a l consequences which Scheffler names: 'The f a l l -
acy here...is perhaps one root of the "verbalism" 
i n moral education that believes success i n the dev-
elopment of moral character to be the necessary prod-
92 
uct of success i n the (non-active) teaching of ethic-
a l formulas' (27). Those who have experienced long 
years of the English headmaster's morning homily 
w i l l "be i n no doubt as to what he means I 
A second schema, 'X teaches Y t o . . . ' , provides 
analyses f o r comparison with those supplied by 'X 
teaches Y t h a t . . . ' , and furnishes a d i s t i n c t i o n of 
special importance f o r moral education - one which 
i s closely related to the work of Peters examined i n 
t h i s chapter, to the emphasis he places elsewhere on 
the 'manner' i n which education i s undertaken and to 
a s i m i l a r emphasis to be noted i n Scheffler's own more 
general analysis of the concept of 'teaching 1, to 
which we s h a l l s h o r t l y move. I t i s that moral con-
duct i s not j u s t behaviour according to any independ-
ently specified norm supported by any r a t i o n a l e . I n 
Scheffler's words, ' I t s r a t i o n a l e must, i n a c e r t a i n 
sense, be "objective", " i m p a r t i a l " or "disinterested" 
i n i t s support of the norm. What t h i s means i s not-
oriously d i f f i c u l t to characterize, but i t i s r e f l e c t -
ed i n the general and impersonal language of moral 
judgment (e.g., "ought") which i s normally used to 
express some rationales but not others. The r a t i o n -
ale of a man's.moral conduct, we may perhaps say, 
needs to be expressible by him i n the language of 
moral judgment' (28) 
(27) I b i d . , p. 83. 
(28) I b i d . , p. 94. 
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I n other words, our moral conduct i s that which 
we do, not u n r e f l e c t i n g l y even though w i t h i n an app-
roved code, not as a means to some other end, but 
"because we believe that we ought to do i t - we ex-
press ourselves n a t u r a l l y about i t i n the serious 
language of morality, at our disposal as the r e s u l t 
of a lif-elong i n i t i a t i o n i n t o i t s use. This i s a 
philosophical viewpoint not at a l l dissonant w i t h 
those of Peters, Taylor and others w i t h i n the area 
we have been examining. I t stresses t h a t , insofar as 
moral conduct i s a goal of moral education, the teach-
er i s t r y i n g to achieve not only the a c q u i s i t i o n of 
ce r t a i n norms but also the serious, thoughtful back-
ing of these norms i n an 'objective' or ' i m p a r t i a l ' 
way. Moral conduct based upon moral conviction 
which flows from moral b e l i e f s i s a d i f f e r e n t t h i n g 
from naively 'moral' conduct l e a r n t u n r e f l e c t i n g l y . 
Scheffler, i n making t h i s point, i s , l i k e Peters, 
as aware of the p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s implied by i t 
as he i s of the ease wi t h which i t can be overlooked 
because of the existence of easier forms of the teach-
ing of conduct. He says: 'The d i s t i n c t i o n here i s 
fundamental to moral education, f o r to ignore i t i s 
to run the danger of confusing the. teaching of honesty 
f o r example, with the teaching of safety rules or con-
ventional forms of courtesy, while to acknowledge i t 
i s to be confronted immediately with the delic a t e ed-
ucational problemu of attempting to develop at once 
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patterns of action and i m p a r t i a l r e f l e c t i o n on such 
patterns' (29). His'patterns of action' and 'impart-
i a l r e f l e c t i o n 1 are so close to Peters' 'basic rul e s ' 
and 'procedural rules' that we cannot but accept the 
coincidence of independent assertion as evidence of 
the philosophical entrenchment of t h i s p o s i t i o n , p a r t -
i c u l a r l y as Scheffler leaves us i n no doubt - again, 
l i k e Peters - that the'delicate educational problem 1 
of which he speaks must be tackled w i t h the s k i l l s 
aad knowledge of s p e c i a l i s t s other than philosophers, 
whose d i s t i n c t job i s to do what i s done (so admirably) 
here. 
And what i s done, the conceptual analysis to be 
found i n Scheffler, has wider significance tham the 
r e s t r i c t i o n of ±± to moral eduaction can bring about. 
We must, at t h i s point, move, as promised, from a 
consideration of reasons i n morality to a b r i e f pre-
liminary examination of the concepts of 'teaching' 
and 'education' at a more general l e v e l , as these 
are interpreted or? by Scheffler and Peters, both of 
whom see b u i l t i n t o the very meaning of the terms, as 
o r d i n a r i l y used, the notion of \& respect f o r the 
pupil's moral r i g h t to understand what he i s taught. 
As one of them.puts i t , teaching always implies 're-
s t r i c t i o n s of manner, r e q u i r i n g acknowledgement of 
the pupil's sense of reasons' (30); and, as the other 
(29) I b i d . , p. 106. 
(30) Scheffler, I . , op. c i t . , p. 104. 
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says, eduaction i s always effected i n 'a way that 
involves at least a minimum of understanding and v o l -
untariness 1 (31). Both are concerned to show that 
education e s s e n t i a l l y creates and exercises r a t i o n a l -
i t y . 
Education ffor R a t i o n a l i t y 
I t almost goes without saying, now that we have 
gathered a wider sample of the work of a n a l y t i c a l 
philosophers who show an i n t e r e s t i n educational the-
ory, that t h i s preoccupation with r a t i o n a l i t y i s per-
vasive i n the w r i t i n g s of those who are, at the pres-
ent time, the most i n f l u e n t i a l . I t i s a preoccupation 
which contrasts strongly with that of Hardie, from 
whose work our own i n v e s t i g a t i o n began and to whom 
we must continue to give c r e d i t , at least fotr being 
the f i r s t i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r f i e l d - though to what 
extent developments have passed him by i s made clear 
by the kind of e t h i c a l pronouncements he i s s t i l l mak-
ing at a time when there i s , on both sides of the At-
l a n t i c , t h i s emphasis on the i m p a r t i a l i t y and object-
i v i t y of moral reasons. He says very recently f o r ex-
ample: ' I t i s essential f o r teachers and parents to 
concentrate on establishing good moral habits. More-
over, the c r i t e r i o n of good i n such cases i s simply 
what i s approved by the teacher or parent 1 (32), rev-
(31) Peters, R. S., op. c i t . (see p. 81, r e f . ( 1 4 ) , 
supra), p. 97. 
(32) Hardie, C. D., 'The Co n f l i c t I n Western Ed-
ucation', The Educand, Vol. 4, p. 16, November 1960. 
96 
ealing, with t h i s 'simply', the philosophical gap 
which separates him from those who lead i n the work' 
which he pioneered. Their emphasis upon the possib-
i l i t y , the necessity even, of r a t i o n a l i t y obtaining 
i n a l l genuine teaching s i t u a t i o n s i s a l i e n to his 
mode of thought; though to what extent i t i s super-
i o r to that mode of thought as manifested i n p h i l o s -
ophers other than Hardie remains yet to be decided. 
At the heart of what we can c a l l , f o r t h i s occ-
asion, the 'Peters-Scheffler' p o s i t i o n i s the idea 
that education's basic task i s to c i v i l i z e ; to create 
human beings out of the material of each new generat-
ion by confronting them w i t h and i n i t i a t i n g them i n t o 
the great modes of man's experience, of which the mor-
a l i t y we have been h i t h e r t o discussing i s but one. 
Science, a r t , r e l i g i o n , h i s t o r y and so on are, taken 
together, i n a sense what man i s . They are the 'forms 
of knowledge' powerfully i d e n t i f i e d by the H i r s t 
whom we mentioned e a r l i e r i n t h i s account, 'the com-
plex ways of understanding experience which"man has 
achieved, which are p u b l i c l y specifiable and which 
are gained through learning' (33)• In. achieving Miem 
man, as i t were, makes himself - or makes the mind 
which i s the better part of himself; and, i n passing 
them on through an education i n them, he ensures the 
(33) H i r s t , P. H., 'Liberal Education And The 
Nature Of Knowledge' in-Archambault, R. D. (Ed.), 
Philosophical Analysis And Education (London, -1965), 
p. 122. 
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continuation and development of t h i s ' s e l f . 
C i v i l i z a t i o n consists of the products of varied, 
d i s t i n c t i v e habits of mind which education transmits 
while at the same time passing on the procedures, the 
s k i l l s and the d i s c i p l i n e s which have created them, 
so that the children of each new generation are form-
ed i n t o autonomous,--mindful p a r t i c i p a n t s , capable of 
re-creating, r e f i n i n g and adding to t h e i r heritage. 
This i s the general theme of which one v a r i a t i o n i s 
the approach to moral education we have described ab-
ove. And at the general l e v e l t h i s conception of ed-
ucation c a r r i e s , too, an analysis of the teacher's 
r o l e and his re l a t i o n s h i p with his pupils i n the 
teaching s i t u a t i o n which i s claimed to be the essence 
of what 'teaching' means, though i t appears to contra-
d i c t many common notions on the subject. 
A r e a l teacher i s not a mere trained servant of 
society, a sort of midwife-technician aiding at the 
b i r t h of an even more complex i n d u s t r i a l way of l i f e 
than exists i n the West at present. He adopts an 
independent a t t i t u d e to current pressures, f o r i f 
'mind' i s to be defined i n terms of schooled i n t e l l -
igence - as i s argued by Gilbert Ryle, from whose work 
some of the main l i n e s of much contemporary education-
a l t h i n k i n g of th i s type derives (34) - then the teach-
er must, by d e f i n i t i o n , play a major part i n determin-
(34) See Ryle, G i l b e r t , The Concept feif Mind (Ion-
don, 1949) 
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ing the nature of education. Certainly, what he i s 
as w e l l as what he does a f f e c t s h i s students; and 
what he asks as w e l l as what he states i s important, 
so that he needs to be himself educated rather than 
merely t r a i n e d , a person possessed of a f l e x i b l e mind 
of his own, an a b i l i t y to examine his subject with h i s 
p u p i l s , a respect f o r the developing minds of his 
charges and a propensity towards ehcouraging the fre e 
flow of ideas, questions and genuine p e r p l e x i t i e s i n 
the teaching s i t u a t i o n . The notion of such a l i v e l y , 
questioning, educatfcdx;. person i s b u i l t i n , so i t i s 
suggested, to the concept of education f o r r a t i o n a l i t y . 
This central concept of ' r a t i o n a l i t y ' i s defined, 
not i n the narrow terms commonly associated w i t h the 
deductive and other processes found i n the prestigious 
d i s c i p l i n e s of mathematics and the natural sciences, 
but i n broad terms as the capacity to grasp p r i n c i p l e s 
and to judge them c r i t i c a l l y i n the l i g h t of reasons 
which can be advanced i n public discussion i n any of 
the areas of human experience f o r which there has been 
developed a d i s t i n c t discourse. This i s what Louis 
Arnaud Reid, the doyen of B r i t i s h a n a l y t i c a l p h i l o s -
ophers of education, means when he says: '...what i s 
already apparent i n the use of " r a t i o n a l " ( i s ) that 
t h i s term has a wider range of ap p l i c a t i o n than can 
be established deductively' (35); and t h i s i s what 
(35) Reid, L. A., Philosophy And Education (Lon-
don, 1962), p. 12. 
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Peters' ' i n i t i a t i o n ' i s i n i t i a t i o n i n t o - the com-
prehensively r a t i o n a l l i f e . 
I n education, so concerned, the p u p i l i s invo l v -
ed by the teacher i n a wide v a r i e t y of open 'convers-
ations' which embrace c i v i l i z a t i o n i n a l l i t s aspects 
- the morality we have examined i n d e t a i l and the 
others we have mentioned. Curiosity, judgment and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r personal choices of b e l i e f and 
conduct are encouraged w i t h i n a pervasively r a t i o n a l 
atmosphere, an ethos i n which, c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , 
reasons are expected and forthcoming i n a l l the realms 
of study. This i s the substance of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r 
a n a l y t i c a l p o s i t i o n , of which more w i l l be said l a t e r . 
And nowhere i s i t expressed more v i v i d l y than i n 
words of Scheffler to be found i n one of those obscure 
places he i s fond of i l l u m i n a t i n g , the existence of 
which bears witness to the growing influence of anal-
y t i c a l philesophy as i t bears on even the most p e r i -
pheral sectors of educational theory - i n t h i s case, 
on the topic og 'guidance'. 
He says: 'The relevance of r a t i o n a l i t y to charac-
t e r seems to me very great indeed. To lea r n to be 
c r i t i c a l while respecting your colleagues i n discuss-
ion, to learn to recognize your f a l l i b i l i t y , to com-
mit yourself to fol l o w i n g the argument on i t s merits , 
and to take the consequences, to be sensitive to the 
standpoint of other persons w i t h c o n f l i c t i n g claims 
and d i f f e r e n t centers of experience, to lea r n to 
1G0 
judge f a i r l y and to take the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r 
your own judgments - these are lessons of morality 
and character no less than cognitive v i r t u e s . They 
are lessons that are relevant to a l l phases of educ-
at i o n , and they cannot be taught by machine, f o r they 
grow out of r a t i o n a l intercourse w i t h other persons. 
The teacher as agent i n t h i s process i s not p r i m a r i l y 
an expert a u t h o r i t y on some realm of f a c t , nor a 
technician i n an i n d u s t r i a l enterprise. He i s a per-
son who can, i n the exercise of h i s special a u t h o r i t y , 
show his respect f o r h i s students' minds, his w i l l i n g -
ness to entertain t h e i r serious questions, and his 
commitment to high standards of i m p a r t i a l and c r i t -
i c a l judgment 1 (36). 
Abstentions From The C o g n i t i v i s t "View 
I f we are, i n Scheffler's words quoted above, 'to 
be sensitive to the standpoint of other persons', we 
must not allow t h i s ' c o g n i t i v i s t 1 view, so powerfully 
argued by such i n f l u e n t i a l philosophers, to go un-
challenged, f o r that would be to r e f l e c t i n a f a l s e 
way the bearing on education of what i s happening i n 
philosophy. We have only to remember Atkinson's 
scepticism i n the e t h i c a l sphere to know that there 
are those who see things i n a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t , and 
(36) Scheffler, I . , 'Concepts Of Education:Some 
Philosophical Reflections On The Current Scene' i n 
Landy, E. and Perry, P. A. (Eds.)> Guidance I n Amer-
ican Education (Harvard, 1964), p. 26. 
101 
we s h a l l have occasion to sample more of t h e i r work 
i n the chapters which f o l l o w . At t h i s point we can 
note t h a t , f o r example, Scheffler's philosophical 
technique used to develop such views as we have seen, 
to point to the proper goal of education as the devel-
opment of r a t i o n a l i t y , i s not accepted by a l l compet-
ent thinkers, even as i t i s set f o r t h i n his power-
f u l new book (37). The d e f i n i t i o n of ' r a t i o n a l i t y ' 
there given - ' . . . r a t i o n a l i t y i s co-extensive with' 
the relevance of reasons' (38) i s not so convincing-
l y argued f o r or so philosophically obvious that i t 
commands the assent of a l l , even of those professing 
a n a l y t i c a l sympathies. 
One p a r t i c u l a r abstention from the 'ordinary 
language' brand of analysis favoured by Scheffler i s 
that made by a reviewer of his work, J.W.Yolton, who 
says: 'Scheffler follows a i a m i l i a r contemporary 
technique of drawing d i s t i n c t i o n s and analysing the 
uses and functions of our cognitive vocabulary...it 
i s important to ask whether that method reveals any-
t h i n g about the nature of knowing, learning and b e l -
i e v i n g 1 (39) f and then answers i n terms which show 
his greater sympathy f o r what we have called the 
(37) Scheffler, I . , Conditions Of Knowledge: I n t r o -
duction To Epistemology And Education (Chicago,.1965) 
(38) . I b i d . , p. 107 
(39) Yolton, J. W., Harvard Educational Review, 
Vol. 36, p. 72, Winter 1966 
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• p o s i t i v i s t i c 1 kind of analysis (see p. 7, supra) 
than f o r the ' l i n g u i s t i c 1 v a r i e t y developed from 
Wittgenstein, Ryle and Austin, and encountered f r e -
quently i n Scheffler (Though i t must be noted that 
Scheffler has another r o l e as a prominent philosopher 
of science,, and i n his work here veers oddly towards 
the ' p o s i t i v i s t i c ' sector!) 
A second negative reaction to the c o g n i t i v i s t 
p o s i t i o n , t h i s time with reference to Peters' main 
thesis as expressed i n his now-famous ' I n i t i a t i o n * 
l e c t u r e , i s given by J.E.McClellan, an American 
thinker not to be l i g h t l y dismissed when t a l k i n g on 
eithe r philosophy or education: he says, ' I am not 
convinced that h i s three c r i t e r i a define the concept 
of education', and suggests that Peters i s o f f e r i n g 
no more than a Stevensonian 'persuasive d e f i n i t i o n ' , 
which i s e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t from the intended d i s -
closure of the essential meaning of the term. He 
continues: 1 1 am persuaded that his conservative 
ideals would promote a good education but not that 
they define the term' (40). 
A f i n a l example, taken from many available, can 
be linked with t h i s charge, that 'conservatism' i n 
education i s being concealed w i t h i n the rev o l u t i o n 
i n philosophy: and i t i s the comment of one who sees 
himself less as a philosopher of education than as a 
(40) McClellan, J. E., Harvard Educational Review, 
Vol 35,. p. 100, Winter 1965 
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humble 'educationist' concerned l e s t innovation i n 
educational theory,, made on no matter what impreg-
nable philosophical grounds, has reactionary p r a c t i a 
a l e f f e c t s . T.W.Eason comments on the c o g n i t i v i s t 
p o s i t i o n of H i r s t , as delivered to a gathering of 
educationists, expressing admiration at the power of 
t h i s performance w i t h i n what we have termed the 'off' 
i c i a l ' p o s i t i o n , and at the same time suggesting"cer 
t a i n dangers: 'But we must p l a i n l y watch l i k e hawks 
to ensure that the new stress on the structure of 
knowledge, on the importance of environmental stim-
u l a t i o n , and on the cos t l y e f f o r t which achievement 
demands, does not father a new dreariness and formal' 
ism. Especially any t h e o r e t i c a l flaw which might i n 
l a t e r days and cruder hands exaggerate any such ten-
dency to the s t e r i l e y academic i s to be guarded ag-
ain s t . My fear i s that Professor H i r s t ' s otherwise 
impeccable account of the"forms of knowledge" l e f t 
no place f o r "personal knowledge" - the kind that he 
himself had of his audience - and f h r that matter 
that his audience, as they l i s t e n e d , had of his scin' 
t i l l a t i n g exposition. A b l i n d spot here would have 
i n t e r e s t i n g t h e o r e t i c a l consequences. Professor 
H i r s t i s a very distinguished English philosopher: 
but I am s t i l l wondering i f he i s wrong or r i g h t 
about t h i s • (41). 
(41) Eason, T. V/., 'The Nature Of Educational 
Theory', Education For Teaching. Vol. 69, p. 52, 
February 1966 
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The basis of Eason's doubts, and hi s determinat-
ion to be v i g i l a n t i n case there are 't h e o r e t i c a l flaws' 
not at the moment apparent i n t h i s p o s i t i o n , l i e s i n 
his d i f f e r e n t philosophical commitment, which has 
c l e a r l y e x i s t e n t i a l i s t aspects to i t and so cannot 
be pursued here. What i t i s important to learn from 
these examples of abstention from the viewpoint which 
i s c u r r e n t l y fashionable i s that being commonly accept-
ed cannot be equated, so f a r as philosophy i s concern-
ed, w i t h being tr u e ; and that there do exist other 
commitments, a n a l y t i c a l as we l l as e x i s t e n t i a l i s t , 
which generate a l t e r n a t i v e viewpoints on the phil o s -
ophical problems of education. We have previously 
suggested (See p. 59, supra)that t h i s i s a good t h i n g , 
i f t r u t h i s the sole object of enquiry; so t h a t , on 
the basis of t h i s b e l i e f , we can, to end t h i s chapter, 
return to the e t h i c a l sector, from which we digressed 
to make some more general points about r a t i o n a l i t y i n 
education, i n order to r e c a l l the 'open' nature of 
the debate. We can remind ourselves of the sceptic's 
p o s i t i o n , a not i n s u b s t a n t i a l a l t e r n a t i v e to that 
which, emphasising the place of reason i n ethics, 
tends to dominate educational t h i n k i n g and so, by an 
enthusiastic consensus, to run the r i s k of obscuring 
any of Eason's 'theo r e t i c a l flaws' that may e x i s t . 
I t i s argued that i n j u s t i f y i n g value judgments 
we appeal to rules and standards which are themselves 
j u s t i f i e d by a f u r t h e r appeal to higher rules and 
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standards, and so on. Vfe involve ourselves i n a 
process that has an either/or outcome: i t eit h e r 
goes on forever, l o g i c a l l y speaking, or i t comes to 
an end at some point. But i f ±£ goes on, there can 
be no l o g i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n , by d e f i n i t i o n ; and i f 
i t ceases, someone i n the discussion must make the 
decision as to where i t ceases, and i s thus making 
an a r b i t r a r y decision, and that i t i s always possible 
f o r another person to deny the reasonableness of stop-
ping there. This i s the point at which the co g n i t i v -
i s t t a l k s of the presuppositions of the very lang-
uage we are using and the d e f i n i t i o n of ' r a t i o n a l i t y ' 
i n terms of i t s l i m i t s , and at which the sceptic 
maintains t h a t , whereever there are d i f f e r e n t people, 
people w i l l d i f f e r i n t h e i r valuations; that the way 
of l i f e advocated, f o r example, by the l a t e r Nietzsche 
i d o l i z i n g force cannot be demonstrated by r a t i o n a l 
means to be i n f e r i o r to that of, say, a moderate, 
non-aggressive Spinoza. 
The sceptic's assumption, which the c o g n i t i v i s t 
denies, i s that the reasoning involved i n reaching 
t h i s ultimate point at which i r r e d u c i b l e differences 
show, i s the kind of deduction f a m i l i a r i n mathemat-
ics and l o g i c , which eventually, i n t h i s process, be-
comes exhausted, leaving fundamental decisions and 
commitments to be declared, with a l l the possible 
v a r i e t y of fundamental preferences to be expected 
amongst human beings whose l i f e experiences are un-
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ique. The c o g n i t i v i s t responds by placing the emph-
asis d i f f e r e n t l y - on the s i m i l a r i t y of human exper-
ience, the public a r t i c u l a t i o n of which i s the lang-
uage or languages i n which knowledge of various sorts 
i s 'stored 1: he argues that the serious use of any of 
these languages, including moral language, commits a 
person to the presuppositions of t h e i r very existence, 
that i s , i n t h i s context, to the p o s s i b i l i t y of ob-
t a i n i n g non-subjective moral knowledge and the poss-
i b i l i t y of resolving moral c o n f l i c t by argument. 
Both philosophical positions are tenable, though 
at the moment the cognitifeist i s heard most i n educ-
a t i o n a l c i r c l e s . His counterarguments to the sceptic 
do not, however, assume the same preponderance i n the 
world of 'pure' philosophy f o r , at t h e i r core, they 
involve a r e j e c t i o n or 'loosening' of the firmest 
d i s t i n c t i o n to be found i n modern philosophy - the 
analytic/synthetic dichotomy. The c o g n i t i v i s t denies 
that 'reasoning' can only take place according to the 
two two ways enshrined i n that dichotomy - the ways 
of mathematics and science. He denies that v e r i f i c -
a t i o n must be a form of s c i e n t i f i c v e r i f i c a t i o n and 
that v a l i d a t i o n must be according to the pattern of 
mathematical v a l i d a t i o n . I n his view, the models 
provided by these d i s c i p l i n e s b l i n d us, because of 
t h e i r great success, to the unique c h a r c t e r i s t i c s of 
reasoning as i t a c t u a l l y takes place i n other areas 
- f o r example i n moral discussion. 
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Preconceptions, taken over from mathematics and 
science, about what constitutes an acceptable l o g i c -
a l pattern, force us i n t o the error of attempting to 
f i t moral reasoning i n t o that r e s t r i c t e d pattern: 
what we should be doing i s to look f o r the pattern 
as i t a c t u a l l y exists. This i s the core of the arg-
ument; but to pursue i t f u r t h e r ( I t has already been 
minimlly developed i n a d i f f e r e n t context during the 
examination of Taylor's views i n the f i r s t chapter) 
would be to stray too f a r from the theme of p h i l o s -
ophy's a n a l y t i c a l involvement i n education and i n t o 
the heart of philosophical controversy about the acc-
e p t i b i l i t y of post-V/ittgensteinian views on the nat-
ure of language. 
Suffice i t to say that what educational t h i n k -
ing receives from a n a l y t i c a l philosophy, now that 
the i n t e r e s t of philosophers i s aroused, depends 
upon the t o t a l i t y of views which that kind of p h i l o s -
ophy has to o f f e r ; and t h a t , i n the mid nineteen-
s i x t i e s , i t o f f e r s no less v a r i e t y than that which 
continuing i n t e r n a l disputes necessitate. Any other 
impression given by the f a c t that those philosophers 
most keenly interested i n the educational relevance 
of t h e i r work tend to hold the s i m i l a r c o g n i t i v i s t 
p o s i t i o n which has h i t h e r t o featured l a r g e l y i n our 
account, would probably be, i n the long run, a f a l s e 
one; f o r i n philosophy there i s always the p o s s i b i l -
i t y , or even the p r o b a b i l i t y , of the undiscovered 
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•theoretical flaw 1 which only c r i t i c a l philosophising 
between c o n f l i c t i n g viewpoints can r e v e a l . I n the 
important sector of ethics and morality which we have 
been considering at some length there i s c l e a r l y plenty 
of room for continued debate. 
So we pass to another aspect of our theme, one 
which, because i t i s centred upon c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of 
educational discourse, w i l l not i n i t i a l l y involve us 
i n reference to the pure philosophical background on 
which we have had to draw i n our i n v e s t i g a t i o n of 
ethics and morality. Nevertheless, we must remember 
that there i s always t h i s background to be taken into 
account, no matter how r e s t r i c t e d the enquiry may 
seem to be, and that what we have j u s t emphasised 
about i t s varied nature i s i n d i r e c t l y important even 
where i t s implications for a p a r t i c u l a r chapter of our 
account i s not stressed. V/e turn then to examine the 
use of analogy, metaphor and models i n educational 
theory. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE USE OF ANALOGY? METAPHOR AND MODELS 
IN EDUCATIONAL THEORY 
Early I d e n t i f i c a t i o n Of The Use -
Hardie And Black 
We return to Hardie once again for our point of 
departure into t h i s sector of enquiry, with the same 
intention of sampling l a t e r work on a topic which he 
was the f i r s t to i d e n t i f y as important, i n order to 
continue showing the 'bearing' by a cross-referencing 
of examples. The names with which we are now famil-
i a r w i l l , of course, reappear i n t h i s chapter; for 
any account which apportioned l e s s than a major por-
tion of i t s substance to t h i s handful of philosophers 
would be misleading. Nevertheless there are others 
who have developed and are continuing to develop, i n 
increasing numbers, the important ideas with which 
t h i s chapter i s concerned; and two of t h e i r contrib-
utions, one from the early and one from the l a t e r 
stage, of the period i n question, w i l l be b r i e f l y 
mentioned as t y p i c a l instances. 
In r e c a l l i n g the point i n Hardie at which the i n -
vestigation into ethics began (See p. 21, supra), we 
note that the o r i g i n a l bypassing of an 'ought' occ-
urred during h i s a n a l y s i s of the 'Nature' theory of 
education; and i t i s from t h i s that we can abstract 
a theme which has received considerable attention 
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during the l a s t few t e a r s . Hardie cosiders the 
truth of the f i r s t of h i s own substituted propos-
i t i o n s and, i n so doing, i d e n t i f i e s foe. the f i r s t 
time the use of analogy i n educational theory. He 
says: "...those educationists who put forward the 
proposition which we are c o n s i d e r i n g maintain... 
that the i n i t i a l state of the c h i l d and the laws 
which govern the i n t e r a c t i o n between the state and 
the environment are analagous to the seed of a plant 
and the laws which govern the i n t e r a c t i o n between 
the seed and the environment... They regard the pro-
cess of education as analagous t o . . . c e r t a i n natural 
processes...as analagous to c e r t a i n processes which 
occur i n the V/orld of Nature. The teacher should 
thus act as a gardener who affords a plant every 
opportunity for "natural" growth, and should not act 
l i k e a gardener who attempts to do something "un-
natural" with a plant. The c r u c i a l question f o r 
such a view of education i s how f a r does the anal-
ogy hold?' ( 1 ) . 
This question - How f a r does the analogy hold? 
- i s of great importance for the philosophical c l a r -
i f i c a t i o n of educational theories, farr such theories, 
as held i n the minds of educationists, are almost 
always analogical i n nature - a f a c t not commonly 
understood by enthusiastic p r a c t i t i o n e r s too imm-
(1) Hardie, C. D., Truth And F a l l a c y I n Educat-
ional Theory (Cambridge, 1942), pp. 3-4 
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ersed i n a c t i v i t y to be c r i t i c a l of the language 
they use to j u s t i f y i t . Hardie does a service to ed-
ucational theory by d i s c l o s i n g the problem; though 
t h i s service i s not equalled, for reasons connected 
with the l i m i t a t i o n s of h i s philosophical background 
which we have already stated, by a s i m i l a r service i n 
showing where t h i s p a r t i c u l a r analogy breaks down. 
But to reveal philosophy's r o l e here i s a pr a i s e -
worthy contribution and we can pass from i t , ignor-
ing the rather mechanical and limited procedure of 
Hardie's own an a l y s i s of the'Nature' theory, to other 
answers given to the general philosophical questions: 
V/hat i s the part played by analogy, metaphor and mod-
el s i n educational theory?; V/hich types are most 
common and what can be said for and against them as 
explanatory devices? 
The f i r s t question - concerning the role of, say, 
metaphor i n educational language - receives i t s most 
thorough answer from Scheffler, who notes that the 
professional philosopher's attention can be most app-
ro p r i a t e l y directed to such language for the purpose 
of '....a cool examination (which) may f a c i l i t a t e the 
discovery of... contro l l i n g analogies usually suppressed 
i n p r a c t i c e ' ( 2 ) . His views, expressed i n a f u l l y 
developed form quite recently, must constitute the 
core of any findings i n t h i s sector; but there are 
(2) Scheffler, I . (Ed.), Philosophy and Educat-
ion (Boston, 1958), p. 13 
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e a r l i e r contributions, ones of which i s so close i n 
time to that of the pioneering work of Hardie, and 
so close, too, i n the attitude i t takes to t r a d i t -
i o n a l educational 'philosophy' and, p a r t i c u l a r l y , 
to the 'Nature' t h e o r i s t s examined by Hardie, that 
i t warrants mention. 
Writing independently i n an American philosophical 
jpurnal of 1944, Max Black suggests that some sense 
can be made of the ' . . . e l a s t i c generalities'and resound-
ing platitudes' (3) of t r a d i t i o n a l educational the-
o r i e s only i f t i l i s understood that they contain 
c e r t a i n persuasive analogies which serve to give 
d i r e c t i o n to the thought expressed i n the theories 
and which are accepted because the s i m i l a r i t i e s 
which they highlight - between the educational pro-
cess and some other f a m i l i a r a c t i v i t y - are so ob-
viously correct. Black argues that the suggested 
likenesses are i n fact v a l i d but are l i m i t e d i n 
each p a r t i c u l a r case: by means of them i t i s poss-
i b l e to organize r e f l e c t i o n i n a preliminary sort of 
way, but t h i s r e f l e c t i o n i s bound to be one-sided. 
He suggests the deliberate creation of a v a r i e t y of 
analogies which together w i l l elucidate the nature 
of the educational process i n question by providing 
views of i t from many directions and.so by giving 
an o v e r a l l picture of ±±s uniqueness. 
(K5) Black, M., 'Education As Art And D i s c i p l i n e ' 
i n Sqeffler, I . (Ed.), Philosophy and Education (Bos-
ton, 1958), p. 33. ( O r i g i n a l l y i n E t h i c s Vol. LIV, 
pp. 290-94, 1944) 
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The 'Nature' t h e o r i s t s ' analogy, i d e n t i f i e d by 
Hardie, which emphasises the l i k e n e s s of a c h i l d to 
a 'natural' b i o l o g i c a l organism such as a garden 
plant, i s p a r t i a l l y v a l i d ; that i s , i t i s part of 
the whole truth about the c h i l d ' s s i t u a t i o n . P a r t i c -
u l a r l y i s t h i s the case when i t s use i s appraised i n 
the h i s t o r i c a l context of i t s appearance i n educat-
ional theory; for, as Black says, 'Emphasis upon non-
interference with "natural" growth was once the f i t -
t i n f expression of revolt against a repressive author-
it a r i a n i s m ' . But i t i s not, by i t s e l f , such a large 
part of the truth as i t s 'child-centred' proponents 
believe, for, as Black adds, '...today i t i s a l l too 
often a symptom of the abdication of the teacher's 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I t may well be that the overworked 
analogy of the b i o l o g i c a l organism has served i t s 
purpose and that the time has come to experiment 
with a l t e r n a t i v e "root" metaphors' ( 4 ) . 
Black thus gives what can be c a l l e d a 'context-
ualiVai: i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the use of analogy i n educ-
atio n a l discourse, an interpretation based upon the 
understanding mentioned above (See p. 18, supra) -
that the meaning of an expression i s i t s use and can 
therefore be comprehended only by going beyond the 
words themselves into the intentions of the users of 
the expressions as they function i n a p a r t i c u l a r soc-
i a l context. This i s a great improvement on Hardie's 
(4) I b i d . , pp. 32-33 
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approach, as i s shown by the i n f e r i o r i t y of Bardie's 
r e s t r i c t e d non-contextual a n a l y s i s of the 'Nature' 
analogy to that of Black from the point of view of 
the t h e o r e t i c a l implications each has. There i s 
nothing i n Hardie to equal the constructiveness of 
Black's own suggested analogy of education as a r t 
and d i s c i p l i n e , a most impressive example of a p h i l -
osopher of some subtlety experimenting with an a l t -
ernative 'root metaphor' and ant i c i p a t i n g by f i f t e e n 
years one of the surest avenues into education taken 
by l a t e r a n a l y t i c a l philosophers. And to these we 
can proceed, leaving the d e t a i l s of a p a r t i c u l a r an-
alogy for a systematic account of analogy i n general. 
Later Investigations Of The Logic o£-
Analogy 
I n a sense, both Hardie and Black, working with-
out a t r a d i t i o n to guide them, act as philosophically 
orientated educational t h e o r i s t s i n spite of t h e i r 
awareness that philosophy has a d i s t i n c t i v e r o l e to 
play and t h e i r attempts to define i t . That i s , t h e i r 
work l a c k s , i n comparison with that of l a t e r w r i t e r s , 
a systematic and s p e c i f i c a l l y philosophical account 
of the l o g i c of analogy, being concerned primarily 
with c r i t i c i z i n g old or creating new analogical theor-
i e s of education. I n contrast, Scheffler i s a more 
consciously philosophical commentator, i n t e n t i o n a l l y 
developing a 'second order' view of t h i s aspect of 
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educational discourse along with the many other asp-
ects subsumed under the comprehensive t i t l e ('The 
Language Of Education') which h i s i n f l u e n t i a l book 
bears. ( 5 ) . 
His ana l y s i s of the l o g i c of analogy contains, 
as we s h a l l see, the 'contextual' element which we 
have noted i n the work of Black, and t h i s suggests 
one of those common but always i n t e r e s t i n g s i t u a t i o n s 
i n philosophy i n which a viewpoint can be brought to 
bear upon i t s e l f , with paradoxical r e s u l t s . (As P.W. 
Briggman puts i t : '...whenever we have a system 
dealing with i t s e l f we may expect to encounter mal-
adjustments and i n f e l i c i t i e s , i f not downright para-
dox 1 ( 6 ) ) . \<Ie can b r i e f l y note t h i s before describ-
ing the d e t a i l s of Scheffler's a n a l y s i s . He st r e s s e s 
throughout a l l h i s work the use of language i n a 
p a r t i c u l a r context; and t h i s i s an emphasis which binds 
together the various aspects of h i s work and l i n k s 
him, as we have seen, with Peters. Thus, the 'cog-
n i t i v i s t ' approach to education which we have already 
examined under i t s e t h i c a l aspect and whiwh, as we 
have seen, centres upon Scheffler, Peters, H i r s t and 
L..:rl t h e i r t a l k of ' i n i t i a t i o n ' and 'forms of knowledge* 
can be interpreted' 1contextually' as an expression of 
the revolt against the excesses of child-centred educ-
a t i o n i s t s , who themselves, according to the same 'con-
(5) Scheffler, I . , The Language Of Education (Spr-
i n g f i e l d , I l l i n o i s , 1960) 
(6) Bridgman, P. ¥., The Way Things Are (Harvard, 
1959), p. 7 
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t e x t u a l 1 view, were at one time l e g i t i m a t e l y reacting 
against authoritarianism i n education. Eason's 
doubts (see p. 103, supra) perhaps express the i n t -
u i t i v e feelings of one who senses the paradox! 
But tu return to Scheffler's present work: he 
carefxilly distinguishes metaphors from the two other 
kinds of l i n g u i s t i c expressions which occur frequent-
l y i n educational discourse and to which they are r e l -
ated - the more formal d e f i n i t i o n s and the l e s s form-
a l slogans - i n order to c l a r i f y the l o g i c of t h e i r 
operation. He says: 'Metaphors are not normally i n -
tended to express the meanings of terms used, eithe r 
i n standard or i n stipulated ways...Metaphorical 
statements often express s i g n i f i c a n t and su r p r i s i n g 
truths, unlike s t i p u l a t i o n s which express no truths 
at a l l , and unlike descriptive d e f i n i t i o n s , which 
normally f a i l to surprise...Like slogans i n being 
unsystematic and lacking a standard form of express-
ion, they nevertheless have a much more serious the-
o r e t i c a l r o l e . They cannot generally be considered 
as mere fragments c r y s t a l l i z i n g the key attitudes of 
some s o c i a l movement, or symbolizing e x p l i c i t parent 
doctrine' ( 7 ) . 
Metaphors are thus, i n a sense, l o g i c a l l y ' i n t e r -
mediate' between d e f i n i t i o n s , which purport to give 
meanings i n a non-figurative, straightforward way, 
(7) Scheffler, I . , op. c i t . , p. 47 
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and slogans, the l i n g u i s t i c phenomena from the other 
end of the scale, which feature as l i t e r a l l y 'mean-
ingless* symbols f o r b e l i e f s j u s t i f i e d elsewhere. 
Being midway they are, as i t were, i n touch with 
both the language and the people using the language. 
Si g n i f i c a n t p a r a l l e l s are suggested by metaphors 
which, unlike slogans, attempt to state truths and 
are so open to the kind of examination which can 
reveal how successful they have been and what t h e i r 
l i m i t a t i o n s are. As any and everytk two things i n 
the universe are a l i k e i n some way, merely to state 
a s i m i l a r i t y i s not by i t s e l f : to make a serious con-
tr i b u t i o n to c l a r i t y : what distinguishes the kind of 
metaphor Sc h e f f l e r has i n mind i s that the l i k e n e s s 
i t suggests i s a n o n - t r i v i a l one which tends to gen-
erate p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y along p a r t i c u l a r l i n e s i n 
those who accept the p a r a l l e l i t suggests. For ex-
ample, i f ±± i s an important truth that children 
are l i k e plants, as the analogy b u i l t into the 'Nat-
ure' theory suggests, then the c l e a r implication 
for p r a c t i c e i s that there be set up educational s i t -
uations i n which 'natural' growth can take place and 
that teachers intervene no more than do gardeners i n 
t h i s kindergarten process. 
An important philosophical task i s the probing 
into"such metaphors i n order to reveal l i m i t a t i o n s 
not obvious to those whose thought and action are 
structured by them. The perspective of any metaphor 
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can be supplements by the perspectives provided by 
other, equally limited metaphors designed by the p h i l -
osopher conscious of t h i s creative aspect of h i s 
ro l e . This i s what Black a s s e r t s and what Scheffler 
repeats i n a more emphatic way when he suggests that 
'...a comparison of a l t e r n a t i v e metaphors may be as 
illuminating as a comparison of a l t e r n a t i v e theories, 
i n i n d i c a t i n g the many-faceted character of the sub-
j e c t . Such a comparison may also provide a fesh sense 
of the uniqueness of the subject, for to know i n what 
ways something i s l i k e many dif f e r e n t things i s to 
know a good deal about what makes i t d i s t i n c t i v e , 
d i f f e r e n t from each...where a p a r t i c u l a r metaphor i s 
dominant, comparison helps i n determining i t s l i m i t -
ations, and i n opening up fresh p o s s i b i l i t i e s of 
thought and action' ( 8 ) . 
Scheffler follows t h i s explanation of the funct-
ion of metaphors, and of the p o s s i b i l i t y of gaining 
in s i g h t s into education from a conscious attention 
to t h i s function, by inspecting several common ones 
in order to note the l i m i t a t i o n s they must have. He 
examines what he c a l l s the 'growth' metaphor, ident-
i f i e d , as we have seen, by Hardie;"the 'moulding' 
metaphor, whose d i f f e r e n t emphasis i s obvious enough 
from the term i t s e l f ; the 'art' metaphor, one form of 
which Black persuasively constructs during the body 
(8) I b i d . , pp. 48-9 
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of h i s a r t i c l e , throwing l i g h t on the educational 
process from an unusual d i r e c t i o n ; and the 'organic' 
metaphor, which, i t can be noted, i s of unusual con-
temporary sig n i f i c a n c e because of the (unconscious) 
influence i t has within the new and dominant socio-
logy of education. 
Scheffler's findings, of the more philosophical 
kind which i s our concern, are i n t e r e s t i n g for the 
c l e a r view they give us of h i s general position -
that of attempting to balance s c i e n t i f i c with ordin-
ary language i n t e r e s t s . F i r s t , there does not appear 
to be, i n h i s opinion, a progression amongst these 
metaphors from the l e s s to the more adequate: they 
do not develop cumulatively as do the models used to 
great effect i n s c i e n t i f i c theory. Second, the ad-
equacy of a metaphor can not, i n Scheffler's view, 
be judged apart from the complex p r a c t i c a l context 
i n which i t appears; so that the procedure of, say, 
Hardie i n i s o l a t i n g a metaphor for l i t e r a l a n a l y s i s 
i s too s u p e r f i c i a l . The context must be taken into 
account - an a n a l y t i c a l d i r e c t i v e which emerges as 
a major item i n t h i s as i n other work of Scheffler, 
and which he constantly repeats: '...education, as 
we have stressed, i s the common ground of a v a r i e t y 
of contexts. I t i s thus wise to be c r i t i c a l about 
accepting metaphors i n a given context that have 
proved illuminating elsewhere...The transplantation 
of metaphors may, indeed, be misleading inasmuch as 
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i t ma^ blur d i s t i n c t i o n s v i t a l i n the new context 
though unimportant i n the o l d 1 ( 9 ) . 
The d i s t i n c t i o n s which Scheffler fears may be 
blurred are those between, on the one hand, moral 
and p r a c t i c a l questions and, on the other, a var-
i e t y of empirical and conceptual questions. I n 
using metaphorical e x p r e s s i o n s i t i s so easy to con-
fuse l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n c t types of questions, to i n t r o -
duce value judgments unwittingly while t a l k i n g i n 
p i c t o r i a l terms and to do so without a r e a l i z a t i o n 
of the vast problem of t h e i r j u s t i f i c a t i o n such as 
we have discussed i n previous chapters. However, 
enough has been said on t h i s topie to give an idea 
of how i t appears to a n a l y t i c a l philosophers. En-
ough, too, has been given to indicate S c h e f f l e r ' s 
views on the role of metaphor i n educational d i s -
course and to make h i s point about the complement-
a r i t y of metaphors, a point which others have taken 
up i n more d e t a i l . 
Of these, C.J.Brauner and H.W.Burns, for example, 
can be b r i e f l y sampled i n continuation of our policy 
of building up a composite picture of the 'bearing' 
i n question. They give a penetrating description of 
the d i f f e r e n t ways of conceiving education, the school 
and the c h i l d which are b u i l t i n to the four analog-
i e s of society and man which they i d e n t i f y and l a b e l . 
(9) I b i d . , pp. 52-3 
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The Beast i n the Herd, the Noble Savage i n the Jung-
l e , the Shopper i n the Market Place and the Shaper 
within an Organism are '...simple analogies which l i k -
en the unexaminable whole of an almost unknowable 
complex c a l l e d "society" to something so simple and 
commonplace that everyone can grasp the basic p r i n -
c i p l e s that are supposed to be operating. These an-
alogies are not n e c e s s a r i l y separate or mutually ex-
c l u s i v e . Frequently two or more are combined to acc-
ount for a di f f e r e n t aspect of what seems to occur'.(10) 
They re-emphasise t h i s point l a t e r , t h i s time 
with reference to the 'man' rather than the'society' 
aspect of t h e i r analogies: 'Each analogy of human 
natuce...has something to say about what order i s 
necessary by virtue of man's being what he i s . Each 
of these analogies about the nature of human nature 
seeks to set out the pickets to mark how f a r order 
must extend' (11). So the insight of Black, devel-
oped by Scheffler, now appears i n an introductory 
text f or student teachers of the s i x t i e s , developed 
and i l l u s t r a t e d i n massive d e t a i l - a fact which i s 
strong evidence of the growing influence of the r e l -
ationship we are inv e s t i g a t i n g i n at l e a s t one of i t s 
dimensions. 
For confirmation of t h i s influence we turn, again, 
(10} Brauner, C. J . and Burns, H. ¥., Problems I n 
Eduaation And Philosophy (Englewood C l i f f s , 1965), p. 90 
(11) I b i d . , pp. 132-3 
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to Peters, leading the f i e l d on t h i s side of the At-
l a n t i c and offering, i n h i s inaugural address, thoughts 
that are easy to r e l a t e to those we have been consid-
ering. Ajlarge part of the address consists of care-
f u l analyses of c e r t a i n analogies, metaphors or mod-
e l s which have played a major part i n t r a d i t i o n a l 
eduaotional theory and practice, and which display, 
according to Peters', objectionable l i m i t a t i o n s when 
considered from the point of view of the p r a c t i s i n g 
teacher i n the classroom. To t h i s person he offers 
what we can c a l l the 'complementarity' thesas, s t r e s s -
ing the l i m i t a t i o n s of any single analogy - 'Concept-
u a l l y speaking...the "growth" model of education, 
l i k e the instrumental or moulding model, i s a c a r i c -
ature; though l i k e a l l e f f e c t i v e c a r i c a t u r e s , i t d i s -
t o r t s a face by emphasising some of i t s s a l i e n t f e a t -
ures' (12). 
The implication i s a f a m i l i a r one to us - that 
we begin to see the face by studying many c a r i c a t u r e s . 
We are warned that f or an educationist to '...shut 
h i s ears a r b i t r a r i l y to such differ e n t accounts i s to 
l i m i t h i s view of the world - to take refuge i n a 
kind of monadic myopia' (13) • Everything i s what i t 
i s and not some other thing says Peters, following 
Bishop Butler, and what t h i s thing i s - i t s unique 
c h a r c t e r i s t i c s - may perhaps best be found by attend-
(12) Peters, R. S., 'Education as I n i t i a t i o n ' i n 
Archambault, R. D. (Ed,), Philosophical Analysis and 
Education (London, 1965), p. 95 
(13) I b i d . , p. 87 
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ing to the s i m i l a r i t i e s which aspects of ±± have to 
other things: education i s , i n a sense, a l l that the 
many pictures painted of i t reveal. 
But i n another sense i t i s not, f o r what educat-
ion i s cannot be found from pictures. Peters' inten-
t i o n i s to construct, eventually, a p o s i t i v e account 
of education on the basis of h i s c r i t i c i s m of the 
onesidedness of the models that he i s examining. I n 
order to elucidate the concept of "education 1, that 
i s , to unravel i t s e s s e n t i a l meaning i n ordinary usage 
(an objective which he frankly states i n spite of the 
disrepute i n which c e r t a i n forms of 1 e s s e n t i a l i s m 1 
are held by philosophers), he has a p r i o r involve-
ment in the examination of the more important educ-
at i o n a l metaphors. But he i s not, he says, therefore 
committed to the f a b r i c a t i o n of an improved model which 
w i l l transcend the l i m i t a t i o n s of a l l the others by 
combining only what i s correct i n each. 
For Peters, l i k e S cheffler, finds no progressive 
improvement i n the models which he inspects; and so, 
again l i k e Scheffler, he concludes h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c -
a l l y d i a l e c t i c a l argument on t h i s topic not with the 
producing of a metaphor to outshine a l l other metaph-
ors, but with a declaration of non-analogical i n t e n t -
ion i n keeping with the emphasis already noted i n the 
general points about 'education' to which h i s work i n 
ethics also leads. He says: 'Of course t h i s account 
w i l l not i t s e l f present yet another model; for to pro-
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duce such a model would be to - s i n a g a i n s t the glimm-
e r i n g s of l i g h t t h a t may so f a r have f l i c k e r e d over 
my treatment of the concept of 'education*. F o r , I 
have cladimed 'education' marks out no p a r t i c u l a r 
type of t r a n s a c t i o n between t e a c h e r s and l e a r n e r s ; 
i t s t a t e s c r i t e r i a to which such t r a n s a c t i o n s have 
to conform 1 ( 1 4 ) . 
Having thus reached a point i n t h i s s e c t i o n of 
our enquiry which i s s i m i l a r to t h a t reached i n an 
e a r l i e r chapter, we can summarize our f i n d i n g s about 
the r o l e of metaphor before l o o k i n g a t the l i m i t a t -
i o n s of one i n somewhat g r e a t e r d e t a i l . I t seems 
t h a t metaphors i n e d u c a t i o n a l d i s c o u r s e a r e to be 
judged, on the evidence of the c l o s e l y r e l a t e d a n a l -
y s e s that we have taken as our sample, as ' u n s t a b l e 1 . 
They can, on the one hand, q u i c k l y degenerate i n use 
to the slogan l e v e l once the s o c i a l context which 
endows them w i t h meaning has changed beyond the point 
of t h e i r r e l e v a n c e : they become anachronisms, not 
worth s e r i o u s a t t e n t i o n . On the other hand, given 
a n a l y t i c a l a t t e n t i o n of the kind p r a c t i s e d by P e t e r s 
and S c h e f f l e r , they e v e n t u a l l y l e a d such i n t e r e s t e d 
p h i l o s o p h e r s to t a l k i n non-metaphorical, non-figur-
a t i v e terms; t h a t i s , to undertake as a main a c t i v i t y 
to which a n a l o g y - i n s p e c t i o n has served as p r e l i m i n a r y , 
the f u l l y p r o f e s s i o n a l a n a l y s i s of the concepts of 
(14) I b i d . , p. 102 
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•education* and 'teaching' as these a r e o r d i n a r i l y -
used; to "become i n v o l v e d i n what S c h e f f l e r d e s c r i b e s , 
i n an e a r l i e r chapter of h i s which we s h a l l examine 
i n our next, ' d e s c r i p t i v e d e f i n i t i o n ' . 
Metaphor i s thus, as has been s a i d , 'intermediate 
between d e f i n i t i o n and slogan as these a r e d e s c r i b e d 
i n c u r r e n t work. I t can perhaps be f o r e c a s t t h a t i t s 
use i n e d u c a t i o n a l w r i t i n g s w i l l be, now that p h i l o s -
o p h i c a l s c r u t i n y i s f o r c i n g a g r e a t e r s e l f - c o n s c i o u s -
ness about language , e i t h e r g r e a t l y diminished or 
more p u r p o s e f u l l y i n c r e a s e d i n one d i r e c t i o n - t h i t 
which s e r v e s as an approach to the s e r i o u s type of 
conceptual c l a r i f i c a t i o n of which the p h i l o s o p h i s i n g s 
of P e t e r s and S c h e f f l e r which we have sampled are i n -
s t a n c e s . To ask more p e r s i s t e n t l y which i t w i l l be 
would be t t o poach arguments from a l a t e r chapter to 
which they more p r o p e r l y belong - the chapter concern 
i n g the c l o s e l y r e l a t e d but wider question of the nat 
ure of e d u c a t i o n a l theory. 
What can be done here i s to s e l e c t one i n f l u e n t -
i a l metaphor f o r c l o s e r s c r u t i n y . The t o t a l of those 
a l r e a d y mentioned p l u s others which appear i n the l i t 
e r a t u r e analysed by the a l r e a d y named p h i l o s o p h e r s 
and o t h e r s pursuing s i m i l a r i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i s too 
great to a l l o w an examination of a l l , i n t e r e s t i n g as 
tha t would be from the e d u c a t i o n a l point of view. 
For our purposes the important p h i l o s o p h i c a l point 
has been made - t h a t metaphorical e x p r e s s i o n s abound 
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i n e d u c a t i o n a l w r i t i n g s , and t h a t the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s 
and use of such e x p r e s s i o n s a r e a s have been s t a t e d : 
these need to he recognised, so t h a t the l i m i t a t i o n s 
of metaphors i n the theory have as few bad p r a c t i c a l 
consequences as p o s s i b l e . 
The example taken w i l l s e r v e to show what such 
consequences can be, f o r i t i s an example taken from 
e d u c a t i o n a l t h i n k i n g which i s c u r r e n t l y widespread, 
o r i g i n a t i n g o u t s i d e education i n the r a p i d l y expand-
i n g and vigorous d i s c i p l i n e of s o c i o l o g y , which i s 
so e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y attempting to s o l v e the problems 
of s o c i e t y , i n c l u d i n g i t s e d u c a t i o n a l problems, t h a t 
i t s pronouncements o f t e n l a c k the c a u t i o n t h a t a 
p h i l o s o p h e r looks f o r . As P e t e r s s a y s , drawing a t t -
e n t i o n to the dangers of s o c i o l o g i c a l concepts operat-
i n g i n the minds of l a y people: ' S o c i o l o g i s t s a s s u r e 
t e a c h e r s t h a t they have a r o l e of a c t i n g as a s o c i a l -
i s i n g ageiicy i n the community.. .Teachers may be a f f -
l i c t e d by a conceptual b l i g h t i f they t h i n k too much 
i n terms of t h e i r s o c i a l i s i n g r o l e . . . E d u c a t i o n i s 
d i f f e r e n t from s o c i a l work 1 ( 1 5 ) . 
F o r a d e t a i l e d probing of s o c i o l o g i c a l t a l k which 
o f t e n r e l i e s h e a v i l y upon the a c c e p t i b i l t y of the 
• o r g a n i c 1 metaphor and has, because of t h i s r e l i a n c e , 
the hidden and unwelcome i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r the p r a c t i c e 
of t e a c h e r s of which P e t e r s warns, we can go f i r s t to 
(15) I b i d . , pp. 87 and 88 
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S c h e f f l e r , who, i t w i l l be rememtjjred, i n c l u d e s t h i s 
metaphor, which he regards as a more complex v e r s i o n 
of the 'growth' metaphor(to be found i n H a r d i e ) , amongst 
the important ones that the i n t e r e s t e d philosopher can 
i d e n t i f y i n e d u c a t i o n a l theory. 
The 'Organic' MetaphorV Sociology 
And Education" 
I n the 'organic' metaphor, the c u l t u r e of a so c -
i e t y i s taken as analogous to l i f e i n an i n d i v i d u a l 
organism, both the s o c i e t y and the i n d i v i d u a l main-
t a i n i n g themselves by a form of renewal and both d i s -
p l a y i n g c e r t a i n p r o c e s s e s by means of which t h i s 
e q u i l i b r i u m and c o n t i n u i t y i s e f f e c t e d . I n the case 
of s o c i e t y , education i s the ' l i f e ' p r o c e s s and i t s 
f u n c t i o n i s the t r a n s m i s s i o n of the c u l t u r e to new 
members of the group, p a r t i c u l a r l y the young. S c h e f f -
l e r puts i t thus: 'The organ i c metaphor a s s i m i l a t e s 
education to the pr o c e s s e s by which i n d i v i d u a l s t a k e 
on the envi r o n i n g c u l t u r e 1 ( 1 6 ) , u s i n g the t e c h n i c a l 
term ' a s s i m i l a t e s 1 to forewarn us t h a t e v e r y t h i n g i s 
not p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y . 
I t i s not t h a t he i s u n w i l l i n g to see the point 
of the analogy i n c e r t a i n c o n t e x t s ; f o r example, i n 
the context of a n t h r o p o l o g i c a l , h i s t o r i c a l and psych-
o l o g i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s designed to d i s c o v e r s c i e n t i f -
(16) S c h e f f l e r , I . , op. c i t . (p. 115, s u p r a ) , pp. 
53-4 
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i c laws he i s as content a s any p h i l o s o p h e r of s c i e n c e 
to accept the use of t h i s model-like d e v i c e , for i t s 
t h e o r e t i c a l r o l e i s quite c l e a r and/aril ^ p p ^ o p f l a t e l y 
guarded a g a i n s t . His concern i s f o r the use of the 
'organic' metaphor i n contexts where the d i s t i n c t i o n s 
he has mentioned e a r l i e r a r e of the g r e a t e s t import-
ance and y e t w i l l not be made because of the b l u r r i n g 
e f f e c t of the metaphor. As he s a y s : 'Nevertheless, 
when the o r g a n i c metaphor i s t r a n s p l a n t e d i n t o p r a c -
t i c a l c o n t exts i n which s o c i a l p o l i c y i s a t s t a k e , i t 
may become p o s i t i v e l y m i s l e a d i n g , s i n c e i t makes no 
room f o r d i s t i n c t i o n s t h a t are of the h i g h e s t import-
ance i n p r a c t i c a l issues'.^ 1 7 ) . 
Moral d i s t i n c t i o n s cannot be made amongst the b i o -
l o g i c a l r e g e n e r a t i v e p r o c e s s e s which g i v e f o r c e to the 
analogy: but i t i s p r e c i s e l y such moral d i s t i n c t i o n s 
which l i e a t the h e a r t of s o c i a l c o n t r o v e r s y about 
which c u l t u r a l processes s h a l l be used to m a i n t a i n 
c o n t i n u i t y - whether i t s h a l l be 'teaching' i n the 
sense i n which S c h e f f l e r d e f i n e s i t on the evidence 
of common, standard usage, or some ot h e r form of c u l -
t u r a l t r a n s m i s s i o n such as f o r c e , t h r e a t , propaganda 
or the i n d o c t r i n a t i o n t h a t we touched upon e a r l i e r , 
a l l of which a r e very e f f e c t i v e i n m a i n t a i n i n g some 
type of ' l i f e ' i n a s o c i e t y analogous to t h a t of an 
organism. 
(17) I b i d . , p. 54 
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As we by now expect, t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n can be r e -
l a t e d to the work of P e t e r s , a m p l i f y i n g the ' P e t e r s -
S c h e f f l e r * approach t h a t we have p r e v i o u s l y adumbrat-
ed. The E n g l i s h philosopher i s a l s o eager to mark out 
the d i f f e r e n c e between education considered i n i t s e s s -
ence and other forms of s o c i a l i s a t i o n : he l a y s a sim-
i l a r s t r e s s on the n e c e s s i t y of i n t e r p r e t i ^ r i n g any 
pronouncements about education made by ex p e r t s whose 
i n t e r e s t s a r e mainly d e s c r i p t i v e and t h e o r e t i c a l i n 
the context of p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y , and u n d e r l i n e s the 
dangers i n h e r e n t i n the l a y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of s o c i o l -
o g i c a l t a l k . 
He s a y s : 'In the context i n which the s o c i o l o g i s t 
i s speaking i t may be q u i t e c l e a r what s p e c i f i c asp-
ec t of the t e a c h e r ' s r o l e i s being picked out. But 
the f a c t i s t h a t when these notions; get n o i s e d abroad 
they ate not always understood i n the s p e c i f i c sense 
i n which the s o c i o l o g i s t may be u s i n g them. The t e a c h -
er who h e a r s t h a t he i s an agent of s o c i a l i s a t i o n 
may come to t h i n k of h i m s e l f a s a s o r t of s o c i a l 
worker s t r i v i n g i n a v e r y g e n e r a l s o r t of way to 
h e l p c h i l d r e n f i t i n t o s o c i e t y . He may get the im-
p r e s s i o n t h a t the t e a c h e r ' s t a s k i s not to educate 
c h i l d r e n , i n the sense i n which I w i l l l a t e r d e f i n e 
i t , but to concentrate on h e l p i n g them to get on 
w i t h others and to s e t t l e down contentedly to a simple 
job, h e a l t h y hobbies, and a happy home l i f e * (18) 
(18) P e t e r s , R. S., op. c i t . (p.122, s u p r a ) , p. 90 
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The v e r y meaning of what the s o c i o l o g i s t says 
when h i s views a r e expressed i n terms of, f o r example, 
the 'organic' metaphor, i s d i f f e r e n t f o r the non-soc-
i o l o g i s t - and t h i s i n c l u d e s the t e a c h e r and, more 
p a r t i c u l a r l y , the student t e a c h e r i n t r a i n i n g who 
p i c k s up a smatteraing of knowledge from the new soc-
i o l o g y of education - than i t i s f o r other s o c i o l o g i s t 
t r a i n e d i n the proper use of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r language. 
The t e a c h e r i n t e r p r e t s , a c c o r d i n g to t h i s view, the 
s c i e n t i f i c concepts he comes a c r o s s as be s t he can 
i n terms of whatever p r a c t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s he can 
d e r i v e from them; and he w i l l , i n t h i s case, come to 
t h i n k of h i s job i n too simple and amoral terms. 
S o c i a l p r o c e s s e s a r e not as the 'organic' meta-
phor i m p l i e s they a r e - as l i t t l e s u b j e c t to cho i c e 
and c o n t r o l as b i o l o g i c a l p r o c e s s e s . But the m i s l e d 
t e a c h e r w i l l make t h i s mistake i n t h i n k i n g , r e s t i n g 
content w i t h a l i m i t e d t a s k t h a t has nothing to do 
w i t h education and t e a c h i n g as these appear from the 
' P e t e r s - S c h e f f l e r ' viewpoint, and w i l l not be a c t i v e 
i n choosing a l t e r n a t i v e s to the p a r t i c u l a r process 
he f i n d s being urged upon him i n the name of s o c i a l 
s c i e n c e . I n t h i s way, d i s c u s s i o n , argument and con-
t r o v e r s y over s o c i a l p o l i c y w i l l be reduced because 
of a f a l s e b e l i e f , engendered by metaphorical e x p r e s s -
i o n s , i n the minds of those who should c o n t r i b u t e ab-
ove a l l others to the debate. Misguided t e a c h e r s w i l l 
be l e s s disposed to offerjs a p e r s o n a l , c r i t i c a l v o i c e 
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to the n e c e s s a r y t a l k about what education should be 
attempting and about the content of the c u l t u r e and 
the methods of i t s t r a n s m i s s i o n . They w i l l come to 
regard as i n e v i t a b l e a p a r t i c u l a r k i nd of s c h o o l i n g , 
on the assumption t h a t what the s o c i o l o g i s t s say about 
the f u n c t i o n of education and the r o l e of the te a c h e r 
i s j t r u e ; and i n t h i s way the assumption w i l l become 
c l a s s i c a l l y s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g , as we s h a l l p r e s e n t l y 
see w i t h a notable case i n contemporary E n g l i s h educ-
a t i o n . 
S c h e f f l e r h i m s e l f reaches the main c o n c l u s i o n 
towards which both he and P e t e r s i n v a r i a b l y move -
t h a t the manner i n which modes of behaviour and b e l -
i e f are acquired i s of the utmost importance - f o l l o w -
i n g a d e t a i l e d and i n c i s i v e a n a l y s i s of the 'organic' 
metaphor which we can f o l l o w f o r the example i t s e t s 
of the p h i l o s o p h i c a l a n a l y s t a t h i s most capable. He 
s t a r t s w i t h the no t i o n of ' c u l t u r a l c o n t i n u i t y 1 , an 
e s s e n t i a l element i n the analogy. U n l e s s , he argues, 
we can s t a t e a standard f o r c u l t u r a l c o n t i n u i t y a t 
l e a s t as c l e a r and uncontrchversial as t h a t used by 
b i o l o g i s t s to measure the c o n t i n u i t y of an i n d i v i d -
u a l organism, we j u s t cannot be c l e a r as to how educ-
a t i o n c o n t r i b u t e s to c o n t i n u i t y a t a l l , f o r we do not 
r e a l l y know what we a r e t a l k i n g about. I t i s a simple 
case of questions of meaning preceding q u e s t i o n s of 
t r u t h i n a language s i t u a t i o n where t h i s f a c t i s l i k e -
l y to be hidden from view. 
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What do we mean by 'same* when, f o r example, 
\;..zn we say that a c u l t u r e remains the same or ceases 
to be the same; t h a t i s , when we c l a i m e i t h e r t h a t 
t h e r e i s or there i s not c u l t u r a l c o n t i n u i t y ? U n l e s s 
we a r e c l e a r about t h i s , u n l e s s we can s p e c i f y 'same-
n e s s 1 , we cannot meaningfully t a l k of the education 
which i s supposed to ensure the c o n t i n u i t y - i t could 
be anything from brainwashing to m o r a l l y s e n s i t i v e 
r a t i o n a l procedures. As S c h e f f l e r puts i t : 'The con-
t i n u i t y of any c u l t u r e may be f u r t h e r e d i n d i f f e r e n t , 
and c o n f l i c t i n g ways, i n accord w i t h d i f f e r e n t stand-
ards of c o n t i n u i t y t h a t may be chosen. I t i s such 
d i f f e r e n c e s between standards t h a t a r e of moral, hence 
p r a c t i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e , though a l l such standards a r e 
compatible with t a l k of c u l t u r a l c o n t i n u i t y i n the 
a b s t r a c t ' ( 1 9 ) . 
F u r t h e r , even i f we do s p e c i f y c u l t u r a l c o n t i n u i t y , 
the use of the term 'function' i n s t a t i n g t h a t the 
f u n c t i o n of education i s to mai n t a i n c u l t u r a l c o n t i n -
u i t y i n v o l v e s us i n other d i f f i c u l t i e s , i n t h a t we 
have not a c l e a r n o t i o n of the 'normal' working of a 
c u l t u r e i m p l i e d by t h a t term, whereas we do have such 
a notion, i n b i o l o g i c a l s c i e n c e , of the 'normal' work-
in g of an i n d i v i d u a l organism s u f f i c i e n t l y a c c e p t a b l e 
to i n v e s t i g a t o r s i n the f i e l d , whose i n t e r e s t s a r e 
d e s c r i p t i v e and not moral. Even i f we make a f u r t h e r 
s p e c i f i c a t i o n and make the notion of 'fu n c t i o n ' as c l e a r 
(19) S c h e f f l e r , I . , op. c i t . , p. 55 
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i n the c u l t u r a l s i t u a t i o n as i t i s i n the b i o l o g i c a l 
s i t u a t i o n , we a r e s t i l l b e d e v i l l e d by the o r d i n a r y 
language overtones of the term which S c h e f f l e r i d e n t -
i f i e s - '...Nevertheless the moral d i s t i n c t i o n s t h a t 
a r e uppermost i n i s s u e s of e d u c a t i o n a l and s o c i a l 
p o l i c y c o n t e x t s a r e omitted from the p i c t u r e . What 
i s worse, the p o s i t i v e moral connotation of the term 
" f u n c t i o n " ( which d e r i v e s , perhaps, from i t s r e l a t -
i o n to b i o l o g i c a l l y s a t i s f a c t o r y working which i s 
g e n e r a l l y favoured) suggests that the notion.of s o c -
i a l f u n c t i o n a l s o i m p l i e s moral v a l u e ' ( 2 0 ) . 
I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note t h a t S c h e f f l e r here 
s t a t e s a t r u t h which i s w e l l enough known to the 
more p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y minded of s o c i o l o g i s t s , eager 
to e s t a b l i s h t h e i r d i s c i p l i n e on a c o n c e p t u a l l y 
sound b a s i s , but one which u n f o r t u n a t e l y tends to be 
ignored i n the w r i t i n g s of e n t h u s i a s t i c s o c i o l o g i s t s 
of education a s they make t h e i r c o n f i d e n t c o n t r i b u t i o n 
i n ignorance of i t s p h i l o s o p h i c a l n a i v e t y . (21) We 
can confirm t h i s by quoting an admirable passage from 
one such 'pure 1 s o c i o l o g i s t , T.B.Bottomore, who i s as 
a l i v e as any to the need f o r r e s t r a i n i n g c l a i m s of a 
s c i e n c e which i s s t i l l m e thodologically i n i t s i n f a n c y 
and thus dependent on v.zn the phi l o s o p h e r f o r concept-
u a l guidance. 
(20) I b i d . , p. 56 
(21) See, f o r example, Musgrave, P. W., The S o c i o -
logy of Education (London, 1965), .for a p e r s u a s i v e 
i n t r o d u c t o r y t e x t which adppts a suspect ' f u n c t i o n a l -
i s t ' approach. 
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He s a y s : '...because the concept of f u n c t i o n i s 
based upon an analogy between s o c i a l l i f e and o r g a n i c 
l i f e , i t may be argued t h a t the analogy i s not s u f f -
i c i e n t l y c l o s e for f u n c t i o n a l i s m , so f a r as i t prov-
i d e s e x p l a n a t i o n s at a l l , to provide v a l i d e x p l a n a t -
ions of s o c i a l phenomena. The analogy presemts sev-
e r a l d i f f i c u l t i e s : s o c i e t i e s change t h e i r s t r u c t u r e 
w h i l e organisms do not; i t i s i m p o s s i b l e to determine 
the h e a l t h or s i c k n e s s of s o c i e t i e s i n the way t h a t 
can be done f o r organisms, and consequently i t i s im-
p o s s i b l e to speak p r e c i s e l y about the "normal" and 
" p a t h o l o g i c a l " f u n c t i o n i n g of the "organs", or about 
" f u n c t i o n " and " d y s f u n c t i o n " ( i n f a c t , a l l such ways 
of speaking about s o c i e t i e s i n v o l v e value judgments); 
i t i s d i f f i c u l t to determine the f u n c t i o n af a s o c i a l 
a c t i v i t y or i n s t i t u t i o n w ith the same p r e c i s i o n as 
the f u n c t i o n of organs i s determined i n biology by 
the examination of numerous i n s t a n c e s (and i n the 
organic world there i s , moreover, a one-to-one c o r r e s -
pondence between organ and f u n c t i o n which does not seem 
to hold i n the s o c i a l w o r ld 1 (22) 
V/e can take a concrete example to i l l u s t r a t e the 
point of such c r i t i q u e s of the 'organic' metaphor. 
I n a t o t a l i t a r i a n s t a t e , f o r i n s t a n c e , c u l t u r a l 'con-
t i n u i t y ' could be defined (perhaps i n the 1984 'New-
speak 1 d i c t i o n a r y I ) i n terms of a c o n s i s t e n t l y d o c i l e 
(22) Bottomore, T. B., Sociology. A Guide To Prob-
lems And L i t e r a t u r e (London, 1962), p. 39 
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a t t i t u d e on the p a r t of the people; t h a t i s , as lo n g 
as there are no complaints i n word and a c t i o n about 
the way t h i n g s a r e i t can be s a i d t h a t the c u l t u r e 
remains the 'same 1. 'Normal' working of the c u l t u r e 
i s t h a t i n which there i s no o p p o s i t i o n to the d i c t a t -
o r s h i p : t h e r e a r e no s t r i k e s , demonstrations, demands 
f o r a f r e e p r e s s , s u b v e r s i v e o r g a n i s a t i o n s e t c . I n 
such a s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n the p r o c e s s e s n e c e s s a r y to 
ma i n t a i n t h i s s t a t e of a f f a i r s - t h a t i s the p r o c e s s 
of 'education' on the ' t r a n s m i s s i o n of c u l t u r e " a n a l -
ogy - w i l l i n c l u d e a l l those e v i l s f a m i l i a r enough to 
any s p e c t a t o r of t w e n t i e t h century h i s t o r y : the meth-
ods of t e r r o r and i n d o c t r i n a t i o n a s s o c i a t e d with the 
Nazi regime, the 're-education' of Spanish a n a r c h i s t s 
and R u s s i a n d e v i a t i o n i s t s and a l l the p a r a p h e r n a l i a 
of mind c o n t r o l d e s c r i b e d by K o e s t l e r , Orwell and 
o t h e r s . 
Most c e r t a i n l y the f u n c t i o n of education under 
such t o t a l i t a r i a n circumstances i s to ensure c o n t i n -
u i t y , f o r the pr o c e s s e s d e f i n e d as 'education' and 
the ' c o n t i n u i t y ' as s p e c i f i e d a r e s e t up together, 
making any argument about education and the t r a n s -
m i s s i o n of c u l t u r e l o g i c a l l y impregnable: i f any 
p r o c e s s which i s i n d i s p e n s a b l e f o r the achievement of 
p r e s c r i b e d g o a l s i s to be c a l l e d 'education', then 
'education' by d e f i n i t i o n has the f u n c t i o n of t r a n s -
m i t t i n g c u l t u r e . But a l l t h i s misses the point urged 
from the ' P e t e r s - S c h e f f l e r ' p o s i t i o n , f o r i t obscures 
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and b l u r s the a l l important d i s t i n c t i o n s between 
d i f f e r e n t p r o c e s s e s of t r a n s m i s s i o n which can only 
emerge, i n t h e i r view, from an awareness of what 'ed-
u c a t i o n 1 means i n i t s o r d i n a r y usage. As S c h e f f l e r 
s a y s , w i t h r e f e r n c e to t h i s , h i s own, t o t a l i t a r i a n 
example: ' I t does not f o l l o w t h a t such p r o c e s s e s 
ought to be employed or approved. I t does not f o l l o w , 
e i t h e r , t h a t d i c t a t o r s h i p s ought to work normally or 
s a t i s f a c t o r i l y i n the s p e c i f i e d sense, i . e . , t h a t 
they ought to be unppposed. The moral i s s u e s a r e 
not only not s t r e s s e d i n s o c i a l " f u n c t i o n " statements, 
but are o f t e n confused by the s o c i a l l y i r r e l e v a n t 
connotation of v a l u e surrounding the term " f u n c t i o n " 1 
( 2 3 ) . 
There a r e examples of a l e s s extreme nature than 
t h i s t o t a l i t a r i a n one chosen by S c h e f f l e r to make 
h i s p o int i n as s t a r k a way as p o s s i b l e ; and, p a r t i c -
u l a r l y , t h e r e i s the example from contemporary E n g l i s h 
education mentioned above (p. 131)- T h i s concerns 
the b r i e f h i s t o r y and i n g l o r i o u s f a t e of the Second-
ary Modern school i n a s o c i e t y geared to i n d u s t r y , 
competition and education-based s o c i a l m o b i l i t y . Prom 
the l a t e n i n e t e e n f i f t i e s onwards these s c h o o l s i n c r e a s -
i n g l y used methods of 'education' of a narrow, unthink-
i n g s o r t under the p r e s s u r e from parents, i n d u s t r i a l -
i s t s and p u p i l s themselves f o r examinations designed 
(23) S c h e f f l e r . I . , op. c i t . , p. 56 
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to provide the paper q u a l i f i c a t i o n s which a compet-
i t i v e s o c i e t y equates w i t h e d u c a t i o n a l s u c c e s s . Very 
many of the t e a c h e r s i n these s c h o o l s showed e i t h e r 
t h e i r ' f e a r of freedom' or t h e i r acceptance of the 
s o c i a l v a l u e s i m p l i e d by the p r e s s u r e s i n w i l l i n g l y 
a l l o w i n g themselves to be i n v o l v e d i n the k i n d of 
examination dominated system which r a p i d l y evolved, 
t a k i n g o f t e n a l e a d i n g p a r t i n the e x t e n s i o n of i t , 
w i t h i n s c h o o l s , from the l e v e l of h i g h e r - a b i l i t y 
p u p i l s down to the l e s s a b l e f o r whom examinations 
would appear, on any sane view, to be t o t a l l y i r r e l -
evant . 
T h i s whole phenomenon has been d e s c r i b e d by the 
s o c i o l o g i s t s as the i n e v i t a b l e movement back on to 
a course d i c t a t e d by s o c i a l r e a l i t i e s of s c h o o l s s e t 
up i n a post-war ethos of e d u c a t i o n a l ' i d e a l i s m * 
and experimental!sm. The f u n c t i o n of the s c h o o l and 
the e d u c a t i o n a l system as a s o c i a l l a d d e r to s u c c e s s 
w i l l determine, they argue, the s o r t of education 
demanded ; and u n r e a l i s t i c o b j e c t i v e s such as were 
o r i g i n a l l y s e t up f o r the Secondary Modern s c h o o l s 
when th e r e was much f i n e t a l k og g i v i n g a meaningful 
education to l e s s a b l e c h i l d r e n a r e bound to be over-
whelmed by the working out of the f a c t s of s o c i a l l i f e 
( 2 4 ) . 
The phenomenon can, however, be d e s c r i b e d i n an 
(24) See T a y l o r , W., The Secondary Modern School 
(London, 1963) 
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a l t e r n a t i v e way, i n keeping w i t h the p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
p o i n t s made above about the t e a c h e r ' s job. I f too 
many t e a c h e r s f a i l to grasp t h a t , i n S c h e f f l e r ' s 
words, '...the teacher has o b l i g a t i o n s t h a t a r e i n -
dependent of s o c i a l c o n t i n u i t y i n v a r i o u s p r e v a l e n t 
s e n s e s ' , ( 2 5 ) , of which one i s that which i s presupp-
osed i n the p r e s s u r e f o r c e r t i f i c a t e s of s u c c e s s i n 
a competitive school system, they w i l l not be i n t e l l -
e c t u a l l y armed to r e s i s t such p r e s s u r e s , w i l l come to 
b e l i e v e what l i e s behind them and w i l l , perhaps w i t h -
out r e a l l y knowing i t , a b d i c a t e the moral r e s p o n s i b -
i l i t y t h a t - so i t i s argued on t h i s p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
view - i s b u i l t i n to the ve r y n o t i o n of 'teaching'. 
I f a Secondary Modern t e a c h e r b e l i e v e s t h a t he can 
p e r s o n a l l y do nothing about the mode of education 
which h i s school i s adopting under p r e s s u r e from 
o u t s i d e and with , i n i t i a l l y , some sympathy w i t h i n , 
then he w i l l , i n f a c t , do nothing and what was assum-
ed to be i n e v i t a b l e f u l f i l s i t s e l f and becomes i n e v i t -
a b l e . 
At the present time i n England t h e r e i s an attempt 
o r i g i n a t i n g a t a high l e v e l to r e c a l l t e a c h e r s to the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s they have to be educators and to 
b r i n g t h e i r own c r i t i c a l , r a t i o n a l s e l v e s to the bus-
i n e s s of s e t t i n g up o b j e c t i v e s , framing s y l l a b u s e s and 
d e v i s i n g t e c h i n g methods. The c r e a t i o n of the C e r t -
(25) S c h e f f l e r , I . , op. c i t . , p. £7 
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i f i c a t e of Secondary Education, the t h e o r e t i c a l work 
backing i t and the subsequent i n v e s t i g a t i o n s and pub-
l i c a t i o n s of the Schools C o u n c i l can be taken as a 
contemporary i l l u s t r a t i o n of what S c h e f f l e r would 
favour i n denying t h a t , ' . . . t e a c h e r s ought, by any 
means and above a l l , to a d j u s t students to the pre-
v a i l i n g c u l t u r e ( s p e c i f i e d i n any way you l i k e ) and 
to ensure i t s c o n t i n u i t y (no matter how s p e c i f i e d ) 1 ( 2 6 ) . 
For whether t e a c h e r s ought or ought not to a d j u s t , 
say, Secondary Modern p u p i l s to our p r e v a i l i n g c u l t u r e 
d e f i n e d i n terms of t e c h n o l o g i c a l foundations, i n d u s -
t r i a l production, v o c a t i o n a l t r a i n i n g , competition i n 
and a f t e r examinations and a l l the other c h a r a c t e r i s t -
i c s suggested by the apt term ' r a t - r a c e ' , i s a moral 
q u e s t i o n which r e q u i r e s the constant, s e r i o u s a t t e n t -
i o n of those most concerned, along the l i n e s which, 
as we saw a t l e n g t h i n e a r l i e r c h a p t e r s , i t i s poss-
i b l e to g i v e i t . Such a question r e c e i v e s no emphasis 
i n the 'organic 1 metaphor which i s embedded i n , a t 
l e a s t , much of the s o c i o l o g i c a l l y i n f l u e n c e d t h i n k -
i n g done i n and around education during r e c e n t y e a r s ; 
and f o r t h a t reason the metaphor i s , as S c h e f f l e r 
shows w i t h the l u c i d i t y t h a t goes only w i t h p h i l o s -
o p h i c a l a n a l y s i s , i n a p p r o p r i a t e i n the p r a c t i c a l 
c o n t e x t s i n which i t i s too o f t e n found. 
To have r e v e a l e d the l i m i t a t i o n s of the 'organic' 
(26) I b i d . , p. 58 
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metaphor i s to have demonstrated the bearing of mod-
ern a n a l y t i c a l philosophy on educational theory i n 
an area that c l e a r l y has need of the philosopher's 
special s k i l l s , an area that vibrates w i t h the a c t i v -
i t i e s of another and less cautious kind of s p e c i a l i s t 
As Scheffler makes p l a i n at the outset, educational 
discourse i s d i f f e r e n t from, say, s o c i o l o g i c a l d i s -
course and the l a t t e r cannot be transplanted whole-
sale i n t o the former without the 'sea change' that 
only the philosopher can describe, f o r i t i s a pecul-
i a r l y complex discourse which '...embraces a number 
of d i f f e r e n t contexts, c u t t i n g across the s c i e n t i f i c , 
the p r a c t i c a l , and the e t h i c a l spheres, which lend a 
v a r i e t y of colors and emphases to ostensibly common 
notions. A fundamental task of analysis would thus 
seem to be the disentangling of d i f f e r e n t contexts 
i n which education i s discussed and argued, and the 
consideration of basic ideas and appropriate l o g i c a l 
c r i t e r i a relevant to each' (27) 
Once again, we f i n d here the expression of ideas 
a r i s i n g out of one part of our enquiry - the use of 
analogy, metaphor and models i n educational theory -
which are, being more general, best l e f t f o r discuss-
ion i n another part; that i s , i n the l a t e r chapter 
which, as mentioned (see p. 125, supra), investigates 
the nature of educational theory from positions a l t e r n 
(27) I b i d . , p. 9 
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a t i v e to that implied i n the l a s t quotation and lab-
e l l e d , f o r convenience, the 1Peters-Scheffler' p o s i t -
ion. But before pursuing that wider topic we can 
make an immediate extension from what we have consid-
ered i n t h i s chapter i n t o closely related themes which 
enable us to redress the philosophical balance of t h i s 
account, i n that there i s post-Schefflerian work of 
some importance being undertaken on the two language 
features which he examines i n conjunction with metaphor 
- slogans and d e f i n i t i o n s - that presents a d i f f e r e n t 
emphasis to that of the predominant 'Peters-Scheffler 1 
approach, an emphasis more i n keeping w i t h the 'pos-
i t i v i s t i c * element i n Hardie and O'Connor, but devel-
oped more rigorously. 
The f o l l o w i n g chapter - mainly on d e f i n i t i o n s and 
concepts i n education, rather than on the associated 
theme of slogans which hawfi. received s u f f i c i e n t i n c -
i d e n t a l mention - w i l l , towards the end , give great-
er weight to the s c i e n t i f i c a l l y orientated ' p o s i t i v -
i s t i c ' approach, not because i t occupies a major part 
of the current l i t e r a t u r e but because of i t s possible 
importance f o r the future development of the new d i s -
c i p l i n e away from the ' o f f i c i a l ' , 'linguistic'emphasis 
which characterises i t and the account we have been 
givin g of i t at the present moment. We can continue 
to f o l l o w the procedure which has enabled us to enter 
the l i t e r a t u r e w i th some p r o f i t by returning once more 
to Hardie f o r a b r i e f cue i n t o l a t e r developments: and 
t h i s w i l l be found at the point at which we commenced 
our i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the use of analogy. 
CHAPTER V 
TWO PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACHES TO DEFINITIONS AND 
CONCEPTS IN EDUCATION 
The Predominant 'Lin g u i s t i c ' Approach 
I n Hardie there are many cues to be found f o r i n -
troducing l a t e r developments of t h i s theme, cues which 
occur at points i n h i s argument a l l the way from the 
l a s t place at which we used him to the f i n a l chapter 
of his book. And i t i s to t h i s , the p o s i t i v e end-
product of a l l h is e a r l i e r c r i t i c i s m s , that we can 
go to f i n d , w i t h i n his discussion of what elements 
any educational theory must contain, remarks on def-
i n i t i o n s i n education which provide an e f f e c t i v e 
springboard f o r a f u r t h e r comparative study, p a r t i c -
u l a r l y of the work of Scheffler, taken as represent-
a t i v e of the ' l i n g u i s t i c ' approach, one of the two 
approaches with which t h i s chapter w i l l deal. 
Hardie i s conscious of the numerous d e f i n i t i o n s 
of education th a t have been given, three of which he 
has analysed before coming to the point ofjsuggesting 
the 'second order', philosophical i n v e s t i g a t i o n which 
must precede any add i t i o n a l d e f i n i t i o n being offered 
as superior and more comprehensive than the r e s t ; he 
says, '...we must f i n d out how we decide whether a 
d e f i n i t i o n i s r i g h t or wrong. I t i s , f o r example, 
sometimes held that we can define words as we please, 
so long as we do not depart from our defined meaning. 
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On the other hand, i t i s sometimes held that i t i s not 
words that we define but things or concepts, and def-
i n i t i o n s therefore cannot be a r b i t r a r y ' ( 1 ) . 
He t r i e s to mediate t h i s controversy through an 
analysis of one type of what he distinguishes as ' b i -
verbal d e f i n i t i o n 1 ( 2 ) , arguing that such d e f i n i t i o n s 
- f o r example, 'man i s a r a t i o n a l animal 1 - consist 
of two kinds of proposition i n conjunction, a prop-
o s i t i o n of what he chooses to c a l l 'social h i s t o r y ' 
and a proposition which expresses the 'command' of" 
the person giv i n g the d e f i n i t i o n ( 3 ) . To state how 
you t h i n k a word has been used i n the past - that i s , 
to define i n terms of a word's 'social h i s t o r y ' - i s 
to r i s k being wrong, f o r there are no grounds f o r 
disputing the f a c t s of past usage. But to express 
one's own intentions about the d e f i n i t i o n of a word 
i s to do something e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t : no one can 
object t o a word being used i n an odd fashion, w i t h -
out reference to i t s social h i s t o r y , provided that 
the use i s consistent. 
Hardie then relates these preliminary remarks, 
which i t w i l l be noted neatly dispose of the problem 
by i n t e r p r etching 'r e a l ' d e f i n i t i o n s i n terms of soc-
i a l conventions, to the problem of de f i n i n g education. 
For a completely s a t i s f a c t o r y d e f i n i t i o n , he says, 1 s.. 
we must give a l l the marks which have been thought 
(1) Hardie, C. D., Truth and Fallacy i n Education-
a l Theory (Cambridge, 1942), p. 67 
(2) I b i d . , p. 67 
(3) I b i d . , p. 68 
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ch a r a c t e r i s t i c of i t , and then agree to use the word 
"education" only f o r a process having those character-
i s t i c marks' ( 4 ) . I n other words, we must survey the 
s o c i a l h i s t o r y of the term 'education', i d e n t i f y the 
main features of that h i s t o r y , bring them together 
and make the decision to l i m i t the use[of the term to 
what we f i n d as the 'essence' of past usage. 
This analysis, simple though i t i s , constitutes 
a f i r s t step along the path that Scheffler ifea± was 
to tread more surely much l a t e r : we can attempt t o 
r e l a t e the two w i t h reference to what Scheffler c a l l s 
'general d e f i n i t i o n s ' ( 5 ) , to be distinguished from 
s c i e n t i f i c d e f i n i t i o n s f o r much the same reasons that 
metaphors i n educational theory are to be d i s t i n g u i s h -
ed from models i n s c i e n t i f i c theory, as we have seen. 
He says: 'Ve are interested, broadly, i n non-scientif-
i c discourses i n which d e f i n i t i o n s of educational 
notions are o f f e r e d . . . I t makes no difference whether 
the d e f i n i t i o n s offered i n such contexts are put f o r -
ward on s c i e n t i f i c a u t h o r i t y or not; the important 
f a c t i s that they are presented not as technical 
statements interwoven with special s c i e n t i f i c res-
earch and f o r t h e o r e t i c a l purposes, but rather as 
general communications i n a p r a c t i c a l context 1 ( 6 ) . 
Scheffler i s quick to i s o l a t e a type of d e f i n -
i t i o n - the ' s t i p u l a t i v e ' - which at f i r s t sight 
appears to be p a r t l y equivalent to the second kind 
of proposition that Hardie says i s present i n a def-
(4),(5),(6) See p. 145, i n f r a 
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i n i t i o n , that which expresses a command or v o l i t i o n . 
I f the two types were equivalent we could give Hardie 
more cr e d i t f o r early o r i g i n a l i t y than i s possible as 
things stand, but they are not, as we s h a l l see i n 
s h i f t i n g the examination to Scheffler, whose analysis 
reveals strongly the influence of those developments 
i n 'pure' philosophy which have taken place, as was 
mentioned e a r l i e r , since Hardie's early days. 
A s t i p u l a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n i s , according to Scheff-
l e r , '...a piece of terminological l e g i s l a t i o n that 
does not purport to r e f l e c t the previously accepted 
usage of the defined term' ( 7 ) ; that i s , i t has no 
connection with what Hardie c a l i s 'social h i s t o r y ' , 
being often, i n f a c t , an invented term and free of 
entanglement, even when i t i s not invented, w i t h 
common usage - which Hardie's ' a r b i t r a r y ' element 
(see pp. 142-3, supra) i s c e r t a i n l y not." The motive 
f o r making such d e f i n i t i o n s i s purely the convenience 
of having abbreviatory terms f o r the sake of economy; 
as, f o r example, with the shorthand terms of teachers 
such as 'pass' or ' c r e d i t 1 , which are handy equival-r-
ents of rather complicated descriptions that could 
be given i n f u l l f o r the papers i n question. 
(4) I b i d . , p. 70 
(5) Scheffler, I . , The Language Of Education 
( S p r i n g f i e l d , I l l i n o i s , 1960), p. 13 
(6) I b i d . , p. 12 
(7) I b i d . , p. 13 
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I n what sense ' s t i p u l a t i v e ' d e f i n i t i o n s can be 
said to be a r b i t r a r y Scheffler makes clear, f o r i t i s 
a point of some importance to the exposition of other 
kinds of d e f i n i t i o n l a t e r , which are of great import-
ance i n education and which musti be distinguished 
from those that he i d e n t i f i e s at f i r s t . He says: 
•What is...fundamental with regard to a l l s t i p u l a t i v e 
d e f i n i t i o n s i s that they do not purport to r e f l e c t the 
p r e d e f i n i t i o n a l usage of the terms they define... 
Once i t i s established that a s t i p u l a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n 
. . . i s formally coherent and pragmatically well-chosen, 
i t i s i r r e l e v a n t to argue against i t f u r t h e r on the 
ground that i t f a i l s to r e f l e c t the normal meaning 
of the defined term. I n t h i s special sense, s t i p u l -
a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n s may be said to be matters of a r b i -
t r a r y choice' ( 8 ) . 
That t h i s ' a r b i t r a r y ' choice i s d i f f e r e n t from the 
'a r b i t r a r y ' element nchiLed by Hardie can be seen i n 
considering the next type of d e f i n i t i o n that Scheff-
l e r distinguishes, f o r t h i s type - the 'descriptive' 
d e f i n i t i o n - is. connected w i t h previous usage i n a 
way that Hardie attempts i n his too crude a fashion 
and w i t h h i s too r e s t r i c t e d a n a l y t i c a l tools to un-
cover. Descriptive d e f i n i t i o n s , according to Scheff-
l e r , purport to give an account of the p r i o r usage of 
the terms i n question; they c l a r i f y meanings by look-
(8) I b i d . , p. 15 
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ing at 'social h i s t o r y ' , genuinely explaining and 
not merely, as 1 s t i p u l a t i v e ' d e f i n i t i o n s do, abbrev-
i a t i n g . Scheffler puts the difference i n t h i s way: 
' I f we v i s u a l i z e the d e f i n i t i o n as a formula, a f t e r 
the fashion of modern l o g i c , i n which the defined 
term...appears at the l e f t and the defining...set of 
terms appears at the r i g h t . . . , then we may also v i s -
u a l i z e the dfefference...as a difference i n the d i r e c t -
i o n of i n t e r e s t i n the formula as a whole. Whereas 
the i n t e r e s t i n s t i p u l a t i o n moves from r i g h t to l e f t , 
t hat i s towards more condensed utterance w i t h increas-
ed vocabulary, the i n t e r e s t i n descriptive d e f i n i t i o n 
moves from l e f t to r i g h t , i . e . , towards expanded ex-
planatory utterance with a smaller vocabulary' ( 9 ) . 
Hardie's 'social h i s t o r y 1 i s thus roughly equiv-
alent to Scheffler's 'descriptive' d e f i n i t i o n , and 
his'command or v o l i t i o n concerning the use of words' 
i s an element \tfhich he c o r r e c t l y i d e n t i f i e s but which 
he f a i l s to account f o r s a t i s f a c t o r i l y : i t draws a t t -
ention to the f a c t that a p a r t i c u l a r aspect of an 
o f t e n complicated p r i o r usage i s to be understood -
something which i s extensively elaborated by Scheffler, 
as we s h a l l see i n examining f u r t h e r h i s 'ordinary 
language 1 approach to the d e f i n i t i o n of 'teaching'. 
So, as with metaphor, we f i n d here an example of the 
e a r l i e r w r i t e r providing a f i r s t attempt at analysis 
(9) I b i d . , p. 16 
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i n an area deemed to be of great, importance by the 
l a t e r w r i t e r ; and doing so i n a manner which appears 
as comparatively unsophisticated and yet as not lack-
ing c e r t a i n v i r t u e s of rough approximation to the ana-
l y t i c a l t r u t h . 
S c h e f f l e r 1 s contemporary analysis i s too thorough 
to be followed i n f u l l , so t h a t , f o r our purposes, i t 
w i l l be best to select those aspects.of i t which can 
be most easily related to the work of other philosoph-
ers, p a r t i c u l a r l y Peters. His (and Peters') continual 
emphasis upon the context i n which the language under 
examination appears i s immediately i n evidence, des-
igned to correct any f a l s e impression given (by t a l k 
of 'formulae 1) that the analysis of d e f i n i t i o n s i s 
a mechanical a f f a i r . He warns, '...a given d e f i n i t -
i o n a l equation may serve e i t h e r as a s t i p u l a t i o n or 
as a descriptive d e f i n i t i o n , depending on the context 
i n which i t i s offered and the purposes which i t i s 
intended to serve; the difference i s thus not a form-
a l or purely l i n g u i s t i c one but relates rather to the 
pragmatic environment of the d e f i n i t i o n . I f and only 
i f the d e f i n i t i o n a l equation purports to mirror pre-
d e f i n i t i o n a l usage i s i t d e s c r i p t i v e 1 (10). 
Such mi r r o r i n g of usage i s precisely what he him-
s e l f claims to be doing, at a l a t e r stage of the arg-
ument of t h i s book, with the concept of 'teaching', 
(10) I b i d . , p. 17 
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aspects of which we have already noted when they 
arose i n our discussion of metaphor. He i s there 
showing i n use a philosophical technique, the l o g i c 
of which he i s here describing when he says: '(Des-
c r i p t i v e d e f i n i t i o n s ) may be formulated i n cases 
where the term i s already being applied p r o f i c i e n t l y 
to instances, the point being to d i s t i l the guiding 
p r i n c i p l e of such ap p l i c a t i o n and to show i t s i n t e r -
connection with others. This l a s t sort of enterprise 
i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y philosophical, exemplified i n 
the work of many thinkers since Socrates, whose attempt 
was precisely to formulate general characterizations 
covering known instances of important terms' (11). 
Thus, a consideration of d e f i n i t i o n soon brings 
us to the same emphasis upon a general philosophical 
p o s i t i o n that we have been brought to on a number of 
occasions before - to the predominant ' l i n g u i s t i c ' , 
'ordinary language', ' o f f i c i a l ' , "Peters-Scheffler' 
or c a l l i t what you w i l l p o s i t i o n which i s ubiquitous 
i n the l i t e r a t u r e . The very terms used are pointers 
to i t s presence; f o r Scheffler's ' d i s t i l ' brings to 
mind Peters' 'essence' and the moment when he, too, 
stakes out the philosopher's claim with a s i m i l a r 
emphasis on contextual considerations. He asks, 
( I ) s a philosopher who embarks on such a task ( i . e . , 
conceptual c l a r i f i c a t i o n ) committed to the suspect 
conviction shared by Socrates that there i s some "ess-
(11) I b i d . , p. 17 
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enceII; of education which conceptual analysis can ex-
p l i c a t e ? . . .have I already put my foot on the primrose 
path that leads to essentialism?...Frankly I do not 
mind i f I have. What would he objectionable would 
be to suppose that c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s could be 
regarded as essential i r r e s p e c t i v e of context and of 
the questions under discussion' (12). 
Both Scheffler and Peters are thus concerned w i t h 
e x p l i c a t i n g ordinary, standard usage; and they both 
make p l a i n t h e i r awareness of the f a c t that such usage 
i s not completely consistent or exhaustive, so that 
i n appealing to i t these can be allowed considerable 
leeway or choice to the philosopher - the s k i l l shown 
i n exercising t h i s i s , i n f a c t , what makes him a p h i l -
osopher. Many descriptive d e f i n i t i o n s meet the demands 
of accuracy i n mirroring p r i o r usage, making some meas-
ure of d e f i n i t i o n a l l e g i s l a t i o n i n e v i t a b l e . As Scheff-
l e r says: •...where p r i o r usage c l e a r l y applies a temm 
to some object, the d e f i n i t i o n may not withhold i t ; 
where p r i o r usage c l e a r l y withholds the term from 
some object, the d e f i n i t i o n may not apply i t . But 
with respect to undecided cases, the d e f i n i t i o n may 
serve to l e g i s l a t e i n any manner' (13). 
That the manner of l e g i s l a t i o n i s important - the 
manner which r e s u l t s i n , f o r example, Peters defining 
'education' i n the way he does and Scheffler defining 
(12) Peters, R. S. 'Education As I n i t i a t i o n ' , i n 
Archambault, R. D. (Ed), Philsophical Analysis and Ed-
ucation (London. 1965), pp. 88-9 
(13) Scheffler, I . , op. c i t . , p. 18 
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'teaching' i n a s i m i l a r ,jway - w i l l become clear as 
we pass' to the t h i r d type of d e f i n i t i o n that Scheffler 
i d e n t i f i e s - 'programmatic* d e f i n i t i o n - and then to 
the most important questions concerned w i t h the poss-
i b l e overlapping i n actual contexts of the d i f f e r e n t 
types of separately i d e n t i f i e d d e f i n i t i o n s . 
A 'programmatic' d e f i n i t i o n i s one which gives 
expression to a p r a c t i c a l programme, appearing as i t 
does on a p a r t i c u l a r occasion i n a p a r t i c u l a r context 
and used often to indic a t e a serious moral choice. 
There i s c l e a r l y no 'programmatic' formmla but only 
a 'programmatic' use: Scheffler derives his views on 
t h i s type of d e f i n i t i o n to a great extent from the 
Stevenson we examined i n the chapter on ethics, and 
makes his debt clear i n an important footnote where 
he states what he conceives to be the difference be-
tween a 'persuasive' and a 1 programmatic * d e f i n i t i o n 
i n terms which confirm our placing him amongst the 
' c o g n i t i v i s t s * . He says:'The emphasis on programm-
a t i c rather than persuasive d e f i n i t i o n s i s not a den-
i a l of the importance of the l a t t e r , but, at least i n 
part, an attempt to stress the "cognitive" import of 
d e f i n i t i o n s f o r s o c i a l practice, which has, i t seems 
to me, been unduly neglected recently despite i t s s i g -
n i f i c a n t r o l e i n general discourse' (14). 
What he i s saying i s that a 'programmatic' d e f i n -
i t i o n expresses a moral choice f o r which arguments 
(14) I b i d . , p. 20, footnote 9 
152 
can be produced, of the sort that we investigated 
e a r l i e r . However, the importance of 'programmatic1 
d e f i n i t i o n becomes clearer from Scheffler's analysis 
of the cases of overlap, the most i n t e r e s t i n g of which 
i s that between 'descriptive' and 'programmatic', part-
i c u l a r l y the s i t u a t i o n i n which, as he says, '...undec-
ided instances are involved and i n which two equally 
accurate d e f i n i t i o n s may yet be programmatically opp-
osed' (15); that i s , i n which a l t e r n a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n s 
of a term are possible, each l e g i t i m a t e l y claiming to 
be accurately 'descriptive' since, as we have noted, 
p r i o r usage i s not exhaustive - the language of the 
past cannot possibly account f o r a l l the non- l i n g u i s t -
i c changes that w i l l have to be described i n the then 
f u t u r e I 
The a l t e r n a t i v e and equally accurate 'descriptive' 
d e f i n i t i o n s may d i f f e r i n l e g i s l a t i n g f o r h i t h e r t o un-
decided cases - as they may without l o s i n g t h e i r claim 
to be 1 descriptive' - and the manner of t h i s l e g i s l a t -
ion , the way i n which undecided cases are brought 
w i t h i n the d e f i n i t i o n s or excluded from them make up 
the differences i n programme i f a l t e r n a t i v e s of prac-
t i c e are involved: the d i f f e r e n t d e f i n i t i o n s are pro-
gramma t i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t . The most f a m i l i a r context 
fear t h i s phenomenon i s , of course, i n law, as Scheff-
l e r says: 'Legal contexts provide clear instances of 
d e f i n i t i o n s that l e g i s l a t e on p r a c t i c a l matters while 
(15) I b i d . , p. 27 
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purporting to sum up p r i o r ( l e g a l ) usage' (16). But 
i t occurs i n s o c i a l thought generally, and particular-
l y i n educational discourse at a time when rapid 
change i s creating the borderline instances of old 
terms which require l e g i s l a t i o n i n S c h e f f l e r 1 s sense 
and which, consequently, become defined programmatic-
a l l y : 'secondary education' i s an obvious example of 
such a term on the contemporary English scene. 
I f we apply t h i s d e f i n i t i o n a l scheme to the term 
•education', we can see that to give i t a d e f i n i t i o n 
i s to i n c i d e n t a l l y convey a programme while attempt-
ing to r e f l e c t previous usage: even with accurate def 
i n i t i o n s we are s t i l l l e f t w i t h the main problem, f o r 
as Scheffler says: '...such accuracy cannot be used 
as a measure of the worth of the expressed education-
a l program. D i f f e r e n t programs are compatible with 
accuracy and the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of any program i s thus 
an independent matter' (17). I n t h i s way he 'unblurs 
the d i s t i n c t i o n s that he i s continually mentioning. 
It.appears that Scheffler i s providing j u s t the 
kind of analysis that can equip us f o r a c r i t i c a l r e -
turn to Hardie, who, i t w i l l be remembered, seeks to 
i d e n t i f y a l l the marks which have been thought char-
a c t e r i s t i c of education before defining the term f o r 
agreed use (see pp. 143-4, supra). According to 
(16) I b i d . , p. 28 
(17) I b i d . , p. 31 
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Scheffler, i t i s not possible to give, i n any useful 
sense, a l l the marks, i . e . , to give the t o t a l i t y of 
p r e d e f i n i t i o n a l usage; so that whatever marks are 
f i n a l l y chosen by Hardie must, i f they are to repre-
sent the achievement of his i n t e n t i o n according to h i s 
own b e l i e f s , be described at such a high l e v e l of gen-
e r a l i t y as to be p r a c t i c a l l y useless as they stand, 
and i n need of f u r t h e r d e f i n i t i o n , a process that w i l l 
i n e v i t a b l y involve him i n implying a programme. 
Hardie does, i n f a c t , pursue f u r t h e r the c o n s t i t -
uent, abstract terms that make up his eventual d e f i n -
i t i o n of 'education 1, apparently unaware of the prac-
t i c a l programme he i s suggesting with the i n t e r p r e t a t -
ion he chooses. The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c marks which he 
uncovers are, '...four conceptions...(1) the o r i g i n -
a l nature of man; (2) the production of changes i n 
behaviour as, f o r example, the formation of habits; 
(3) the environment; (4) the idea of value' (18); and 
these are b u i l t i n t o the d e f i n i t i o n : 'Education i s a 
process i n v o l v i n g the action of the environment on 
the o r i g i n a l nature of man i n such a way as to pro-
duce valuable changes i n behaviour' (19). 
But t h i s i s not a great help to educationists, 
p a r t i c u l a r l y as we already know how he goes on to 
f u r t h e r define the most promising element - conc-
erning what is'valuable'- i n the d e f i n i t i o n . I t w i l l 
(18) Hardie, C. D., o . c i t . , p. 73 
(19) I b i d . , p. 73 
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be remembered that he defines 'valuable 1 i n emotive 
terms and bases his. conclusions about the p r a c t i c a l i t -
ies of moral education upon the d e f i n i t i o n ; he supplies 
a programme, but , i n any event, the d e f i n i t i o n he o f f -
ers i s 'programmatic' and the programme i n either case 
receives no independent j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n the sense that 
Scheffler pses. 
S i m i l a r l y , i n examining what Hardie does with the 
second element i n his d e f i n i t i o n , the 'original' nature 
of man', we note the lack of that awareness that a Sch-
e f f l e r - t y p e analysis would have cured, had there been 
one developed at the time. He i s drawn into a lengthy 
account of what i s known about the m o d i f i a b i l i t y of 
behaviour which i s a good example of the sort of eduE-
a t i o n a l discussions which Scheffler charges w i t h , '... 
f a i l i n g to take account of the several points noted 
abve regarding d e f i n i t i o n s that are both descriptive 
and programmatic. There are an i n d e f i n i t e number of 
a l t e r n a t i v e d e f i n i t i o n s of "man", i n d e f i n i t e l y many 
ways of dimensionalizing h i s structure and capacities, 
a l l equally accurate. To choose one such dimensional-
i z a t i o n on the basis of i t s accuracy and to proceed 
to read o f f c u r r i c u l a r counterparts to each dimension, 
as i s often done, i s to beg the whole question. One 
basis of choice of a d e f i n i t i o n f o r educational pur-
poses must be a consideration of the very consequences 
f o r educational practice to be expected as a r e s u l t 
of adoption of such a d e f i n i t i o n ' (20). 
(20) Scheffler, I . , op. c i t . , pp. 33-4 
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And i f i t i s argued, as i t w e l l might be, t h a t 
Hardie's ' p o s i t i v i s t i c 1 i n t e n t i o n i s to i n t r o d u c e 
r e l e v a n t s c i e n t i f i c i n f o r m a t i o n i n t o the d i s c u s s i o n 
- an imp r e s s i o n given by both h i s e a r l y and l a t e r 
w r i t i n g s - t h i s s t i l l l e a v e s him open to another of 
S c h e f f l e r ' s s t r i c t u r e s , aimed not, of course, d i r e c t -
l y a t him"but as an o b j e c t f o r which he can c e r t a i n -
l y stand. S c h e f f l e r s a y s : *An analogous point holds 
f o r the t r a n s f e r of d e f i n i t i o n s from s c i e n c e to educ-
ation...They cannot be f i t t e d i n t o our s t i p u l a t i v e , 
d e s c r i p t i v e , and .programmatic c a t e g o r i e s withput s e r -
i o u s d i s t o r t i o n . . . t o take a s c i e n t i f i c d e f i n i t i o n f o r 
programmatic use i s not to avoid the need f o r e v a l -
u a t i o n of the program such use conveys. The s c i e n t i f -
i c adequacy of a d e f i n i t i o n i s no more a s i g n of the 
p r a c t i c a l worthwhileness of such a program than a c c -
u r a c y with r e s p e c t to p r i o r usage* ( 2 1 ) . 
I n sum, Hardie's achievement, i n s p e c t e d from the 
viewpoint of a much l a t e r philosopher, a b l e to draw 
upon r i g o r o u s enquiry w i t h i n the philosophy of l a n g -
uage, i s diminished a t the l e v e l of p h i l o s o p h i c a l app-
r a i s a l i f not a t the l e v e l of h i s t o r i c a l i n t e r e s t -
assuming, t h a t i s , the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of the more con-
temporary work. The c o n f r o n t a t i o n of the two p h i l o s -
ophers a f f o r d s us, too, a f u r t h e r s t r o k e f o r the p i c -
t u r e we a r e p a i n t i n g of the 'bearing' as t h i s has dev-
eloped over the y e a r s ; and i t has allowed us to d e t a i l , 
(21) I b i d . , p. 34 
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by s u b s t a n t i a l quotation, one contemporary part, of 
t h a t p i c t u r e which i s as s i g n i f i c a n t as any. J u s t 
how s i g n i f i c a n t i t i s we can now t r y to show by b r i n g -
i n g the S c h e f f l e r a n a l y s i s to bear, not upon a dated 
Hardie, but upon a c u r r e n t l y i n f l u e n t i a l P e t e r s , and, 
i n the manner which produces the paradoxes - mention-
ed above (see p.115) - upon S c h e f f l e r ' s own attempt 
to d e f i n e ' t e a c h i n g 1 . 
T h i s procedure, of making 'the predominant " l i n g -
u i s t i c " approach' of our s e c t i o n heading i n t o the work 
of two'of i t s l e a d i n g p r a c t i t i o n e r s , w i l l enable us 
to develop c r i t i c i s m s of our own to an extent and of 
a type not h i t h e r t o attempted, i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r the 
more p o s i t i v e and l e s s l i t e r a t u r e - b o u n d p a r t s of the 
t h e s i s to come l a t e r ; and i t w i l l a l l o w us to bridge 
the two p h i l o s o p h i c a l approaches mentioned i n the 
t i t l e of t h i s chapter, c a r r y i n g us i n t o an account of 
a m i n o r i t y , ' s c i e n t i f i c a l l y o r i e n t a t e d ' view of d e f i n -
i t i o n s and concepts i n education which combines a 
c l o s e n e s s i n s p i r i t to the Hardie we have j u s t seen 
d i s m i s s e d w i t h a more i m p r e s s i v e , contemporary a n a l -
y t i c a l v i g o u r . 
The Ordinary Language D e f i n i t i o n Of 'Education' 
And 'Teaching' 
P e t e r s d e f i n e s 'education' i n h i s l a t e s t work (see 
p.28, supra) w i t h a s p e c i f i c purpose i n mind, and def-
i n e s i t i n h i s i n a u g u r a l address as a s e p a r a t e and 
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s e l f - c o n t a i n e d p i e c e of philosophy: i t i s to the l a t -
t e r t h a t we t u r n . What s o r t of d e f i n i t i o n i s i t t h a t 
he o f f e r s ? How does i t f i t i n t o S c h e f f l e r ' s scheme? 
I s i t s t i p u l a t i v e ? ; or programmatic?; or d e s c r i p t i v e ? ; 
or does i t i l l u s t r a t e one of the p o s s i b l e overlappings 
of these t y p e s ? Our previous r e f e r e n c e s to P e t e r s ' 
work t e l l s us t h a t the d e f i n i t i o n , no matter what 
ki n d i t i s , r e s u l t s from P e t e r s ' concern to get c l e a r 
about education i n such a way as to make sense of the 
t e a c h e r 1 s t a s k and to make sense to the t e a c h e r as he 
sees h i s t a s k , engaged i n the e n t e r p r i s e . 
I f we look a t another p a r t of h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n , 
d e l i v e r e d i n a t r a n s a t l a n t i c symposium on the p o s s i b -
i l i t y of a d i s c i p l i n e of education, we f i n d a c l e a r 
admission of h i s d e s i r e both to keep t e a c h e r s i n mind 
$ h i l e p h i l o s o p h i s i n g i n education ('...most ph i l o s o p h -
e r s regard t h i s f i e l d as a p h i l o s o p h i c a l slum. But 
i t need not be so. There a r e genuine and e x c i t i n g 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems i n t h i s f i e l d . Indeed t h e r e 
i s enough work to keep a company of t r a i n e d philosoph-
e r s busy f o r h a l f a century. And such work could 
c o n t r i b u t e much to the clear-headedness of t e a c h e r s 
on the job' (22) ) and to g a i n b e n e f i t i n philosophy 
from the concrete, r e a l problems t h a t t e a c h e r s have to 
f a c e ( ' I f i n d t h a t t a k i n g the c o n c r e t e s i t u a t i o n of 
the t e a c h e r i n a school system i s o f t e n an admirable 
(22) P e t e r s , R. S., 'eomments1 on Walton, J . , 'A 
D i s c i p l i n e of Education' i n 'Walton, J . and Kuethe, 
J . L. ( E d s ) , The D i s c i p l i n e Of E d u c a t i o n (Wisconsin, 
1963), p. 20 
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way of t r y i n g out conceptual a n a l y s e s and t h e o r i e s of 
j u s t i f i c a t i o n and b r i n g i n g them down to e a r t h j (23) ) . 
T h i s b e l i e f , t h at the t e a c h e r ' s p o s i t i o n i s c l a r -
i f i e d by philosophy and h i s concrete s i t u a t i o n i s a 
t e s t i n g ground f o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l t h e o r i e s which o t h e r -
wise would f l o a t too f r e e l y , i s shown i n P e t e r s ' manner 
ofl d e f i n i n g 'education'. He t a k e s , i t w i l l be r e c a l -
l e d , v a r i o u s one-sided views which are to be found 
condensed i n t o metaphors, and a f t e r examining t h e i r 
l i m i t a t i o n s makes '...three conceptual p o i n t s about 
"education" which are n e c e s s a r y f o r the e x p l i c a t i o n 
of i t s essence' ( 2 4 ) . The 'essence' must, of course, 
account f o r what the dedicated teacher b e l i e v e s him-
s e l f to be doing. 
The f i r s t of these p o i n t s i s '. . . t h a t "education" 
i m p l i e s the i n t e n t i o n a l b r i n g i n g about of a d e s i r a b l e 
s t a t e of mind' ( 2 5 ) ; the second i s ' . . . t h a t to be "ed-
ucated" i m p l i e s ( a ) e a r i n g about what i s worthwhile and 
(b ) b e i n g brought to car e about i t and to posse s s the 
r e l e v a n t knowledge or s k i l l i n a way t h a t i n v o l v e s a t 
l e a s t a minimum of understanding and v o l u n t a r i n e s s 1 ( 2 6 ) ; 
and the t h i r d , concerned w i t h the c o g n i t i v e aspect of 
education t h a t P e t e r s i s always a t pai n s to s t r e s s , 
i s added to t h a t which emphasises the v a l u e of what 
i s passed on and that which u n d e r l i n e s the manner of 
(23) I b i d . , p. 20 
(24) P e t e r s , R. S., 'Education As I n i t i a t i o n ' ( s e e 
p. 150, s u p r a ) , p. 90 
(£5) I b i d . , p. 91 
(26) I b i d . , v. 97 
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i t s a s s i m i l a t i o n , i s expressed n e g a t i v e l y w i t h r e f e r -
ence to the k i n d of person who i s h i g h l y t r a i n e d but 
not 'educated' - '...he has a very l i m i t e d concept-
i o n of what he i s doing. He does not see i t s connect-
io n w i t h anything e l s e , i t s p l a c e i n a coherent p a t t -
ern of l i f e . I t i s , f o r him, an a c t i v i t y c o g n i t i v e l y 
a d r i f t • ( 2 7 ) . ' 
, These t h r e e c r i t e r i a , together w i t h the i n s i g h t s 
gained from an examination of the popular but l i m i t e d 
models of h i s p r e l i m i n a r y c r i t i q u e , equip P e t e r s to, 
as he puts i t , ' c o n s t r u c t ' a more p o s i t i v e account 
of edu.cation. The q u e s t i o n f o r us i s to what extent 
such t a l k of ' c o n s t r u c t i o n ' can be f i t t e d i n t o the 
d e f i n i t i o n a l scheme suggested by S c h e f f l e r . F o r t h i s 
• c o n s t r u c t i o n * i s undoubtedly understood by P e t e r s 
h i m s e l f as r e v e a l i n g what '..."Education" i n v o l v e s 
e s s e n t i a l l y ' (28) and '...what i s meant by "education"' 
( 2 9 ) ; and i s thus, apparently, both an attempt to ex-
p l i c a t e the o r d i n a r y usage of the term * education' 
and an e f f o r t towards r e c o n s t r u c t i n g , d i a l e c t i c a l l y , 
a more s a t i s f a c t o r y account of what education i s . 
According to Schef-£er, t h e r e a r e many p o s s i b l e 
d e s c r i p t i o n s of the o r d i n a r y usage of any term, each 
one w i t h a l e g i t i m a t e c l a i m to be m i r r o r i n g p r e d e f i n -
i t i o n a l usage a c c u r a t e l y ; so t h a t , on t h i s account, 
i f P e t e r s ' main preoccupation, i n what appears to be 
a double e x e r c i s e , i s w i t h the f i r s t a s p e c t , with what 
(27) I b i d . , p. £8 
(28) I b i d . , p. 102 
(29) I b i d . , p. 108 
161 
•education' does i n p r a c t i c e mean, then h i s second 
a s p e c t , i n which he t a l k s of ' e s s e n t i a l ' meaning, 
h a r d l y f i t s i n t o what S c h e f f l e r a s s e r t s about the i n -
exhaustive nature of ' d e s c r i p t i v e ' d e f i n i t i o n and the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of e q u a l l y v a l i d d e f i n i t i o n s of t h i s type. 
He must be d e f i n i n g 'programmatically 1: i n which case, 
the programme he i s e x p r e s s i n g stands i n need of the 
'independent j u s t i f i c a t i o n ' t h a t S c h e f f l e r r e f e r s t o . 
I n f a c t such independent j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a programme 
of moral education i s what we have seen P e t e r s s k e t c h -
i n g i n another context; and t h i s he continues i n the 
l a t e s t of h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n s , which we have not, un f o r -
t u n a t e l y , been able to a s s i m i l a t e more than m a r g i n a l l y 
i n t o t h i s account. 
But, as f a r as the i n a u g u r a l l e c t u r e i s concerned 
- and t h i s i s the o b j e c t of our p r e s e n t examination -
the above questions and p e r p l e x i t i e s about the nature 
of P e t e r s ' d e f i n i t i o n of 'education 1 remain. S c h e f f -
l e r and P e t e r s , h i t h e r t o v e r y much i n harmony, appear-
to c l a s h . We can perhaps best proceed by r e - e a s t a b -
l i s h i n g the harmony and d e a l i n g w i t h the " f e l t ' d i f f -
i c u l t i e s by examining them i n S c h e f f l e r ' s work, taken 
a s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the whole ' P e t e r s - S c h e f f l e r 1 app-
toach. And the r e - e s t a b l i s h m e n t of harmony i s e a s i l y 
e f f e e t e d by i n t e r p r e t i n g P e t e r s ' 'education' as equiv-
a l e n t f o r our purposes, to S c h e f f l e r ' s 'teaching'. 
For t h i s economical procedure t h e r e i s some warrant 
i n the emphasis, a l r e a d y noted, which P e t e r s p l a c e s , 
when d i s c u s s i n g the nature of education, on the t e a c h -
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er'on the job*. A l s o , we can note, i n h i s account 
of 'education as i n i t i a t i o n ' , the h e s i t a t i o n about 
d i s c a r d i n g the term 'teaching' as a s u i t a b l e l a b e l 
f o r what he has i n mind. ( 3 0 ) . 
So, we can put i t t h i s way: P e t e r s d e s c r i b e s as 
the o r d i n a r y meaning of 'education' - i . e . , what i t s 
standard use i m p l i e s - j u s t one of the e q u a l l y v a l i d 
meanings t h a t can be a n a l y s e d out of o r d i n a r y language: 
and t h i s meaning i s very c l o s e to the meaning of 'teach-
i n g ' as t h i s i s analysed out of o r d i n a r y usage by 
S c h e f f l e r . I n s h o r t , the e s s e n t i a l meaning of 'ed-
u c a t i o n ' , the core of i t s use, i s 'teaching' i n 
S c h e f f l e r ' s sense of the term. Our questions about 
P e t e r s (see p. 158, supra) then become questioms ab-
out S c h e f f l e r . To what extent i s h i s 'teaching' def-
ined ' d e s c r i p t i v e l y ' a c c o r d i n g to h i s own account of 
' d e s c r i p t i v e ' d e f i n i t i o n s ? How does the d e f i n i t i o n 
i n the l a t e r p a r t of h i s book withstand the f o r c e of 
h i s own e a r l i e r a n a l y s i s i n which i t i s shown- t h a t 
t h e r e are always s e v e r a l , e q u a l l y v a l i d ' d e s c r i p t i v e ' 
d e f i n i t i o n s f o r any term? 
C l e a r l y , t here i s at the h e a r t of t h i s problem, 
which i s s i m p l i f i e d to make i t manageable w i t h i n the 
c o n f i n e s of t h i s enquiry but which i s n e v e r t h e l e s s 
d i f f i c u l t enough to see i n t o , the very l a r g e p h i l o s -
o p h i c a l question which has been i m p l i e d a t s e v e r a l 
(30) I b i d . , p. 102 
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p o i n t s h i t h e r t o , i n d i s c u s s i n g the ' l i n g u i s t i c * app-
roach. I t i s to what extent 'ordinary language'anal-
y s i s i s s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t , granted t h a t i t i s a sound 
s t a r t i n g - p o i n t f o r conceptual e n q u i r i e s . As we s h a l l 
see b e t t e r i n the f i n a l s e c t i o n of t h i s chapter, t h e r e 
ar e those who o b j e c t to what they c o n s i d e r to be the 
s t u l t i f y i n g e f f e c t on conceptual c r e a t i v i t y of a t o t -
a l commitment to 'ordinary language' a n a l y s i s - an 
e f f e c t b r i e f l y touched upon i n our comments below. 
Turning to the d e t a i l s of S c h e f f l e r , we read t h a t 
h i s purpose i s , '...through an a p p l i c a t i o n of philosoph-
i c a l methods to c l a r i f y c e r t a i n p e r v a s i v e f e a t u r e s of 
e d u c a t i o n a l thought and argument 1 ( 3 1 ) : i t i s c l e a r 
t h a t h i s ' p h i l o s o p h i c a l methods' are those of 'o r d i n -
a r y language' a n a l y s i s and t h a t i t i s c l a r i f i c a t i o n 
of what e x i s t s t h a t concerns him and not i n v e n t i o n 
of something new. But i t can be argued t h a t d e s c r i p -
t i o n of usage can and should be followed by p r e s c r i p -
t i o n , t h a t the disentanglement of the common language 
confusions should be a p r e l i m i n a r y t a s k to t h a t of 
c r e a t i n g more p r e c i s e d e f i n i t i o n s and concepts, w i t h 
c l e a r p r a c t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s , f o r use i n education. 
I n f a c t , i f S c h e f f l e r ' s own d e f i n i t i o n a l scheme i s 
accepted, t h i s cannot but happen, f o r s i t u a t i o n s i n 
which h i s 'descriptive-programmatic' o v e r l a p p i n g ob-
t a i n s a r e almost i n e v i t a b l e i n a complex d i s c o u r s e 
(31) S c h e f f l e r , I . , The Language Of Education 
( S p r i n g f i e l d , I l l i n o i s , 1960), p. v i i 
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l i k e that of eduaation. 
However, he i n s i s t s t h a t h i s own c l a r i f i c a t i o n of 'teach 
i n g 1 i s of ' . . . i t s everyday HSK, standard use', of 
1...ways i n which i t i s t y p i c a l l y a p p l i e d , and t h a t 
to which i t t y p i c a l l y r e f e r s ' ( 5 2 ) ; and by t h i s i n -
s i s t e n c e he l e a v e s no doubt tha$ he b e l i e v e s h i m s e l f 
to be o f f e r i n g a d e s c r i p t i v e d e f i n i t i o n . Presumably , 
he would deny t h a t h i s method here could be d e s c r i b e d 
i n the words he uses on another occ a s i o n ; and yet 
they seem to f i t admirably what he does w i t h 'teach-
i n g ' when we c o n s i d e r the constant use by so very 
many people of t h a t term. S c h e f f l e r s a y s : 
'...mention must be made of " e x p l i c a t i v e " methods, 
whose o b j e c t i s not p r i m a r i l y to d e s c r i b e standard 
uses of c u r r e n t concepts, but r a t h e r to r e f i n e and 
e x p l a i n these concepts s y s t e m a t i c a l l y so as to render 
them unambiguous, p r e c i s e , and t h e o r e t i c a l l y adequate. 
The r e f i n e d products of e x p l i c a t i v e methods must be 
s i m i l a r i n c e r t a i n b a s i c r e s p e c t s to t h e i r n a t u r a l 
o r i g i n a l s ; they must be, r e c o g n i z a b l y , p r e c i s i o n -
made i d e a l i z a t i o n s of these o r i g i n a l s . Yet f o r the 
sake of s u p e r i o r i t y i n e x p r e s s i v e or t h e o r e t i c a l 
power, " e x p l i c a t i o n " f e e l s f r e e to d e v i a t e c o n s i d e r -
a b l y from the a c t u a l uses of concepts i n o r d i n a r y 
language' ( 3 3 ) . 
But t h i s i s what S c h e f f l e r appears to be doing 
w i t h 'teaching'. I f he i s not - and i t i s f o o l i s h 
(32) I b i d . , p. 60 
(33) S c h e f f l e r , I . , Philosophy and Education 
(Boston, 1958), pp. 8-9 
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to be dogmatic i n an a r e a where puzzlement i s r e s p e c t -
a b l e - then i t i s d i f f i c u l t to know why h i s a n a l y s i s 
i s so thought-provoking; f o r to s t a t e t h a t to 'teach' 
i s to submit to the requirement of the p u p i l s ' under-
sta n d i n g , to h i s demand f o r reasons and adequate exp-
l a n a t i o n s , does not appear, on the f a c e of i t , to be 
the mere g i v i n g of a d e s c r i p t i o n of the term's o r d i n -
a r y usage. I t seems more a p p r o p r i a t e l y c l a s s e d as an 
' e x p l i c a t i o n ' , made, as i s quoted above, (...for the 
sake of s u p e r i o r i t y i n expressive...power 1, and imply-
i n g a programme i n i t s d e f i n i n g as 'teaching' only 
those a s p e c t s of pedagogical r e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t a r e 
found i n a s m a l l p r o p o r t i o n of t e a c h i n g ( i n another 
sense) s i t u a t i o n s . 
For i f we t h i n k of t e a c h i n g i n S c h e f f l e r ' s way, 
we must favour g r e a t changes i n the s c h o o l s t h a t we 
have a t p r e s e n t ; and, of course, t h e r e i s the same 
i m p l i c a t i o n i n any acceptance we g i v e to P e t e r s * 
n o t i o n of 'education as i n i t i a t i o n ' w i t h which we 
entered t h i s phase of the d i s c u s s i o n . And t h a t t h i s 
programme of change i s not to the l i k i n g of everyone, 
we have seen i n r e p o r t i n g Eason's doubts (see p. 103, 
supra) expressed on b e h a l f of an o l d e r g e n e r a t i o n 
of e d u c a t i o n i s t s , who would no doubt d e f i n e 'teach-
i n g ' i n a manner d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of S c h e f f l e r 
and, i n t h e i r view, p r e f e r a b l e tm h i s because of the 
v e r y consequences f o r p r a c t i c e i m p l i e d . I t would app-
ear then t h a t h i s d e f i n i t i o n cannot be other than 
(programmatic 1. 
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Yet S c h e f f l e r i n s i s t s t h a t he i s d e s c r i b i n g w i t h -
out l e g i s l a t i n g ; and t h i s , i n view of h i s p h i l o s o p h i c -
a l standing, makes our c r i t i c a l remarks open to doubt, 
f o r whtever f o r c e they have d e r i v e s i n f a c t from S c h e f f 
l e r ' s own e a r l i e r i n s i g h t s i n t o d e f i n i t i o n s . I t w i l l 
be as w e l l to s p e c u l a t e on the kind of move he would 
make a g a i n s t the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t he c o n s t r u c t s r a t h e r 
than r e p o r t s i n h i s a n a l y s i s of ' t e a c h i n g 1 . We can 
summarize the o b j e c t i o n to h i s views by s t a t i n g t h a t 
' d e s c r i p t i v e ' d e f i n i t i o n s must be ( a ) s e l e c t i v e w i t h 
r e s p e c t to the t o t a l i t y of past usage, and (b) l e g i s -
l a t i v e or c o n s t r u c t i v e , because each use of a word 
c o n t r i b u t e s to new usage or meaning - t h a t i s , the 
meaning of, say, 'teaching' i s changed f o r us on 
r e a d i n g S c h e f f l e r ' s account, and i f i t i s changed 
f o r us i t i s changed f o r everyone w i t h whom we have 
c o n v e r s a t i o n a l contact i n which 'teaching' o c c u r s ; 
and s i m i l a r l y with them. 
To t h i s we can r e p l y , t a k i n g S c h e f f l e r ' s p a r t , 
thata'his framework of d e f i n i t i o n i s a r e l a t i v e l y soph-
i s t i c a t e d and s u b t l e t o o l w i t h which to i n v e s t i g a t e 
language and that i t i s i n the hands of a s k i l l e d 
p hilosopher. I t i s not a case of anyone's o p i n i o n 
on language usage being equal to anyone 1 e l s e ' s . A 
S c h e f f l e r only d e f i n e s a f t e r e x t e n s i v e p r e l i m i n a r y 
s o r t i n g and judging of usage, c a l c u l a t e d to develop 
a ' f e e l ' f o r the concept - f o r i t s important, c e n t r a l 
uses i n o r d i n a r y language. The r e s u l t i n g d e f i n i t i o n 
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m i r r o r s t h i s usage and so f a l l s w i t h i n the ' d e s c r i p t -
i v e * c l a s s . Without such r e f l e c t i o n of the o r d i n a r y 
a p p l i c a t i o n s of the terms i n question by a language-
conscious, s k i l l e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n v e s t i g a t o r , d e f i n -
i t i o n would be completely a r b i t r a r y , f o r i t i s only 
the c o n t r o l by i n i t i a l l y accepted c a s e s of a p p l i c a t -
io n t h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s a ' d e s c r i p t i v e ' d e f i n i t i o n 
from a ' s t i p u l a t i v e ' d e f i n i t i o n , as these are p r e s e n t -
ed by S c h e f f l e r . 
I n p l a i n terms ( which no doubt modesty prevents 
p h i l o s o p h e r s from u s i n g ) , any f o o l can g i v e a d e f i n -
i t i o n but only a philosopher can g i v e one t h a t cap-
t u r e s what can only be c a l l e d i t s 'essence'. And the 
reason foa? t h i s i s the sheer complexity of the t a s k , 
f o r which few are f i t t e d - a f a c t t h a t a r e c e n t p i c -
ture of the philosopher a t work, sketched by R y l e , 
makes one h e s i t a t e to deny. He s a y s , '...the p h i l -
o s o p h i c a l examination of a concept... can never be the 
examination of t h a t concept by i t s e l f , but only the 
examination of i t v i s - a - v i s i t s numerous neighbour-
concepts, and then v i s - a - v i s t h e i r innumerable neigh-
bours too. I t f o l l o w s . . . t h a t the procedure of the 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l examination of a concept i s n e c e s s a r -
i l y an argumentative or, i f you p r e f e r , a d i a l e c t i c -
a l procedure. The philosopger has done nothing a t a l l 
u n t i l he has shown the d i r e c t i o n s and the l i m i t s of 
the i m p l i c a t i o n - t h r e a d s t h a t a concept c o n t r i b u t e s to 
the statements i n which i t occurs; and to show t h i s 
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he has, so to speak, to tug these threads through 
t h e i r neighbouring threads , which, i n t h e i r t u r n , he 
must si m u l t a n e o u s l y be tugging' ( 3 4 ) • 
I t i s t h i s s k i l l t h a t S c h e f f l e r c l a i m s to be exer-
c i s i n g , showing what R y l e d i s t i n g u i s h e s , i n the ment-
ioned a r t i c l e , as the ph i l o s o p h e r ' s 'afternoon' con-
cern w i t h the language t h a t we a l l use unconcernedly 
i n the 'morning 1. S c h e f f l e r ' s purpose i s , above a l l , 
to make c l e a r what a 'programmatic' d e f i n i t i o n i s ; 
and, p e ^ t i c u l a r l y , to warn us t h a t such a d e f i n i t i o n 
appears, as i t were,'in d i s g u i s e and needs, i n every 
case, to be unmasked and shown f o r what i t i s - a 
departure from i n i t i a l usage made f o r p r a c t i c a l and 
moral purposes and hence to be evaluated by a p p r o p r i a t e 
moral and p r a c t i e a l c r i t e r i a . H i s own concept of t e a -
ching i s not intended to be programmatic i n t h i s c a r e -
f u l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d sense, f o r t e a c h i n g i s , S c h e f f l e r 
m a i n t a i n s , normally d i s t i n g u i s h e d by;., the g i v i n g of 
honest reasons such as he has s t a t e d i n h i s a n a l y s i s . 
I n answer to the o b j e c t i o n t hat 'teaching'- as we 
know i t i s most p l a i n l y not so d i s t i n g u i s h e d , S c h e f f -
l e r c l a r i f i e s h i s p o s i t i o n by i s o l a t i n g the ' a c t i v i t y ' 
sense of the term from a l l other s e n s e s . He does t h i s 
so w e l l - i n r e p l y to a c r i t i c v o i c i n g s i m i l a r doubts 
to those we expressed above - t h a t i t i s worth l e a v i n g 
i t a s h i s l a s t say i n t h i s s e c t i o n of the d i s c u s s i o n . 
(34) R y l e , g i l b e r t , 'Ordinary Language and P h i l o s -
ophy*, i n Hammer, L. Z. ( E d ) , Vafie and Man (New York, 
1966), p. 382. (From 'Abstractions', Dialogue, Vol.1, 
No.I, pp. 5-16, June 1962).* 
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He s a y s : ' I t i s t r u e t h a t we o f t e n employ a r o l e -
n otion of t e a c h i n g , as r e f e r r i n g to whatever t e a c h e r s 
(an i n s t i t u t i o n a l c l a s s ) do i n f a c t . I n s o f a r as t h i s 
may be t r u e , the o r d i n a r y word i s ambiguous, and I 
have chosen to e x p l a i n the a c t i v i t y - s e n s e of the word, 
u s i n g other means to t a l k about s c h o o l s as i n s t i t u t -
i o n s and the r o l e of f u n c t i o n a r i e s i n them. T h i s 
choice b r i n g s out the option of c o n s i d e r i n g how f a r 
t e a c h i n g ( i n the d i s t i n c t i v e a c t i v i t y sense) i s to be 
used i n s o c i e t y as a model of c u l t u r a l renewal. To 
b l i i r the d i s t i n c t i o n would, i n e f f e c t , ( I t h i n k ) tend 
to conceal t h i s o ption, But I hope I d i d not beg the 
moral i s s u e ; t h e r e may be good reasons f o r u s i n g other 
than r a t i o n a l methods i n given c i r c u m s t a n c e s , f o r i n -
s t a n c e . My point i s t h a t the option, as a moral, not 
l i n g u i s t i c , i s s u e , needs to be c l e a r l y exposed' ( 3 5 ) . 
We can l e a v e S c h e f f l e r on t h i s note of r e s t r a i n t , 
perhaps not wholly convinced t h a t 'whatever t e a c h e r s 
do i n f a c t ' can be excluded from the d i s c u s s i o n by 
t a l k of ambiguity. Teachers - those '...quiet men 
working a t the .job a t which they have always worked 1 
( 3 6 ) , as P e t e r s puts i t , diaarmingly, f o r t h e i r ears 
- do many t h i n g s : hundreds of thousands of them eng-
age i n a v a r i e t y of a c t i v i t i e s , a l l of which they 
would u n h e s i t a t i n g l y c a l l ' t e a c h i n g 1 . And most of 
these a c t i v i t i e s , measured a g a i n s t the standards 
i m p l i e d i n S c h e f f l e r ' s 'teaching' and P e t e r s ' 'educ-
( 3 5 ) S c h e f f l e r , I . , Studies i n Philosophy and Ed-
u c a t i o n , V o l . I V No.I, pp. 1 3 5 - 6 , Spring 1965 
( 3 6 ) P e t e r s , R. S., op. c i t . , p. 87 
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a t i o n ' , f a l l s h o r t ; so t h a t i t i s s t i l l hard to see 
how these philosophers* emphases can be claimed as 
d e s c r i p t i o n s of what i s the case. There remains the 
s u s p i c i o n t h a t the work of S c h e f f l e r ' a n d P e t e r s i s 
best i n t e r p r e t e d as the s o p h i s t i c a t e d p l e a , of p h i l -
osophers with a p a r t i c u l a r a n a l y t i c a l commitment, to 
view education and t e a c h i n g i n a s p e c i a l way. Howev-
er, to show any l e s s r e s t r a i n t i n v o i c i n g t h i s s u s p i c -
i o n than S c h e f f l e r shows i n developing the o b j e c t of 
i t would be i n a p p r o p r i a t e . V/e can, i n s t e a d , t u r n to 
r e p o r t on a philosopher w i t h a d i f f e r e n t a n a l y t i c a l 
commitment who does not h e s i t a t e to be b l u n t . 
The A l t e r n a t i v e ' P o s i t i v i s t i c ' Approach 
T h i s approach i s as w e l l represented by G.R.East-
wood as by any philosopher c u r r e n t l y working i n educ-
a t i o n . And i n t u r n i n g to him v/e can g i v e an i n s t a n c e 
of the 'bearing' under s c r u t i n y which o r i g i n a t e s , un-
l i k e those we have been c o n s i d e r i n g , i n a more-peri-
p h e r a l part of the E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g world. Eastwood 
i s a Canadian working i n an area h i t h e r t o dominated, 
so f a r as our account goes, by a s m a l l group of p h i l -
osophers with a p a r t i c u l a r commitment; so t h a t he i s , 
o 
g e o g r a p h i c a l l y and ph i l o s o p h i c a l l y speaking, an o u t s i d -
e r who^ argues i n the manner we have c a l l e d ' p o s i t i v -
i s t i c ' and who i s thus c l o s e r i n s p i r i t to Hardie and 
O'Connor than to the phi l o s o p h e r s who have tended to 
take up our time. 
171 
R±B views, as expressed i n the bulk of h i s work, 
are r a d i c a l l y opposed to those who would r e s t content 
with an 'ordinary language' approach; but, as we s h a l l 
see, the degree of h i s o p p o s i t i o n i s d i f f i c u l t to 
determine f i n a l l y , and the grounds of i t even more 
d i f f i c u l t to s t a t e , becaxise i n p a r t s of h i s w r i t i n g s 
he appears to r e v e a l a c o n t r a d i c t o r y sympathy f o r the 
procedures he a t t a c k s . However, we can s t a r t by rep-
o r t i n g the 'new' element to be found i n h i s c o n t r i b -
u t i o n . I n a number of a r t i c l e s p ublished during the 
n i n e t e e n - s i x t i e s he pursues the theme t h a t education-
i s t s must attempt to develop a p r e c i s e , t e c h n i c a l 
language - what he c a l l s a 'P-language 1, f o r p r o f e s s -
i o n a l s . A quotation from ones of these a r t i c l e s , not-
able f o r the s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e to the views of S c h e f f -
l e r d i s c u s s e d above, w i l l serve to show both h i s blunt 
demand f o r thoroughness and system and h i s philosoph-
i c a l sympathies and a n t i p a t h i e s . 
He s a y s : 'The language a n a l y s i s of p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
a c t i v i t y i s l a r g e l y , but not e n t i r e l y , t h e r a p e u t i c . 
Understanding c u r r e n t usage and c u r r e n t meanings i s 
an i n i t i a l stage but u n l e s s i t i s followed or accomp-
anied by the s u b s t i t u t i o n of the p r e c i s e f o r the im-
p r e c i s e and the c l e a r f o r the vague, l i t t l e i s ach-
i e v e d . Language does not f u n c t i o n a c c o r d i n g to r u l -
e s . Rules summarize usage. To f o l l o w a r u l e means 
to understand the r u l e . Most of the work so f a r done 
i n a n a l y s i s of the language of education d i s p l a y s a 
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tendency t o accept i t as i t i s and t h e r e f o r e does not 
proceed beyond the elementary t h e r a p e u t i c l e v e l . . . D e f -
i n i t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l f o r p r e c i s e usage i n any l a n g -
uage though i t remains l a r g e l y unexplored w i t h spec-
i f i c reference to education and the o n l y published 
work /'reference to Scheff.ler^ on the t o p i c i s l i m i t -
ed i n scope and makes l i t t l e attempt t o explore the 
p o s s i b i l i t i e s of many types of d e f i n i t i o n t h a t have 
been developed i n other c o n t e x t s . This alone const-
i t u t e s a f i e l d i n which t h e r e i s hope f o r a great 
deal o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l a c t i v i t y and i t may w e l l be 
t h a t new ways of d e f i n i n g are necessary. The act o f 
d e f i n i n g may be l a r g e l y the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o f the work-
er i n a s p e c i a l i s t f i e l d (e.g., c u r r i c u l u m ) but c l a r -
i f i c a t i o n of use and i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the e s t a b l i s h -
ment of s a t i s f a c t o r y c r i t e r i a f o r use and the approp-
r i a t e n e s s or relevancy of the concept associated w i t h 
the term are p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems. The degree t o 
which they are performed determines the degree t o 
which an adequate P-language i s e s t a b l i s h e d * (37). 
This i s a c l e a r demand t h a t we go beyond c l a r i f -
i c a t i o n or therapy to the c r e a t i o n o f p r e c i s e concepts 
f o r e f f e c t i v e p r o f e s s i o n a l intercommunication. I t a l -
so appears t o be a simple demand, u n f l a t t e r i n g i n i t s 
i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t philosophers such as S c h e f f l e r have 
been remiss i n not seeing to i t . The tone i s such as 
(37) Eastwood, G. R., 1"Contemporary Philosophy" 
I n E d u c a t i o n 1 , A u s t r a l i a n J o u r n a l Of Higher Educat-
i o n , V o l . 1 , pp. 32-3, 1961-63 
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to make us wonder e i t h e r how we could ever have been 
impressed by the 'Peters-Scheffler' approach or how 
Eastwood can be b l i n d to t h e i r d e l i c a t e l y argued sub-
t l e t i e s . There i s no doubt t h a t he i s s c i e n t i f i c a l l y 
o r i e n t a t e d , l i k e Hardie: he t a l k s o^ educational p h i l -
osophy 'moving towards g r e a t e r u t i l i t a r i a n value and 
p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a b i l i t y 1 ( 3 8 ) , away from i t s scandal-
ously l i m i t e d past. 
The c a r e f u l s e p a r a t i o n o f slogan, metaphor and 
d e f i n i t i o n to which S c h e f f l e r devotes many pages, 
and which we have reported as a s u b s t a n t i a l p o r t i o n 
of the 'bearing' of philosophy, i s p r a c t i c a l l y i g n o r -
ed by Eastwood, who disparages the whole of t r a d i t -
i o n a l views as though i t were j u s t a g i g a n t i c , s e l f -
p e r p e t u a t i n g slogan, a p h i l o s o p h i c a l f r e e - f o r - a l l . 
He says: 'The concept of educational philosophy as one 
grand slogan i n t e r p r e t e d by a system of s u b s i d i a r y 
slogans lea.ves those r e s p o n s i b l e f o r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 
and a p p l i c a t i o n f r e e t o do anything or n o t h i n g and 
yet claim t o " f o l l o w the r u l e " . The r e s u l t i s t h a t 
whatever X chooses to t h i n k i s l i f e adjustment is_ 
l i f e adjustment. A slogan means whatever i t i s taken 
to mean' (39)• 
This passage, the content of which i s p l a i n l y der-
i v e d from the l e s s i c o n o c l a s t i c work done by the Amer-
icans Komisar and McClellan ( 4 0 ) , i l l u s t r a t e s Eastwood's 
(38) I b i d . , p. 29 
(39) I b i d . , p. 30 
(40) IComisar, B. P. and McClellan, J. E., 'The Logic 
Of Slogans', i n Smith, B. 0. and Ennis, R. H. (Eds), 
Language and Concepts i n Education (Chicago 1961) 
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main weakness, p a r t i c u l a r l y evident at t h i s p o i n t i n 
our account, f o l l o w i n g a c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f more moder-
ate o p i n i o n ; f o r t h e r e i s an element of tongue-in-
cheek about h i s source which he has obviously missed. 
I n c o n t r a s t to them, East wood w i l l have none o f the 
inadequately d e f i n e d terms and vaguely expressed i d -
eas t h a t pack educational discourse. He i s d i s t u r b e d . 
at the acceptance o f slogans as l e g i t i m a t e f e a t u r e s 
o f such language, f o r a s i t u a t i o n i n which a term 
means whatever a user o f i t t h i n k s i t means outrages 
the s c i e n t i s t i n him. We are reminded o f Bardie's 
j i b e a t a s i m i l a r acceptance of an un d e s i r a b l e f e a t -
ure of ed u c a t i o n a l t h e o r y - " I t has been customary 
to consider t h a t disagreement i n such a s u b j e c t i s 
q u i t e r e s p e c t a b l e ' ( 4 1 ) . - and h i s d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o d i s -
pose of i t w i t h a new s o l u t i o n f o r o l d problems. 
The 'P-language' i s Eastwood's s o l u t i o n . This 
w i l l embody accurate d e s c r i p t i o n and e x p l a n a t i o n and 
w i l l demand of i t s p r o f e s s i o n a l users the p r e c i s e s t a t e -
ments and c o n s i s t e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f terms t h a t 
c h a r a c t e r i s e s any t e c h n i c a l language. For the f i r s t 
time p r o f e s s i o n a l educators w i l l be able t o communic-
ate w i t h each other i n terms t h a t a c c i i r a t e l y convey 
b e l i e f s , l e a v i n g the expression o f a t t i t u d e s as the 
task of the 'L-language 1, intended f o r communication 
w i t h and amongst laymen, f o r whom a t t i t u d e s are more 
(41) Hardie, C. D., T r u t h And F a l l a c y I n Educat-
i o n a l Theory (Cambridge, 1942), p. i x 
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necessary. The o l d terms w i l l thus have a double 
r o l e , one of which, the P-role, i s amde p o s s i b l e by 
the d e l i b e r a t e c r e a t i o n of a completely new s c i e n t i f -
i c a l l y p r e c i s e usage f o r the terms. 
Eastwood puts i t i n t h i s way: 'The d i f f e r e n c e ex-
i s t s i n the p r e c i s i o n o f the concepts associated w i t h 
them. The use o f the term " a c t i v i t y " i n the P-language 
i m p l i e s , or should imply, a concept c l e a r l y d e f i n e d 
f o r the p a r t i c u l a r context or use and based upon an 
adequately developed set o f c r i t e r i a so t h a t i t i s 
capable of u n i v e r s a l l y c o n s i s t e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . 
I t s use i n the L-language permits emotive-persuasive 
connotations designed t o f a c i l i t a t e acceptance o f a 
k i n d o r q u a l i t y of programme the c r i t e r i a f o r which 
are a p r o f e s s i o n a l concern. C u r r e n t l y terms such as 
" a c t i v i t y " , "curriculum","growth", " i n d i v i d u a l d i f f -
erences", "progress", "achievement" and others are 
no more c l e a r l y d e f i n e d and understood and no more 
c o n s i s t e n t l y used or i n t e r p r e t e d among p r o f e s s i o n a l s 
than i n l a y d i s c u s s i o n . The educator cannot speak 
or w r i t e p r e c i s e l y or assume t h a t he i s being i n t e r -
p r e t e d as he means to be because the language does 
not a l l o w 1 ( 4 2 ) . 
To t h i s diagnosis of the communication disease 
amongst e d u c a t i o n i s t s anyone i n the business, exper-
i e n c i n g i t s e f f e c t s d a i l y , w i l l be tempted to g i v e 
(42) Eastwood, G. R., op. edit., p. 52 
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immediate assent. So much d i s c u s s i o n of educational 
t o p i c s a t a l l l e v e l s i n the system seems t o be semant-
i c a i l y anarchic: conversation i n s t a f f room and i n 
committee|often resembles the dialogue of a P i n t e r 
p l a y . But a diagnosis i s not a cure. What Eastwood 
o f f e r s as ajremedy, h i s c o n s t r u c t i v e proposal f o r the 
c r e a t i o n o f a new, vigorous use o f educational concept 
seems a l i t t l e too c l e a r - c u t and s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d . 
V/e are reminded again of Hardie w i t h h i s mechanical 
s u b s t i t u t i o n a l a n a l y s i s t h a t seemed inadequate t o the 
proposed task. And one of Eastwood's own f a v o u r i t e 
phrases comes t o mind as an a p p r o p r i a t e l a b e l f o r 
what we suspect: he t a l k s o f 'naive s p e c i a l i s a t i o n 1 , 
and we sense t h a t such i s the weakness of h i s own 
proposal, f o r s u r e l y o n l y a naive person could f a i l 
to see t h a t such a simple s o l u t i o n r e s t s upon an ass-
umption o f s i m p l i c i t y i n edu c a t i o n a l discourse. 
I f v/e r e c a l l t h a t S c h e f f l e r and the 'or d i n a r y 
language' a n a l y s t s assume a complexity i n such d i s -
course, we r e a l i z e t h a t once more we are t o u c h i n g on 
the general problem o f the nature o f edu c a t i o n a l t h e -
ory t h a t we have t w i c e before approached i n d e a l i n g 
w i t h s u b s i d i a r y matters. Eastwood's s o l u t i o n - as 
opposed t o h i s i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f the problem, which 
i s u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l - assumes t h a t ' edujz^ion' i n one 
of i t s senses i s or could be a ' d i s c i p l i n e ' possessed 
of an autonomous discourse i n which key concepts 
could be r e f i n e d by p r o f e s s i o n a l agreement and e f f o r t . 
Such, a t any r a t e , i s the impression t h a t h i s over-
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condensed pronouncements g i v e . 
Now t h i s i s an assumption very much open t o c h a l -
lenge, as we s h a l l see i n d e t a i l d u r i n g the next 
chapter. For the moment i t can be said t h a t the n a t -
ure o f educational theory i s a debatable issue i n 
which one of t h e c r u c i a l questions i s whether East-
wood-type a s s e r t i o n s such as the one given belerw are 
acceptable i n the face o f the arguments of a Scheff-
l e r o r , even more, a h i r s t (see p. 2, supra). East-
wood says, f o r example, l i n k i n g h i s views on 'theory' 
w i t h the a t t a c k on slogans t h a t we have noted: 'An 
edu c a t i o n a l theory does not d i f f e r i n p r i n c i p l e from 
a t h e o r y i n any other f i e l d and the use o f the word 
"theory" i n the weak sense t o mean a s p e c u l a t i v e gen-
e r a l i s a t i o n based on what someone be l i e v e s t o be the 
case and the a p p r o p r i a t e way of d e a l i n g w i t h i t stems 
from inadequate development of the concept. I n t h i s 
weak sense a t h e o r y i s no more than a g e n e r a l i z e d 
set o f b e l i e f s designed t o create an a t t i t u d e and 
d e r i v i n g e f f e c t i v e n e s s from the degree t o which emot-
i v e language and s l o g a n i s t i c expressions can advance 
the o p i n i o n of the advocate' (43) 
To r e t u r n to the more r e s t r i c t e d t o p i c : we have 
s t i l l t o enquire a l i t t l e more c l o s e l y i n t o Eastwood' 
proposals f o r clean and t i d y d e f i n i t i o n s . How exact-
l y does he suggest t h a t concepts can be developed 
(43) I b i d . , pp. 39-40 
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and a •P-language 1 created? What are the d e t a i l s o f 
any procedures he may have f o r g i v i n g concrete form 
t o what might be c a l l e d h i s Carnapian a s p i r a t i o n s 
f o r e d u c a t i o n a l language? How e f f e c t i v e a defence 
of h i s procedures can he erec t against the i n e v i t a b l e 
c r i t i c i s m s t h a t w i l l come from the 'ordinary language 
school, whom he acknowledges by name i n the f o l l o w i n g 
passage, where h i s own (predominant) approach i s also 
b r i e f l y described? - '...contemporary philosophy i s , 
i n p a r t , at l e a s t , e m p i r i c a l l y based and concerned i n 
some way and degree w i t h language. The language com-
ponent may be o r d i n a r y language which i s the d i s t -
i n g u i s h i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f one type or st r a n d ; or 
i t may be one of the forms of i d e a l language t y p i c a l 
o f another which attempts t o e„chieve a g r e a t e r degree 
of expressienal c l a r i t y by us© of symbolic systems o f 
logico-mathematical form' (44) 
The answers to these questions can be found, i f 
at a l l , i n the thr e e stages t h a t Eastwood suggests 
f o r p rogressing from the a n a l y s i s o f language as i t 
i s c u r r e n t l y used t o the more c o n s t r u c t i v e a c t i v i t i e s 
t h a t he favours. I n d e s c r i b i n g them as stages riecess 
ary f o r the c r e a t i o n of s a t i s f a c t o r y e d u c a t i o n a l con-
cepts, he charges both groups of contemporary t h e o r -
i s t s - the 'progressive' e d u c a t i o n i s t s and t h e i r cog-
n i t i v e c r i t i c s - w i t h an equal f a i l u r e i n p r e c i s i o n ; 
(44) I b i d . , p. 28 
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f o r terms l i k e ' s t r u c t u r e ' , e s s e n t i a l t o the argum-
ents of one group, are as u n s a t i s f a c t o r i l y d e f i n e d 
as the terms l i k e ' a c t i v i t y ' which crowd the w r i t i n g s 
o f the o t h e r group, the ' c h i l d - c e n t r e d ' t h e o r i s t s , ag-
a i n s t whom the s t r u c t u r a l i s t s are r e a c t i n g . C l e a r l y 
Eastwood t h i n k s t h a t a Bruner (45) represents no p h i l -
o sophical advance on a DeweyI 
The f i r s t stage, h i s ' e x p l i c a t i o n ' ( 4 6 ) , c a l l s f o r 
a survey and c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the mea,nings of terms 
as they are used i n v a r i o u s normal c o n t e x t s , w i t h 
the o b j e c t i v e o f e s t a b l i s h i n g a p r e c i s e and c o n s i s t -
ent meaning f o r each c o n t e x t . This seems a reasonable 
s t a r t i n g p o i n t ; but as Eastwood, u n l i k e the p h i l o s o -
phers whom he tends t o i n d i c t , expresses h i m s e l f 
t e r s e l y , w i t h o u t the i l l u m i n a t i n g examples encounter-
ed i n , say, S c h e f f l e r , h i s own meaning f o r the key 
term 'context' i s not a t a l l c l e a r . I f he means by 
i t what S c h e f f l e r means, f o r example, then h i s f i r s t 
stage i s no more than an 'ordinary language' c l a r i f -
i c a t i o n . I f , on the ot h e r hand, he means something 
d i f f e r e n t , then h i s compacted e x p o s i t i o n of the stage 
stands i n obvious need of the "ordinary language' 
technique i t p u r p o r t s t o replace. 
.Fortunately, the o b s c u r i t y of h i s p o s i t i o n i s 
s l i g h t l y diminished by Eastwood's account of stage 
two. C r i t e r i a are t o be s p e c i f i e d f o r each context 
(45) See Bruner, J. S., The Process Of Education 
(harvard, 1961), Ch.2, f o r 'The Importance Of Struc-
t u r e 1 
(46) Eastwood, G. R., op. c i t . , ' p . 35 
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i n which a term may he used; so there w i l l he a v a i l a b l e 
what he c a l l s a 1 c r i t e r i a s e t 1 ( 4 7 ) f o r each s i t u a t i o n 
i n which terms l i k e ' a c t i v i t y ' and ' s t r u c t u r e ' can 
l e g i t i m a t e l y occur. Presumably the s p e c i f i c a t i o n s 
and instances of s i t u a t i o n s , agreed between the now 
• p r o f e s s i o n a l ' e d u c a t i o n i s t s ( a t a convention?) w i l l 
p rovide the content o f the p r o f e s s i o n a l course ^ the 
' l i t e r a t u r e ' ( t o use the Peters' vocabulary i n an a l -
i e n place) i n t o which young a s p i r a n t s are ' i n i t i a t e d ' 
The p i t y i s t h a t Eastwood provides us w i t h an a t t r a c t -
i v e c o l l e g e brochure but l i t t l e i n the way of schemes 
of work; f o r w h i l e we might agree w i t h him i n what he 
says i n , f o r example, the f o l l o w i n g q u o t a t i o n , we can 
n 0" t r e a l l y say what i t i s we are agreeing w i t h u n t i l 
h i s terms become more expanded. The s i t u a t i o n i s 
s i m i l a r to t h a t i n which Hardie's d e f i n i t i o n of 'educ-
a t i o n ' was found acceptable because o f i t s g e n e r a l i t y 
and the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of unforced d i s p u t e (see p. 154, 
supra). We l o n g f o r a d e t a i l e d example of a ' c r i t e r -
i a s e t 1 when he says: '...the e s s e n t i a l p o i n t i s t h a t 
each c r i t e r i a s e t designates a separate concept so 
t h a t f o r any term t h e r e i s not an associated concept 
but a " f a m i l y " of concepts. I t does not make sense 
to ask "What does...a...mean?"I The question must 
be phrased i n some such way as " I n t h i s context f o r 
t h i s purpose what does X mean by the use o f . . . a . . . ? " 1 
(48). 
(47) I b i d , , p. 35 
(48) i b i d . , p. 35 
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The a l l u s i o n to the ' f a m i l y ' n o t i o n o f the l a t e r 
W i t t g e n s t e i n puzzles us f u r t h e r , coming as i t does 
from one whose main o b j e c t of a t t a c k i s the k i n d o f 
' l a i s s e z f a i r e ' philosophy t h a t stems from the ' P h i l -
o sophical I n v e s t i g a t i o n s 1 . I f what Eastwood describes 
i n t h i s way as stage two i s not another aspect of the 
k i n d o f enquiry t o which Petrs and S c h e f f l e r devote 
themselves, i t i s , as w i t h stage one, d i f f i c u l t t o 
say what i t i s . And i f i t i s the same, we wonder 
why th e r e i s a l l the i n i t i a l f uss about the 'elem-
entary t h e r a p e u t i c l e v e l ' and ' l i m i t e d scope' o f , f o r 
example, S c h e f f l e r (see pp. 171-2, supra); f o r already 
two o f the three stages have been described w i t h o u t 
a n y t h i n g r e c o g n i z a b l y new being o f f e r e d . 
Several years l a t e r than the *P and L language' 
a r t i c l e Eastwood s t i l l d i s p l a y s t h i s d i s c o n c e r t i n g 
ambivalence towards the ' l i n g u i s t i c ' branch of a n a l -
y t i c a l philosophy when he says: 'Since the p u b l i c a t -
i o n o f W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s " P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g a t i o n s " 
the concept of " f a m i l i e s of meanings" i n s t e a d o f 
"meaning" has been debated but not questioned. Aware-
ness o f t h i s s i t u a t i o n i n language usage i s an essent-
i a l p r e l i m i n a r y step, but i t does not c o n s t i t u t e an 
e f f e c t i v e s o l u t i o n t o the problem' ( 4 9 ) . He again im-
p l i e s the i c o n o c l a s t i c i n t e n t i o n of h i s own work, 
w r i t t e n against the orthodoxy which i s "debated but 
(49) Eastwood, G. R., 'Categories, Concepts And 
Ostensive Learning', Canadian Education And Research 
Digest, Vol.5 No.3, p. 175, September 1965 
182 
not questioned', again acknowledges 'ordinary language' 
a n a l y s i s as 'anjessential p r e l i m i n a r y step' but f a i l s , 
ones more, t o giv e a p o s t - p r e l i m i n a r y step which reads 
as c o n v i n c i n g l y as the d e t a i l e d w r i t i n g s of those 
whom he c r i t i c i z e s . 
Lack o f d e t a i l i s h i s s t r e n g t h and h i s weakness: 
h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n cannot be dismissed, f o r i t s l a r g e 
claims may, v/e f e e l , t u r n out t o be j u s t i f i e d ; and 
yet t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n i s p r e s e n t l y l a c k i n g . At times 
he comes close t o a d m i t t i n g t h a t h i s r o l e i s the neg-
a t i v e one o f diagnosing a p h i l o s o p h i c a l ailment w i t h -
ot the power, at the moment, t o v / r i t e out the f u l l 
p r e s c r i p t i o n f o r a remedy: as, f o r i n s t a n c e , when he 
says, 'The c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f the language o f a d i s c i p -
l i n e i s not a task t o be undertaken w i t h hopes o f 
reaching f i n a l i t y . Even i f p r e c i s i o n could be ach-
ieved now i t would, w i t h o u t f u r t h e r development, be 
short l i v e d . The r e s u l t s t h a t accrue stem not so much 
from the d e f i n i t i o n s provided, the usages e s t a b l i s h e d 
and v a l i d a t e d and the c r i t e r i a developed, as from 
c r e a t i o n o f awareness t h a t t h e r e i s a c o n t i n u i n g 
problem. The s o l u t i o n comes not by c r e a t i n g a prec-
i s e language but by c r e a t i n g a p r e c i s e a t t i t u d e t o -
x-irards i t s use. Changing the form and/or elements of 
a language i s not a s u f f i c i e n t c o n d i t i o n f o r e f f e c t -
i v e establishment of pr e c i s e and c o n s i s t e n t use' ( 5 0 ) . 
(50) Eastwood, G. R., '"Contemporary Philosophy" 
I n Education', A u s t r a l i a n Journal Of Higher Education, 
Vol. I , p. 34, 1961-63 
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The more we read such passages i n Eastwood - char 
a c t e r i s e d by vague t a l k of the need f o r p r e c i s i o n -
the more we suspect t h a t the ' a l t e r n a t i v e " p o s i t i v -
i s t i c " approach' of our s e c t i o n heading i s a l i t t l e 
o p t i m i s t i c f o r the nineteen s i x t i e s . I n t h i s area, 
a t l e a s t , the thorough i n v e s t i g a t i o n s o f S c h e f f l e r , 
Peters and others occupy p r i d e of place not o n l y i n 
terms of b u l k , which we have r e f l e c t e d i n our account 
but also i n terms of q u a l i t y ; f o r t h i s t u r n i n g from 
the main path to f o l l o w the Eastwood t r a c k does not 
seem t o have provided us w i t h a s a t i s f a c t o r y a l t e r n a t 
i v e r o u t e . Perhaps t h i s i s a judgment c o n d i t i o n e d by 
the s t a t e of the d i s c i p l i n e at the time o f w r i t i n g 
and the sheer i n f l u e n c e of the c e n t r a l emphasis i n t h 
l i t e r a t u r e . Perhaps these views on concept develop-
ment should be appraised more f o r t h e i r p o t e n t i a l 
than f o r t h e i r achievement: t h e r e are signs i n the 
above passage t h a t Eastwood h i m s e l f would be content 
w i t h such a r e c e p t i o n . 
We can, then, inspect the t h i r d stage w i t h i t s 
p o t e n t i a l i t y r a t h e r than i t s accomplishment i n mind, 
asking ourselves how i t might be developed, g i v e n 
time and i n t e l l e c t u a l labour, and remembering how 
short has been the p e r i o d o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l a c t i v i t y 
t h a t we are surveying. This f i n a l stage i s one of 
' i n t e r s u b j e c t i v e e x p l i c a t i o n ' ( 5 1 ) , i n which the fam-
i l i e s of concepts from stage two are c o r p o r a t e l y ex-
(51) I b i d . , p. 36 
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amined w i t h reference to the range of contexts i n 
which they occur and the range of persons who use 
them i n those c o n t e x t s ; presumably w i t h the purpose 
of exposing i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by users and 
d e c i d i n g upon c o n s i s t e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by profess-
i o n a l users. 
The whole e n t e r p r i s e has the sound o f an e m p i r i c -
a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n f o r which the s c i e n t i s t i n Eastwood 
i s more resp o n s i b l e than the philosopher. ( i t Has 
suggested above - see pp. 166-8 - t h a t one of the 
d e f i n i n g c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a philosopher i s t h a t 
' f e e l ' f o r the c e n t r a l uses of a concept which cannot 
be t r i v i a l i z e d i n t o s c i e n t i f i c enquiry.) Kis own 
words w i l l c o n f i r m t h i s impression of s c i e n t i f i c 
eagerness, f o r they are l i t t e r e d w i t h the impressive-
l o o k i n g symbolism t h a t has bulldozed genuine p h i l o s -
o p h i c a l d i s c u s s i o n out of many ah argument. He seeks 
'.. . t o determine i f , even though the concept i n each 
a p p r o p r i a t e context i s founded upon adequate c r i t e r i a , 
i t i s i n f a c t used by a l l informed i n d i v i d u a l s both 
a p p r o p r i a t e l y and consistently;,:. Adequate xuiderstand-
i n g i s dependent upon t m i v e r s a l l y c o n s i s t e n t i n t e r p r e -
t a t i o n which can be achieved only i f concept C\ (where 
" i " goes from 1 t o n and designates the f a m i l y of con-
c e p t s ) , i s i n t e r p r e t e d by s u b j e c t s S_. so t h a t i f p a r t -
i c u l a r subject S1 uses a term and associates w i t h i t 
a p a r t i c u l a r concept i t w i l l be i n t e r p r e t e d w i t h 
an acceptable degree of p r o b a b i l i t y as by S^ , S^ ... 
..S . The l e v e l of p r o b a b i l i t y of a p p r o p r i a t e i n t e r -
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p r e t a t i o n t h a t i s acceptable i s , i n p r i n c i p l e a t 
l e a s t , e m p i r i c a l l y determinable 1 ( 5 2 ) . 
Such amanner o f expression provokes questions. 
I f t h i s type of 'meta' language i s r e q u i r e d f o r the 
c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f eduaational discourse, where do we 
t u r n f o r c o n f i r m a t i o n t h a t the concepts i n It are, 
as Eastwood h i m s e l f puts i t , 'used by a l l informed 
i n d i v i d u a l s both a p p r o p r i a t e l y and c o n s i s t e n t l y ' ? 
The i m p r e c i s i o n which he sees as a problem i n h i s 
'object' language ( t h e language o f e d u c a t i o n ) , and 
which he attempts to solve by u s i n g such a language 
as t h a t e x e m p l i f i e d above, i s s u r e l y a problem, t o o , 
i n t h a t language(our 'object' language - the language 
of Eastwood), f o r the s o l u t i o n o f which a t h i r d , 'high 
er order' language i s r e q u i r e d . Are we not ca^lght 
i n an i n f i n i t e regress which we can break out of o n l y 
by u s i n g , a t some p o i n t , o r d i n a r y langmage i n as con-
scious and c r i t i c a l a manner as we are able? But are 
we not then a t t e m p t i n g to do what philosophers l i k e 
S c h e f f l e r and Peters were doing i n the f i r s t place? 
(And doing i t B e l l ; which i s what makes them p h i l o s -
ophers ) . 
Again, we cannot be dogmatic i n e v a l u a t i n g the 
p a r t t h a t Eastw0od i s p l a y i n g i n an ongoing and as 
yet s h o r t l i v e d e n t e r p r i s e . The f a c t t h a t he f o l l o w s 
the qimted; 'symbolic' passage by an attempt t o r e l a t e 
(52) I b i d . , p. 36 
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h i s own views t o W i t t g e n s t e i n ' s second thoughts on 
language i s cause enough f o r h e s i t a t i o n i n i d e n t i f y -
i n g h i s p o s i t i o n . E xactly where he stands, to what 
degree he r e a l l y favours ' i d e a l language' over 'ord-
i n a r y language' ( h i s own terms f o r our ' p o s i t i v i s t -
ic<L and ' l i n g u i s t i c ' approaches), to what extent h i s 
remarks on S c h e f f l e r imply a bias towards the former 
language and h i s d i r e c t references (here and els e -
where) t o W i t t g e n s t e i n imply a c o n t r a d i c t i o n of t h i s 
b ias - these are questions not r e a l l y answerable on 
the evidence provided by the a r t i c l e we have concen-
t r a t e d upon and h i s other a l w a y s - b r i e f e x p o s i t i o n s . 
What can be s a i d i s best l e f t to Eastwaod h i m s e l f , 
to a pronouncement so remarkr-.ably n e x i t r a l , so u n i v e r s -
a l l y accommodating i n i t s conclusion t h a t we are l e f t 
w i t h the s o r t o f c o n t i n u i n g doubt t h a t o n l y a f u l l 
scale statement of h i s p o s i t i o n , e quivalent i n d e t a i l 
t o those of a S c h e f f l e r o r a Peters, could r e s o l v e . 
He says: 'Two approaches t o the task seem t o be poss-
i b l e . On one hand there i s the more f o r m a l way which 
begins w i t h the d e f i n i t i o n o f terms and the d e l i n e a t -
i o n o f a p p r o p r i a t e modes of expression and attempts 
to b u i l d a P-language of an i d e a l form. On the oth e r 
hand th e r e i s a v a i l a b l e the l e s s formal approach t h a t 
has been w i d e l y a p p l i e d i n ( p a r t i c u l a r l y ) e t h i c s which 
operates upon e x i s t i n g language and endeavours to ach-
ieve c l a r i f i c a t i o n by e x p l i c a t i n g a p p r o p r i a t e mean-
ings and uses, d e s i g n a t i n g d e f i n i t i o n a l c r i t e r i a and 
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e s t a b l i s h i n g s y n t a c t i c a l forms. Each has i t s place 
and one of two s i t u a t i o n s might p r e v a i l - e i t h e r some 
w i l l use one and others t h e o t h e r , or p r e f e r a b l y , a l l 
w i l l use both and al l o w t h e p a r t i c u l a r context t o d e t -
ermine on which form the g r e a t e r s t r e s s should be 1 (53). 
Eastwood does, i n f a c t , h i m s e l f attempt t o 'use 
b o t h 1 i n the l a t e r a r t i c l e mentioned above (54); hut 
i t s u pplies l i t t l e t o a l t e r the general p o i n t v/e have 
been making about h i s p o s i t i o n i n r e l a t i o n t o the more 
i n f l u e n t i a l philosophers working i n t h i s f i e l d , i t 
being a f u r t h e r expression o f viev/point.concentrated 
t o the extent o f d e f y i n g c l e a r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . The 
f i n a l word on t h i s aspect o f h i s work must be t h a t 
i t s f u l l e r development (not o n l y by Eastwood but also 
by others v/ho accept h i s s t r a t e g y f o r concept develop-
ment) w i l l p o s s i b l y be of as much importance to some 
f u t u r e i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the bearing of a n a l y t i c a l 
philosophy on educational theory as i t s present adum-
b r a t i o n has been i n t r i g u i n g f o r our own. But how l o n g 
v/e w i l l have t o await t h i s development and t o what 
extent i t w i l l prove to be the c r e a t i o n of a p r e c i s e 
language of education r a t h e r than p a r t o f the normal 
improvement o f the s o c i a l science languages t h a t un-
d e r p i n education'is a question which t r a n s p o r t s us t o 
the more comprehensive problem t h a t has been i n e v i t a b l y 
mentioned s e v e r a l times d u r i n g the e x p l o r a t i o n o f t h i s 
and o t h e r more r e s t r i c t e d t o p i c s - to the problem o f 
(53) I b i d . , p. 33 
(54) Eastwood, G. R., 'Categories, Concepts And 
Ostensive Learning', Canadian Tsiduaation And Research 
Dig e s t , Vol. 5 No. 3, pp. 175-89, September 1965 
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the nature of educational theory. 
Yfe can suggest, as ajpreliminary to the examination 
of that problem and as a f i n a l word on t h i s phase of 
our report, that Eastwood, i n attempting to force the 
development of the new d i s c i p l i n e "beyond what i s curr-
ently f e a s i b l e , i n seeking to transcend an 'ordinary 
language 1 approach, displays the p r a c t i c a l naivety 
implied i n the quotation which follows. Ernest Nagel, 
a powerful philosopher of science whose w r i t i n g s have 
influenced the more ' s c i e n t i f i c 1 aspect of Scheffler's 
work and a proponent of views that are of importance 
i n a l a t e r chapter, comments on the hazards of any 
premature attempt at 'reducing' one science to anoth-
er: t h i s comment, mentally translated so as to embrace 
the 'reduction' of ordinary educational concepts t h r -
ough three stages to s c i e n t i f i c - e d u c a t i o n a l concepts, 
i d e n t i f i e s the flaw we have sensed i n Eastwood's work. 
Hagel says: '...the p o s s i b i l i t y should not be i g -
nored that l i t t l e i f any new knowledge or increased 
power f o r s i g n i f i c a n t research may a c t u a l l y be gained 
from reducing one science to another at c e r t a i n per-
iods of t h e i r development, however great may be the 
potentiajjadvantages of such reduction at some l a t e r 
time. Thus, a d i s c i p l i n e may be at a stage of active 
growth i n which the imperative task i s to survey and 
c l a s s i f y the extensive and d i v e r s i f i e d materials of 
i t s domain. Attempts to reduce the d i s c i p l i n e to an-
other (perhaps t h e o r e t i c a l l y more advanced) science, 
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even i f successful, may then d i v e r t needed energies 
from what are the c r u c i a l problems at t h i s period of 
the d i s c i p l i n e ' s expansion, without being compensated 
"by e f f e c t i v e guidance from the primary science i n the 
conduct of f u r t h e r research* (55). 
Our contention i s t h a t , during the present 'active 
growth' of a new philosophy of education, Eastwood's 
approach may "divert needed energies from what are 
the c r u c i a l problems at t h i s period of the d i s c i p l i n e ' s 
expansion 1, and that the f i r s t 'philosophical approach 1 
of our chapter t i t l e , that of Scheffler and Peters, 
i s the more appropriate (and hence the more convinc-
ing) now, no matter how much i t may require complem-
enting at some future time when the so c i a l sciences 
have outgrown t h e i r infancy and the r e l a t i o n s h i p be-
tween formal and informal languages has been p h i l o s -
ophically i l l u m i n e d . To what extent t h i s contention 
i s a strong one or whether i t needs modification and 
a change i n emphasis we s h a l l see i n exploring the 
central area of 'educational theory'. 
(55) Nagel, E., The Structure Of Science; Problems 
I n The Logic Of S c i e n t i f i c Explanation (London, 1961), 
p. 362 
CHAPTER VI 
RIVAL THEORIES OF 1 EDUCATIONAL THEORY1 
H i r s t ' s 'Field'Thesis 
I n examining t h i s very recent c o n t r i b u t i o n , the 
most e x p l i c i t expression of the London school's ' o f f i c 
i a l 1 view, we keep the promise, made early i n our I n -
troduction (see p. 2, supra), to view H i r s t ' s i n f l u e n t 
i a l thesis against a previously drawn background of 
varied 'bearings': such a background i s provided by 
our f i r s t f i v e chapters. We also cease to use Hardie?.. 
t e x t as the s t a r t i n g point f o r the separate avenues 
of exploration, having done t h i s s u f f i c i e n t l y tx> est-
a b l i s h his r e l a t i o n s h i p with current, accepted p h i l o s -
ophising - as was also promised(see p. 9, supra) - as 
that of precursor, and to expose the l i m i t a t i o n s that 
he i n h e r i t e d from the philosophical masters of h i s 
day while establishing his f i r m r i g h t to an important 
place i n the h i s t o r y of t h i s mid-twentieth century 
enterprise. 
H i r s t ' s A r t i c l e on philosophy and educational the-
ory i s of major importance, whether viewed as the most 
l u c i d of statements f o r those i n c l i n e d to accept the 
' l i n g u i s t i c ' p o s i t i o n or as the most i n c i s i v e of c r i t -
icisms f o r those who are " p o s i t i v i s t i c ' about theories 
and t h e i r r o l e . I n a sense, he attempts both to do 
more and to do less than i s attempted i n t h i s account. 
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The scope of h i s con t r i b u t i o n i s greater than ours 
i n that only one of i t s parts i s s p e c i f i c a l l y concern-
ed with the r e l a t i o n to edvicational thought of anal-
y t i c a l philosophy, of, as he puts i t , 'The more anal-
y t i c a l view th a t philosophy has a purely c r i t i c a l and 
c l a r i f i c a t o r y function f o r educational discussion 1 ( 1 ) . 
Other sections take him beyond the bearing of p h i l o s -
ophical analysis to an examination of the t r a d i t i o n a l 
claim that speculative systems of thought, the various 
c o n f l i c t i n g 'isms', have educational implications, a 
claim that we have ignored i n order to concentrate 
on what seems more important i n the new approach. 
But H i r s t ' s views on the topic that i s of specif-
i c concern to us are more r e s t r i c t e d than our own en-
quiry, i n that we are attempting t o show the 'bearing 1 
by contrasting examples of work that has been"and i s 
being undertaken i n f a c t ; and his co n t r i b u t i o n i s mere-
l y one such example, a l b e i t one t h a t , i n the firmness 
of i t s pronouncements, could, i f i t were to be widely 
accepted, cause the v a r i e t y we have encountered i n 
the l i t e r a t u r e to be replaced by a more un i t a r y app-
roach - the p o s s i b i l i t y and the unwelcome consequences 
of t h i s we have implied i n using the term ' o f f i c i a l ' 
f o r the views of H i r s t and those with whom he i s ass-
ociated . 
I n comparing his delineation of 'educational theory' 
(1) H i r s t , P. H., 'Philosophy And Educational 
Theory', B r i t i s h Journal Of Educational StMies, Vol. 
12, p. 51, November 1963 
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wit h those of others who have given thought to the 
problem of describing i t , we necessarily overlap with 
the content of our other chapters, p a r t i c u l a r l y the 
l a s t one which, i t w i l l be remembered, flowed from 
Bardie's i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the four c h a r a c t e r i s t i c 
marks of education as a process. A systematic account 
of these marks i s , to the e a r l i e r w r i t e r , what makes 
an 'educational theory', one element i n such a theory 
being the 'idea of value' that we discussed at some 
length i n the f i r s t chapter. A l t e r n a t i v e theories 
consist, to him, of the i n t e g r a t i o n of a l t e r n a t i v e 
accounts of these elements; that i s , '...when educat-
i o n a l theories d i f f e r , they must do so i n the accounts 
they give of one or more of these basic conceptions' (2 
Somewhat s i m i l a r l y i n H i r s t , we f i n d that 'educat-
ional theory' i s viewed as the complex ra t i o n a l e f o r 
the p r a c t i c a l process of education and has w i t h i n i t 
an important e t h i c a l component necessitated by the 
involvement of the theory with such practice: t h i s 
l i n k s him s u r p r i s i n g l y w i t h Hardie, replenishing to 
some extent the by now diminished philosophical stand-
ing of the l a t t e r . We f i n d , too, that H i r s t establish-
es the l o g i c a l status of 'educational theory' by d i s -
cussing the p o s s i b i l i t y of there being a d i s c i p l i n e 
of education: t h i s connects his work with that report-
ed i n the l a s t chapter and thus emphasises the i n t e r -
related nature of a l l that we are exploring i n t h i s 
(2) Hardie, C. D., Truth And Fallacy I n Education-
a l Theory (Cambridge. 1942), p. 73 
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account and the p o s s i b i l i t y of other than our own 
d i v i s i o n Of the subject matter being made on the basis 
of a l t e r n a t i v e modes of entry i n t o the l i t e r a t u r e l i s t -
ed i n the bibliography. 
H i r s t employs a Peters* technique: he p o s i t i v e l y 
declares his own p o s i t i o n only a f t e r an analysis of 
the positions of others i n which l i m i t a t i o n s are ex-
posed a f t e r the fashion f a m i l i a r to us from Peters' 
construction of 'education as i n i t i a t i o n ' on a basis 
of metaphor-scrutiny. The t r a d i t i o n a l view, that 
there exists a d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p between philosophy 
and education, i s the f i r s t to be rejected. Philos-
ophical b e l i e f s cannot, i n H i r s t ' s view, form premises 
from which educational p r i n c i p l e s are l o g i c a l l y ded-
uced. Logically, the r e l a t i o n s h i p i s 'looser' than 
t h a t . 
What such b e l i e f s can provide are some of the Reas-
ons f o r the educational judgments made w i t h i n a com-
plex area l y i n g midway between the high l e v e l abstract-
ions and the concrete practice, the area i n fact of 
'educational theory 1 conceived as what H i r s t c a l l s a 
' f i e l d ' of knowledge. This notion of a ' f i e l d ' , char-
acterized by complexity because of the many d i f f e r e n t 
d i s c i p l i n e s (including philosophy as b e l i e f rather x 
than analysis) that enter i n t o i t s creation, i s part 
of H i r s t ' s epistemological p o s i t i o n , which he prog-
ressively discloses throughout t h i s a r t i c l e u n t i l i t 
i s made e x p l i c i t i n givin g his own view of the nature 
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of educational theory and which he develops more f u l l y 
elsewhere, as we s h a l l see. 
He makes t h i s point early, c l e a r l y conscious of 
the need to introduce some consistency i n t o the term-
inology and taking the opportunity of making i t a 
l o g i c a l l y based consistency. He says: '...between 
philosophical b e l i e f s themselves and educational prac-
t i c e we must envisage a domain of t h e o r e t i c a l discuss-
ion and i n v e s t i g a t i o n concerned with forming these 
p r i n c i p l e s . To t h i s domain, which I s h a l l r e f e r to 
as educational theory, philosophical b e l i e f s make 
t h e i r own d i s t i n c t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n alongside s o c i a l 
theory, psychological theory and so on' ( 3 ) . 
Next, having contended that there i s a place f o r 
educational theory against those who plunge s t r a i g h t 
from philosophy to practice, Hir s t argues that t h i s 
domain i s not autonomous, that 'education' i s not a 
d i s c i p l i n e . Clearly, his willingness to assert what 
i s a ' d i s c i p l i n e ' and what i s some other kind of the-
o r e t i c a l enterprise must be j u s t i f i e d as more than a 
mere preference f o r a p a r t i c u l a r use of the term, and 
he does, i n f a c t , f u r t h e r develop his basic epistemol-
ogical p o s i t i o n from which such judgments proceed, ar-
guing t h a t , ' I t i s i n f a c t i n terms of d i s t i n c t i v e 
types of judgment that d i s c i p l i n e s are usually said 
to be autonomous1 (4)» gi v i n g us with the 'usually said' 
the clue to hi s philosophical commitment. 
(3) H i r s t , P. H., op. c i t . , p. 52 
(4) I b i d . , p. 56 
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H i s t o r i c a l judgments and, as vre would expect i n 
the l i g h t of our own early chapters, moral judgments 
are ' d i s t i n c t i v e ' i n H i r s t ' s sense; and there are no 
analogous educational judgments, f o r they are, l o g i c -
a l l y speaking, examples of the wider class of p r a c t i c -
a l judgments which are 'not unique to educational 
theory f o r i n everyday a f f a i r s and i n p o l i t i c a l and 
social theory, f o r example, the same process i s to be 
found' ( 5 ) . Educational theory i s thus one of several 
related theories, a l l of which answer questions about 
i n t e n t i o n a l p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s by making s i m i l a r 
forms of judgment: i t does not develop c r i t e r i a of 
i t s own f o r assessing the wide range of knowledge 
and b e l i e f s , from a v a r i e t y of i n t e l l e c t u a l sources, 
out of which i t i s created. We must look to the var-
ied sources of educational and s i m i l a r theories to 
f i n d the d i s c i p l i n e s . 
They are found outside, develop outside and are 
only j u s t i f i a b l e outside. H i r s t says, using h i s a l t -
ernative name f o r ' d i s c i p l i n e ' , 'These forms of under-
standing are v a l i d i n t h e i r own r i g h t and must there-
fore be accepted i n t o the theory as they are. As 
t h e i r function i s to provide a wider knowledge of 
what i s imvolved i n educational practice and so prom-
ote more responsible judgments, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see 
how the knowledge i t s e l f can bejassessed by c r i t e r i a 
w i t h i n the theory. The t h e o r i s t has to recognise or 
(5) I b i d . , p. 57 
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discover the relevance of other s p e c i a l i s t studies 
f o r education, taking these i n t o account when he forms 
his p r i n c i p l e s ' ( 6 ) . 
I t can he noted that H i r s t ' s r e f u s a l to allow that 
education can be a d i s c i p l i n e i s a more thorough ver-
sion of hi s colleague Peters' s l i g h t l y e a r l i e r r e j e c t -
ion of an American claim published i n a volume e n t i t l e d , 
nevertheless, 'The Disc i p l i n e Of Education'. Peters 
says: ' I j u s t cannot grasp the thesis that education 
could ever be a d i s c i p l i n e i n any ordinary sense; i t 
i s rather a focus or meeting place of d i s c i p l i n e s . . . 
A d i s c i p l i n e develops when there are some reasonably 
well-worked-out and structured answers t o . . . questions 
which come to form' a body of knowledge, together w i t h 
techniques and procedures f o r developing b e t t e r answers 
or f o r dealing w i t h new problems which these answers 
give r i s e to...These various d i s c i p l i n e s are concerned 
wi t h quite d i f f e r e n t sorts of questions, and i f the 
case of education i s considered i t i s absurd to t h i n k 
that the various d i s c i p l i n e s that have bearing on ed-
ucation could ever be co-ordinated i n t o one d i s c i p l i n e 1 
( 7 ) . 
However, the existence of and the arguments i n 
the book that contains t h i s confident pronouncement 
are testimony to the strength of an i n t e l l e c t u a l l y 
respectable 'open' discussion i n which the Peters-Hirst 
(6) I b i d . , p. 57 
(7) Peters, R. S., 'Comments' on 'A Di s c i p l i n e Of 
Education' by Walton, J., i n Walton, J. and Kuethe, J.L., 
The D i s c i p l i n e Of Education (Madison, Wisconsin, 1963) 
pp. 17-8 
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po s i t i o n i s j u s t one element. Scheffler, f o r example, 
supplying i n the same volume the most sustained p h i l -
osophical analysis of the problem, places his emphasis 
i n such a way as to reveal the more s c i e n t i f i c of h i s 
varied i n t e l l e c t u a l t r a i t s , and thus introduces a d i s -
cordant note i n t o the harmony that we have perceived 
between him and Peters i n another context. He equates 
' d i s c i p l i n e ' with ' s c i e n t i f i c d i s c i p l i n e ' and thus 
draws away from the epistemology of a H i r s t towards 
that of an O'Connor, an alignment that we s h a l l pres-
ently describe w i t h reference to his more substantial 
w r i t i n g and one t h i t i s c l e a r l y shown i n t h i s confer-
ence report when he says: 
'A c r u c i a l issue, i t thus seems to me, i s whether 
we can establish r e l i a b l e p r i n c i p l e s to explain how 
and why children learn, schools develop, c u r r i c u l a 
change, ideals c o n f l i c t , perceptions a l t e r , societies 
d i f f e r , standards of taste and culture are formed. 
That any d i s c i p l i n e i s l i k e l y to be developed capable 
of answering these questions systematically and r e l i a b l y 
i s s t i l l a matter of some controversy...The problem, 
i t seems to me, i s thus toa advance the state of soc-
i a l i n q u i r y - i n p a r t i c u l a r , of a l l those studies ±ka± 
which seem l i k e l y to y i e l d explanatory p r i n c i p l e s r e l -
evant to the concerns of education' ( 8 ) . Scheffler 
c l e a r l y has 'social i n q u i r y ' of a recognized s c i e n t i f i c 
kind i n mind rather than some hybrid 'domain of theor-
(8) Scheffler, I . , 'Is Education A d i s c i p l i n e ? ' i n 
op. c i t . (see p. 196, supra), pp. 60-1 
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e t i c a l discussion and i n v e s t i g a t i o n ' as the answer 
to educational problems. 
But to r e t u r n to H i r s t : so f a r he has b u i l t up a 
p a r t i a l p i c t u r e of what he conceives 'educational the-
ory' to be out of the p o s i t i v e aspects of his c r i t i c -
ism of two w e l l known positions. But i t i s the t h i r d 
p o s i t i o n , the a n a l y t i c a l , which allows him to develop 
his own views to the f u l l , and his c r i t i c i s m s here are 
of the greatest importance f o r a number of reasons: 
the philosopher under attack i s O'Connor, the p o s i t i o n 
under attack i s ' a n a l y t i c a l ' i n one of the two broad 
senses that we have defined, and the manner of attack 
i s ' a n a l y t i c a l ' i n the other sense. I n H i r s t v O'Conn-
or we have, then, the i n t r a - a n a l y t i c a i dispute at i t s 
most elemental. 
Elsewhere the a n a l y t i c a l alignments, a major theme 
of our account, are becoming less clear cut as we acc-
umulate examples. We have already seen that the Scheff-
l e r of 'educational theory' i s not quite the Scheffler 
who analysed 'teaching' i n the 'ordinary language* 
manner. We have seen, too, that the Hardie of 'educ-
a t i o n a l theory 1 i s closer to what we so f a r have seen 
of H i r s t ' s views than would have been imagined on the 
evidence of the e t h i c a l Hardie (see p. 192, supra). 
Before reporting the simple confrontation of H i r s t and 
O'Connor, i t w i l l be perhaps best to b r i e f l y confirm 
t h i s b l u r r i n g of the clear l i n e s of our main theme as 
a warning against o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of issues that 
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t h i s key a r t i c l e of H i r s t i n v i t e s i n the context of 
t h i s account w i t h i t s personal sampling. 
We can easily do t h i s by quoting from a recent 
l e c t u r e by (the so f a r ' p o s i t i v i s t i c ' ) Hardie on the 
'educational theory' topic of research and progress 
and bearing i t i n mind while f o l l o w i n g how H i r s t com-
ments on O'Connor. Hardie says: 'Closer a t t e n t i o n to 
the d i f f e r e n t u^ ses of language i n communication would 
make possible a d i f f e r e n t sense f©'t? "theory" i n the 
phrase "theory of education". I n t h i s sense a theory 
of education would not be a deductive pattern c o r r e l -
a t i n g d i f f e r e n t empirical laws, but a c o l l e c t i o n of 
sentences that had a v a r i e t y of functions. Some of 
them would be a n a l y t i c , functioning as d e f i n i t i o n s ; 
others would be empirical generalizations from observ-
ations and experiments; " s t i l l others would be preserip 
t i o n s leading to evaluative sentences; and so on. 
I n the formation of these sentences l o g i c a l words 
such as " i f . . . t h e n " , " t r ue", "not", " a l l " would be 
used as well as e x t r a - l o g i c a l or empirical words. 
The l a t t e r would be either terms from commonsense or 
technical terms, linked to observation by means of 
d e f i n i t i o n s . An educational theory would then be 
considered s a t i s f a c t o r y i f i t was successful i n corr-
e l a t i n g a wide range of experience. The construction 
of an educational theory i n t h i s sense would make 
coherent the kind of t a l k i n which we indulge when 
we w r i t e a r t i c l e s or t a l k about our work either w i t h 
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our colleagues or on more solemn occasions such as 
lectures and conferences' ( 9 ) . 
Hardie's t h i n k i n g has c e r t a i n l y moved i n a H i r s t -
ian d i r e c t i o n . The phrase 'would make coherent' made 
with reference to 'a c o l l e c t i o n of sentences that 
(have) a v a r i e t y of Emotions', and hi s r e j e c t i o n of 
the idea that an educational theory displays a 'ded-
uctive p a t t e r n 1 show t h i s . V/hen he t a l k s of the suc-
cess of a theory i n terms of 'connecting a wide range 
of experience' we cannot hut he reminded of Hirst&s 
view, as so f a r described, that an educational theory 
attempts 'to b u i l d together whatever knowledge, values 
and b e l i e f s are relevant to p r a c t i c a l issues'. The 
s i m i l a r i t i e s are close enough to make the point ment-
ioned above and make an i n t e r e s t i n g preliminary to 
the H i r s t i a n view of O'Connor that we can now take. 
This view i s dominated by the objection that O'Conn 
or i s obsessed with s c i e n t i f i c theory as the paradigm 
f o r a l l theories, and that he has not been able, i n 
consequence, to discover the job that educational 
theory a c t u a l l y does. O'Connor has'excluded f o r sep-
arate treatment the metaphysical statements and value 
judgments - the n o n - s c i e n t i f i c elements i n educational 
discourse that he c e r t a i n l y i d e n t i f i e s as of importance 
- and thus a r t i f i c i a l l y reduced the complexity of the 
discourse to a much simpler s c i e n t i f i c l e v e l . I n short 
(9) Hardie, C. D., Research And Progress I n Educ-
at i o n ' , Australian Journal Of - Education, Vol. 9 No. 3, 
p. 238, October 1965 
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educational theory i s concerned solely w i t h the means 
by which separately j u s t i f i e d ends are achieved; and 
such theory i s or could be or should be s c i e n t i f i c : so 
comments H i r s t . 
His own p o s i t i o n Obliterates the 'ends-means' d i v -
i s i o n by creating the middle domain. He says: ' I f we 
accept O'Connor's c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of the two main senses 
of the word "theory" that are important f o r education, 
i t i s surely the f i r s t of these that gives the prim-
ary meaning here,, not the second as he suggests. Ed-
ucational theory i s i n the f i r s t place to be under-
stood as the essential background to r a t i o n a l educat-
i o n a l p ractice, not as a l i m i t e d would-be s c i e n t i f i c 
p u r s u i t . Even when O'Connor momentarily recognizes 
t h i s , he nevertheless f a i l s to r e a l i z e the complex 
kind of theory that i s necessary to determine a whole 
range of p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . He therefore f a l l s 
back on his s c i e n t i f i c paradigm maintaining that the 
theory must be simply a c o l l e c t i o n of pieces of psy-
chology' (10). 
Hir s t ' s c r i t i c i s m i s t h a t O'Connor has overlooked 
the important difference between s c i e n t i f i c theories 
and theories of p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y : the f i r s t aim at 
explaining what i s while the second aim at guiding 
and c o n t r o l l i n g what i s done: the f i r s t are the r e s u l t 
of i n v e s t i g a t i o n while the second determine a c t i v i t i e s . 
Confusion of the two i s a philosophical s i n , of which 
(10} H i r s t , P. H., op. c i t . , p. 59 
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O'Connor i s g u i l t y - 'To t r y to understand the nature 
and pattern of some p r a c t i c a l discourse i n terms of 
the nature and pattern of some purely t h e o r e t i c a l 
discourse can only r e s u l t i n i t s being r a d i c a l l y mis-
conceived' (11). Radical misconceptions on the part 
of philosophers of O'Connor's standing are, i t must 
be noted, less common than p l a i n differences of commit-
ment] V/e can r e c a l l Atkinson's comment: '...the class-
i c a l statement of the view that a l l p r a c t i c a l problems 
have t h i 4 form / i h a t i s , are means/ends problems^... 
i s followed i n a l l essential respects by so recent 
and philosophically sophisticated a w r i t e r as O'Conn-
or. Such scepticism as O'Connor expresses...about the 
adequacy of the education/applied science analogy 
does not derive from any doubts about the appropriate-
ness of applying the means/ends category here, but 
rather from his doubt whether the soc i a l sciences have 
developed to a point at which they are c l e a r l y of 
more use to the educator than i s commonsense, "psych-
o l o g i c a l " l o r e ' (12). 
But to H i r s t empirical i n v e s t i g a t i o n and p r a c t i c -
a l a c t i v i t y are r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t . s o f a r as t h e i r 
theories are concerned; and education i s j u s t one sec-
t o r of the l a t t e r . The 'education/applied science 1 
analogy i s a l i e n to his way of th i n k i n g rather than 
merely to him, a fa c t that c l e a r l y emerges from h i s 
(11) I b i d . , p. 60 
(12) Atkinson, R. P., 'In s t r u c t i o n And I n d o c t r i n -
a t i o n 1 i n Archambault, R. D. (Ed), Philosophical Anal-
ysisAnd Education (London, 1965), p. 180 
203 
reference to the work of a philosophical f r i e n d whose 
very i n d i v i d u a l and thorough expression of an a n t i -
O'Connor point of view i s w e l l known. We can t u r n 
to Arnaud Reid f o r a moment to sample the background 
to the H i r s t t h e s i s . He devotes a chapter i n the book 
that sums up h i s long years of experience i n educat-
i o n a l philosophy to the notion of 'application' of 
theory to practice; and t h i s i s founded on a ce n t r a l 
p r e s c r i p t i o n the very phrasing of which reveals the 
distance at which he operates from the more s c i e n t i f -
i c a l l y - o r i e n t a t e d a n a l y t i c a l philosophers: 'We have, 
I believe, to work from the idea of applying theories 
and concepts, as such, to practice, towards the idea... 
of a person, charged w i t h ideas, deciding and acting 
i n an enlightened way i n the i n d i v i d u a l s i t u a t i o n ' (13)• 
His scale of 'application' examples ranges from 
engineering (favoured i n analogies by both O'Connor 
and Scheffler) to educational philosophy, and i s des-
igned to persuade us t h a t , at the l a t t e r end, '.... 
"application" t e l l s us hardly anything and becomes 
the wrong word' (14); f o r there i s an increasing com-
p l e x i t y of s i t u a t i o n i n which imponderables m u l t i p l y . 
I n a complex s i t u a t i o n , he argues, i t i s not meaning-
f u l to t a l k of, f o r example, 'applying* p r i n c i p l e s 
of s c i e n t i f i c psychology to p a r t i c u l a r instances: r a t h -
er, we must conceive the s i t u a t i o n as '...the use of 
(13) Reid, L. A., Philosophy And Education (Lon-
don, 1962), p. 87 
(14) I b i d . , p. 88 
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science "by a teacher who has assimilated i t , i n help-
ing him to come to terms with his p r a c t i c a l problems* 
(15). 
Moreover, there i s implied i n every a p p l i c a t i o n 
of theory to practice, according to Reid, a judgment 
of value - very o f t e n . t h i s i s a simple looking judg-
ment ( f o r example, ''...we want i n education to teach 
b e t t e r , to help c h i l d r e n 1 (16) ) , but i t s presence 
i s precisely what makes t a l k about education the com-
plex phenomenon that i t i s . Reid's p o s i t i o n i s thus 
consonant with that of H i r s t , f o r he holds that the 
theory of the a c t i v i t y that i s education must draw 
upon many d i f f e r e n t kinds of knowledge, that i t i n v -
olves the making of value judgments and the u t i l i s a t -
ion of b e l i e f s of the metaphysical and r e l i g i o u s kind 
which O'Connor dismisses as an irrelevance i n educat-
io n a l theory. To Reid, t h i s complex theory can only 
be e f f e c t i v e i n the thought and action of a person 
who i s i n d i v i s i b l e i n t o the philosophic 'ends' chooser 
and s c i e n t i f i c 'means' inves t i g a t o r and applie r that 
O'Connor's po s i t i o n suggests. 
H i r s t ' s " f i e l d " thesis, seen against t h i s back-
ground, i s thus the careful elaboration of the l o g i c -
a l status of 'educational theory' as t h i s appears to 
philosophers of a cerfc&in persuasion. But 0 1 Connor C'JS 
s c i e n t i f i c model f o r educational theory i s not lacking 
(15) I b i d . , p. 91 
(16) I b i d . , p. 92 
205 
various a l l i e s i n the philosophical "background, and 
to these we can t u r n before resuming the report on 
Hir s t i n a context w i t h i n which he gives his f u l l y 
developed p o s i t i o n , the context of a d i r e c t examin-
atio n of O'Connor's co n t r i b u t i o n . We thus follow 
the H i r s t technique i t s e l f i n reporting i n stages w i t h 
i n c i d e n t a l cross-reference to related and a l t e r n a t i v e 
views; and continue i n t h i s way the established pro-
cedure of our own account. 
Eastwood's S c i e n t i f i c Model 
Eastwood bewails "... the f a i l u r e of eduaational 
philosophy to be influenced by contemporary s c i e n t i f i c 
philosophy' (17), by which he means the f a i l u r e to 
di s t i n g u i s h , w i t h i n the complex discourse that attends 
education, those elements that are capable of scient-
i f i c improvement from those that are n o n - s c i e n t i f i c 
i n character: he i s a 'means/ends* thinker, eager to 
i s o l a t e , concemtrate upon and f e f i n e the theory of the 
'means' and i s thus i n complete opposition to the kind 
of view developed by H i r s t . 
He t a l k s i n terms of theories^ rather than theory_; 
that i s , of explanation w i t h i n l i m i t e d areas of phen-
omena rather than of r a t i o n a l l y i l l u m i n a t i n g practice 
through general discussion which integrates the f i n d -
ings of a v a r i e t y of d i s c i p l i n e s with respect to educ-
(17) Eastwood, G-. R., '"Contemporary Philosophy" 
I n Education', Australian Journal of Higher Education, 
Vol. I , p. 38, 1967-63 
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a t i o n . To Eastwood 'theories' are s c i e n t i f i c , deriv-
ed from experimental research and refined i n practice 
to describe, explain and predict phenomena i n the fam-
i l i a r manner of other areas of enquiry: to him, 'educ-
a t i o n a l theory' implies a piecemeal, cumulative under-
standing of what goes on, i t '...implies the formul-
a t i o n of a ^systematically related set of theories to 
explain the educative process and f a c i l i t a t e the dev-
elopment of coherent pract i c e s 1 (18). 
As we would expect, from what we know of Eastwood''s 
work on concepts, he i s concerned w i t h what i s i n p r i n -
c i p l e possible and not with what exists to be seen i n 
the achievements to date of even the most s c i e n t i f i c 
parts of educational theory. His v i s i o n i s of a s c i -
e n t i f i c d i s c i p l i n e of education, the eventual construc-
t i o n of a set of related laws and established hypoth-
eses which are spec i f i c to education - 'Undefined terms 
and terms defined i n the system and the axioms estab-
lished by means of them are as capable of development 
i n education as i n any other f i e l d ' (19). Though t h i s 
view, the a n t i t h e s i s of H i r s t ' s , i s expressed w i t h 
the reminder that a very long way has to be t r o d bef-
ore the v i s i o n becomes the r e a l i t y - ' . . . i t must not 
be expected that a set of s a t i s f a c t o r y theories can 
be easily and quickly evolved' (20). 
An example of a theory such as Eastwood's 'system-
(18) I b i d . , p. 39 
(19) I b i d . , p. 40 
(20) I b i d . , p. 40 
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a t i c a l l y related set' would consist of i s that of i n -
d i v i d u a l differences, one f o r which he claims scient-
i f i c maturity. The development and i n t e r - r e l a t i n g 
of such theories i s possible, he argues, i f the task 
i s approached p o s i t i v e l y , i f resources and s c i e n t i f -
i c 'know how* are made available so that i t i s acc-
epted by those involved that i t i s possible to struc-
ture adequate s c i e n t i f i c theories i n the context of 
education, j u s t as i t i s i n the context of the more 
f a m i l i a r f a c t u a l sciences. Eastwood's point ^.always 
s l i g h t l y obscure, as was shown i n our l a s t chapter) 
seems to be that hindrances of resource and w i l l hold 
bac& education more than hindrances of p r i n c i p l e ; and 
that as much can be expected of education as of the 
other social sciences, once these hindrances are over-
come: his assumptions, that social sciences i n gener-
a l have impressive records and that education can be 
made i n t o another social science and so partake i n 
t h i s record, are so controversial as to make us hope 
once again:: f o r an extended exposition of his views. 
When he says, 'Such development has not occurred 
i n the case of educational theories and one of the i n -
i t i a l tasks of the contemporary s c i e n t i f i c philosopher 
i s the modification of t h i s structure to s u i t educ-
at i o n or the development of an e n t i r e l y new structure' 
(21), he would seem to be s u b s t i t u t i n g his own wishes 
f o r a r e a l i s t i c assessment of what i s possible at the 
(21) I b i d . , p. 40 
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moment i n the social sciences and what i s i n princ-
i p l e possible f o r 'educational theory' viewed under 
i t s s c i e n t i f i c aspect. Certainly there are w e l l - f i n -
anced attempts being made, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n America, 
to r e a l i z e what we can i d e n t i f y as Eastwood's v i s i o n , 
but these, f o r example the series of papers by E l i z -
abeth Maccia l i s t e d i n our bibliography, are open to 
the charge of methodological naivety and the pseudo-
use of symbolism such as we noted i n our l a s t chapter 
with reference to Eastwood himself. A t y p i c a l comment 
from a leading philosopher of science on such attempts 
to a n t i c i p a t e the genuine, slow progress of s o c i a l 
research i s the f o l l o w i n g : 'To the l o g i c i a n i t i s 
clear that i n educational research...there i s s t i l l 
a pathetic tendency to i d e n t i f y the use of jargon 
with the possession of a science...It could almost 
be said t h a t , outside of s t a t i s t i c s , terms which have 
been introduced s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r educational research 
have done more to confuse than to c l a r i f y 1 (22). 
Confusion rather than c l a r i t y seems to r e s u l t , 
f o r example, from Eastwood's i n t r o d u c t i o n of the terms 
' f i r s t order theories' and 'second order theories' 
to develop h i s present views, f o r , as we s h a l l see, 
s i m i l a r terms are used i n a much more straightforward 
sense by H i r s t : the two senses and the contexts of t h e i r 
use symbolize, i n f a c t , what much of our account i s 
(22) Scriven, M., 'The Philosophy Of Science I n 
Educational Research', Review Of Educational Research, 
Vol. XXX No. 5, pp. 427-8, December"1960 
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about. F i r s t order theories describe and explain 
selected aspects of the educational process and thus 
have t h e i r o r i g i n i n observation, practice and exper-
iment w i t h i n the school s i t u a t i o n : they are develop-
ed by researchers who are, presumably, close enough 
to the classroom to be thought of as educational re-
searchers. The English Schools Council i s c u r r e n t l y 
i n i t i a t i n g work that probably meets some of Eastwood's 
demands at t h i s l e v e l , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n i t s emphasis 
upon p u t t i n g the curriculum on a more r a t i o n a l basis. 
Second order theories are closer to the 'human 
sciences' of Hir s t ' s analysis of the forms of know-
ledge i n that t h e i r construction depends upon a l i n k -
ing of f i r s t order theories with those derived from 
such sciences. As Eastwood puts i t : 'Their develop-
ment necessitates the establishment of cross-connection 
laws and i s p r i m a r i l y a logico-philosophical task* 
The difference between f i r s t - o r d e r and second-order 
theories i s one of degree or scope rather than struc-
ture. The former fun c t i o n predominantly i n the proc-
ess of education while the l a t t e r are directed toward 
the d i s c i p l i n e ' (23). I t cannot go unnoticed that 
Eastwood i s as bound to ordinary terms such as ' l i n k ' 
and 'r e l a t e ' f o r the exposition of central parts of 
his thesis as i s H i r s t to terms l i k e 'build together' 
and 'composite' f o r h i s . 
(23) Eastwood, G. R., op. c i t . , p. 40 
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Both l e v e l s of theory require philosophical a t t -
ention: but, i n s t a t i n g t h i s , Eastwood means the a t t -
ention of what he himself c a l l s ' s c i e n t i f i c philosophy 
and what we can take to be the philosophy of science. 
The comment already given from that quarter indicates 
to what extent t h i s bold demand f o r s t r u c t u r i n g res-
earch and developing theory w i t h i n 'the context of 
education' stands much chance of being implemented i n 
the near f u t u r e . The whole analysis derives from a 
hopeful i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of what the l o g i c of science 
could make possible predated i n t o an assertion of 
what i t does make possible j>rovided the exhortations 
of those l i k e Eastwood who make the claim are widely 
acted upon. 
I t i s a view completely a n t i t h e t i c a l to that of 
H i r s t , a view that can be rated as a 'tough minded 1, 
less restrained version of the O'Connor p o s i t i o n on 
metaphysically-unencumbered s c i e n t i f i c theory i n educ-
at i o n which draws H i r s t ' s f i r e . And i t s answer to the 
question of 'application' of theory to prac t i c e , to 
the problem of 'building together' what ,is w i t h what 
ought to be i s expectedly unsubtle. The issues raised 
by H i r s t and Reid concerning the complexity of the' 
theory-practice r e l a t i o n s h i p are not even recognized 
by Eastwood: they are ruled out by his d e f i n i n g 'the-
ory' i n the way that he does. He says, boldly: '... 
the contention that theories i n education f u n c t i o n as 
descriptive and explanatory devices precludes the poss 
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i b i l i t y of the question of der i v a t i o n of practice from 
theory from a r i s i n g ' (24). 
The whole of t h i s question of what we educate 
f o r i s banished from the area i n which 'theory' i s to 
be c l a r i f i e d i n t o a separate realm of 'ends' which i s 
no concern of the s c i e n t i f i c philosopher. Eastwood 
quotes Scheffler i n passing on the problem, obviously 
having l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n the t r a d i t i o n a l type of 
discussion which i s so open to the kind of non-rigor-
ous sloganizing that he has elsewhere condemned. He 
says: 'For those who wish to c l i n g to the concept of 
the educational philosopher as a determiner of values 
and a designator of goals t h i s view has l i t t l e to o f f -
er and l i t t l e to say other than as a reminder that 
value-determination cannot "plausibly be considered 
the exclusive r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of any s p e c i a l i s t " 1 (25). 
The a l t e r n a t i v e which he o f f e r s to the Reidian notion 
of a 'person charged with ideas', one i n whom the 
H i r s t ' f i e l d 1 can be said to operate, i s the charac-
t e r i s t i c a l l y impersonal one of '...an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a l 
agency which must function at the l e v e l of the prac-
t i s i n g educator and be capable of t r a n s l a t i n g research 
findings in t o p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s ' (26). 
However, there must be more than a suspicion that 
Eastwood i s overstating a case here, and that i t i s 
the overstatement rather than the case that i s at f a u l t . 
(24) I b i d . , p. 41 
(25) I b i d . , p. 29 
(26) I b i d . , p. 41 
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Decisions about ends have to be taken, whether they 
are taken i n such a way as to establish the t r u t h of 
the H i r s t ' f i e l d ' thesis or i n a manner that needs 
an O'Connor 'means-ends' view f o r i t s description. 
I f the l a t t e r , there i s need f o r the decisions to be 
made i n the l i g h t of what philosophy can o f f e r : i t i s 
not the case, as Eastwood contends, that ' t h i s view 
has l i t t l e to o f f e r ' , as we s h a l l see when we examine 
O'Connor's p o s i t i o n d i r e c t l y . But f o r the moment we 
can take up the reference to Scheffler i n order to 
indicate that a philosopher who values what philosophy 
can contribute to general discussions of education 
(V/e have seen him i n his n o n - s c i e n t i f i c r o l e i n e a r l -
i e r chapters) can also appreciate the need f o r scien-
t i f i c theories somewhat s i m i l a r to those f o r which 
Eastwood so singlemindedly ca}.ls. 
Scheffler i n s i s t s time and again on the need to 
recognize that both teacher and researcher, both ped-
agogue and s c i e n t i s t have le g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s i n ed-
ucation and that each should accept the claim of the 
other. As he says: ' I f i n q u i r y i s to be e f f e c t i v e l y 
related to the practice of teaching, the divergence 
of goal between teacher and educational researcher 
needs to be recognized as le g i t i m a t e and as c a l l i n g 
f o r d i f f e r e n t working distances from the world of 
practice. There needs, of course, also to be a r e l -
a t i o n of mutual and sympathetic i n t e r e s t between teach-
ers and educational researchers. Teachers must not 
on£y understand the researcher's divergence of aim 
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and his difference i n p r a c t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n ; they 
must also be able to comprehend the implications of 
his r e s u l t s f o r t h e i r own work. For t h e i r p a r t , the 
researchers must not only appreciate the goals i n s -
p i r i n g teaching; they must also understand ±3bs pecul-
i a r problems i n diverse s i t u a t i o n s and be w i l l i n g to 
take these as s t a r t i n g points f o r research and as end-
points to which research res u l t s may be applied 1 (27). 
This i s , as i s to be expected, a much more r e s t -
rained emphasis upon s c i e n t i f i c theory i n education 
than that t y p i c a l l y encountered i n Eastwood: never-
theless, the emphasis i s there. Scheffler c l e a r l y 
conceives educational theory as providing be t t e r and 
better means f o r achieving the p r a c t i c a l teacher's 
goals as s c i e n t i f i c knowledge replaces.the less than 
s c i e n t i f i c . The goals themselves are another matter, 
of more concern to the other Scheffler whom we have 
watched disentangling the pervasive features of gener-
a l educational discourse, the discourse which i s closer 
to H i r s t ' s middle domain than that of the s c i e n t i s t . 
As has been mentioned on a number of occasions, Scheff-
l e r appears to combine i n one philosopher the two app-
roaches ( ' s c i e n t i f i c ' and 'humanistic'?) to be found 
respectively, i n the present context, i n Eastwood and 
H i r s t . This i s a f a c t that i s coming to be noticed 
i n the l i t e r a t u r e and one which holds out some hope 
f o r the eventual r e a l i z a t i o n of that complementarity 
(27) Scheffler, I . , The Language Of Education 
( S p r i n g f i e l d , I l l i n o i s , 1960), p. 75 
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which we suggested e a r l i e r . G.F.Kneller says very 
recently, f o r example, ' . . . i f we choose to analyze 
pedagogical discourse seriously, we are not l i k e l y to 
f i n d the f o r m a l i s t approach h e l p f u l . I s r a e l Scheffler, 
f o r example, who writes as a l o g i c a l empiricist on 
the philosophy of science, adopts the method of inform-
a l analysis when he considers some major concepts i n 
pedagogy' (28) 
The term 'pedagogy1, contrasted "by Kneller with 
'research 1, i s that branch of the study of edmcation 
1...which i s l a r g e l y p r e s c r i p t i v e . . . I t consists basic-
a l l y of recommendations f o r educational practice... 
and i t includes much e t h i c a l and general philosophic-
a l writing...Although i t also involves descriptions 
of practice, i t s language i s f o r the most part norm-
at i v e .. .Pedagogy tends to be expressed i n , a ordi n -
ary language, or the language of educated speech... 
So-called pedagogical theories... are not explanations 
i n any s c i e n t i f i c sense;.1 (29). 'Pedagogy* i s thus 
what H i r s t wants to improve by making us conscious of 
i t s l o g i c a l r o l e , what Scheffler examines i n his 'ord-
inary language' moments, what Eastwood closes his eyes 
to i n concentrating on the 'science' of education and 
what has been created and re-created by thinkers from 
Plato to Dewey. 
However, our immediate concern i n t h i s section i s 
(28) Kneller, G. F., Logic And Language Of Educ-
a t i o n (New York, 1966), p. 154 
T29) I b i d . , pp. 153-4 
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w i t h the s c i e n t i f i c model f o r theory which i s common-
l y contrasted with 'pedagogy1, and, at the moment, 
xvith Scheffler's emphasis i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . He points, 
f o r example, to the resemblance between teaching and 
other p r a c t i c a l a r t s such as engineering and medicine 
(and cooking!) i n a way that sets him o f f from the 
th i n k i n g of a Reid, who, as we saw, notes s i g n i f i c a n t 
differences between the enterprises " - 'The r e l a t i o n 
of educational research to teaching may thus be com-
pared w i t h the r e l a t i o n of physical research to engin-
eering, or, b e t t e r , with the r e l a t i o n of medical res-
earch to the c l i n i c a l practice of medicine 1 (30). He 
reminds us that t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p i s complex, as i t 
i s between any p r a c t i c a l a r t and underpinning science; 
i t i s such that educational research must be a common 
focus of many sciences - sociology, anthropology, ec-
onomics as wel l as psychology - but he does not, as 
Reid does i n his t a l k of 'application', cease to look 
from the underlying sciences towards the p r a c t i c a l 
a c t i v i t y as he moves along the 'continuum': to Scheff-
l e r , the re l a t i o n s h i p i s l o g i c a l l y the same no matter 
how complex the sit u a t i o n s are i n which i t obtains. 
His purpose i s clear when he says: 'Though no 
unique science underlies each of the major p r a c t i c a l 
a r t s , the degree to which some body of t h e o r e t i c a l 
science underlies an a r t i s an important f a c t o r det-
(30) Scheffler, I . , op. c i t . , p. 72 
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ermining i t s degree of pro f e s s i o n a l i z a t i o n ' (31). 
This i s not the impossible demand f o r immediate r i g -
our of an Eastwood, though i t carries a s i m i l a r mess-
age of f a i t h i n what the so c i a l sciences could, i n 
time, empower teachers to do and a s i m i l a r scepticism 
about the p o s s i b i l i t y of achievement i n education 
without proper s c i e n t i f i c knowledge of the most e f f -
ective means. I t i s the voice of one who, having 
demonstrated his sympathy f o r a proper philosophical 
analysis i n the more general 'Hir s t i a n ' domain, s t i l l 
wishes to urge the strong claims of s c i e n t i f i c i n q u i r y 
f o r a large place i n the educational enterprise. His 
conclusion from another discussion gives, i n f a c t , i n 
two sentences an answer each to the assertions of 
H i r s t and Eastwood and an admirable summary of his 
moderate p o s i t i o n - 'The problem, i t seems to me, i s 
thus to advance the state of so c i a l i n q u i r y - i n p a r t -
i c u l a r , of a l l those studies which seem l i k e l y to 
y i e l d explanatory p r i n c i p l e s relevant to the concerns 
of education. Whether, however, i t tmrns out that 
one or several t h e o r e t i c a l d i s c i p l i n e s develop, and 
whether any of these i s a d i s c i p l i n e of education 
s p e c i f i c a l l y , seem to me quite unimportant issues' (32). 
We re t u r n now to H i r s t f o r the f i n a l developmaat 
of h i s p o s i t i o n as i t i s given i n c r i t i c i s m of the 
a n a l y t i c a l views of O'Connor. And i n doing so we can 
(31) I b i d . , p. 73 
(32) Scheffler, I . , 'Is Education A Discipline?' 
i n Walton, J. and Kuethe, J. L. (Eds), The D i s c i p l i n e 
Of Education (Madison. Wisconsin, 1963), p. 61 
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note that t h i s section has dealt with the 'means' 
aspect of the 'ends/means' p o s i t i o n and that the next 
section, when i t reaches the d i r e c t examination of 
O'Connor, must deal, i n addition, with the 'ends' as-
pect i f the a l t e r n a t i v e to the complex ' f i e l d ' view 
i s not to appear unacceptably remote from education 
as a purposeful a c t i v i t y . I t i s i n O'Connor's book 
that the 'grids/means' thesis i s most p l a i n l y stated 
and i t i s that statement, so i n f l u e n t i a l i n the d i s -
agreement i t has provoked, which must occupy a not 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t place i n our report of the main l i n e s 
of discussion. 
O'Connor's 'Means/Ends' Thesis 
That t h i s thesis de-emphasises the importance of 
philosophy i n i t s demand f o r s c i e n t i f i c theory i n 
education i s a main contention of H i r s t - ' I f we r e j -
ect the s c i e n t i f i c model as thoroughly f a l s e and a r t -
i f i c i a l , w i t h i t there can go too the idea that p h i l -
osophy i s of only peripheral significance, even i f 
by philosophy we s t i l l mean an a n a l y t i c a l a c t i v i t y 1 
(33). His object i s to show that educational t h i n k -
ing has at i t s centre a philosophical component, even 
on a l i m i t e d a n a l y t i c a l view of what philosophy i s ; 
and t h a t , on a less r e s t r i c t e d view of philosophy, 
philosophy enters i n t o educational theory i n more than 
one way. 
(33) H i r s t , P. H., op. c i t . (see p. 191, supra), 
p. 60 
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He distinguishes ' f i r s t order' subjects from 
'second order' (see Eastwood, p. 208, supra); that 
i s he emphasises the difference between those subjects, 
the sciences and the humanities, which explain the 
world and ourselves and which give us knowledge about 
them d i r e c t l y , and, p a r t i c u l a r l y , philosophy which 
has a d i f f e r e n t kind of object f o r i n v e s t i g a t i o n -
which, i n f a c t , '...can be said to be a second order 
subject because i t seeks to describe and explain the 
way i n which f i r s t order subjects do t h e i r job' (34). 
His point i s that, i f s c i e n t i f i c theory i s taken as 
the model f o r education, philosophy w i l l be 'second 
order' i n the sense of being of second importance (or, 
as we could add, remembering Eastwood's singleminded-
nes, of no importance at a l l ) . He says, ' I f educat-
io n a l theory i s thought of as s c i e n t i f i c i n charac-
t e r , then t h i s kind of understanding may w e l l seem 
of only f r i n g e significance. I f however the theory 
i s as complex as has been suggested above, i t may 
well be of quite c e n t r a l importance a f t e r a l l ' (35)• 
I n f a c t , H i r s t makes a case f o r the twofold imp-
ortance of philosophy. F i r s t there i s i t s '.second 
order' c o n t r i b u t i o n , such as O'Connor, f o r example, 
favours - and valued even more highly by H i r s t himself 
because of the very complexity of the f i r s t ' l e v e l * 
s i t u a t i o n which i s the object of the philosophical 
(34) I b i d . , p. 60 
(35) I b i d . , pp. 60-1 
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analysis. This i s the 'formal' c o n t r i b u t i o n , i n 
which the philosopher brings his s k i l l s i n a sense 
from the outside to bear upon educational discourse. 
Presumably, such discourse w i l l have a cumulative ben-
e f i t from conscious philosophical scrutiny, becoming 
less open to the more obvious philosophical c r i t i c i s m s 
as time goes on and the 'second order' a c t i v i t y becomes 
more widely practised and known to be practised. 
Then, the other c o n t r i b u t i o n of philsophy, i t s 
'substantial' c o n t r i b u t i o n as philosophical b e l i e f , 
w i l l - again, presumably - become more consciously 
b u i l t i n to educational discourse as an essential e l -
ement of what i s i n e v i t a b l y composite. I n short, the 
ef f e c t on 'educational theory', i n the complexity of 
which philosophical b e l i e f i s always to be found, of 
the a n a l y t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s of interested modern p h i l o -
sophers, w i l l be the improvement which knowing more 
c l e a r l y what one is.doing always brings. Such, at 
any r a t e , appears to be the i m p l i c a t i o n of H i r s t ' s 
going beyond O'Connor's confined a n a l y t i c a l p o s i t i o n . 
Even on the assumption that philosophy i s purely 
a n a l y t i c a l , argues H i r s t , i t s importance cannot be 
r e s t r i c t e d to what O'Connor has i n mind: his scient-
i f i c paradigm f o r educational theory would make neg-
o 
l i g i b l e philosophy's r o l e , whereas a correct assess-
ment of the complexity of t h i s domain reveals the 
cen t r a l importance of philosophy - '...the s i g n i f i c -
ance of philosophical work i n these two f i e l d s i s . 
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very d i f f e r e n t . Generally speaking the sciences dep-
end l i t t l e on t h i s kind of c l a r i f i c a t i o n f o r i t i s 
part of the s c i e n t i f i c pursuit i t s e l f to construct 
and r e f i n e the concepts used so that they c l e a r l y ex-
press what i s understood about the world. This they 
do d i r e c t l y against the empirical evidence. As has 
been repeatedly stated, educational theory i s not 
developed i n t h i s monolithic manner, but depends upon 
bringing together of many diverse elements of under-
standing to form a composite theory i n which p r a c t i c -
a l judgments are made. I n such a complex a c t i v i t y , 
serious problems of meaning frequently occur and i n 
p a r t i c u l a r a f a i l u r e to understand the r e l a t i o n s be-
tween d i f f e r e n t f i e l d s of discourse befogs many educ-
a t i o n a l issues' (36). 
Hir s t ' s estimate of the dependence of the scient-
i s t on the philosopher of science must be judged as 
grossly inaccurate, unless the ' s c i e n t i f i c p u r s u i t ' 
i s intended to cover the conceptual c l a r i f i c a t i o n ach-
ieved f o r science by any person whatsoever, no matter 
what d i s c i p l i n a r y allegiance he owes; but, i n t h i s case, 
the estimate i s true by definition. However, the main 
point i s to underline the significance of philosophy, 
even i n i t s r e s t r i c t e d a n a l y t i c a l aspect, f o r educat-
io n a l theory i f such a domain i s the composite phen-
omenon that H i r s t declares i t to be: i t s importance 
i n t h i s respect i s hardly increased by asserting that 
(56) I b i d . , p. 61 
221 
i t would be less were there no such domain and 1 educ-
a t i o n a l theory 1 was simply s c i e n t i f i c . 
H i r s t ' s thesis places, then, great store "by the 
formal, second order, a n a l y t i c a l f unction of philoso-
phy - i t s c l a r i f i c a t o r y value i n a domain where many 
t y p i c a l phrases are of uncertain meaning. Education-
a l discourse i s l i t t e r e d w i t h such expressions as 
•equality of opportunity', 'freedom of the i n d i v i d u a l 1 
'the education of character' which stand i n need of 
s k i l l e d analysis. There are so many of them, from 
such a v a r i e t y of sources, that even when philosophy 
i s conceived only i n t h i s way,as an accessory to exist 
ing educational t a l k , i t must be of major importance 
f o r the succes of the enterprise: i n Hirs t ' s words, 
' . . . i t would seem to be rather l i k e some c r u c i a l t o o l 
without which i t i s hard to see how the various b i t s 
of the machine can be put together* (37). 
But, i n addition, there i s philosophy's second 
co n t r i b u t i o n , i d e n t i f i e d by H i r s t i n going beyond the 
mere a n a l y t i c a l p o s i t i o n of O'Connor ('...in general 
his view of the nature of philosophy seems to me acc-
eptable as f a r as i t goes' (38) ). He argues that 
an important ingredient i n the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y com-
posite educational theory i s that provided by ph i l o s -
ophy i t s e l f i n making available philosophical analyses 
leading to philosophical b e l i e f s . The judgments of 
(37) I b i d . , p. 62 
(38) I b i d . , p. 58 
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educational p r i n c i p l e made w i t h i n the domain of the-
ory are warranted by, amongst other things derived 
from other d i s c i p l i n e s , what philosophers working i n 
areas other than education have found out i n t h e i r 
own unique way. We have seen at some length the ex-
ample of 'pure' ethics providing the analysis of the 
nature and j u s t i f i c a t i o n of value judgments which has 
such a strong bearing on questions of moral education. 
Other parts of 'pure 1 philosophical i n v e s t i g a t i o n 
provide the substance to be mixed i n t o the theory of 
education: and, as we have observed, philosophers 
themselves w i l l probably enter education more d i r e c t -
l y as the place of t h i s kind of co n t r i b u t i o n i s made 
clear; and do some of t h e i r philosophical work w i t h i n 
a pedagogical context rather than i n seclusion as has 
been the case. Further, non-'philosophers 1 w i t h i n ed-
ucation w i l l possibly be moved by the force of Hirs t ' s 
and others theory of educational theory to equip them-
selves with the necessary s k i l l s to improve the job 
of t h e o rising that they would be doing i n any case, 
so that there w i l l be a great increase i n the amount 
and v a r i e t y of philosophical analyses which, as H i r s t 
contends, '...constitute one of the diverse elements 
that are brought together as the material out of which 
educational theory i s b u i l t 1 (39). 
H i r s t ' s thesis thus lays great stress on the need 
f o r philosophy i n educational theory, on the understand-
(39) I b i d . , p. 62 
223 
i n g peculiar to i t and on the d i r e c t c o n t r i b u t i o n 
that i t can make. He does t h i s f i n a l l y by b u i l d i n g 
h i s theory while showing the inadequacies - as he sees 
them - of O'Connor's p o s i t i o n . But the l a t t e r has so 
f a r been described omly on the basis of second hand 
information derived from accounts which are h o s t i l e , 
as w i t h H i r s t ' s , or i n f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n , as w i t h 
Eastwood's. I n view of i t s influence i n arousing i n -
terest i n , as O'Connor himself puts i t , '...important 
contemporary i d e a s . . . s t i l l unfamiliar to educational 
t h e o r i s t s ' (40), i t w i l l be as w e l l to go to the o r i g -
i n a l , leaving fmrther consideration of H i r s t u n t i l 
the next chapter. 
O'Connor's philosophical stance i n r e l a t i o n to the 
f a c t of education i s easier to perceive than that of 
H i r s t . Educational problems are simply 'ends-means' 
problems, each aspect of which requires separate p h i l -
osophical treatment. The "ends' are the '...set of 
values or ideals embodied and expressed i n the purpos-
es f o r which knowledge, s k i l l s and a t t i t u d e s are imp-
arted and so d i r e c t i n g the amounts and types of t r a i n -
ing given' (41).. A s a t i s f a c t o r y attempt at s t a t i n g 
such ideals must involve the d i r e c t use of several 
branches of philosophy, argues O'CSnnor, f o r i t must 
discuss questions of value and the nature of human 
experience. 
(40-) O'Connor, D. J., An Introduction To The P h i l -
osophy Of Education (London, 1957), p. v 
(41) I b i d . , p. 5 
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The 'means', the '...set of theories which purport 
to explain and j u s t i f y the use of... technique's f o r im-
p a r t i n g knowledge, s k i l l s and a t t i t u d e s ' (42), involve 
f i r s t , as we have seen asserted i n a more extreme way, 
the p o s i t i v e sciences, f o r they deal broadly w i t h 
questions of f a c t . But they also involve philosophy 
i n d i r e c t l y , f o r "...questions about the nature of the-
ories and t h e i r explanatory function are philosophical 
questions' (43). He i n t h i s way places his emphasis 
where H i r s t considers i t to be inappropriate - on the 
philosophy of science and away from the philosophy of 
'practice 1 . 
There i s no doubt that the education/applied science 
analogy already i d e n t i f i e d i n Scheffler dominates 
those portions of O'Connor's book which d i s t i n g u i s h 
i t from any other primer i n modern philosophy ( i . e . , 
without 'of education 1). He, too, stresses that im-
proved educational practice w i l l come only with the 
s u b s t i t u t i o n of adequate theory facr pedagogical f o l k -
l o r e , and that t h i s theory waits upon the f u r t h e r 
development of the s o c i a l sciences. His hope, l i k e 
Scheffler's, i s that the f u t u r e development of psych-
ology, sociology and the rest w i l l narrow the gap be-
tween s c i e n t i f i c educational theory and the confirming 
evidence f o r i t ; and i n saying that ' . . . t h i s hope gives 
an incentive f o r developing these sciences' (44) he 
makes us wonder whether a c r i t i c i s m of H i r s t by 0' 
(43) I b i d . , p. 5 
(44) I b i d . , p. 110 
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Connor, i f there were one, might not be such as to 
bring out what t h i s statement implies - that an under-
valuing of what science can c o n t r i b u t e to education, 
i s i t s e l f part of the ' f o l k l o r e ' , no matter how soph-
i s t i c a t e d i t s modern dress. 
There i s much i n O'Connor that makes H i r s t ' s con-
demnation of the ' s c i e n t i f i c paradigm' appear somewhat 
hasty. I n p a r t i c u l a r , his careful d e s c r i p t i o n and d i s -
t i n g u i s h i n g • of four p r i n c i p a l ways i n which s c i e n t i f i c 
explanation i s made provides the essential background 
to his remarks on educational theory and cannot be d i s -
missed i n the casual manner of H i r s t ' s c r i t i q u e . They 
are included f o r the good reason t h a t , without them, 
O'Connor's f i r m b e l i e f that the s o c i a l sciences hold 
the key to greater educational e f f i c i e n c y coiild not 
be moderated by his equally f i r m r e a l i z a t i o n that 
development along these l i n e s w i l l be slow. 
He distinguishes the f i r s t type of explanation -
of facts as instances of general laws - as '...clear-
l y a f a i r l y p r i m i t i v e l e v e l of explanation...more 
easily exemplified from the less developed sciences' 
(45); and the second type - of laws as instances of" 
more general laws - as that found frequently i n ad-
vanced sciences, and sometimes prematurely attempted 
' . . . i n those s o c i a l sciences relevant to education 
where the rules of method are not always so closely 
(45) I b i d . , p. 86 
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looked to as they must be i n the sciences of nature 1 
(46). These two types show the fundamental l o g i c a l 
pattern of s c i e n t i f i c explanation, according to 01Gonno 
a conclusion i s true only when i t i s ar r i v e d at by 
v a l i d deductive procedures from true premises. 
O'Connor's point i s that two other kinds of 'gx-
planation' are not so l o g i c a l l y basic, being more i n 
the nature of a n c i l l a r i e s to the deductive type, and 
that educational theory at the moment patterns i t s e l f 
on these. The f i r s t , the constructing of a model to 
elucidate puzzling f a c t s , i s a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c explan-
atory device of (these days) the social sciences, 
being simply the p u t t i n g of the unfamiliar injterms 
of what i s f a m i l i a r . I t i s only an aid to the dev-
elopment of 're a l ' theories, acting as a source f o r 
hypotheses designed to replace theories which t h e i r 
confirmation shows to be unsatisfactory. Consequently, 
i t i s used '...at lower l e v e l s of s c i e n t i f i c t h i n k i n g 1 
where '...explanatory models are a very useful method 
of developing old and less adequate theories i n t o 
new and more adequate ones' (47). 
The use of such models i n science was touched up-
on, i t w i l l be remembered, by Scheffler during his 
discussion of the role of metaphor i n educational 
discourse. He says: 'The l i n e , even i n science, be-
tween serious theory and metaphor, i s a t h i n one i f 
i t can be drawn at a l l . . . t h e i n i t i a l metaphor must 
(46) I b i d . , p. 87 
(47) I b i d . , p. 89 
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lead to refinements i n the comparison, expressed l i t -
e r a l l y , and to experimental confirmation of p r e d i c t -
ions or other inferences derived from them...metaph-
ors have often been said to organize r e f l e c t i o n and 
explanation i n s c i e n t i f i c . . . contexts 1 (48). The same 
view i s expressed by O'Connor: models enlighten us by 
suggesting arguments, '...But by themselves they are 
no more than a useful stimulus to the process of ex-
planation' (49). 
They may feature as an a n c i l l a r y element i n the 
l a s t type of explanation, that which ' . . . f i l l s the 
gap' (50) between two f a c t s which are separated by 
space, time or both i n such a way as to reduce the 
puzzlement which the f a c t s engender. O'Connor's care-
f u l analysis of types of explanation has been a prelim 
inary to t h i s one, the most important f o r educational 
theory because of i t s use i n social science. He says: 
'...there are some sciences i n which explanation at 
t h i s l e v e l i s basic and of the f i r s t importance. The 
so-called genetic or developmental sciences which i n -
clude large parts of ...psychology...and almost the 
whole of studies l i k e h i s t o r y and anthropology depend 
f o r the explanations which they can give us on gap-
f i l l i n g s t o r i e s of t h i s k i n d 1 (51). 
Consequently, educational theory i t s e l f , being i n 
(48) Scheffler, I . , The Language Of Education (Spr 
i n g f i e l d , I l l i n o i s , 1960), pp. 47-8 
(49) O'Connor, D. J., op. c i t . , p. 90 
(50) I b i d . , p. 90 
(51) I b i d . , p. 91 
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O'Connor's view a focus f o r the so c i a l sciences, w i l l 
r e l y heavily on such g a p - f i l l i n g explanations u n t i l 
such time as the parent sciences can provide a more 
sa t i s f a c t o r y pattern; that i s , explanation of the gen-
uine deductive kind. This moderate appraisal of the 
s i t u a t i o n contains no exaggerated claim f o r what i s 
presently or even shortly possible i n educational 
theory conceived as s c i e n t i f i c theory. I t i s r e a l i s t -
i c i n i t s acceptance that there are good reasons why 
the sciences i n question have not achieved more than 
they can presently show; and, as such, i t contrasts 
favourably w i t h the extremism of Eastwood. Certainly, 
t h i s aspect of O'Connor's work, f u l l y argued and pres-
ented with r e s t r a i n t , stands up w e l l to Hi r s t ' s b r i e f 
attempt at dismissal. Given the p o s s i b i l i t y of a 
s c i e n t i f i c theory or theories of education, i t i s very 
necessary to know i n some d e t a i l what the philosophy 
of science has to say about th e o r i s i n g and explanation, 
and O'Connor makes a good provision of t h i s knowledge 
f o r our b e n e f i t . 
When he turns from t h i s thoroughly explicated''back-
ground to the primary enquiry i n t o the place of educate 
io n a l theory, he uses that analogy to be found conf-
irmed i n Scheffler and rejected by Reid. Just as the 
'growing points' (52) f o r the p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s of 
medicine and engineering l i e i n science and i t s theor-
e t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n of practice, so too with education. 
(52) I b i d . , p. 93 
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History makes t h i s p l a i n : as O'Connor says, 'There 
were of course doctors, surgeons and engineers i n the 
ancient and medieval worlds. They had to work without 
the s c i e n t i f i c equipment of t h e i r present-day counter-
parts and, as a r e s u l t , the scope of t h e i r work and 
i t s e f f i c i e n c y was immeasurably less than that of mod-
ern doctors and engineers' (53). 
But O'Connor knows that he i s using an analogy. 
He i s not so f o o l i s h as to ignore obvious d i f f i c u l t i e s 
and his argument abounds with q u a l i f i c a t i o n s and caut-
ion. He expects no revolution from the systematic app-
l i c a t i o n to education of the modest advances made i n 
the relevant human scienees, and chides the view that 
does - ' . . . I t h ink there are good reasons foe - suppos-
ing i t i s f a r too o p t i m i s t i c about the fu t u r e and, 
moreover, f a r too pessimistic about the present 1 (54). 
An important point which he makes i s that , of the 
natural r e g u l a r i t i e s that the sciences seek to estab-
l i s h , some are much more easily known than others, are 
more quickly grasped by persistent and car e f u l observ-
ers unaided by controlled experimentation: many of the 
r e g u l a r i t i e s of the sciences of man on which education 
depends are of t h i s type. 
Consequently, i n t e l l i g e n t and c r i t i c a l observat-
ion can teach us much: 'The rough r e g u l a r i t i e s of be-
haviour and experience that we can a l l notice i n our-
(53) I b i d . , p. 93 
(54) I b i d . , p. 94 
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selves, our frie n d s and animalsjare s u f f i c i e n t to give 
us a l l a modest stock of psychological knowledge 1 (55). 
On the basis of t h i s rough-hewn knowledge we can op-
erate successfully enough f o r everyday p r a c t i c a l pur-
poses i n our contact with other people, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n a r e l a t i v e l y uncomplicated social context. So, 
education has f o r thousands of years been a auccess-
f u l enterprise while lacking any s c i e n t i f i c underpin-
ning, f o r the teacher has known '...enough of the 
workings of human nature from common experience to 
enable him to teach e f f e c t i v e l y 1 (55). This s u f f i c -
iency, i t can be noted, i s one of the causes of the 
'average' teacher's scepticism i n regard to demands 
that he should acquire greater professional knowledge, 
a scepticism c u r r e n t l y centred upon the Schools Council 
i n i t i a t i v e . 
O'Connor emphasises that social conditions change; 
and i n the case of education they have changed dramat-
i c a l l y i n recent times. There i s now the need to ed-
ucate the whole of the c h i l d population and to comm-
unicate the vast accumulation of modern knowledge. To 
cope w i t h t h i s problem i t i s necessary f o r teachers 
to recognize that practice depends upon theory i n tlse 
O&Connor sense and that the theory needs to be as w e l l -
founded as the times can make i t . T r a d i t i o n a l methods 
of teaching, based upon unconsciously absorbed theary 
of a p r e s c i e n t i f i c commonsensical kind, which i s pick-
(55) I b i d . , p. 96 
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ed up at best by i n t e l l i g e n t r e f l e c t i o n on wide ex-
perience, are not appropriate f&ff a mass society un-
dergoing a knowledge explosion, no matter how w e l l 
they ma# have worked i n the past or how w e l l they may 
seem s t i l l to work when judged only by the same people 
who use them. 
O'Connor's poin t , that every p r a c t i t i o n e r i s also 
a t h e o r i s t i n his sense, appears a v a l i d one and rec-
eives considerable support from investigations i n t o 
the philosophy of research, an area which, i t w i l l be 
remembered, H i r s t undervalues i n his desire to construct 
his own theory of 'theory' at O'Connor's expense. For 
instance, one of the most respected contemporary model-
makers i n education has t h i s to say: 'Yet, of course, 
a l l men...are t h e o r i s t s . They d i f f e r not i n whether 
they use theory, but i n the degree to which they are 
aware of the theory they use. The choice before the 
man i n the street and the research worker a l i k e i s not 
whether to theorize but whether to a r t i c u l a t e h i s the-
ory, to make i t e x p l i c i t , to get i t out i n the open 
where he can examine i t . I m p l i c i t theories - of pers-
o n a l i t y , of learning, and indeed of teaching - are 
used by a l l of us i n our everyday a f f a i r s . Often 
such theories take the form of f o l k sayings, proverbs, 
slogans, the unquestioned wisdom of the race. The 
s c i e n t i s t on the other hand explicates his theory' (56). 
(56) Gage, W. L.,'Paradigms For Research On Teaching' 
i n Gage, E. L., (Ed), Handbook Of Research On Teaching 
(Chicago, 1963), pp. 94-5 
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Nevertheless, O'Connor's desire to see the replace-
ment of ' f o l k ' theory "by s c i e n t i f i c theory i s not ex-
pressed i n ignorance of the differences between educ-
at i o n and other analogous p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . The 
time we l i v e i n demands that what we know i n the s c i -
ences of man - and he makes no exaggerated claims f o r 
the estent of t h i s knowledge - be applied i n place of 
the rules of thumb that are no longer e f f e c t i v e i n 
achieving objectives which he considers are decided 
outside 'theory' i n t h i s r e s t r i c t e d sense, He concl-
udes: 'Thus the analogy between education and applied 
s k i l l s l i k e medicine or engineering i s imperfect. 
Even to be e f f i c i e n t on a sraall scale,- medicine and 
engineering must be based on natural science. But 
education demands t h i s only when i t has so increased 
i n scale and complexity that the laws of human nature 
that are patent to i n t e l l i g e n t observers prove an i n -
adequate t h e o r e t i c a l basis and need to be supplemented 
or replaced by the sciences of man' (57). 
So, O'Connor on 'means' i s a valuable c o n t r i b u t -
ion to the debate - c e r t a i n l y more valuable than could 
be guessed from only an i n d i r e c t knowledge of him 
gained from between the l i n e s of Hirs t ' s c r i t i c a l ar-
t i c l e . But there i s also the O'Connor of the separate 
'ends' to be considered; b r i e f l y , for i t i s one of the 
cha r a c t e r i s t i c s of O'Connor's type of thesis that t h i s 
aspect of i t contains the p o s s i b i l i t y of a sort of 
(57) O'Connor, J. D., op. c i t . , p. 97 
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'escalation 1: as he says i n his peroration, '...the 
problems of the philosophy of education, i f pressed 
f a r enough, become the t r a d i t i o n a l problems of p h i l -
osophy' (58). Thus, an examination of the 'bearing' 
of a n a l y t i c a l philosophy on education could e n t a i l an 
almost l i m i t l e s s series of enquiries i n t o the contemp-
orary state of 'pure' philosophy i n a l l i t s varied 
aspects, f o r , as the quotation implies, a l l these as-
pects have some bearing, clear or obscure, on educat-
io n a l problems. 
P a r t i c u l a r l y , two s p e c i a l i s t areas w i t h i n p h i l o s -
ophy could easily be drawn w i t h i n a thesis such as t h i s 
one, i f the O'Connor approach were to be examined thor-
oughly on the assumption of i t s s u p e r i o r i t y to r i v a l 
approaches which attempt to make sense of t h i s puzzling 
'boundary' domain. These are the philosophy of r e l i g -
ion, the scope of which i s merely sketched by O'Connor 
('...there i s a set of basic questions i n the ph i l o s -
ophy of r e l i g i o n that have been discussed at a very 
elementary l e v e l ' (59) ) , and which could be explored 
with p r o f i t now that a n a l y t i c a l philosophy has begun 
to penetrate theological discussion: and the p h i l o s -
ophy of philosophy, s i m i l a r l y broached by O'Connor -
'...there i s the very d i f f i c u l t and controversial 
question of the nature of philosophical enquiry of 
which a rather s u p e r f i c i a l and admittedly p a r t i a l acc-
ount was given' (60). 
(58) I b i d . , p. 140 
(59) I b i d . , p. 138 
(60) I b i d . , p. 138 
234 
However, to assume the s u p e r i o r i t y of O'Connor's 
manner of displaying the 'philosophy of education' 
(the t o t a l i t y of h i s separate treatment of 'ends' and 
•means') would "be to sin against the stated objectives 
of t h i s account as much as would have been an i n i t i a l 
acceptance of H i r s t ' s view - a course d e l i b e r a t e l y 
avoided (see p. 2, supra). Therefore the philosophy 
of r e l i g i o n can be passed over with jxist t h i s mention 
of i t s importance, not only i n connection w i t h the 
elu c i d a t i o n of 'ends' which appear i n the O'Connor 
scheme but also as a c o n t r i b u t i n g source of H i r s t -
type b e l i e f s to his composite domain. This avoidance 
of an important area i s j u s t as w e l l from the point 
of view of s e t t i n g some bounds to our account, f o r an 
examination of r e l i g i o n , i t s philosophy at a time of 
' a n a l y t i c a l ' rejuvenation and the r e l a t i o n of these 
to the problems of education would demand the kind of 
space that only a separate thesis could provide. (61) 
The philosophical i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the nature of p h i l -
osophy i t s e l f i s a somewhat d i f f e r e n t case and must 
be here included, i f only to the extent of u n i f y i n g 
the scattered remarks made about i t h i t h e r t o . 
I t i s i n considering the question of the extent 
to which 'educational theory' mirrors the s c i e n t i f i c 
model so c a r e f u l l y described i n his preliminary excur-
(61) See Religious Education, Vol. LX No. 1, Jan/ 
Feb. 1965 f o r a whole issue devoted to 'Linguistic 
Philosophy And Christian Education' - an example of 
the bearing of modern a n a l y t i c a l philosophy on educat-
i o n a l theory i n an i n d i r e c t manner v i a theology 
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sion i n t o the l o g i c of explanation that O'Connor sorts 
out the d i s t i n c t i v e areas to be found mixed i n t o t r a d -
i t i o n a l 'philosophy of education'; and thus touches 
upon the nature of philosophy, p a r t i c u l a r l y on the 
status of metaphysical statements which enter so prof-
usely i n t o the w r i t i n g s he has i n mind. His i n t e n t i o n 
i s of course to i s o l a t e the empirical component, to 
make i t s importance clear and the p o s s i b i l i t y of i t s 
improvement as a separate element beyond doubt. I n 
unscrambling the Hirst-approved mixture i n t h i s way, 
he distinguishes three kinds of statement - metaphys-
i c a l , empirical and value statements - which, as he 
says, '...are d i f f e r e n t i n the sense that they belong 
to d i s t i n c t l o g i c a l f a m i l i e s and f o r that reason need 
to be supported i n quite d i f f e r e n t ways' (62). 
I t i s with reference to me&iphysical statements 
that he makes clear h i s basic philosophical commit-
ment, a h i n t of which we have already reported i n 
presenting his c o n t r i b u t i o n to the e t h i c a l debate (see 
pp. 66-72, supra). We can best c l a s s i f y i t b r i e f l y 
i n a negative way by givin g a comment on i t made by 
one whose commitment i s t h i t a l t e r n a t i v e to the 'tough-
minded' neo-positivism which we have broadly classed 
as ' l i n g u i s t i c * . Though i t i s to be noted that t h i s 
c r i t i c , Reid, i s l i n g u i s t i c only i n his own idiosyn-
c r a t i c way - a fa c t that can serve as one more warning 
that any u n i t i e s of p o s i t i o n which we impress upon the 
(62) O'Connor, J. D., op. c i t . , pp. 104-5 
236 
v a r i e d nature o f a n a l y t i c a l ' b e a r i n g 1 are t e n t a t i v e 
o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n s t h a t f u t u r e accounts w i l l need t o 
remedy. 
Reid, i n the f i r s t p a r t of h i s book, draws upon 
those p a r t s o f 'pure' a n a l y t i c a l philosophy which are 
l e a s t sympathetic t o ' t h e science-bound a n t i - s p e c u l a t -
i v e viewpoint o f an O'Connor. He draws a t t e n t i o n , 
f o r example, to the n o t i o n of ' v i s i o n ' i n philosophy 
propounded by the ex-Vieiana C i r c l e Waisniann i n saying: 
'This l i b e r a l view of philosophy as f r e s h v i s i o n , or 
as a case b u i l t up i n r a t i o n a l , though not s c i e n t i f i c 
ways, as accepting a f l e x i b l e view o f the nature and 
use o f language, i s an answer to the o v e r - v i o l e n t rep-
u d i a t i o n of "metaphysics" ( o r s p e c u l a t i v e philosophy) 
so evident some years ago...Profeesor O'Connor, f o r 
example' ( 6 3 ) . 
This emphasis upon ' r a t i o n a l ' procedures being 
much wider than science dreams o f , upon the l i m i t a t -
ions o f the merely a n a l y t i c a l approach, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n i t s e a r l y r e v o l u t i o n a r y m a n i f e s t a t i o n s such as 
l i v e on i n the 'dated' pronouncements of an O'Connor, 
i s to be found throughout Reid's p e r s i s t e n t c o n t r i b -
u t i o n t o the d i s c u s s i o n and, i n more orthodox and l e s s 
'personal' form, w i t h i n o t h e r instances t h a t we have 
already examined. As Reid says elsewhere: 'Metaphys-
i c s i n p a r t i c u l a r was l o u d l y pronounced t o be dead, 
(63) Reid, L. A., Philosophy And Education (London, 
1962, p. 13 
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though i t wouldn't l i e down* ( 6 4 ) . But t o what ex-
t e n t i t can be said t h a t ' l i n g u i s t i c ' s o p h i s t i c a t i o n 
has replaced 1 p o s i t i v i s t i c ' v i g o u r i n the arena of 
contemporary philosophy ( t o say n o t h i n g o f the very 
s p e c i a l f u s i o n of the ' l i n g u i s t i c ' w i t h the r e l i g i o u s 
t o be found i n Reid h i m s e l f ) i s something to be l e f t 
f o r the next chapter. 
What can be s t a t e d i n t h i s c o ntext, t h a t of an ex-
amination of 'theory', i s t h a t O'Connor deals m i n i m a l l y 
w i t h the n o n - s c i e n t i f i c elements i n educational d i s -
course i n order t o h i g h l i g h t the importance, i n h i s 
view, o f the s c i e n t i f i c element. He says: 'Statements 
o f t h i s k i n d /metaphysical/ are not b e l i e v e d , i n the 
f i r s t place, j u s t because they form p a r t of education-
a l theory. They are'accepted r a t h e r because they 
f e a t u r e i n a philosophy or a theology which i s already 
b e l i e v e d on oth e r grounds' ( 6 5 ) ; and thus expels any 
d i s c u s s i o n from 'educational theory' t o the acknowled-
ged p h i l o s o p h i c a l and t h e o l o g i c a l domains where the 
•other grounds' can be p r o p e r l y debated. 
To him, the proper procedure i s t o i d e n t i f y the 
metaphysical statements, s i f t them from the complex 
muddle o f educational w r i t i n g s (66) and then s u b j e c t 
them t o a p p r o p r i a t e p h i l o s o p h i c a l c r i t i c i s m on, as i t 
were, t h e i r home ground. As he says: ' I t i s important 
( 6 4 ) Reid, L. A., Philosophy And The Theory And 
P r a c t i c e Of Education (London, 1 9 6 5 ) , p. 17 - Lecture 
d e l i v e r e d i n 1962 
( 6 5 ) O'Connor, J. D., op. c i t . , p. 105 
( 6 6 ) See O'Connor, J. D., and o t h e r s , 'Discussion: 
Philosophy Of Education', Harvard Educational Review, 
Vo l . 33, pp. 219 - 3 6 , Spring 1963 f o r a more recent 
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t h a t , whether or not we suppose t h a t such statements 
are meaningful o r provable, we should a t l e a s t "be able 
to recognize them 1 (67). And i t i s c l e a r from the 
context and the emphasis to be found t h e r e t h a t O'Connor 
has what he would regard as h e a l t h y p o s i t i v i s t i c doubts 
about metaphysics, e s p e c i a l l y when i t i s contained i n 
the 'urbane and c u l t u r a l sermonizing' which i s the 
o b j e c t of h i s most recent s c e p t i c a l comment (see a r -
t i c l e c i t e d a t (66) ) . 
Nevertheless, he admits t h a t metaphysical s t a t e -
ments would be of great relevance t o a d i s c u s s i o n o f 
the aims o f education i f they were t r u e : and h i s reas-
on f o r a d m i t t i n g t h i s i s of present i n t e r e s t becaiise 
i t echoes ( o r , r a t h e r , a n t i c i p a t e s ) an argument i n 
the r i v a l H i r s t t h e s i s . L i k e H i r s t , he denies the 
p o s s i b i l i t y of l o g i c a l l y deducing statements about 
aims from statements t h a t are metaphysical, but grants 
t h a t such statements, i f t r u e , provide 'reasons' f o r 
c r e a t i n g an educational system of a p a r t i c u l a r s o r t . 
He says: 'There i s a sense i n which a p r a c t i c a l p o l i c y 
f o r education can " f o l l o w from" a p s y c h o l o g i c a l theory 
. . . i f we know or t h i n k t h a t we know something about 
the motives governing human conduct, i t would be f o o l -
i s h not to take advantage o f t h i s knowledge i n plann-
i n g the educational system...In a s i m i l a r way, p h i l o s -
(66) cont., but e s s e n t i a l l y unchanged p o s i t i o n 
than t h a t found wanting by Reid and H i r s t . 
(6?) O'Connor, J. D., op. c i t . (see p. 223, supra), 
p. 106 
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o p h i c a l statements which are metaphysical can have 
p r a c t i c a l consequences f o r education .just because such 
statements p u r p o r t t o be:;':f a c t u a l as w e l l as p h i l o s o p h -
i c a l . The d i f f i c u l t y , as we have seen, i s t h a t these 
" f a c t s " are of a p e c u l i a r l y i n a c c e s s i b l e k i n d 1 ( 6 8 ) . 
With t a l k of metaphysical " f a c t s " we reach the 
p o i n t at which commitments c l a s h . H i r s t , i n h i s t h e -
ory o f educational 'theory', assumes the existence o f 
p h i l o s o p h i c a l b e l i e f s - w h i c h , because they are a k i n d 
of knowledge, form' p a r t of the g r i s t brought t o the 
m i l l o f general educational d i s c u s s i o n . O'Connor, i n 
h i s l e s s 'tender minded' approach t o 'theory', banish-
es a l l donors of p u r p o r t e d l y d i r e c t p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o t h a t place where the g i f t s can be 
most p r o p e r l y examined; where, i n f a c t , the possib-
i l i t y o f there being such g i f t s to o f f e r i s i t s e l f 
an issue - to the s e l f - q u e s t i o n i n g heart o f 'pure' 
philosophy. What goes on t h e r e , the next chapter 
must b r i e f l y d i s c l o s e , f o r an account such as t h i s i s 
drawn towards i t , as we have seen, at every p o i n t 
where there i s a p a i r o f opposing v i e w p o i n t s express-
ed i n the context o f educational d i s c u s s i o n . 
But before we leave the concept o f an 'education-
a l theory' or j > l a i n 'educational theory', we can make 
the s o r t o f general comment which i n d i c a t e s t h a t the 
d i s c u s s i o n as r e p o r t e d here i s a mere fragment of the 
(68) I b i d . , p. 106 
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a v a i l a b l e d i s c u s s i o n and t h a t the r e p o r t i t s e l f i s 
j u s t one p o s s i b l e v e r s i o n . Reid, f o r example, ends 
h i s l o n g p r o f e s s i o n a l a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the p r a c t i c a l 
working out of some of the problems o f educational 
theory i n r e l a t i o n t o philosophy by saying f a r e w e l l 
w i t h the theme o f t h a t very r e l a t i o n s h i p ; and presents 
a conceptual framework w i t h i n which the H i r s t t h e s i s 
and the O'Connor t h e s i s could perhaps merge w i t h o u t 
c l a s h i n g . This i s a p o s s i b i l i t y which must remain 
unexamined and merely suggested on the tone r a t h e r 
than the d e t a i l s o f the Reid v a l e d i c t o r y l e c t u r e as 
evidence - as when he expresses h i s f i n a l hope, '... 
not one v o i c e o n l y , but many, i n concourse' ( 6 9 ) . 
Perhaps the normative and the explanatory aspects of 
the term 'theory', aspects which have received d i f f e r -
ent emphases i n the examples which t h i s chapter has 
taken from the l i t e r a t u r e , can both be given due 
weight by some t e r m i n o l o g i c a l agreement of the near 
f u t u r e , f o r c e d on c o n f l i c t i n g philosophers of educat-
i o n by the i n c r e a s i n g volume o f work i n t h i s area. 
I n any event, no matter what the u l t i m a t e r e s o l u t -
i o n o f the d i f f i c u l t i e s o f which t h i s chapter has made 
us aware, i t w i l l not come s o l e l y a t the l e v e l o f d i s -
cussion connoted by the term which f e a t u r e s l a r g e l y 
i n i t s t i t l e . Prom 'theory' we must move t o ' p h i l o s -
ophy' and so take up the fundamental questions of - t o 
(69) Reid, L. A., Philosophy And The Theory And 
P r a c t i c e Of Education (London, 1965), p. 40 
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quote our own i n t r o d u c t i o n - 'The nature of p h i l o s -
ophy, of language and, p a r t i c u l a r l y , o f knowledge' 
(see p. 7, supra). Perhaps a t the end of t h i s more 
thorough than h i t h e r t o s c r u t i n y of the most fundament-
a l s ector o f our f i e l d of enquiry we s h a l l have be-
come more capable than a t present o f suggesting aven-
ues along which ' a n a l y t i c a l ' harmony may be found. 
For the moment, however, ' c o n f l i c t ' i s the most app-
r o p r i a t e term f o r the main c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the scene 
t h a t we have witnessed; and t h i s term appears i n the 
chapter t i t l e to f o l l o w as a reminder t h a t , whatever 
cooperation the near f u t u r e may b r i n g , rooted disharm-
ony i s the mark of the present. 
CHAPTER -VII 
THE CONFLICT IN ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY ABOUT 
LANGUAGE AND KNOWLEDGE 
The Basic Issue I n 'Pure' Philosophy 
Lack o f unanimity amongst the a n a l y t i c a l l y dispos-
ed has become f a m i l i a r to us by r e p e t i t i o n i n s e v e r a l 
contexts w i t h an 'educational' aspect. The reason, 
l o c a t e d o u t s i d e such c o n t e x t s , i s not f a r t o seek: i t 
has been i m p l i e d on a number o f occasions, but not 
yet s t a t e d i n the words o f those most c l o s e l y i n v o l v e d . 
I t i s , however, recognized by them. At one .end of 
the spectrum o f a n a l y t i c a l shades o f o p i n i o n O'Connor 
admits t h a t he i s ' . . . p u t t i n g forward a p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
t heory which, l i k e a l l such t h e o r i e s , f i n d s no gener-
a l acceptance* ( 1 ) . At the o t h e r end, Reid recognizes 
t h a t 'The nature and f u n c t i o n o f philosophy i s i t s e l f 
a k i n d of p h i l o s o p h i c a l problem - over which t h e r e has 
always been controversy' ( 2 ) . 
Both thus l o o k back to the ground i n 'pure' p h i l -
osophy of the issues with; which they are i n v o l v e d 
when t h a t philosophy i s 'applied' to education. Small 
wonder t h a t the very scope of a n a l y t i c a l ' b e a r i n g 1 , 
the manner i n itfhich i t i s sai d t o operate and the r e s -
u l t s a n t i c i p a t e d from i t have been seen by us t o pres-
ent a r i c h v a r i e t y to the i n v e s t i g a t o r ; f o r the authors 
( 1 ) O'Connor, J. D., An I n t r o d u c t i o n To The P h i l o s -
ophy Of Education (London, 1 9 5 7 ) , p. 4 
( 2 ) Reid, L. A., Philosophy And Education (London 
1 9 6 2 ) , p. 3 
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of our examples l o o k back, l i k e O'Connor and Reid, 
and see d i f f e r e n t views and so produce the v a r i e d mat-
e r i a l i n terms of which we have chosen to d e f i n e the 
'bearing'. Nevertheless, we have been f o r c e d to n o t -
i c e a basic dichotomy w i t h i n the l i t e r a t u r e - even 
w i t h i n the sample of i t t h a t we have taken from t h a t 
produced d u r i n g a r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t p e r i o d o f p h i l o s o p h -
i c a l a c t i v i t y . This we can s p e l l o i i t i n terms of-.i the 
'pure' p h i l o s o p h i c a l background which the 'education-
a l ' w r i t i n g s p e r f o r c e m i r r o r . 
This procedure i s now demanded i f we are t o avoid 
imbalance i n an account t h a t i s drawing t o a close; 
f o r , so f a r , i n paying close a t t e n t i o n t o 'education-
a l ' m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of a n a l y t i c a l philosophy, we have 
neglected (though not completely ignored) the reference 
i n d e t a i l to the fundamental debate which stands behind 
what i s being voiced i n educational discourse. I n our 
l a s t chapter, f o r example, we have seen how the con-
f l i c t between two broad p o i n t s of view i m p l i e s an un-
d e r l y i n g c o n f l i c t t h a t i s being waged i n l e s s r e s t r i c t -
ed t e r r i t o r y than t h a t provided by educational w r i t -
i n g s . The concepts of 'knowledge', ' d i s c i p l i n e 1 , 
'theory* and so on t o be found t h e r e are the markers 
of e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l t e r r i t o r y which i s extensive enough 
to permit endless j o u r n e y i n g . 
We s h a l l have t o co n f i n e ourselves to a s h o r t ex-
c u r s i o n , j u s t s u f f i c i e n t l y i n f o r m a t i v e to c o r r o b o r a t e 
and g i v e 'body' t o the main p r e s u p p o s i t i o n o f our sur-
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vey - t h a t two branches of a n a l y t i c a l philosophy, the 
broadly ' p o s i t i v i s t i c ' and the broadly ' l i n g u i s t i c 1 , 
e x i s t i n f a c t , and t h a t t h e i r existence and the char-
a c t e r i s t i c s o f each can be i n f e r r e d q u i t e a c c u r a t e l y 
from the body o f l i t e r a t u r e which i s a 'secondary' 
m a n i f e s t a t i o n of 'pure' p h i l o s o p h i s i n g . I n d e a l i n g 
w i t h e t h i c s we were cl o s e s t to the o r i g i n a l sources, 
a f a c t which i l l u s t r a t e s t h a t the more important a 
sector of 'pure' philosophy i s f o r e d u c a t i o n a l t h i n k -
i n g the more non-educational work must be c a l l e d upon. 
S i m i l a r l y now, epistemology must be viewed, f o r i t too 
i s o f great s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r education. S c h e f f l e r ' s 
l a t e s t book i s evidence o f t h i s ; though the mention 
of i t (3) must, u n f o r t u n a t e l y , be a l l we give of i t 
f o r the same reason as t h a t o f f e r e d t o excuse our mere 
mention of Peters' l a t e s t c o n t r i b u t i o n - l a c k of time 
to a s s i m i l a t e important and r e l e v a n t w r i t i n g s t h a t 
are o n l y j u s t beginning t o appear i n s u b s t a n t i a l form 
and t h a t w i l l , undoubtedly, occupy key p o i n t s i n the 
accounts s t i l l t o be w r i t t e n . 
So, we move t o a n a l y t i c a l philosophy and i t s views 
of language, knowledge and the r e l a t i o n s h i p between 
them. We have alrea d y s t a t e d (see p. 15» supra) t h a t 
the two-phase p h i l o s o p h i c a l career o f W i t t g e h s t e i n 
i s t he main source o f , and the symbol f o r , both the 
c o n t i n u i t y and the divergences w i t h i n contemporary 
( 3 ) S c h e f f l e r , I . , Conditions Of Knowledge: I n t r o d u c t -
i o n To Epistemology And Education (Chicago 1965) 
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a n a l y t i c a l philosophy. The for m a l and the i n f o r m a l 
branches, the ' p o s i t i v i s t i c ' and ' l i n g u i s t i c ' emphases 
as we have c a l l e d them, stem both l a r g e l y from h i s 
n 
i n s i g h t s . And these i n s i g h t s cocern language, as i s 
w e l l known. Common to both branches of the 'f a m i l y * 
i s the l o c a t i o n of problems o f knowledge, the core 
o f p h i l o s o p h i c a l problems, i n problems of language, 
meaning and the a n a l y s i s of these. This i s the over-
a l l p i c t u r e , u n d i s t o r t e d enough f o r our purposes i f 
not f o r the c h r o n i c l e r . o f f i n e d i s t i n c t i o n s . 
As W.H.P.Barnes says of the f i r s t , v igorous a n a l -
y t i c a l phase ( i n a sh o r t i m p a r t i a l account w r i t t e n 
f o r e d u c a t i o n i s t s l e s s than t e n years ago t o f i l l an 
obvious gap - a f a c t which i l l u s t r a t e s the shortness 
of the p e r i o d w i t h which t h i s survey d e a l s ) : ' P o s i t -
i v i s m gave philosophy a t i l t ::by which words, sentences, 
t a l k i n g , language, e t c . , became the o b j e c t of a t t e n t -
i o n , r a t h e r than ideas, thoughts, t h i n k i n g , t h e o r y , 
and so on' ( 4 ) . Of the l a t e r phase, Stuart Hampshire 
comments: 'There are c e r t a i n permanent or r e c u r r i n g 
puzzles about the forms of our knowledge.. .V/hat i s 
l a r g e l y new i n the philosophy of the l a s t t h i r t y years 
. . . i s t h a t many philosophers are now s a t i s f i e d t o 
t r a c e these p e r p l e x i t i e s t o t h e i r source i n misunder-
standings of the common forms of language' ( 5 ) . 
(4) Barnes, V/. H. P., 'Logical P o s i t i v i s m ' i n Jud-
ges, A. V., (Ed), Education And The Philosophic Mind 
(London 1957), p. 125 
(5) Hampshire, S., Spinoza (Harmondsworth 1951), 
p. 219 
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Language occupies the centre o f the p h i l o s o p h i c -
a l scene, i t i s c l e a r . But how and why? The ' p o s i t -
i v i s t ' can speak f i r s t . Put roughly, i t can be s a i d 
t h a t language has two main uses: to communicate ' f a c t s 
and t o e s t a b l i s h agreements about the use of terms 
w i t h which such f a c t s are communicated. The p h i l o s -
opher would put i t t e c h n i c a l l y by s t a t i n g t h a t t h e r e 
e x i s t two d i s t i n c t types o f statements - ' s y n t h e t i c ' 
and ' a n a l y t i c ' - and the p o s i t i v i s t would i n s i s t t h a t 
the s y n t h e t i c aspect of language a c t i v i t y , the a s s e r t -
i o n o f how t h i n g s are, i s o f primary importance, the 
a n a l y t i c aspect being necessary only to ensure t h a t 
fact-communication i s accomplished by means o f a r e l -
i a b l e vehicle.-
Only i f agreement i s reached about word-use can 
language operate e f f e c t i v e l y as an instrument o f comm-
u n i c a t i o n : t h e r e must be a c o n s i s t e n t i n t e r - r e l a t i o n -
ship e s t a b l i s h e d between the elements of a language, 
a set of r u l e s f o r the game. C l e a r l y , i n such 'anal-
y t i c a l ' use, experience of the world of f a c t i s i r r e l -
evant t o the question o f proper use: an a n a l y t i c a l 
p r o p o s i t i o n says n o t h i n g about the experienceable, 
non-verbal w o r l d , but speaks o n l y o f men's 'agreement' 
as t o how the elements of language s h a l l be used. Tho 
ugh t h i s i s not t o deny the importance o f a n a l y t i c s 
statements, f o r the p o s i t i v i s t values s t u d i e s i n l o g -
i c and mathematics - the two most c l e a r l y demarcated 
areas i n which such statements form the bu l k o f what 
i s s a i d . I t i s only t o emphasise the primary f u n c t i o n 
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o f language, which i s t o convey i n f o r m a t i o n about 
something other than i t s e l f , t o d i r e c t a t t e n t i o n away 
from the language l e ^ e l towards the n o n - l i n g u i s t i c u n i -
verse. 
I t i s s y n t h e t i c statements which g i v e us knowledge 
o f the w o r l d : the t r u t h o f such statements depends 
upon what i s the case and they are t o be t e s t e d , acc-
o r d i n g t o the p o s i t i v i s t i c view, against a c t u a l or poss 
i b l e sense experiences. This t e s t d i s t i n g u i s h e s be-
tween a n a l y t i c and s y n t h e t i c statements, which between 
them account f o r a l l statements t h a t can be s a i d t o 
be meaningful. I f sense experience i s a p p r o p r i a t e 
t o the question of t r u t h the statement i s s y n t h e t i c , 
but i f t r u t h i s determined only by an examination of 
the terms and agreements i m p l i e d i n t h e i r use the 
statement i s a n a l y t i c . I f n e i t h e r , the statement i s , 
t o the p o s i t i v i s t , 'meaningless' i n a l i t e r a l sense. 
The n o t o r i o u s p r i n c i p l e of v e r i f i a b i l i t y i s the 
answer o f t h i s p o s i t i o n t o the question o f the mean-
i n g of a p r o p o s i t i o n . That i s , the meaning o f a prop-
o s i t i o n c o n s i s t s i n the l o g i c a l l y e q u i v a l e n t propos-
i t i o n s i n t o which the o r i g i n a l can be t r a n s l a t e d ; 
and c o n s i s t s , u l t i m a t e l y , i n derived statements about 
d i r e c t experiences - the so c a l l e d ' p r o t o c o l ' s t a t e -
ments which are, i n a sense, t h e i r own j u s t i f i c a t i o n . 
The philosopher of t h i s persuasion penetrates ( i n t h e -
o r y ) deep beneath the surface of language t o t h i s pro-
t o c o l - r e f l e c t e d bedrock, and i f , i n mining down from 
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a p r o p o s i t i o n or a k i n d o f discourse, he f a i l s t o 
f i n d the basic l e v e l , the immediately known ' r e a l i t y ' 
which a f f o r d s a s e l f - c e r t i f y i n g sense experience, he 
t y p i c a l l y uses phrases l i k e ' l i t e r a l nonsense', 'mean-
i n g l e s s language', 'emotive meaning', or even 'meta-
p h y s i c a l moonshine'. 
The v e r i f i c a t i o n p r i n c i p l e and i t s more guarded 
o f f s p r i n g , the p r i n c i p l e o f f a l s i f i a b i l i t y , l i e s thus 
a t the heart o f the p o s i t i v i s t i s r theory of language 
and knowledge, a t t e m p t i n g t o anchor a l l language i n 
the raw, common sensations which a l l human creatures 
possess and which the simplest terms of our language 
unmistakably ' r e f l e c t ' . I t s i c o n o c l a s t i c nature i s 
c l e a r , as i s the sympathy of those who he l d i t i n i t s 
o r i g i n a l form and those who have i n h e r i t e d i t s devel-
opments i n contemporary philosophy o f science f o r 
the p o s i t i v e achievements of science. These charac-
t e r i s t i c s we have seen s u r v i v i n g , i n va r i o u s ways, 
i n the work o f 'educational' philosophers such as 
Hardie, O'Connor and Eastwood, a l l , t o some e x t e n t , 
w i l l i n g i n h e r i t o r s o f t h i s v igorous, 'no nonsense* 
t r a d i t i o n . 
I n c o n t r a s t , the o t h e r , ' l i n g u i s t i c ' , branch of 
a n a l y t i c a l philosophy eschews b l a t a n t idol-smashing 
and a n t i - m e t a p h y s i c a l pronouncements. I t i s much 
more l i b e r a l i n a t t i t u d e , as we have seen where i t 
appears i n educational contexts: i t de-emphasises the 
importance o f for m a l l o g i c and p o s i t i v e science, as i s 
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c l e a r from the w r i t i n g s of philosophers l i k e H i r s t . 
Barnes gives an admirable image o f the c o n t r a s t when 
he says: 'To have made t h i s t r a n s i t i o n i s t o have es-
caped from a s t r a i t - j a c k e t i n t o an e a s y - f i t t i n g lounge 
s u i t ' (6) - though, i t must be s a i d , he does not d w e l l 
on.the u n s u i t a b i l i t y of lounge s u i t s f o r the perform-
ance o f many e s s e n t i a l p r a c t i c a l t asks: b o i l e r s u i t s 
are o f t e n made o f s t r a i t j a c k e t - l i k e m a t e r i a l . 
With t h i s approach, ' v e r i f i c a t i o n ' as a slogan i s 
replaced by 'the meaning i s the use 1 mentioned e a r l i e r . 
The e x t r a o r d i n a r y v a r i e t y t o be found i n the uses of 
language, a v a r i e t y which i s u n c l a s s i f i a b l e w i t h i n the 
simple a n a l y t i c / s y n t h e t i c dichotomy, i s appealed t o ; 
p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the seminal passage from the l a t e r 
W i t t g e n s t e i n which concludes: ' I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o 
compare the m u l t i p l i c i t y o f the t o o l s i n language and 
of the ways they are used, the m u l t i p l i c i t y of kinds 
of words and sentence, w i t h what l o g i c i a n s have s a i d 
about the s t r u c t u r e of language. ( I n c l u d i n g the author 
o f the "Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus") ' ( 7 ) . 
I f i n t e r e s t s h i f t s , as i t does w i t h the ' l i n g u i s t -
i c ' p hilosopher, t o language as a n a t u r a l phenomenon, 
of an almost organic complexity, there are not the 
grounds f o r exc l u d i n g as 'meaningless' any uses - as 
th e r e are when language i s viewed ' p o s i t i v i s t i c a l l y ' 
(6) Barnes, W. H. P., op. c i t . , p. 138 
(7) W i t t g e n s t e i n , Ludwig, P h i l o s o p h i c a l I n v e s t i g -
a t i o n s (Oxford, 1953), pp. 11e-12e 
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as f u n c t i o n i n g p r o p e r l y o n l y i n the communication of 
• f a c t ' . A l l uses have t h e i r ' n a t u r a l ' place, and are 
t o be s t u d i e d v r i t h patience r a t h e r than excluded bec-
ause they do not measure up to a t i d y but r e s t r i c t e d 
s c i e n t i f i c i d e a l . Language i s a complex s o c i a l prod-
u c t and should, i n the ' l i n g u i s t i c ' philosopher's op-
i n i o n , be allowed t o c a r r y out i t s many f u n c t i o n s and 
not be subjected t o Procrustean a s s a u l t : i t should be 
c a r e f u l l y observed and not v i o l e n t l y i n t e r f e r e d w i t h . 
This p o s i t i o n l i e s behind H i r s t ' s accusation t h a t 0' 
Connor '...has s i n g u l a r l y f a i l e d t o do what he set out 
to do - t o discover the j o b educational theory performs' 
( 8 ) . ; and represents, perhaps, the ' g e n t l e r ' side to 
t h i s c o n t i n u i n g domestic q u a r r e l w i t h i n the a m a l y t i c -
a l f a m i l y . 
'Look and see' i s the e x h o r t a t i o n from t h i s q u a r t -
er: l o o k f o r the meaning i n the use, f o r i t i s not 
b u r i e d deep a t the l e v e l o f i n c o r r i g i b l e p r o t o c o l s , 
themselves the product o f an a b e r r a t i o n i n a n a l y t i c a l 
philosophy caused by what i s o f t e n known as 'scientism'. 
V/hat can be seen i s the a c t u a l use, the o r d i n a r y stan-
dard use such as we have seen Peters and S c h e f f l e r 
a t t e m p t i n g t o e l u c i d a t e i n an educational c o n t e x t . 
T h e i r work i l l u s t r a t e s s e v e r a l techniques which have 
emerged from l i n g u i s t i c philosophy as v a l u a b l e probes 
f o r language e x p l o r a t i o n . For example, they show i n 
a c t i o n the s o - c a l l e d 'paradigm case' technique which, 
(8) H i r s t , P. H., 'Philosophy And Educational Theory* 
B r i t i s h J ournal Of Educational Studies, Vol. 12, p. 59, 
November 1965 
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i n i t s s i m p l i c i t y , d i r e c t n e s s and wide a p p l i c a b i l i t y , , 
i s f r u i t f u l i n many an 'applied' p h i l o s o p h i c a l domain. 
I t can be put thus: whereever t h e r e i s a piece o f 
language whose use i s not c l e a r and i s causing d i s p u t e , 
i t can be c l a r i f i e d by f i n d i n g another example which 
i s q u i t e c l e a r i n the sense t h a t the d i s p u t a n t s w i l l 
accept e i t h e r t h a t or they are beyond any k i n d o f con-
v i n c i n g . The discovered example, the standard, unob-
j e c t i o n a b l e , paradigm use, can be s c r u t i n i z e d and the 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s e s t a b l i s h e d i n t h i s process ( i n a 
Peters sense, the ' e s s e n t i a l ' c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : see p. 
123 supra) used t o u n r a v e l the o r i g i n a l use. The 
' l i n g u i s t i c ' p r e s u p p o s i t i o n i s t h a t a paradigm f o r 
each word, phrase and sentence i n the language does, 
i n f a c t , e x i s t : the piece of language cannot appear 
a t a l l w i t h o u t c r e a t i n g , by use, a genuine and l e g i t -
imate (though not ' s c i e n t i f i c ' ) meaning - the meaning 
i s the use.1 
Such a p r e s u p p o s i t i o n explains the frequent occ-
urrence i n the w r i t i n g s o f , f o r example, Peters of 
statements l i k e t h i s , taken from an e d u c a t i o n a l l y 
r e l e v a n t source which we have not time t o explore: 
'The paradigm case of a human a c t i o n i s when some-
t h i n g i s done i n order t o b r i n g about an end' ( 9 ) . 
I t shows through, t o o, i n a passage which w i l l serve 
to b r i n g t h i s 'pure' p h i l o s o p h i c a l stage of the d i s -
(9) Peters, R. S., The Concept Of M o t i v a t i o n 
(London, 1958), p. 4 
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cussion t o anjend by echoing W i t t g e n s t e i n and so con-
t r a s t i n g the two a n a l y t i c a l approaches w i t h which 
t h i s s e c t i o n has been concerned. 
He says: 'Ordinary language can convey... s u b t l e 
suggestions; f o r one way i n which i t d i f f e r s from 
s c i e n t i f i c language i s t h a t i t s use i s not simply t o 
describe and e x p l a i n . I t may command, condemn, guide, 
express s t a t e s o f mind, announce, provoke, exhort, and 
perform countless o t h e r such s o c i a l f u n c t i o n s . Often 
a d i f f e r e n t word i s used p r e c i s e l y because such a 
s p e c i f i c s o c i a l f u n c t i o n i s t o be performed. S c i e n t -
i f i c language, almost by d e f i n i t i o n , has no such sub-
t l e t i e s ' ( 1 0 ) . We must now r e - e n t e r the 'a p p l i e d ' area 
t o reconsider the basic issue as i t appears t h e r e , 
bearing Peters' words i n mind. 
The Issue R e f l e c t e d I n An 'Educational' Context 
What i s r e f l e c t e d i s the issue between the two an-
a l y t i c a l p o s i t i o n s described admirably by P.P.Strawson, 
probably the most p o w e r f u l l y 'pure' philosopher a l i v e , 
as having '...been of dominant importance i n post-war 
p h i l o s o p h i z i n g . One i n v o l v e s t u r n i n g away from the 
forms of common speech, w h i l e p r e s e r v i n g much of the 
apparatus of the o r i g i n a l programme of a n a l y s i s . The 
o t h e r i n v o l v e s continued close a t t e n t i o n to the forms 
of common speech, togethe r w i t h a v a s t l y a l t e r e d and 
extended conception of the nature and techniques o f 
(10) I b i d . , p. 29 
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a n a l y s i s 1 ( 1 1 ) . 
H i r s t can provide us w i t h perhaps the best example 
of the l a t t e r approach, i n the important a r t i c l e which 
complements h i s work on educational theory examined 
i n our l a s t chapter. I t s l e v e l i s best gauged from 
the comment o f Archambault, who e d i t s the volume i n 
which i t appears. He t a l k s o f '...an approach which 
i s f r a n k l y e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l and consequently r e l a t i v e l y 
a b s t r a c t ; y e t a major p o r t i o n of h i s paper i s concerned 
w i t h the a p p l i c a t i o n s of the p r i n c i p l e s thus derived 
t o the p r a c t i c a l educational c o n t e x t 1 ( 1 2 ) . H i r s t 
makes e x p l i c i t , i n s h o r t , h i s views on the nature o f 
knowledge which are presupposed by him i n the e a r l i e r 
a r t i c l e . I n the process, he leaves no doubt about the 
close r e l a t i o n s h i p of the e p i s t e m o i o g i c a l p o s i t i o n 
he adopts t o ' l i n g u i s t i c ' i n s i g h t s w i t h i n the p h i l o s -
ophy o f mind - a f a c t which w i l l a l l o w us t o confine 
our i n v e s t i g a t i o n and excuse us from d e l v i n g deeply 
i n t o the l a t t e r s e c t o r o f 'pure' philosophy (an app-
r o p r i a t e sector f o r a separate and d i f f e r e n t l y s l a n t e d 
account). 
A key H i r s t i a n phrase i s 'forms of knowledge' (see 
pp. 193—4 , supra) which he defines as '...the complex 
ways o f understanding experience which man has achieved 
which are p u b l i c l y s p e c i f i a b l e and which are gained 
through l e a r n i n g ' ( 1 3 ) . He maintains t h a t these forms 
(11) Strawson, P. P., 'Construction And A n a l y s i s ' 
i n Ryle, G. (et a l ) , The Rev o l u t i o n I n Philosophy (Lon-
don, 1956), p. 101 
(12) see p. 254, i n f r a . 
(13) see p. 254, i n f r a . 
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of knowledge are d i s t i n g u i s h e d by t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r 
concepts and expressions and by the c r i t e r i a they have 
e s t a b l i s h e d f o r h a n d l i n g questions of t r u t h w i t h i n 
t h e i r ' j u r i s d i c t i o n ' . I t can be noted how close t h i s 
way of t h i n k i n g i s to t h a t behind the W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n 
n o t i o n o f language games or universes of discourse, i n 
which and o f which 'mindful' men partake- H i r s t t a l k s 
o f the development o f mind being determined by the 
forms o f knowledge and, having d e f i n e d the forms as 
' p u b l i c l y s p e c i f i a b l e ' , thus i m p l i e s t h a t what i s char-
a c t e r i s t i c o f man i s t h a t he i s the crea t u r e i n which 
many d i s t i n c t languages achieve, i n a sense, s i g n i f i c -
ant 1 embodiment 1. 
His exact words are as d e s c r i p t i v e l y vague as those 
i n the l a s t paragraph: he says t h a t t here i s a '... 
l o g i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the concept o f "mind" 
and the concept of "knowledge", from which i t f o l l o w s 
t h a t the achievement o f knowledge i s n e c e s s a r i l y the 
development o f mind - t h a t i s , the se l f - c o n s c i o u s 
r a t i o n a l mind o f man - i n i t s most fundamental aspect' 
(14 ) . Mind i s defin e d i n terms o f the conceptual 
schemes, and the languages i n which these are express-
ed, by means of which experience i s s t r u c t u r e d and 
a r t i c u l a t e d - ' . . . i t i s by means of symbols, p a r t i c -
u l a r l y i n language, t h a t conceptual a r t i c u l a t i o n be-
(12) Archambault, R. D., ' I n t r o d u c t i o n . The Context 
Of Educational Discussion' i n Archambault, R. D. (Ed), 
P h i l s o p h i c a l A n a l y s i s And Education (London, 19-65), p. 58 
(13) H i r s t , P. H., ' L i b e r a l Education And The Nature 
Of Knowledge 1 i n op. c i t . ((12) above), p. 122 
(14) I b i d . , p. 123 
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comes o b j e c t i f i e d , f o r the symbols g i v e p u b l i c embod-
iment to the concepts' ( 1 5 ) . 
His argument i s t h a t a l l the v a r i o u s domains o f 
human knowledge have been acquired by u s i n g accepted 
t e s t s on p u b l i c l y agreed a s s e r t i o n s ; on the symbolic 
expressions which have empowered man i n h i s probing 
of experience t o f i n d (or co n s t r u c t ? ) r e l a t i o n s and 
d i s t i n c t i o n s of an i n c r e a s i n g l y f i n e n a t u r e . As H i r s t 
puts i t : 'To acquire knowledge i s to become aware o f 
experience as s t r u c t u r e d , organized and made meaning-
f u l i n some q u i t e s p e c i f i c way, and the v a r i e t i e s o f 
human knowledge c o n s t i t u t e t he h i g h l y developed forms 
i n which man has found t h i s p o s s i b l e ' ( 1 6 ) . He o f f e r s 
a persuasive p o r t r a i t of the development o f man, ach-
i e v i n g through countless and b a r e l y imaginable cent-
u r i e s these p r i c e l e s s forms of knowledge, c r e a t i n g 
f o r h i m s e l f a mind , a many sided r a t i o n a l i t y which 
i s embedded i n the unique modes of understanding, i n 
the d i s t i n c t i v e languages which create sense out o f a 
p r i m o r d i a l experience. 
We can pause f o r a sobering look a t the work o f 
a philosopher cast i n a d i f f e r e n t mould, one whose 
' p o s i t i v i s t i c ' i n c l i n a t i o n s take him t o the more 'tough 
minded' areas o f contemporary philosophy o f science 
and whose b r i e f c o n t r i b u t i o n t o the educational debate 
of t e n t e a r s ago cannot p o s s i b l y be o m i t t e d from our 
(15) I b i d . , p. 123 
(16) I b i d . , pp. 124-5 
256 
sample i f we are t o do j u s t i c e to the o l d e r branch of 
a n a l y t i c a l philosophy. Herbert E e i g l makes e x p l i c i t 
the a f f i n i t y f o r science which t h i s branch continues 
to d i s p l a y even i n i t s more moderate ' m a t u r i t y ' which 
philosophers such as he have brought about: as when 
he says, '...there are important educational aspects 
i n the s c i e n t i f i c humanism which, as a general and 
fundamental a t t i t u d e , u n d e r l i e s the t h i n k i n g of the 
l o g i c a l e m p i r i c i s t s ' ( 1 7 ) . 
He t a l k s b o l d l y o f the equation o f knowledge and 
science i n words t h a t must make H i r s t wince. To him, 
' . . . t h e o l o g i c a l and metaphysical assertions...must be 
considered as n o n s c i e n t i f i c ( o r , as the l o g i c a l empir-
i c i s t s g e n e r a l l y would claim) no n c o g n i t i v e ' ( 1 8 ) ; and 
are thus excluded from the realm o f genuine knowledge 
which the ' l i n g u i s t i c ' philosophers do not wish t o 
see l i m i t e d i n t h i s way. He discusses the semantics 
of the word ' b e l i e f as i t i s used t o make a knowledge 
cl a i m o n l y t o i s o l a t e f o r acceptance t h a t meaning •... 
which may be c h a r a c t e r i z e d as e m p i r i c a l because i t i s 
a t l e a s t i n p r i n c i p l e capable o f being examined as t o 
i t s t r u t h or f a l s i t y i n the l i g h t of o b s e r v a t i o n a l 
evidence* ( 1 9 ) . Our d i s c u s s i o n of ' p r o t o c o l s ' comes 
immediately t o mind] (See pp. 247-8, supra). 
(17) F e i g l , H., 'Aims Of Education For Our Age Of 
Science: R e f l e c t i o n s Of A L o g i c a l E m p i r i c i s t 1 i n 
Modern Philosophies And Education (Chicago, 1955), 
N.S.S.B. 54th Yearbook Part 1, p. W. 304 
(18) I b i d . , p. 312 
(19) I b i d . , p. 313 
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posing psexido-problems i s i n marked c o n t r a s t w i t h 
the ' l i b e r a l i s m ' o f H i r s t , to whom the very term 'pseudo-
problem' would no doubt smack of an u n p h i l o s o p h i c a l 
obsession w i t h science. For even when F e i g l makes 
p l a i n h i s awareness t h a t t h i n g s have changed i n p h i l -
osophy since the swashbuckling heyday of l o g i c a l pos-
i t i v i s m of the Vienna dazzlement, he s t i l l urges t h a t 
i t i s s c i e n t i f i c knowledge t h a t coxmts, as when he says: 
' . . . i t i s wise t o proceed c a u t i o u s l y and c o n s e r v a t i v e -
l y . We c e r t a i n l y must not c a v a l i e r l y r e pudiate as 
meaningless questions f o r which we have at the moment 
no technique o f d e c i s i o n but where the discovery o f 
such a technique and o f r e l e v a n t data i s not l o g i c a l l y 
excluded by the manner i n which the question i s prop-
osed. There are countless unanswered questions i n 
science and many of them may remain unanswered f o r 
a l l we know; mankind may not e x i s t l o n g enough t o 
work out an answer. But a question which i s so con-
strued t h a t i t prevents any responsiblB answer whatso-
ever should be regarded as a pseudoproblem' ( 2 2 ) . 
To which H i r s t would probably r e p l y t h a t such an 
i m p l i e d c o n t i n u i n g h o s t i l i t y towards the knowledge-
claims made by r e l i g i o u s and metaphysical (not to 
mention moral) ' b e l i e v e r s ' i s the p r e j u d i c e o f a 
science-conditioned mind which i s b l i n d e d to the obvious 
f a c t s of man's t o t a l experience. C e r t a i n l y "Feigl 
shows an impatience w i t h s u b t l e t i e s ; and H i r s t ' s 
(22) I b i d . , p. 317 
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w r i t i n g s are n o t h i n g i f not s u b t l e . F e i g l says, f o r 
example: 'To make a very l o n g s t o r y very s h o r t , i t 
may be said t h a t t h e r e i s an e m p i r i c a l , c o g n i t i v e l y 
meaningful concept of r e a l i t y , used i n common l i f e 
and merely r e f i n e d i n science' ( 2 3 ) . On the face of 
i t , t h i s i s s t a r t l i n g l y close t o what H i r s t says:'The 
va r i o u s forms of knowledge can be seen i n low l e v e l 
developments w i t h i n the common area of our knowledge 
of the everyday w o r l d . From t h i s t here branch out 
the developed forms which, t a k i n g c e r t a i n elements 
i n our common knowledge as a b a s i s , have grown i n 
d i s t i n c t i v e ways' ( 2 4 ) . 
But the s i m i l a r i t y i s n o t h i n g and the d i f f e r e n c e 
i s a l l . F e i g l ' s 'refinement' i s the a n t i t h e s i s o f 
H i r s t ' s 'growth': t o the younger philosopher i t must 
appear more o f a confinement ( l i k e Barnes 1 s t r a i t -
j a c k e t - see p. 249, sixpra), j u s t as, t o the o l d e r 
philosopher, H i r s t ' s p l u r a l forms o f knowledge must 
appear the s o r t of s e l f - d e l u s i o n t h a t only the f u t u r e 
development o f a s c i e n t i f i c psychology t o the p o i n t 
where i t can account f o r the strange b e l i e f s o f non-
s c i e n t i f i c philosophers can e x p l a i n . 
For F e i g l propounds an e m p i r i c a l r e a l i s m which 
combines the ( t o him j u s t i f i a b l e ) claims o f the a f o r e -
mentioned c r i t e r i a o f meaning and v a l i d i t y w i t h the 
sound elements of 'common sense' which science i d e n t -
(23) I b i d . , p. 318 
(24) H i r s t , P. H., op. c i t . , p. 128 
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i f i e s as the f o u n d a t i o n upon which i t s own c o n s t r u c t -
i o n stands. I t s opponents would c a l l i t a ' n a t u r a l -
i s t i c metaphysic 1 u n d e r l y i n g the ' p o s i t i v i s t i c ' theory 
of knowledge; and t h i s charge might very w e l l he acc-
eptable ( i r o n i c a l l y , i n view o f one of i t s terms) by 
the F e i g l who i s w i l l i n g t o w r i t e : 'Small p a r t s of 
p h y s i c a l space and l a t e a r r i v a l s i n e v o l u t i o n a r y t i m e , 
t h i s i s the place of "homo sapiens" i n the universe. 
An adequate theory o f knowledge must r e c o n s t r u c t the 
r e l a t i o n s of the knower to the known i n such a manner 
t h a t obvious n a t u r a l i s t i c conclusions are not d i s t o r t -
ed' ( 2 5 ) . 
But we must r e t u r n from t h i s b r i e f glimpse of the 
s o r t of statement of p o s i t i o n which i s , a t the moment, 
not favoured by the m a j o r i t y o f , a t any r a t e , E n g l i s h 
p a r t i c i p a n t s t o the most c o n f i d e n t statement of the 
p o s i t i o n which i s - to H i r s t , f o r a summary of the 
e p i s t e m o l o g i e a l underpinning o f the c u r r e n t ' o f f i c i a l ' 
pronouncements which spread f a r and f a s t from London. 
S c i e n t i f i c knowledge i s , to H i r s t , one amongst many 
kinds of knowledge, f o r science i s only one of the 
many ways i n which man s t r u c t u r e s and a r t i c u l a t e s h i s 
experience. Other kinds have equal or perhaps g r e a t e r 
importance. 
To r e c a l l h i s main c o n t e n t i o n : the v a r i o u s 'forms 
of knowledge 1 e x i s t p r i m i t i v e l y i n the i n t e r a c t i o n s 
o f everyday l i f e and are found i n developed form i n 
(25) F e i g l , H., op. c i t . , p. 319 
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the d i s t i n c t i v e d i s c i p l i n e s achieved by c i v i l i z e d 
man. These d i s c i p l i n e s are i d e n t i f i a b l e by t h e i r cen-
t r a l concepts, by the p a r t i c u l a r l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e 
each has developed t o r e l a t e the concepts i n c e r t a i n 
l i m i t e d but meaningful ways and by t h e i r d i s t i n c t i v e 
procedures f o r t e s t i n g t h e i r own expressions against 
experience, using d i f f e r e n t techniques and s k i l l s . 
We have, o f coxirse, examined such a form of knowledge 
w h i l e c o n s i d e r i n g Peters' views on e t h i c s , he being 
a H i r s t - t y p e e p i s t e m o l o g i s t ( f o r our purposes and 
according t o our terms). 
Not o n l y i s s c i e n t i f i c knowledge t o be viewed i n 
t h i s c h a r a c t e r i z i n g way - t h e r e i s u n i v e r s a l ' a n a l y t -
i c a l ' agreement on t h i s - but a l s o , according to H i r s t , 
'...moral knowledge, and...the arts...Each form, then, 
has d i s t i n c t i v e expressions t h a t are t e s t a b l e against 
experience i n accordance w i t h p a r t i c u l a r c r i t e r i a 
t h a t are p e c u l i a r i n the form' ( 2 6 ) . There i s the 
c l e a r i m p l i c a t i o n t h a t the ' s c i e n t i f i c ' mind i s a 
mind i n b l i n k e r s ; and H i r s t leaves us i n no doubt t h a t 
the o r i g i n s of t h i s (by now f a m i l i a r ) view l i e i n the 
l a t e r W i t t g e n s t e i n i a n q u a r t e r o f recent 'pure' p h i l o s -
ophy - though, i t must be noted, the u n i n h i b i t e d tone 
of h i s e x p o s i t i o n i s such as t o imply, t o o , t h a t he 
b e l i e v e s h i m s e l f t o be advancing the d i s c u s s i o n as a 
'pure' philosopher h i m s e l f . 
The ' d i s t i n c t worlds oiff d i s c o u r s e 1 (27) are, then, 
a l l we can know, being, i n sum, a l l we can say. But 
(26) See p. 262, i n f r a 
(27) See p. 262, i n f r a 
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we can say a l o t , i n H i r s t ' s view. There are more 
t h i n g s i n 'knowledge' than the s c i e n t i s t dreams o f ; 
and t h e r e f o r e the conclusion o f the e a r l y Wittgen-
s t e i n - the seventh p r o p o s i t i o n , 'Whereof one cannot 
speak, t h e r e o f one must be s i l e n t ' , o f the 'Tractatus' 
- which the p o s i t i v i s t i c a l l y i n c l i n e d have used to 
throw so much a c t u a l language i n t o the abyss of 'mean-
inglessness' i s t r u e (because o f the l i b e r a t i o n e f f e c t -
ed by the l a t e r W i t t g e n s t e i n ) i n a sense beyond the 
p o s i t i v i s t ' s ken. 
So, science and mathematics are not the o n l y d i s -
c i p l i n e s i n the 'knowledge' sense. And even they are 
seen somewhat d i f f e r e n t l y by H i r s t , who claims t h a t 
t h e r e i s '...a good case, because of the nature of 
t h e i r e m p i r i c a l concepts, f o r r e g a r d i n g the human 
sciences s e p a r a t e l y from the p h y s i c a l sciences' ( 2 8 ) , 
a c o n t e n t i o n t h a t can be put alongside a t y p i c a l 
statement o f F e i g l t o produce a f a m i l i a r dissonance. 
He says: 'The u n i t y - o f - s c i e n c e movement, which has 
been an important expression o f the l o g i c a l e m p i r i c -
i s t o u t l o o k ever since i t s i n c e p t i o n , has stressed 
the e s s e n t i a l u n i t y o f both method and subject matter 
of the sciences. The n a t u r a l and s o c i a l sciences d i f f -
er i n t h e i r s p e c i a l techniques, but the methods of 
v a l i d a t i o n are e s e n t i a l l y the same. They d e l i m i t the 
range and the l e v e l of t h e i r analyses d i f f e r e n t l y , but 
(26) H i r s t , P. H., op. c i t . , p. 129 (see p. 261,supra) 
(27) I b i d . , p. 129 (see'p. 261, supra) 
(28) I b i d . , p. 130 
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t h e r e are good reasons t o assume t h a t these (super-
f i c i a l l y very s t r i k i n g ) d i f f e r e n c e s amount only t o 
f r u i t f u l d i v i s i o n s of one u n i t a r y subject matter i n 
i t s v a r i o u s aspects and l e v e l s of o r g a n i z a t i o n 1 ( 2 9 ) . 
I n a d d i t i o n to 'knowledge' as understood by the 
p o s i t i v i s t s , there are the forms developed from o t h e r 
aspects of human experience: moral knowledge, h i s t o r -
i c a l knowledge, r e l i g i o u s knowledge and knowledge from 
the a r t s - broad areas o f understanding which d i v i d e 
i n t o the v a r i o u s a r t s and sciences of c i v i l i z e d l i f e . 
Such are ' f i r s t order' forms; but t h e r e are, i n add-
i t i o n , the second order forms already mentioned (see 
p. 218, supra), of which philosophy i s p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i m p o r t a n t . As a famous e x - p o s i t i v i s t (and present 
' p o s i t i v i s t i c ' sympathizer amongst Oxford philosophers) 
puts i t : '...however u n c e r t a i n they may be about the 
d e t a i l s , there i s now a f a i r measure of agreement 
among philosophers t h a t t h e i r s i s what i s t e c h n i c a l l y 
c a l l e d a second-order subj e c t . . .Philosophy, i t has 
been s a i d , i s t a l k about t a l k 1 ( 3 0 ) . 
Furthermore, there are many ' f i e l d s ' o f knowledge, 
one o f which we have explored i n the l a s t chapter 
w h i l e r e p o r t i n g the a r t i c l e o f H i r s t which i s complem-
en t a r y , so f a r as the epistemology i s concerned, t o 
t h i s one. A ' f i e l d 1 i s an o r g a n i s a t i o n o f knowledge 
created by i n t e g r a t i n g f i n d i n g s of v a r i o u s r o o t d i s -
(29) F e i g l , H., op. c i t . , p. 339 
(30) Ayer, A. J., 'Philosophy And Language 1 i n 
Ayer, A. J., The Concept Of A Person And Other Essays 
(London, 1963), p. 3 
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c i p l i n e s , w i t h reference t o s p e c i f i c o b j e c t s or prac-
t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s . Engineering and geography are exam-
p l e s ; and so, of course, i s educational theory - though 
i n a s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t way. Work w i t h i n a ' f i e l d 
does not e n t a i l the v a l i d a t i o n of any l o g i c a l l y unique 
form o f expression or w i t h s t r u c t u r i n g experience i n 
a p a r t i c u l a r way, as work w i t h i n a 'form' does. I n 
consequence, the number and nature of t h i s k i n d of 
o r g a n i z a t i o n i s not ' l a i d down' but w i l l vary from 
time t o time as p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s and t h e i r more 
immediate t h e o r e t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n demand. 
The most p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g o f the ' f i e l d s 
are those i n which the p r a c t i c a l knowledge i n c l u d e s 
d i s t i n c t moral elements: t h i s i s , i n f a c t , how moral 
knowledge i s subdivided, as opposed t o the s u b d i v i s i o n 
of the 'forms' i n t o i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i s c i p l i n e s . So we 
e s t a b l i s h the place of educational t h e o r y , amongst 
s i m i l a r t h e o r i e s w i t h moral components - and, i n so 
doing, help t o e x p l a i n the appearance i n the h i s t o r y 
of e d u cational theory o f works ranging from P l a t o ' s 
'Republic' t o P e t e r s 1 'Social P r i n c i p l e s ' , works 
which have an eq u a l l y l e g i t i m a t e place i n the h i s t o r y 
of p o l i t i c a l theory. For, as H i r s t says: ' P o l i t i c a l , 
l e g a l and educational theory are perhaps the c l e a r e s t 
examples o f f i e l d s where moral knowledge o f a d e v e l -
oped k i n d i s t o be found' ( 3 1 ) . 
H i r s t ' s summary of h i s r a t h e r neat e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l 
(31) H i r s t , P. H., op. c i t . , p. 131 
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c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s so c l e a r t h a t i t i s worth r e c o r d -
i n g before we hear a l a s t voice from the o p p o s i t i o n . 
He says: ' I n summary, then, i t i s suggested t h a t the 
forms of knowledge as we have them can be c l a s s i f i e d 
as f o l l o w s : ( I ) D i s t i n c t d i s c i p l i n e s or f'OEms of know-
ledge ( s u b d i v i s i b l e ) : mathematics, p h y s i c a l sciences, 
human sciences, h i s t o r y , r e l i g i o n , l i t e r a t u r e and the 
f i n e s.rts, philosophy. 
( I I ) F i e l d s of knowledge: t h e o r e t i c a l , 
p r a c t i c a l (these may or may not i n c l u d e elements of 
moral knowledge). 
I t i s the d i s t i n c t d i s c i p l i n e s t h a t b a s i c -
a l l y c o n s t i t u t e the range o f unique ways we have of 
understanding experience i f t o these i s added the c a t -
egory of moral knowledge' ( 3 2 ) . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o 
note the appearance, a t about the same time as t h i s 
u n h e s i t a n t c l a s s i f i c a t i o n , another e q u a l l y a n t i - p o s i t -
i v i s t i c , e q u a l l y ' l i b e r a l ' , e q u a l l y f i r m pronouncement 
of '...a p h i l o s o p h i c a l theory o f the c u r r i c u l u m f o r 
general education based on the idea o f l o g i c a l p a t t e r n s 
i n d i s c i p l i n e d understanding 1 (33) - and t o note how 
d i f f e r e n t i t i s J 
With t h i s summary i n mind, we can pay a l a s t v i s i t 
to Hardie, g i v i n g us the o p p o r t u n i t y to sample the 
'second phase 1 work o f one whose o r i g i n a l c o n t r i b u t -
i o n gave us a v a l u a b l e s t a r t i n g p o i n t . He can be found 
(32) I b i d . , p. 131 
(35) Phenix, P. H., Realms Of Meaning (New York, 
1964), p. x (Note the s i g n i f i c a n c e of Chapter 16 f o r 
Eason's comment on H i r s t - see p. 103, supra) 
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g i v i n g recent v o i c e t o ' p o s i t i v i s t i c 1 sentiments, as 
when he s t a t e s b l u n t l y : ' S c i e n t i f i c knowledge has come 
to dominate our way o f l i f e , not j u s t because o f i t s 
p r a c t i c a l and t h e o r e t i c a l successes but because i t i s 
i n f a c t coextensive w i t h the e n t i r e f i e l d of knowledge' 
( 3 4 ) . This a s s e r t i o n , o f as u n H i r s t i a n a k i n d as i t 
i s p o s s i b l e t o make, must make us judge Hardie t o be 
e i t h e r p l a i n i n c o n s i s t e n t o r f a s c i n a t i n g l y v a r i e d i n 
h i s views, f o r , on the l a s t occasion we used h i s w r i t -
i n g s , he appeared to be moving i n the d i r e c t i o n o f 
H i r s t : here, he i s i n step w i t h F e i g l . 
We w i l l take him as we f i n d him i n t h i s c o n t e x t , 
f o r i t i s a l i t t l e l a t e t o do any o t h e r : and some o f 
h i s own words, w h i l e they make i t hard t o get the whole 
o f h i s l o n g c o n t r i b u t i o n i n t o one focus, nevertheless 
are r e l e v a n t to the issue we are p r e s e n t l y d i s c u s s i n g . 
He sounds l i k e one of F e i g l ' s ' l o g i c a l e m p i r i c i s t s ' 
i n t h i s , f o r example: ' I f , as i s the case i n most of 
the problems i n t r a d i t i o n a l philosophy, we have no idea 
what the r e l e v a n t evidence would even be l i k e , then 
we must admit t h a t such problems are not meaningful 
ones. This c r i t e r i o n f o r the meaning-fulness of any 
question or problem, adopted by p r a c t i s i n g s c i e n t i s t s , 
must now be accepted f o r the whole o f knowledge' ( 3 5 ) . 
Again, he emphasises '...the knowledge of common-
sense... of mathematics...of the sciences' (36) i n prov-
(34) Hardie, C. D., 'The Philosophy Of Education I n 
A Uew Key' i n Park, J., Selected Readings I n The P h i l o s -
ophy Of Education (New York, 1963), p. 580 
(35) I b i d . , p. 583 
(36) I b i d . , p. 583 
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i d i n g the p h i l o s o p h i c a l underpinning f o r a suggested 
c u r r i c u l u m . His "brief excursions i n t o the phil o s o p h -
i e s of language, mathematics, science and h i s t o r y -
f o u r s u b j ects i n which, as he says, '...there are 
problems t h a t can be p r o f i t a b l y be c l a r i f i e d by mod-
ern p h i l o s o p h i c a l methods* (37) - show p l a i n l y how 
1 p o s i t i v i s t i c 1 h i s views are, i n s p i t e of h i s use o f 
the Ryleian term 'category mistakes' (38) and h i s 
c o n t e n t i o n t h a t ' i n each o f these f o u r spheres... re v -
o l u t i o n a r y changes have taken place i n the l a s t few 
decades' ( 3 9 ) . For he places H i s t o r y squarely amongst 
the s o c i a l sciences; and we have seen where the o t h e r 
side i n the debate (e.g., H i r s t ) puts i t . 
I f i t was only Hardie who was c u r r e n t l y arguing 
i n t h i s manner, we should n a t u r a l l y suspect t h a t the 
a l t e r n a t i v e p o s i t i o n to t h a t of the ' l i n g u i s t i c ' p h i l -
osophers was a weak one, not r e a l l y i n tune w i t h the 
s i x t i e s ; f o r we have already noted i,hat h i s h i s t o r i c -
a l importance probably exceeds h i s importance from 
a p h i l o s o p h i c a l p o i n t of view. But, as we have seen, 
he i s not alone i n remaining ' p o s i t i v i s t i c ' i n s p i t e 
of a n a l y t i c a l developments of more recent years, v/e 
have drawn a t t e n t i o n to F e i g l here and to O'Connor 
and others elsewhere, and i t would have been p o s s i b l e 
t o e s t a b l i s h the v i a b i l i t y of the more s c i e n t i f i c a l l y 
centred p o s i t i o n by scores of other samplings of the 
(37) I b i d . , p. 585 
(38) I b i d . , p. 586 
(39) I b i d . , p. 589 
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l i t e r a t u r e . 
For, as we have constantly asserted, the only f a i r 
judgment that can be made on the evidence which accum-
ulates from an enquiry such as t h i s one i s that the 
most recent philosophy i s not necessarily the most acc-
eptable, that ' l i n g u i s t i c ' analysis i s not obviously 
superior to ' p o s i t i v i s t i c ' analysis, that Wittgenstein 
p r o f e s s o r i a l second thoughts do not have to replace 
the f i r s t thoughts of his e a r l i e r years, that H i r s t ' s 
• o f f i c i a l 1 c l a r i f i c a t i o n i s not uncontroversially 
safe from damaging counter-attacks o r i g i n a t i n g i n the 
a n a l y t i c a l sector which he considers to be out of date 
And to such an attack we can now go, selecting an ass-
e r t i o n of H i r s t and seeing to what extent i t i s contra 
dieted by ' p o s i t i v i s t i c 1 views that s t i l l carry great 
weight i n the philosophical world. This w i l l involve 
reference to Nagel (as promised; see p. 188, supra), 
the s l i g h t 'deepening' of the argument i n t h i s l i m i t e d 
sector, with less d i r e c t reference to s p e c i f i c works 
than h i t h e r t o , and the provision of a p a r t i c u l a r ex-
ample of the 'issue' with which t h i s section has been 
concerned (as, indeed, was the l a s t - at the 'purer' 
l e v e l ) . 
The Nature Of History; One Example Of The C o n f l i c t 
On the one hand, H i r s t proclaims the autonomy of 
History and, on the other, Hardie (taken merely as a 
spokesman f o r the ' p o s i t i v i s t i c ' side) regards History 
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as a social science and, hence, part of Science. I t 
must be said that neither philosopher goes much f u r -
ther than proclamation. I n the case of H i r s t , there 
i s reference to the ' l i n g u i s t i c ' work of Dray (40), 
so presumably t h i s important work i s to be taken as 
read and as providing the detailed case which H i r s t 
has not space to give. As, however, we have tended 
to weight t h i s account on the ' l i n g u i s t i c ' side i n 
terms of the detailed reference to arguments, we can 
choose to present here the ' p o s i t i v i s t i c ' approach 
to the nature of History, leaving the view of the opp-
o s i t i o n to be i n f e r r e d from t h a t . 
The ' p o s i t i v i s t i c ' view of History cannot, i n f a c t , 
be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y described without reference to the 
more general thesis of the u n i t y of science which has 
been implied i n many of the comments we have reported 
and which, i t w i l l be remembered, Fe i g l refers to (see 
p. 262, supra). Clearly, i f t h i s thesis can be sub-
sta n t i a t e d , the 'forms of knowledge' view i s mistaken. 
I f , that i s , i t can be accepted that the whole range 
of i n s t i t u t i o n a l d i s c i p l i n e s - from physics through 
biology, psychology, the socdial sciences to h i s t o r y -
form one complex, interconnected tissue that cannot 
l o g i c a l l y be bisected or cut i n other ways, then the 
' l i n g u i s t i c ' case i s i n error. 
I n such an event, not only does the H i r s t claim 
f o r the autonomy of the human sciences and, p a r t i c u l -
(40) Dray, V/. , Laws And Explanation I n History 
(Oxford, 1957) 
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a r l y , f o r the uniqueness of History as a mode of under-
standing f a l l down, but, even more surely, his wider 
claim f o r the d i s t i n c t 'knowledge1 provided by r e l i g -
ion and the arts collapses; and t h i s w i l l a f f e c t any 
judgment made on Hirst ' s work w i t h i n 'educational 
theory 1, making an acceptance of the more s c i e n t i f i c -
a l l y - t u r n e d sympathies of such as O'Connor more l i k e l y . 
I n a sense, then, the nature of History i s a test case, 
the outcome of which i s important f o r deciding between 
the many t e n t a t i v e judgments that have to be made 
during an exploration l i k e t h i s . 
The 'unity of science', which, i f established, 
would decide the case i n favour of the ' p o s i t i v i s t i c ' 
p o s i t i o n , means something quite simple, p a r t i c u l a r l y 
i n comparison w i t h the complex c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s of a 
Hi r s t (or a Phenix - see p. 265, supra). I t denotes 
those features that a l l branches of knowledge have i n 
common - so i t i s claimed - i n spite of the recognized 
wide differences of methodology to be found i n the 
separate d i s c i p l i n e s . P a r t i c u l a r emphasis i s placed 
i n the philosophical contexts w i t h i n which t h i s thesis 
i s discussed on the l o g i c a l u n i t y which i s claimed 
to embrace the natural sciences and the humanities; 
hence the importance of History f o r t e s t i n g the claim. 
A p o s i t i v i s t would regard i t as f o o l i s h to deny 
undoubted differences between d i s c i p l i n e s or to ass-
ert the 'sameness1 of, say, physics and h i s t o r y w i t h -
out c a r e f u l l j r describing the l o g i c a l s i m i l a r i t y which 
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alone concerns him. Dist i n c t i o n s of subject matter 
and of methods between, f o r example, the sciences of 
meteorology, chemistry and botany are as acceptable 
to him as they are to H i r s t . What he would want to 
ask, however, i s why, i f these sub-disciplines can be 
classed together as 'natural science 1 (one of Hirst ' s 
forms of understanding), the process of establishing 
s i m i l a r i t i e s should cease at the p a r t i c u l a r points 
or boundaries indicated by a H i r s t (or anyone, l i k e 
Phenix, who cares to enter the epistemological arena). 
He would want to question the contrasts between, 
say, physics and psychology which H i r s t i d e n t i f i e s i n 
order to place them i n d i f f e r e n t logical: groups: f o r 
on what grounds are they judged to be more 'basic' 
than the undoubted contrasts between sciences which 
Hirst does c l a s s i f y together? H i r s t ' s argument i s 
carried on i n the most abstract terms - t a l k of d i f f -
erent modes of s t r u c t u r i n g experience, of d i f f e r e n t 
languages to be l e a r n t , etc. - which are as inconclus-
ive as they are undoubtedly persuasive. This w i l l 
become clear when we sample the contrasting rigour of 
Nagel. 
And i n coming to him we can make the general point 
that the 'unity of science' view i s often opposed by 
attempting to d i s t i n g u i s h the natural sciences and the 
humanities by t h e i r supposed c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as 'gen-
e r a l i z i n g ' and ' i n d i v i d u a l i z i n g ' d i s c i p l i n e s , respect-
i v e l y . Nagel describes t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n with care: 
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he refers to '...a widely accepted d i s t i n c t i o n between 
two allegedly d i f f e r e n t types of sciences: the nomo-
t h e t i c , which seek to establish abstract general laws 
f o r i n d e f i n i t e l y repeatable events and processes; and 
the ideographic, which aim to understand the unique 
and the non-recurrent. I t i s often maintained that 
the natural sciences and some of the so c i a l ones are 
nomothetic, whereas h i s t o r y ( i n the sense of an acc-
ount of human events, as d i s t i n c t from the events 
themselves) i s pre-eminently ideographic. I n con-
sequence, i t i s frequently claimed that the l o g i c a l 
structure of the concepts and explanations required 
i n human h i s t o r y i s fundamentally d i f f e r e n t from the 
l o g i c a l structure of concepts and explanations i n the 
natural (and other "generalizing") sciences' (41). 
Nagel affords t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n a painstaking and 
penetrating analysis, reaching the conclusion that 
h i s t o r i c a l explanations possess no absolutely unique 
l o g i c a l features and that the methodological problems 
i n t h i s area have t h e i r counterparts i n other branches 
of enquiry. This analysis i s detailed and d i f f i c u l t , 
and so must be passed over ( i n i t s o r i g i n a l form), 
j u s t as the Dray p o s i t i o n i s merely c i t e d by H i r s t . 
We can, f o r our purposes, but state that i t i s a piece 
of philosophising which takes Dray's ' l i n g u i s t i c ' views 
i n t o account and yet reaches ' p o s i t i v i s t i c ' conclus-
(41) Nagel, E., The Structure Of Science. Problems 
I n The Logic Of S c i e n t i f i c Explanation (London, 1961*77 
p. 548 
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ions that are very widely accepted amongst the i n t e r -
national philosophical community, before s u b s t i t u t i n g 
some simpler observations of our own. 
I n commenting on the alleged d i s t i n c t i o n , the pos-
i t i v i s t could proceed thus: f i r s t , he could ask f o r 
general agreement that the course of h i s t o r y , taken as 
a whole, i s a unique phenomenon; that i s , time flows, 
as i t were, i n one d i r e c t i o n and flows only once. 
Through time, the earth was formed and plant species 
evolved, creatures came i n t o existence and 'culminated' 
i n man whose t o t a l a c t i v i t i e s have taken place w i t h i n 
the 'stream 1. The whole of t h i s happening we know as 
one i n d i v i d u a l event, i n that i t has happened only 
once. So, to be consistent with the d e f i n i t i o n of 
History as the i n d i v i d u a l i z i n g d i s c i p l i n e , every i n -
ve s t i g a t i o n carried out w i t h i n the t o t a l i t y of t h i s 
happening should be regarded as History. 
Yet we do not, of course, so regard most of the 
investigations that men make. The normal procedure 
i s to single out c e r t a i n aspects of t h i s t o t a l complex 
phenomenon, aspects which are approximately repeated 
so that we can ignore the differences between one 
occasion and another, and to emphasise these, creating 
thus what i s meant by generalizing 'science'. A b r i e f 
look at meteorology makes t h i s clear. The weather i s 
a unique i n d i v i d u a l occurrence: i f we examine, say, 
temperature readings made over years at a p a r t i c u l a r 
place, we f i n d that no month i s exactly equal to the 
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'same' month of the previous year. Yet we have a 
generalizing science which describes t h i s phenomenon 
by s i n g l i n g out approximately s i m i l a r elements i n i t 
i n order to state general laws, such as that i t i s 
hot i n summer and cold i n winter at the place i n quest-
ion. 
Certainly t h i s example i s a simple one, but the 
l o g i c a l point i s v a l i d (according to the p o s i t i v i s t ) : 
what we are doing i n t h i s case i s acting s c i e n t i f i c a l l y , 
creating science, that i s , a r r i v i n g at the formulation 
of general laws by abstracting from the unique, i n d i v -
i d u a l , immediately given phenomena under i n v e s t i g a t i o n . 
We s i m p l i f y by neglecting the i n d i v i d u a l characteris-
t i c s of the separate occasions, by a r b i t r a r i l y c u t t i n g 
through most of the profusion of i n d i v i d u a l d e t a i l 
that a 'time-unfolded' ' r e a l i t y ' possesses to the 
common elements that science can t h e o r e t i c a l l y manip-
ulate . 
I n view of t h i s , the p o s i t i v i s t ' s fundamental 
question i s : do the humanities, or can the humanities 
adopt any other procedure? His answer i s that they 
do not and can not. There i s the one basic procedure. 
I f there were not - i f the a n t i - p o s i t i v i s t i c d i s t i n c t -
ion between 'generalizing' and ' i n d i v i d u a l i z i n g ' d i s -
c i p l i n e s were v a l i d i n the sense intended - then, to 
be consistent, such sciences as palaeontology and the 
theory of evolution would need to be classed as human-
i t i e s (being descriptive of aspects of the unique course 
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of events)and economics and l i n g u i s t i c s , f o r example, 
would need to be put with the natu r a l sciences. 
The economist, f o r instance, states the law orff 
diminishing returns, a general s c i e n t i f i c statement; 
but he must begin w i t h the observation of unique cases 
(there are no others), the i n d i v i d u a l differences of 
which he disregards i n order to achieve h i s s c i e n t i f i c 
objectives. The l i n g u i s t , too, states laws: he states 
laws, f o r example, governing the s h i f t of consonants 
with reference to the development of Romance languages 
from L a t i n . But t h i s was a unique h i s t o r i c a l event 
which took place once only and thus provides us with 
a 'closed' episode; so that the l i n g u i s t s procedure 
has to be that which i s said to be c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of 
the natural sciences - he examines separate events 
w i t h i n our records of the episode, and eliminates i n -
d i v i d u a l d e t a i l s i n order to generalize on the basis 
of the approximately repeated elements which he abstr-
acts. 
The inexorable p o s i t i v i s t i c conclusion i s that 
t h i s alleged c r i t e r i o n by means of which natural s c i -
ences and humanities are distinguishable - that the 
one generalizes by passing over i n d i v i d u a l v a r i a t i o n s 
while the other attends to what i s i n d i v i d u a l - i s i n -
v a l i d , at least w i t h reference to the d i s c i p l i n e s 
that can be thought of as 'intermediate' on the implied 
scale. Perhaps, though, i t works w i t h the 'extreme' 
cases; with t h e o r e t i c a l physics as the model of a 
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generalizing d i s c i p l i n e and History (say, pure chron-
i c l e ) as the model of an i n d i v i d u a l i z i n g d i s c i p l i n e . 
We can r e c a l l , with reference to t h i s conjecture, that 
while H i r s t i s i n no doubt about the autonomy of h i s t -
o r i c a l understanding, he i s more hesitant i n c l a s s i f -
ying the social sciences (see p. 262, supra). 
I n inspecting extremes, the p o s i t i v i s t would no 
doubt f r e e l y admit that there are sentences whose sub-
j e c t i s a single i n d i v i d u a l and whose predicate i s a 
unique action; and that there are, too, sentences that 
state something repeatable about a group of people or 
a ' p l u r a l ' subject. But sentences of both kinds are 
to be found i n both d i s c i p l i n e s , i n v a l i d a t i n g the 
suggested c r i t e r i o n f o r l o g i c a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the 
two enterprises. A sentence i s usually called 'gener-
a l ' because i t s content makes no reference to time 
and l o c a t i o n ; i s independent of them, being, as we 
have seen, a description of what i s abstracted from 
the i n f i n i t e l y varied flow of events. But such 'gen-
e r a l i t y ' i s r e l a t i v e and i s to be found i n the state-
ments of physics and History i n varying degrees. 
For instance, the physical statement that a l l bod-
ies f a l l equally f a s t i s a general statement. I t i s 
therefore, according to what we have said, a statement 
the content of which i s independent of time and l o c a t -
ion. But i s i t ? I t depends on what i s meant, i n t h i s 
case, by 'location'. The statement c l e a r l y r e f e r s to 
a l l bodies near to earth: i t may not r e f e r to bodies 
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elsewhere i n a vast universe ( j u s t as even more gen-
eral statements and established systems of statements 
w i t h i n physics which seem of 'universal' a p p l i c a t i o n 
may be replaced when found to be l i m i t e d - as with 
the work of Newton and E i n s t e i n ) . I t s generality i s 
r e l a t i v e , r e s t r i c t e d by l o c a t i o n . 
There i s thus no such t h i n g as an u n r e s t r i c t e d l y 
general statement. Physics c e r t a i n l y tends towards 
producing statements that are as general as possible, 
ones that cover as many cases as possible, but any 
conclusion covering a number of cases, be i t many, 
few or even one, i s , i n t h i s context, s t i l l a state-
ment of physics. So, 'individualized' sentences, 
which are supposed to characterize History,, are to 
be found i n other d i s c i p l i n e s , even physics. I n fact., 
the' d i s t i n c t i o n between 'generalizing' and ' i n d i v i d u a l -
i z i n g ' statements seems to be less appropriate than 
the notion of the r e l a t i v e l y general content of sta t e -
ments - a matter of degree rather than of kind. 
This i s confirmed (says the p o s i t i v i s t ) i f we look 
at History i n a new l i g h t . Most c e r t a i n l y ' i n d i v i d -
u a l ' statements are to be found there i n abundance; 
that i s , statements of the least possible generality, 
ones that are most dependent upon time and place. But 
they by no means form the whole content of h i s t o r i c a l 
w r i t i n g ; f o r even i n 'pure' chronicle the choice of 
what i s to be stated (and there must be choice) must 
be made on the basis of the w r i t e r ' s general conceptions 
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of a host of things that are the proper object of 
study of other d i s c i p l i n e s (psychology f o r one) and 
so must i m p l i c i t l y transmit c e r t a i n general p r o p s i t -
ions which are as much a part of the w r i t i n g as the 
words that a c t u a l l y appear. 
We can, at t h i s point where the 1 p o s i t i v i s t i c 1 
p o s i t i o n cries out f o r the kind of detailed advocator 
that only a Nagel i s capable of giving i t , t u r n to 
him f o r at least a couple of t y p i c a l paragraphs, be-
fore attempting to bring t h i s stage of the discussion 
to a close, knowing that we have here another example 
of the way i n which the 'bearing' we have been examin-
ing could at many points involve us i n an 'escalation' 
i n t o the f a r corners of philosophy. For i t must be 
said t h a t , had we substituted a simple account f o r 
Dray's p o s i t i o n instead of f o r Nagel*s, we should prob-
ably s t i l l f e e l the ' p u l l ' towards the o r i g i n a l sources 
which i s i t s e l f some i n d i r e c t evidence of the extent 
to which modern a n a l y t i c a l philosophy has become i n -
volved i n matters that are 'educational' i n a wide 
sense. 
Nagel says: 'Even a hasty inspection of t r e a t i s e s 
i n t h e o r e t i c a l science on the one hand...and of books 
on h i s t o r y on the other, sxiffices to reveal a s t r i k i n g 
difference between them. For by and large the state-
ments occurring i n the former are general i n form and 
contain few i f any references to specific objects, 
dates, or places, whereas the statements i n the l a t t e r 
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are almost without exception singular i n form and are 
rejblete w i t h proper names, designations f o r p a r t i c u l a r 
times or periods, and geographic s p e c i f i c a t i o n s . To 
t h i s extent, at any r a t e , the contrast between the 
natural and some social sciences...appears to be w e l l -
founded. I t would be a gross error, however, to con-
clude that singular statements play no rol e i n the 
t h e o r e t i c a l sciences or that h i s t o r i c a l i n q u i r y makes 
no use of universal ones. As previous chapters have 
repeatedly noted, no conclusions concerning the actual 
character of specif i c things and processes can be der-
ived from general statements alone; f o r theories and 
laws must be supplemented by i n i t i a l conditions( i . e . 
by statements singular or i n s t a n t i a l i n form) i f those 
general assumptions are to serve f o r explaining or pre-
d i c t i n g any p a r t i c u l a r occurrence...But neither can 
h i s t o r i c a l study dispense with at least a t a c i t acc-
eptance of general statements of the kind c i t e d i n 
t h e o r e t i c a l t r e a t i s e s . Thus, although the h i s t o r i a n 
may be concerned with the nonrecurrent and the unique, 
he must obviously select and abstract from the concr-
ete occurrences he i s engaged i n studying, and his 
discourse about what i s unquestionably i n d i v i d u a l 
requires the use of common names or general descript-
ive terms. Accordingly, the h i s t o r i a n ' s characteriz-
ations of i n d i v i d u a l things assume that there are var-
ious kinds of occurrences, and i n conseqvience that 
there are more or less determinate r e g u l a r i t i e s which 
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are associated w i t h each other and which d i f f e r e n t i -
ate one kind from other kinds' (42). 
Nagel 1s point about '...the use of common names 
or general descriptive terms' i s one which i s fundam-
ental to the ' p o s i t i v i s t i c 1 view of the nature of 
History, proceeding as i t does from a p a r t i c u l a r pos-
i t i o n on language. There i s implied a basic property 
of language i n i t s r e l a t i o n to ' r e a l i t y 1 : the descrip-
t i o n of an i n d i v i d u a l event must abstract from the 
uniqueness of that event by v i r t u e of being a descrip-
t i o n . Or, as the father of the American general sem-
antics movement, Korzybski, was never t i r e d of pro-
claiming: 'The word i s not the thing' (43). 
I n the act of using language the h i s t o r i a n must 
reduce the unique to a combination of repeatable elem-
ents which are, as i t were, 'stored' i n the words at 
h i s disposal. He thus proceeds i n an analogous manner 
to the physicist who, too, abstracts recurrent f e a t -
ures from the equally unique stream of na t u r a l events. 
To the p o s i t i v i s t , the l o g i c of the procedures i s the 
same, the physicist's abstraction and s i m p l i f i c a t i o n 
of ' r e a l i t y ' being merely more thorough, obvious and 
easy to achieve, and his d i r e c t i o n of i n t e r e s t d i f f e r -
ent from that of the h i s t o r i a n . One makes p r i m a r i l y 
general statements, leaving the inferences about i n -
d i v i d u a l cases to his readers; while the other uses 
(42) Nagel, E., op. c i t . , pp. 548-9 
(43) See Korzybski, A l f r e d , Science And Sanity, 
3rd ed. ( L a k e v i l l e , Conn., 1948) 
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general judgments i n selecting and formulating the 
i n d i v i d u a l sentences that tend to dominate his actual 
w r i t i n g s . 
Nagel refers to t h i s difference i n the d i r e c t i o n 
of i n t e r e s t and resultant c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s as '...an 
important assymetrjr' (44) between t h e o r e t i c a l science 
and History. The historian's task, usually taken to 
be the assertion of i n d i v i d u a l statements, rests on 
the assumption and use of general laws, even though 
the establishment of such laws i s no part of the h i s t -
orian's objectives. And t h i s conclusion of Nagel i s 
part of h i s ' p o s i t i v i s t i c ' answer, reached a f t e r very 
detailed discussion, to the question w i t h which we 
have been concerned i n t h i s very r e s t r i c t e d section 
(Though Nagel, of course, i s not d i r e c t l y answering 
our question): the question of the extent to which 
H i r s t ' s alleged differences between his 'sub-divisions 
of the 'forms of knowledge' are less r a d i c a l , i n a 
l o g i c a l sense, than the differences between the 'forms 
themselves. 
Nagel's p o s i t i o n i s clear: there are no r a d i c a l 
d i v i s i o n s I Or, as he puts i t analogically: 'The d i s t -
i n c t i o n between h i s t o r y and t h e o r e t i c a l science i s 
thus f a i r l y analogous to the difference between geol-
ogy and physics...A geologist seeks to ascertain, f o r 
example, the sequential order of geologic formations, 
(44) Nagel, E., op. c i t . , p. 550 
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and he i s able to do so i n part by applying various 
physical laws to his materials of study; but i t i s 
not the geologist's task, qua geologist, to establish 
the laws of mechanics or of radioactive d i s i n t e g r a t -
i o n which he employs i n his investigations' (45). 
To which we can add that the h i s t o r i a n , too, i s a 
s c i e n t i s t , on the ' p o s i t i v i s t i c ' l i s t of d i s c i p l i n e d 
enquirers: a very special kind of s c i e n t i s t , of course, 
but then, so are they a l l . I t i s the f a c t that there 
i s only the one l i s t f o r such philosophers which causes 
the c o n f l i c t reported i n t h i s chapter and assumed 
throughout t h i s whole account; f o r , as we well know, 
there are those l i k e H i r s t who have not one but many] 
So we leave the c o n f l i c t as i t appears at the three 
le v e l s described i n these l a s t three sections, noting 
t h a t i t started with epistemology and ended w i t h the 
philosophy of science; that i s , i t has ranged over an 
area which i s both fundamental and controversial amongst 
philosophical a c t i v i t i e s , no matter what labels are 
used to i d e n t i f y i t . For, as Hagel says: '...the 
term "philosophy of science" designates investigations 
continuous w i t h those that have been pursued f o r cen-
t u r i e s under such headings f o r t r a d i t i o n a l d i v i s i o n s 
of philsophy as..."theory of knowledge" ' (46). We 
must pass from the c o n f l i c t i t s e l f to the p o s s i b i l i t y 
of i t s r e s o l u t i o n ( i f there i s a p o s s i b i l i t y ) ; and, 
(45) I b i d . , p. 550 
(46) I b i d . , p. v i i 
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before t h a t , as a l a s t quick glance at the voluminous 
l i t e r a t u r e i n an account of i t that has grown weighty 
enough to make i t s e s s e n t i a l l y simple poi n t , to a men-
t i o n of other sectors i n which the same c o n f l i c t between 
the two a n a l y t i c a l approaches can be detected. 
The Resolution Of The Conflict? 
The philosophy of mind has received no special a t t -
ention; and one reason f o r t h i s has already been given 
(see p. 253, supra) - that i t i s i n e x t r i c a b l y linked 
w i t h the theory of knowledge i n the work of H i r s t 
which gave us our most recent entry i n t o a sector of 
the 'bearing'. To pursue i t f u r t h e r would be to enter 
a vast domain. I t would, f o r example, commit us to 
an examination of at least the Ryle whose w r i t i n g s 
have featured here and there i n the account as sources 
f o r more d i r e c t 'educational' w r i t i n g s . We can only 
note i n passing that Scheffler, i n selecting material 
f o r what he c a l l s h is 1...hypothesis about the kind 
of i n v e s t i g a t i o n philosophy of education might bec-
ome1 (47), overlooks neither t h i s area, nor t h i s p h i l -
osopher, and draws out from such work implications 
f o r educational t h i n k i n g which we cannot pursue more 
deeply without embarking upon a separate account. 
He emphasises both 'mind' and 'ordinary language' 
analysis i n commenting on .Ryle, bringing out the way 
(47) Scheffler, I . , Philosophy And Education (Bos-
ton, 1958), p. 10 
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i n which revolutionary insights i n t o the concept have 
been achieved by the use of ce r t a i n (to us now f a m i l -
i a r ) philosophical techniques; and i n d i c a t i n g how the 
whole procedure i s of great importance to educationists, 
because, as he says: 'Education, i t i s thus normally 
said, i s a matter of the imparting of t r u t h s , the 
transmission of knowledge, the enrichment of the mind 1 
(48) . We do not have to search f a r i n our own account 
to see whom Ryle's 'pure' philosophising has influe n c -
ed! We have seen i n the w r i t i n g s of H i r s t and Peters 
much that i s i n harmony with, f o r instance, t h i s comm-
ent: 
' . . . i n t e l l e c t u a l powers are the products of advanced 
schooling, of "didactic discourse", of higher educat-
ion which constitutes culture and which i s a condit-
ion of " a l l but the most p r i m i t i v e occupations and 
in t e r e s t s " . I n view of the predominant e f f o r t , by 
philosophers and researchers a l i k e , to cast l i g h t on 
educational processes by applying to them theories of 
the mind, Ryle's d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposite attempt, to 
construe the i n t e l l e c t i n terms ofNschooling, has con-
siderable significance and may appear to many to have 
the advantage of b u i l d i n g upon a more concrete base 1 
(49) . 
We are here presented neatly with one basis i n 
'pure' philosophy f o r Hir s t ' s t a l k of 'harmony' between 
(48) I b i d . , p. 89 
(49) I b i d . , p. 91 
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the concepts of 'mind' and 1 knowledge', which features 
prominently i n his epistemological a r t i c l e . And we 
have a basis, too, f o r his contention that the know-
ledge out of which mind i s "built ('...construe the 
i n t e l l e c t i n terms of schooling') '...must be l e a r n t 
from a master on the job' (50-)-, a contention with 
which the major emphasis i n the work of Peters i s i n 
f u l l agreement - f o r 'education as i n i t i a t i o n ' can be 
taken as a most appropriate slogan f o r developments 
i n educational t h i n k i n g that have the mark of Ryle 
a l l over fhem. 
I t . would, them, be both i n t e r e s t i n g and i n s t r u c t -
ive to journey through the neighbouring kingdom of 
'mind', p a r t i c u l a r l y those parts of i t so w e l l charted 
by Ryle. But t h i s i s not possible now. A t t e n t i o n can 
be drawn to the detailed and d i r e c t examination o£ a 
s p e c i f i c aspect of his work - the penetrating d i s t i n c t -
ion between "knowing that" and "knowing how" - given 
i n a recent book of American essays (51). This would 
(and at one time did) make an entry f o r us i n t o an 
e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t ' l e v e l ' of the 'bearing' i n quest-
ion, the l e v e l of analysis i n action with reference 
to s p e c i f i c concepts and r e s t r i c t e d problems. For 
our own account has been pitched more at a 'second 
order' l e v e l , concerned p r i m a r i l y with discussing 
what analysis i s about as t h i s reveals i t s e l f i n the 
(50) H i r s t , P. H., op. c i t . (see p. 254, supra), p.1 
(51) Smith, B. 0. and Ennis, R. H., Language And 
Concepts I n Education (Chicago, 1961). A l l 13 of the 
papers, and not j u s t the 'Ryle' c r i t i q u e by Roland, are 
important examples of analysis i n a c t i o n . 
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l i t e r a t u r e . 
At what might be called the 'working' l e v e l , at 
which the c o n f l i c t s and controversies that we have i d -
e n t i f i e d are not evident ( a n a l y t i c a l t ools being taken 
f o r granted i n order to get on with the job) there i s 
a mass of a c t i v i t y which could be explored w i t h i n the 
terms of our assignment. To mention mere obvious f r a g -
ments: Peters, w i t h a f i r m foot i n each of the psych-
o l o g i c a l and philosophical camps, has c r i t i c i z e d i n 
a number of places the concept of 'mental health' which 
i s often set up as an educational aim. This has e l i c -
i t e d a n a l y t i c a l responses of the type that would prov-
ide us wi t h material for a survey many times the length 
of t h i s which we are bringing to a close; p a r t i c u l a r l y 
such examples as are appearing i n the s p e c i a l i s t Amer-
ican journal to which we have made some reference dur-
ing our survey and with which the developments we have 
been charting come of age. (52). 
I n another d i r e c t i o n , we could point without hes-
i t a t i o n to the importance, at t h i s 'working' l e v e l 
of uninhibited a n a l y t i c a l a c t i v i t y , of philosophising 
about s p e c i f i c concepts such as 'learning' and 'adjust-
ment' ( and a hundred others) to be found i n mimeo-
graphed form wherever philosophers of the persuasions 
and new i n t e r e s t s that we have been describing are to 
be found gathered together, eager to contribute to and 
(52) See, for example, Peters, R. S., ' "Mental 
Health" As An Educational Aim', Studies I n Philosophy 
And Education, V o l . I l l pp. 185-200, Spring 1964;"and 
response by McClure, G., 'Growth As An Educational Aim: 
Reply To R.S.Peters', Studies V o l . I l l , pp.259-270, F a l l , 
1964 
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to learn from the corporate and enthusiastic enter-
prise. A l l t h i s could be brought w i t h i n our terms of 
reference, had we decided upon an a l t e r n a t i v e (out of 
the many available - a point that we have t r i e d to stress) 
mode of exploring the l i t e r a t u r e which was closer to 
the educational problems w i t h i n our broad area than 
to the philosophical problems on which we have con-
centrated. As i t i s , we must merely mention such pen-
e t r a t i n g and c u r r e n t l y relevant analyses ofmthe form 
j u s t described as those by Komisar and Macmillan (53) 
- an almost random dipping i n t o an ever-broadening 
stream of 'concept' l i t e r a t u r e . 
However, the termination of a survey should not 
consist solely of an apology f o r what i t does not con-
t a i n . I t should, rather, attempt to draw some sort of 
conclusions about the material that has been examined. 
I n p a r t i c u l a r , w i t h reference to the major presuppos-
i t i o n of our own account and especially i n view of the 
t i t l e of t h i s l a s t chapter (and the question at the 
head of t h i s section).we should make some comment on 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of a res o l u t i o n of the ' c o n f l i c t ' 
that has occupied so much of our time. This was prom-
ised at the outset (see pp. 7-8, supra). 
But, i n view of t h i s promise, we must be careful 
to d i s t i n g u i s h the ending of a c o n f l i c t w i t h the actual 
f i n d i n g of a s o l u t i o n from the suggestions that can be 
(53) Komisar, B. p., 'More On The Concept Of learning' 
and Macmillan, C. J. B., 'The Concept Of Adjustment: An 
Analysis' - mimeographed booklets used i n Temple Univ-
e r s i t y Education courses (copies i n the possession of 
the present w r i t e r ) . 
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made as to the d i r e c t i o n i n which a s o l u t i o n might 
l i e . The former eventuality would, c l e a r l y , be the 
i n t e l l e c t u a l feat of the century ( i f not of a l l time), 
f o r the c o n f l i c t i n question i s that between p h i l o s -
ophers; and to a r b i t r a t e philosophical disputes such 
as are found amongst the 'big names' whose w r i t i n g s 
have occupied us i s a job that awaits one of them -
when one has reached the stature to accomplish i t . 
A l l that can be suggested i s that our own survey of 
the f i e l d leaves a very strong impression that there 
exist differences of emphasis that 'must' surely (?) 
be complementary; that must represent aspects of the 
t r u t h as t h i s w i l l come to be seen at some fut u r e 
time; that are, i n t h e i r own ways, enthusiastic but 
nonetheless t e n t a t i v e approaches to some philosophical 
'Golden Mean'. 
The c o n f l i c t i n a n a l y t i c a l philosophy (and, hence, 
i n i t s 'bearing' on education) i s - because i t i s 
a n a l y t i c a l philosophy - a c o n f l i c t 'about' language. 
I s , then, the work of the only philosopher to have 
consciously attempted to describe and account f o r a l l 
the dimensions of language not relevant to i t s r e s o l -
ution? We must hesitate before asserting i t s relevance, 
i f only on the grounds that his work (the work of C. 
W.Morris: see p. 8, supra) i s r a r e l y mentioned by either 
'side' i n the dispute we claimant to see and the c i t i n g 
of i t may w e l l bring no more than a t o l e r a n t smile to 
the face of any philosopher of the non- 1 s c i e n t i f i c ' 
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'ordinary language' kind. 
Yet we can be encouraged to put out t h i s suggest-
ion - that Morris's three dimensions of language study 
contain the germ of a s o l u t i o n f o r a n a l y t i c a l c o n f l i c t 
- by the recent appearance of two philosophical comm-
ents i n two e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t contexts, both of which 
demonstrate that the framework which he provides i s 
f i r m enough to bear the str a i n s generated by p a r t i a l 
a n a l y t i c a l i n t e r e s t s of a kind that we have repeated-
l y noted i n 'educational' discourse and i t s immediate 
'pure' philosophical sources. Mention of these two 
views i s a l l that we can now allow ourselves; f o r an 
i n t e g r a t i o n of them i n order to apply them to our 
context would be (and perhaps w i l l be) a mighty task 
indeed, f o r which the present survey work could act 
as prologue. 
The f i r s t i s i n the context of theology, become, 
as we have ourselves noted, language conscious with 
the consequent appearance of c o n f l i c t i n g viewpoints 
such as we have had to contend with i n educational 
discourse. Ferre, drawing on the work of Morris, has 
attempted, as he puts i t , to '...place the controversy 
over theological discourse w i t h i n a wider understand-
ing of l i n g u i s t i c s i g n i f i c a t i o n 1 (54). His disent-
anglement of the 'manifold l o g i c ' to be found i n the 
various philosophical contributions recently made by 
a n a l y t i c a l l y orientated thinkers to theoxlogical d i s -
(54) Ferre, F., Language, Logic And God (London, 
1962), p. 146. The chapter w i t h implications f o r 
our i n t e r e s t s i s Chapter 12. 
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course i s l u c i d , convincing and of a s i m p l i c i t y that 
betokens the presence of a valuable i n s i g h t : come to 
foll o w i n g the inconclusive wanderings of an account 
such as our own i t "feels" r i g h t , as the kind of s o l -
u t i o n to the problems that have emerged i n t h i s enquiry. 
The second p o t e n t i a l l y relevant use of the Morris 
structure f o r language i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s to be found 
i n a l i t t l e - k n o w n American journal devoted broadly 
to 'semantics 1, the kind of peripheral philosophical 
pu b l i c a t i o n i n which 'large' ideas that would f i n d 
d i f f i c u l t y i n taking root i n more orthodox c i r c l e s 
(because, perhaps, of the too-firm allegiances that 
we have been forced to notice i n our subject matter) 
can be propounded. This i s not to imply that t h i s 
c o n t r i b u t i o n i s at a l l philosophically 'cranky', f a r , 
as we have noted, i t i s one which i s very s i m i l a r to 
that of Ferre", now become a standard work i n the p h i l -
osophy of r e l i g i o n . And i t s author i s , i n f a c t , a 
professor i n educational philosophy (though t h i s i s 
mentioned as a cre d e n t i a l : education does not come irofco 
the a r t i c l e at a l l ) . 
Dettering enquires i n t o the prospect f o r semiotic 
u n i t y , ranging wide over the d i s c i p l i n e s that have a 
current i n t e r e s t i n language, moving r a p i d l y from one 
to another while remaining 'on course' with the Morris 
'dimensions' as a s t a b i l i z i n g device. From our point 
of view, his conclusion i s a fascinating one; f o r he 
reaches a f i n a l point at which his references to the 
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conclusions of the l a t e r Y/ittgenstein s t r i k e f a m i l i a r 
chords yet i n a sense set up a minor cacophony. He 
sounds so l i k e a spokesman f o r what we have called 
the ' l i n g u i s t i c ' view and yet does so with the confid-
ence of one who has ainpreciated and absorbed i n t o an 
architectonic p o s i t i o n that which we have called the 
• p o s i t i v i s t i c * view, that we can only wonder what a 
detailed examination of t h i s a r t i c l e with reference 
to our own accumulated material might produce. 
He i s worth quoting - as a substitute for any major 
conclusions of our own and as a j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r our 
s t a t i n g that there might yet come a re s o l u t i o n of our 
' c o n f l i c t ' along the l i n e s that we have barely suggested, 
and that i t might w e l l be that Bettering i s the p h i l -
osopher to achieve i t : at least as f a r as educational 
theory i s concerned. Af t e r a l l , i t i s , as we have 
said, an educational philosopher who writes t h i s : 
'The hope of a new' r a t i o n a l empire l i e s before us. I f 
anyone questions t h i s hope, l e t him then consider any 
fac t of the external world or any known behavior of 
an organism . Could such a"fact" or "behavior", wheMier 
i t be the discovery of America, or the sun having 
ri s e n t h i s morning,...possibly be notarized merely 
by observation of some l i g h t and sound, or by the 
hearsay of people or the d u l l s c r i p t of text-books? 
Or i s not our strong conviction about the t r u t h 
i n such matters founded on the t o t a l conspiracy of 
our experience - including the co l l u s i o n between our 
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"language game" and the empirical data which force ± 
themselves upon us? Would even most of our own acts 
make much sense without those same language rules?... 
These "language games", as Wittgenstein called them, 
perhaps create our greatest human dilemma. .Those who 
think they have avoided them by f i n d i n g some "pure 
r e a l i t y " ...have simply been caught more i n e x t r i c a b l y 
i n some more engulfing, subterranean language which 
they mistake f o r p r i s t i n e being. Naturally, f u r t h e r 
i n q u i r y i s needed i n t o these vast and c i r c u l a r r e l -
ationships, but f o r the moment i t would seem that any 
such i n q u i r e r could only eschew the "game" by invent-
ing a new one of his own. The f r o n t i e r s opened by 
such new games may wel l be worth the e f f o r t of con-
ceiving and playing them, however. They might keep 
the human i n t e l l e c t quick and a l i v e f o r another cen-
t u r y or so' (55). 
And f o l l o w i n g the cues i n such a passage might 
keep t h i s account a l i v e f o r another century or so.' 
We must leave i t , and w i t h i t any pretensions to be 
able to o f f e r conclusions other than those t e n t a t i v e -
l y reached during the exploration - w i t h one exception. 
I t i s t h i s : coming to know a l i t e r a t u r e i s an e x c i t i n g 
i n t e l l e c t u a l adventure. I t can be recommended to the 
growing number of educationists whose work now involves 
them i n the act of philosophising. Perhaps i t should 
(55) Dettering, R. W., 'The Prospect For Semiotic 
U n i t y 1 , Etc.: A Review Of General Semantics, Vol. XXI 
No. 1,(pp- 39-71), pp. 68 and 71 
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be prescribed, f o r much that i s being w r i t t e n (thou^gh 
not, of course, that which we have examined) displays 
,an alarming ignorance that such a study would r e c t i f y 
- an ignorance of the short but r i c h l y varied h i s t o r y 
that these l i v e l y philosophical a c t i v i t i e s have behind 
them, a h i s t o r y that we have entered- i n j u s t one simple 
way. Maybe t h i s thought i s a halfconscious echo of 
that Peters theme: one comes to know the 'language' 
only through the ' l i t e r a t u r e ' ! Certainly one at least 
gets to know the l i t e r a t u r e , and having 'heard great 
Argument About i t and about' w i t h i n that store, one 
feels (or hopes) that there i s a separate e x i t f o r 
those who are the wiser f o r i t . 
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